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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Téwodros W. Workneh 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
School of Journalism and Communication 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: The Politics of Telecommunications and Development in Ethiopia 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore salient issues in the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector. In doing so, the research investigated the institutional history 
and origins of state-monopoly of telecommunications in Ethiopia from the first 
ministerial level communications-related institution, the Ministry of Posts, Telegraph and 
Telephone, to Ethio-Telecom presently. Using a theoretical framework informed by 
political economy of communications, development studies and political science, the 
study explored the foundations, rationales and implications of contesting ideologies in the 
Ethiopian telecommunications sector involving the Ethiopian state and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The study also explored the extent to which, and why, the 
Ethiopian public endorses/denounces state monopoly of the telecommunications sector. It 
also investigated the premises on which Sino-Ethiopian partnerships in the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector are laid. 
A triangulated, multi-method research approach involving document analysis, 
online survey and semi-structured interviewing was employed in this study. World Bank 
documents and other secondary resources were analyzed to chronicle the institutional 
history of telecommunications in Ethiopia. IMF reports and Ethiopian People’s 
 v 
 
Revolutionary Democratic Front economic programs and political manifestos were 
carefully examined to address contesting liberalization discourses pertinent to the 
Ethiopian telecommunications sector. An online survey was administered to collect 
public opinion about, among other things, state monopoly of telecommunications in 
Ethiopia. Ethiopian government officials, IMF country representatives, Ethio-Telecom 
consultants and other important figures were interviewed to explore the pros and cons of 
Sino-Ethiopian relations in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector as well. 
The study revealed that a host of different factors, most notably the rise of China 
as an alternative global economic power, have shifted Ethiopia’s preference of global 
development partnership from West to East including in telecommunications 
infrastructure development. Growing concerns over state monopoly of 
telecommunications were reported by users, particularly in relation to lack of quality of 
services and fear of surveillance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR:  Téwodros W. Workneh 
 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
 Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
 Dilla University, Dilla, Ethiopia 
 
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 
 Doctor of Philosophy, Communication and Society, 2014, University of Oregon 
 Master of Arts, Journalism & Communication, 2007, Addis Ababa University 
 Bachelor of Education, English, 2004, Dilla University  
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 Media Globalization 
 Development Communication 
Political Economy of Communication 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
Graduate Teaching Fellow, School of Journalism and Communication, University 
of Oregon, 2009-2013 
 
Graduate Teaching Fellow, Department of International Studies, University of 
Oregon, 2013-2014 
 
Lecturer, Department of English Language and Literature, Arba Minch 
University, 2007-2009 
 
Department Head, Department of English Language and Literature, Arba Minch 
University, 2004-2005 
 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
 
Columbia Scholarship, School of Journalism & Communication, University of 
Oregon, 2009-2013 
 vii 
 
Kappa Tau Alpha, School of Journalism & Communication, University of 
Oregon, 2012 
 
Glenn Starlin Fellowship in Telecommunications, School of Journalism and 
Communication, University of Oregon, 2011 
 
Gary E. Smith Summer Professional Development Award, Graduate School, 
University of Oregon, 2010 
 
Promising Scholar Award, Graduate School, University of Oregon, 2009 
 
Outstanding Masters Graduate, School of Journalism and Communication, Addis 
Ababa University, 2007 
 
Save the Children Thesis Award, School of Journalism and Communication, 
Addis Ababa University and Save the Children Denmark, 2006 
 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS: 
 
Workneh, Tewodros W (2011). War journalism or peace journalism? A case study of 
U.S. and British newspapers coverage of the Somali conflict. Global Media 
Journal, Mediterranean Edition, 6(1), 40-52. 
 
Workneh, Tewodros W (2008). Disney kids: A study on the reception of a global media 
mogul by Ethiopian children. The International Clearinghouse on Youth, 
Children and Media Yearbook, 83-97. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to record my profound appreciation to my advisor and committee chair, Dr. 
H. Leslie Steeves, who has supported me profusely over the past five years. Her inspiring 
academic mentorship was only matched by the kindness and generosity she extended to 
my family and me. Thanks are also due to my other committee members: Dr. Gabriela 
Martínez, Dr. Biswarup Sen, Dr. Janet Wasko and Dr. Stephen Wooten. Your works have 
influenced my academic trajectory tremendously. I am grateful for all the conversations 
we shared and the feedback you gave me. 
I am grateful to Mary Erickson and Benjamin Birkinbine who edited parts of my 
final draft. I am also thankful to all faculty and staff at the School of Journalism and 
Communication, University of Oregon, who have helped me along the way in many 
different ways. 
I am indebted to all my interviewees and survey participants who kindly gave me 
their valuable time.   
I would also like to thank Bemnet Alemayehu, Hiwot Kassahun, Ridwan Berihu, 
Betelehem Teshome, Endalkachew Hailemichael, Fitsum Mekonnen and Hiwot Amare 
for their friendship and support. My thanks also go to the Kirtner-Goldenberg family, 
Chris and Shauna Stadler, Ryan and Lori Moore, Senyo and Bernice Ofori-Parku, Dan 
Reece and many other friends in Eugene for their varied support throughout the writing 
process of this dissertation. 
I am eternally indebted to Jeff Goldenberg and Naomi Kirtner for their 
unconditional support and generosity. Your graciousness and compassion even at your 
 ix 
 
most difficult times always helped me to put life in perspective. Every minute I spent 
with you had been an education in love and kindness. Thank you. 
My enduring gratitude and appreciation goes to my wife Naami Belihu Ketema, 
who accompanied me throughout the ups and downs of this journey. I do not know how I 
can ever compensate your selfless love, support and patience in spite of your own 
demanding conditions. I love you, my hobbit. 
And to my Neshama, my sunshine, who came to this world at the middle of this 
dissertation project. In spite of all the sleepless nights you caused, the very thought of 
you annulled my circumstances and made me count my blessings. You made me braver 
and stronger.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Abayé, who taught me what school couldn’t. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................  1 
 IMF, the Ethiopian State and the Chinese Alternative .........................................  4 
 Rationale to the Research and Research Questions ..............................................  9 
 
 Significance of the Study ......................................................................................  14 
Overview ...............................................................................................................  19 
II. A CONTEXTUAL SURVEY OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC  
OF ETHIOPIA .......................................................................................................  22 
 
 Ethiopian Geography, Demographics and Economy ............................................  22 
 The Constitutional Framework of the FDRE ........................................................  26 
 
 The Historical Evolution of the Ethiopian State ...................................................  28 
 Unification, Independence, and Modernization ..............................................  33 
 The Rise of Teferi: From Reformation to Absolutism ....................................  38 
 International Relations, Modernization and the Proliferation of Global  
Capitalism .......................................................................................................  40 
 
 Feudal Aristocracy and the Rise of Neopatrimonial Governance ..................  42 
Revolts, Coups, and Revolution: the Decadence and Decline of Haylä  
S!llasé  .............................................................................................................     44 
 
Military Rule, Socialism and Command Economy ........................................  47 
Ethiopia since EPRDF ..........................................................................................  53 
EPRDF and the Rise Ethno-nationalism .........................................................  53 
The Politics and Economy of Abiyotawi Dimokrasi .......................................  59 
 Conclusion ............................................................................................................  64 
 xii 
 
Chapter Page 
 
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW ..................  65 
 
 Modernization Theory ..........................................................................................  66 
 Modernization as a Dominant Paradigm .........................................................  66 
 Development Communication and Modernity ................................................  67 
 Debacle, Criticism, and Consequences ...........................................................  68 
 
The Hegemony of the Global Neo-liberal Order ..................................................  70 
The Washington Consensus ............................................................................     70 
 
Tenets of Neo-liberal Economics ....................................................................  71 
Dependency, Debt and Structural Adjustments: Neo-liberal Prints in  
Africa ..............................................................................................................  73 
 
IMF and the World Bank: The Institutional Couriers of Global Neo- 
liberalism .........................................................................................................  74 
 
The Theory of the Developmental State ...............................................................  76 
The Developmental State Experiment in Africa .............................................  82 
The Theory of the Neopatrimonial State ..............................................................  85 
The Weberian roots of Neopatrimonialism .....................................................  85 
The Postcolonial African State as a Neopatrimonial State .............................  89 
Regulatory vs. Predatory Neopatrimonialism .................................................  92 
Approaching Global Neo-liberalism through Critical Political Economy ............  94 
What Is Political Economy? ............................................................................  94 
Approaches in Political Economy of Communication ....................................  96 
Related Literature and Research Questions ..........................................................  100 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................  102 
 xiii 
 
Chapter Page 
 
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .........................................................................  104 
 
 Human Subjects Research and the Institutional Review Board ............................  105 
Methodology .........................................................................................................  105 
 Philosophical Underpinnings in Quantitative and Qualitative Research ........  105 
 Quantitative Research .........................................................................  106 
 
Qualitative Research ...........................................................................  108 
The Idea of and Argument for Triangulation ......................................   111 
 
Data Collection Methods ......................................................................................  113 
The Online Survey ..........................................................................................  114 
 
Background .........................................................................................  114 
 
The Questionnaire Design ...................................................................  117 
Sampling .............................................................................................  120 
Participants’ Profile and Demographics .............................................  123 
Questionnaire Administration .............................................................  126 
Data Collection and Analysis ..............................................................  127 
Document Analysis .........................................................................................  127 
Background .........................................................................................  127 
Sampling .............................................................................................  130 
Data Analysis ......................................................................................  135 
Semi-structured Interviews .............................................................................  136 
Background .........................................................................................  136 
Sampling and Recruitment of Individual Interviewees ......................  140 
 xiv 
 
Chapter Page 
 
The Interview Guides ..........................................................................  141 
Analyzing and Reporting the Interview Results .................................  142 
Validity and Reliability .........................................................................................  143 
Limitations ............................................................................................................  144 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................  145 
V. HISTORICIZING TELECOMMUNICATIOS IN ETHIOPIA .............................  147 
 
 The Formative Years (1894-1935) ........................................................................  148 
Occupation & Resistance: The Erratic Years (1936-1942) ..................................  155 
Postwar Restoration and Restructuring (1941-1957) ............................................  157 
The IBRD and IDA Years (1958-1992) ................................................................  162 
Consolidation of a State Monopoly and the Localization of Financing  
(1992-2009) ...........................................................................................................   182 
 
Rebranding, Outsourcing and the Chinese Influx (2010-Present) ........................  189 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................  194 
VI. DISCONTENT, DISSONANCE AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE  
ETHIOPIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR .......................................  195 
 
 The Service Woes of Ethio-Telecom ....................................................................  196 
Internet Governance Policy Framework in Ethiopia ............................................  201 
Surveillance, Censorship and Content Filtering in the Ethiopian Online  
Sphere ...................................................................................................................   205 
Public Perceptions vs. State Policy .......................................................................  216 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................   218 
 
 
 
 xv 
 
 
Chapter Page 
 
 
VII. ACTORS AND DISPARITIES IN (DE)REGULATION DISCOURSES OF          
THE ETHIOPIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR ................................  219 
 
 Putting the Tense IMF-Ethiopia Relationship into Context .................................  221 
IMF’s Deregulation Logic for the Ethiopian Telecommunications Sector ..........  230 
The Domestic Push for Telecom Liberalization ...................................................  234 
EPRDF’s Defense .................................................................................................  240 
Telecommunications as Universal Service .....................................................   240 
Telecommunications as a “Cash Cow” ...........................................................   244 
An “Unready” Local Private Sector ................................................................   245 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................   248 
 
VIII. CHINESE MULTINATIONALS IN THE ETHIOPIAN  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR ............................................................  250 
 
 Tenets in Sino-African Partnerships .....................................................................  253 
No Oil, No Problem: Making Sense of Ethio-Chinese Relations .........................  259 
Chinese Multinationals in the Ethiopian Telecommunications Sector .................  264 
Salient Issues in the Proliferation of Chinese Multinationals into the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Sector: Assessing Advantages & Drawbacks .....................  267 
 
Vendor Financing Schemes and Chinese Malleability ...................................   267 
Chinese Multinationals and Surveillance ........................................................   280 
 Conclusion ............................................................................................................  287 
IX. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  288 
 Major Findings ......................................................................................................  289 
 Future Research Directions ...................................................................................  296 
 xvi 
 
Chapter Page 
 
 
 Concluding Remarks .............................................................................................  297 
 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................  299 
A. ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................  299 
B. ONLINE SURVEY CONSENT FORM (ENGLISH) .....................................  304 
 C. ONLINE SURVEY CONSENT FORM (AMHARIC) ....................................  306 
 
 D. ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH) .....................................................  308 
E. ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE (AMHARIC) ...................................................  320 
 F. ONLINE SURVEY INVITATION MESSAGE ..............................................  329 
 
 G. INTEVIEW CONSENT LETTER ...................................................................  330 
H. INTERVIEW GUIDE ......................................................................................  332  
 I. WORLD BANK OPEN DATA ACCESS E-MAIL GUIDE ............................  335 
 J. TRANSLATED EXCERPTS USED IN THE ANALYSIS ..............................  337 
REFERENCES CITED ...............................................................................................  340 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xvii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure Page 
 
 
1. Political map of FDRE ..........................................................................................  23 
 
2. Participants’ orientation toward government’s political direction. .......................  125 
 
3. Participants’ orientation toward government’s economic policy .........................  125 
4. First urban and interurban telephone and telegraph connections ..........................  152 
5. Telephone subscription statistics 1955-1964 ........................................................  166 
6. Imperial Board of Telecommunications of Ethiopia organizational chart at  
1968 .......................................................................................................................  169 
 
7. Interurban and international carrier circuits at the end of 1967 ............................  170 
8. Main open wire lines at the end of 1967 ...............................................................  171 
9. Imperial Board of Telecommunications of Ethiopia organizational chart at  
1972 .......................................................................................................................  174 
10. Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation organizational chart .......................  180 
11. Institutional setting of ETC ...................................................................................  186 
12. ETC organizational chart as of May 2006 ............................................................  189 
13. Organizational chart of Ethio-Telecom ................................................................  193 
14. Public attitude toward Ethio-Telecom ..................................................................  198 
15. Profile picture of the Facebook group “ETC Sucks” ............................................  200 
16. Comparative public rating of Ethio-Telecom to other state-owned enterprises ...  201 
17. Major challenges facing the Internet in Ethiopia ..................................................  206 
18. General attitude toward the effects of Internet .....................................................  208 
19. Public perception toward the existence of Internet monitoring ............................  210 
 
 xviii 
 
Figure Page 
 
20. Public perception on potential Internet monitoring bodies ...................................  211 
21. Public attitude toward online surveillance ............................................................  212 
22. Public attitude on government trust ......................................................................  213 
23. Trends in Internet self-censorship .........................................................................  213 
24. Risks associated with posting critical material on the government ......................  214 
25. Experiences in circumvention tools for accessing blocked content ......................  214 
26. Public perception toward information access/filtration on the Internet ................  215 
27. Public perception toward access and usage of Internet as a right .........................  215 
28. Public perception toward national filtering of online content ..............................  216 
29. Public perception in favor of/against national filtering of Internet in select  
categories ..............................................................................................................  216 
30. Public attitudes on the liberalization of the telecommunications sector ...............  217 
31. Major FDRE foreign currency inflow-outflow .....................................................  271 
 xix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table Page 
 
 
1. Major population size statistics of Ethiopia (1994-2013) .....................................  25 
 
2. Administrative divisions and official population estimates of FDRE at July  
2013 .......................................................................................................................  25 
 
3. Gender distribution of participants .......................................................................  123 
4. Age distribution of participants ............................................................................  123 
5. Participants’ place of residence ............................................................................  123 
6. Participants’ monthly income distribution ............................................................  124 
7. Participants’ educational level ..............................................................................  124 
8. Participants’ employment status ...........................................................................  125 
9. Participants’ marital status ....................................................................................  125 
10. Summary of research questions, corresponding analysis chapters and methods ..  146 
11. Sixth telecommunications project goals and results .............................................  181 
12. Summary of all telecommunication expansion projects until 1993 ......................  181 
13. Regional distribution of landline and mobile phones ...........................................  187 
14. Ethio-Telecom capacity targets 2009-2015 ..........................................................  190 
15. Ethiopian telecommunications sector subscription and density statistics .............  191 
 
 
! 1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, the telecommunications sector in many countries has 
been expanding rapidly. The fast-paced growth of telecommunications services can be 
explained by a number of factors, such as advancements in telecommunications 
technology, market liberalization, and privatization (Donner, 2006). The output of the 
world’s economy has also been growing at a faster rate during the period. In particular, 
many developing countries and transition economies have experienced rapid growth. It 
has been widely recognized that advancement in telecommunications technology is one 
of the driving forces of globalization and the rapid growth of the world’s economy 
(Martínez, 2008; Meso et al., 2005).  
Telecommunications today is a sector that involves technologies far more than the 
traditional domestic and long-distance telephone services. A few examples of what 
constitutes telecommunications presently include Internet, wireless technologies, 
aeronautical and maritime navigation, radio astronomy, satellite-based meteorology, 
cellular communication, data, voice, fiber-optics, TV broadcasting and next-generation 
networks. Telecommunications service providers are expanding into new territories such 
as entertainment as evidenced by the likes of AT&T and Verizon that stream and sell 
television via the Internet through pay-per-view and on demand arrangements. 
Consumers today no longer have to go to their TV screens to view their favorite live 
sports or other events, as they are able to stream them on their smart phones. 
This growing pervasiveness of telecommunications into multiple technological 
platforms and services makes the sector a multi-trillion dollar industry. On one hand, 
! 2 
telecommunications involves equipment manufacturing, sales, installation and 
consultation. On the other hand it constitutes services such as subscriber lines and data 
networks. With both equipment and services combined, telecommunications was a US$5 
trillion sector by the end of 2013 (Plunkett Research, n.d). According to the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) the penetration rate of mobile phone subscriptions per 
100 people worldwide reached an astonishing 96 people in 2013 whereas households 
with Internet access at home reached 40 for the same year. ITU predicts there will be 
about 3 billion global Internet users, out of which two-thirds will be from developing 
countries, by the end of 2014. During the same period mobile-broadband subscriptions 
are expected to reach 2.3 billion (ITU, 2014).  
The importance of the telecom sector across the globe has never been more 
imperative as manifested by the reluctance of governments to avoid “a hands-off 
approach” amidst flagship neo-liberal and free market economic policies. As in 
everything else, the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in 2011 have 
changed the way states approach telecom operations (Curwen, 1997; Hills, 2002; Preston, 
2001). No more do states view telecom merely as powerful technologies and economic 
corporations but also as a critical hub for combating security threats by enemies, 
imagined and real. The growing importance of the telecommunications for and beyond 
profit motives means governments, liberal or not, find it difficult to allow the sector to go 
completely unregulated explicitly or implicitly. This creates a different kind of challenge 
for the global capitalist order, whose agenda is set by its premium financial powerhouses 
like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization 
(Abbott & Brady, 1999; Bruce, Kessides, & Kneifel, 1999). 
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Following neo-liberal prescriptions of the Washington Consensus,1 the IMF and the 
World Bank began in the early 1980s linking loan guarantees for heavily indebted 
developing countries to structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which mandated that 
loan-receiving governments restructure their economies according to neo-liberal 
principles (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007; Bello, Cunningham, Rau, & Institute for Food 
and Development Policy, 1994). These include: putting more emphasis on production for 
export than on meeting the needs of national and local markets; severe spending cuts, 
especially for social programs; sweeping privatization measures; reduced regulation on 
the activities of transnational corporations; and, in a number of cases, significant currency 
devaluations (Steger & Roy, 2010). 
When the Third World Debt Crisis hit the world in 1982, the IMF and World Bank 
devised stringent SAPs that forced 29 sub-Saharan African countries to adopt the neo-
liberal model before the decade was over (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). During the 
1990s, the familiar dynamics of deregulation, liberalization, and privatization measures 
enforced export-oriented production at the expense of domestic food production, thus 
exposing many African countries to famine, epidemics and ensuing political instability. 
Consequently, despite Africa’s adoption of free-market imperatives constructed in the 
global North, the continent’s commodities trade fell from 7% of the world’s trade in the 
mid-1970s to less than 0.5% in the 1990s. Instead of economic recovery and repayment 
of all external debts, the past three decades of neo-liberalism have seen the lowest rates of 
economic growth ever recorded in Africa, along with rapidly rising disparities in wealth 
and wellbeing (Bush, 2007). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The Washington Consensus represents the set of views about effective development strategies that have !
! 4 
IMF, the Ethiopian State and the Chinese Alternative 
One of the least developed countries of the world, the Horn of Africa nation of 
Ethiopia has experienced devastating consequences of the Washington-based global 
financial architects. Notoriously resisting the neo-liberal construct, Ethiopia was left out 
of favor in many instances by the Bretton Woods institutions and particularly the IMF. 
Although not a self-declared Communist as its predecessor,2 the current ruling party of 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is known to be 
sympathetic to Marxist-Socialist ideals of economics and development, and it maintains a 
strong sense of regulation, albeit claiming to practice a free market economy (Gill, 2010). 
Many argue that such a double standard of economic policy by the ruling party is 
manifested by its strong grip on areas that it identified as critical to development, such as 
the financial sector, aviation, power and electricity and, more importantly, 
telecommunications. EPRDF’s vehement resistance to IMF’s aggressive deregulation 
prescriptions in these sectors marks some of the major themes of the communiqué 
between these two parties. As recently as the summer of 2011, the IMF has severely 
criticized the Ethiopian government’s five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP),3 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 EPRDF’s predecessor, the Derg, came to power on September 1974. Derg, which means “committee” or 
“council” in Amharic, is the short name of the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and 
Territorial Army. It is a committee of military officers, which ruled the country from 1974 to 1987. The 
Derg’s government was formally known as the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia. The 
Derg introduced major changes in economic reforms including the nationalization of more than 100 
companies, restructuring of trade unions and nationalization of rural and urban land.  
3 The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), according to the EPRDF, aims to sustain an 11% average 
economic growth for the upcoming five years. It envisages doubling the current economic growth by 
registering an average 14.9% economic growth during each year of the period. It also aims to end 
Ethiopia’s dependence on foreign direct investment and replace it with a domestically driven economy. 
Among the targets of the GTP are: raising the current 2000MW power generating capacity to 10,000MW; 
building a fertilizer-producing company that would contribute to the average of 550,000 metric tons of 
fertilizer demand; significantly increasing the current 4 million mobile phone subscribers to 6.1 million; 
and increasing the 0.74 million subscribers of the fixed line to 8.5 million (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development, 2010). 
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which was announced in October 2010, for its “lack of feasible financial and 
implementation planning and adequate prioritization of targets in the plan” (World Bank, 
2011, p. 3). The Fund further contends that the focus given to the public sector 
investment is crowding out the private sector, pointing to the government’s regulation in 
the financial industry in recent times. The Ethiopian state’s position amidst such criticism 
remains uncompromised, however.  
Close observers of the Ethiopian state and its economic policy would know that one 
sector that is at the center of such friction between EPRDF and IMF is 
telecommunications (Noam, 1999). In many instances, leading officials of the EPRDF 
have ruled out the privatization of Ethio-Telecom, the only state-owned 
telecommunications provider for Ethiopia’s 83 million people. Amidst continuous 
attempts of coercion and cooption by the IMF to liberalize the sector, EPRDF claims to 
remain unfazed by repercussions of cuts in loans and aid. True to the claim, Ethiopia’s 
telecommunications industry is characterized by a vertically integrated market run by a 
state-owned enterprise outside the realm of competition. Ethio-Telecom has a monopoly 
over all telecom services including fixed, mobile, Internet and other value added services 
(Temesgen, Ketema, & Negi, 2010). The government maintains its apprehension about 
the impact of telecommunications liberalization on the economy, not least on power 
relationships. Progress so far indicates that despite pressures from international financial 
institutions for competition, and in the absence of local initiative for liberalization of the 
communication sector, Ethiopia’s telecommunications market structure will continue to 
be state-owned for the foreseeable future.  
! 6 
In a country where aid constitutes more than 90% of the government’s budget 
(Gatune, 2010), it is ironic how the Ethiopian state sets its own terms of negotiation with 
its primary donors. One theory attributes such a political stance to Ethiopia’s location in 
an increasingly strategic region. In his statement of Support for Democracy and Human 
Rights in Ethiopia Act of 2008, former U.S. Senator Russ Feingold highlights the 
significance of Ethio-American relations: 
Ethiopia sits on the Horn of Africa—perhaps one of the roughest neighborhoods 
in the world, with Somalia a failed state and safe haven for terrorists, Eritrea an 
inaccessible authoritarian government that meddles across national borders, 
Sudan a genocidal regime, and Kenya still emerging from a profound electoral 
crisis. One look at the deteriorating situation across the Horn and the importance 
of a robust relationship with Ethiopia is obvious (“A Bill to Reaffirm,” 2008, 
para. 2). 
 
This policy of appeasement towards Ethiopia for the strategic alliance it offers in 
exchange is even more interesting given the ruling party’s poor track record of human 
rights issues. Rawlence & Human Rights Watch (2010) highlight how development 
agencies have turned a blind eye to the Ethiopian government’s repression of civil and 
political rights, even though these agencies recognize human rights to be central to 
sustainable socioeconomic development. Donors defend the decision to support the 
government, the report further notes, by pointing to Ethiopia’s stability.  
Another factor that has come to play a mammoth role on how EPRDF maintains its 
counter-neo-liberal policy is related to the emergence of China as an economic 
superpower in the past two decades. Following its alignment with the World Trade 
Organization and spectacular growth, China along with India is gaining attention in the 
African economy, including in Ethiopia, as a key trade partner (Alden, 2007). In a span 
of less than a decade, trade between China and Africa has increased from US$10 billion 
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in 2000 to US$28 billion in 2005, and to a whopping $120 billion in 2010 (Men & 
Barton, 2011, p. 34). In the past few years, China has given more loans to poor countries, 
mainly in Africa, than the World Bank. The Heritage Foundation, an American think-
tank, estimates that in 2005-2010, about 14% of China’s investment abroad found its way 
to sub-Saharan Africa (The Economist, 2011).  
Although Ethiopia has many development partners and continues to attach great 
importance to such partnerships, EPRDF has singled out China’s role as “so beneficial” 
that it is in Ethiopia’s interest to deepen this relationship “in every way possible” (“The 
World, Africa, China and Ethiopia,” 2010, para. 7).4 EPRDF officials attach little or no 
importance to the West’s criticism of China’s development approach in Africa that 
doesn’t take into consideration human rights issues. The party deems it right to be 
skeptical “when some appear to be more concerned about human rights or governance in 
say, Ethiopia, than Ethiopians themselves” (“The World, Africa, China and Ethiopia,” 
2010, para. 3).  EPRDF contends that the West’s criticism of the Chinese presence in 
Africa has covert motives related to the former’s national interests, thereby using claims 
of human rights abuses as a rationale. The Ethiopian state has on more than one occasion 
described China’s approach to Ethiopia as “generous” and, in an implicit attack on 
Western neo-liberalism, committed to creating possibilities for consolidating “sovereign 
choices and independently chosen paths of development” (“The World, Africa, China and 
Ethiopia,” 2010, para. 7).  It is therefore not surprising in any measure to see the tenacity 
with which Chinese firms are involved in major investment activities being carried by the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Dr. Tekeda Alemu, State Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, visited China in 2010 and delivered a 
speech at the China Foreign Affairs University on the subject of “The World, Africa, China, and Ethiopia: 
China-Africa Relations.” 
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Government of Ethiopia (GoE), especially in the road construction, electricity and 
telecommunication sectors. Evidently, by 2009, direct Chinese investment in Ethiopia 
had reached US$900 million (Men & Barton, 2011).  
In this context, it is not surprising that Ethiopia has struck a deal with a Chinese 
company for its first major partnership in telecommunications. In tandem with the very 
cordial Sino-Ethiopian partnership narrative, the “Chinese alternative” gave EPRDF its 
ticket of independence from IMF directives in avoiding the privatization of the telecom 
sector. This is partly because, despite being a pioneer in the African telecommunications 
landscape, Ethio-Telecom struggled to catch up with technology and was utterly 
inefficient in providing a reasonably sound service to its customers. With dissatisfied 
customers who would leap at a competitor and foreign investors ready to buy the sector at 
will if the market were to be liberalized, EPRDF understood it had to find a partner that 
would boost the country’s telecom service efficiency without compromising state 
ownership of the sector. 
As a result, in 2006, the Ethiopian government selected China’s ZTE Corporation5 
as a strategic partner in the local telecom market, and Ethio-Telecom inked a framework 
agreement with the Chinese company in the construction of a local national telecom 
network. As one of the biggest Chinese telecom companies, ZTE has offered Ethio-
Telecom credit (vendor financing) to the tune of $1.5 billion, conditional on ZTE doing 
the job of expanding and improving the Ethiopian telecom infrastructure without bidding. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 ZTE Corporation, formerly Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation, is a 
Chinese multinational telecommunications equipment and systems company headquartered 
in Shenzhen, China. As of 2011, it is the second-largest Chinese telecoms equipment maker (after global 
number two Huawei) and the world’s fourth-largest mobile phone manufacturer. 
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This credit was as big as the then total worth of the Ethiopian telecom monopoly 
(Whelan, 2010). 
Rationale to the Research and Research Questions 
Although the specific research questions that are the driving guidelines of this 
study are discussed later in this section and throughout the subsequent chapters, I find it 
important to address this simple yet fundamental inquiry: what is the rationale for 
researching telecommunications in Ethiopia? 
Before he retired some 15 years ago, my father worked as a district manager for 
one of the predecessors of Ethio-Telecom, the Ethiopian Telecommunication Authority. 
There were no mobile phones in Ethiopia during that time. Landlines were available but 
there was a long waitlist, years sometimes, for new subscribers to get the service installed 
in their houses. The few households that had access to landlines used it sparingly since 
the monthly service fee was expensive. It was common to see locked dial pads of 
telephone apparatuses that were deliberately reduced to call receiving capacity in many 
homes. The aim was to prevent children and extended family members from making non-
essential calls that would incur expensive charges. It was a very common practice for 
most people to give the phone number of their neighbors who had access to a landline. 
I remember one of the benefits my father got as part of his employment package 
was access to a landline. In addition to the access, our household was able to make 100 
free calls every month. I was probably the most excited family member about this deal 
because it won me a lot of friends who would come to my place to hang out “dialing.” 
We made a habit of sneaking into the phone area in the absence of my parents to call 
random numbers for no good reason. My parents never found out about our dialing 
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adventures because we had free access and there were no bills to expose me and my 
partners in crime. 
A little more than two decades later, I find it interesting that I am still curious 
about this idea of “access.” My view that notions like telecommunications as commons, 
universal access and service in telecommunications, communication rights, and freedom 
of speech are central to sustainable economic development has been a major motivation 
behind my interest in researching telecommunications. The horizontal expansion of 
access has hardly caught up with the vertical upsurge of innovation in information 
communication technologies, making notions like “bridging the digital divide” utopian, if 
not obsolete. On one hand, the global hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism has made 
access to information communication technologies a practice based on affordability and 
monetary value. On the other hand, states and their agents view the digital world as the 
next frontier of surveillance and “digital imperialism,” a sort of rendition to George 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, thereby making access harmful or even undesirable at 
times.  
One of the very last breeds of state monopoly of telecommunications globally, 
Ethiopia presents a unique opportunity for a litmus test of whether universal access in 
telecommunications services could be achieved through state intervention. Although the 
concept of universal access and universal service in telecommunication is a dynamic 
proposition, proponents of market fundamentalism see it as a detrimental idea. The 
popular wisdom of the day is that the market should take care of it and that “market 
failures” do not exist. Market fundamentalists argue that deregulation and consequent 
competition have solved, or will do so, problems of access (Faulhaber, 1997; Pilati, 
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1999). Others argue that market failures exist, but intervention is not the answer (Hart, 
1998; Neu & Scanlan, 2000; Shuler, 1999; Xavier, 1997). Intervention, they contend, 
alters technological neutrality and slows down innovation. As Faulhaber (1997) remarks, 
innovation would be hampered should “the invisible hand of the market be replaced 
(whether intended or not) by the visible one of the government” (p. 5). According to 
Garnham (1997): 
Such an acceleration [of universal service] is likely to lead simply to highly 
inefficient patterns of investment with a large amount of fixed plant earning 
unacceptably low rates of return; the result of this will either delay long-term 
network development and traffic growth, by asking existing subscribers to pay 
more than they otherwise would for this excess capacity, or by diverting tax 
revenue from where it could be spent more efficiently (p. 211). 
 
Conversely, protagonists of universal service recognize the existence of market 
failures and argue for intervention. “Latent” proponents of universal service admit the 
need for public intervention, although they also argue that intervention should be 
minimalized as much as possible. This group advocates for a restricted extension of 
universal service obligations that are explicitly focused on the solution of identified 
problems (Downes & Greenstein, 1998; Gillet, 1994; MacKie-Mason, 1998; Mansell & 
Steinmueller, 1996; Murroni, 1997; Noam, 1995; OECD 1997; Wolak 1996). “Manifest” 
proponents of universal service view telecommunications as a public or merit good. 
Consequently, intervention is justified by the fact that telecommunication services 
expand inappropriately or insufficiently as regards what would be the optimum for all 
society (Bar & Munk Riis, 1998; Bergman et al., 1998; Burgelman, 1996; Gómez Sáenz 
de Hermúa, 2000; Hadden & Lenert, 1995; Parker, 2000; Shields et al., 1993). A third 
group, universal access/service “fundamentalists,” propose strong equity arguments, and 
essentially perceive access to telecommunications service as a right.  For this group, 
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calculations in cost and pure economic efficiency are marginal priorities. They contend 
society is forced to provide the service to everyone, regardless of any economic, or even 
technological, considerations (Bar & Munk Riis, 1997; Biton Tapia & Dalmazo, 1999; 
De Reuck & Joseph, 1999; Forestier, Grace, & Kenny, 2002; Goggin, 1998; Latzer, 
2000; Poullet & Van der Mensbrugghe, 1995). 
Herein lies the paramount relevance of the Ethiopian telecommunications sector. 
To what extent is the state-monopoly of telecommunications in Ethiopia based on 
legitimate concerns of universal access and service? Answering this question inevitably 
calls for revisiting the century-old yet dynamic debate of whether states or markets bring 
about economic development, although I also recognize there are multifarious spillover 
issues to be addressed. In this sense, the aim of this study is to provide a wholesome 
account of pertinent issues in the Ethiopian telecommunication sector. In order to present 
such a comprehensive treatment, this research is guided by the following research 
questions: 
RQ1: What is the institutional history of telecommunications in Ethiopia? 
Ethio-Telecom and its predecessors have more than a century long history of 
state-controlled service in Ethiopia. In fact, the original predecessor of Ethio-Telecom is 
the oldest telecommunications service provider in Ethiopia. What were the circumstances 
under which telecommunications services in Ethiopia began? What role did the Ethiopian 
government play in the institutionalization of telecommunications in Ethiopia 
historically? What was the significance of international players like the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association in 
telecommunications infrastructure development in Ethiopia? 
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RQ2: To what extent does the Ethiopian public endorse/denounce state monopoly of 
the telecommunications sector? 
Since its inception in 1894, Ethio-Telecom (formerly Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Authority) has remained completely under state control. How do 
Ethiopians measure the role of telecommunications under monopolized state control? In 
addition to technical efficiency and service affordability, how do customers assess the 
operating model of the telecom sector in Ethiopia? In a nutshell, amidst the confrontation 
of EPRDF with neo-liberal forces and the emergence of the “Chinese alternative” in the 
mix, what is the view of the major stakeholders, the Ethiopian people?  
RQ3: What are the underlying reasons behind the differences in telecom 
liberalization policies between the IMF and the Ethiopian state?  
The Ethiopian state maintains (and will likely continue to maintain) its grip on the 
telecommunications sector of the country amidst persistent and immense pressure from 
the IMF and the World Bank. In an increasingly volatile and fiercely competitive 
technology market, what is the rationale for Ethio-Telecom to insist on retaining its 
current state ownership model? How do the IMF and its collaborators respond to this 
policy? What do they envision the Ethiopian telecom sector to look like and why? Given 
that the ruling party Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has 
requested that the World Trade Organization (WTO) grant a grace period of eight years 
for the sector to be liberalized, are there realistic possibilities of deregulation? 
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RQ4: What are the premises on which Sino-Ethiopian partnerships in the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector are laid? 
The Ethiopian state has established multi-layered partnerships with China in the 
past decade including in the telecom industry. The “Chinese alternative” has 
comprehensively attracted sub-Saharan Africa, a region that has been historically 
dominated by the West’s structural adjustment entrapments. In synthesizing the most 
trenchant criticisms of the Western approach to aid giving, Halper (2010) explains how 
China’s governing model is increasingly becoming more appealing to the developing 
world and some of the middle-sized powers than America’s market-democratic model. 
Halper argues that given a choice between market democracy and its freedoms and 
market authoritarianism and its high growth, stability, improved living standards, and 
limits on expression, a majority in the developing world—as well as many middle-sized, 
non-Western powers—prefer the authoritarian model. 
Whereas the position of developing countries to jump to the Chinese alternative is 
understandable, many crucial questions remain: what’s in it for China? What are the 
premises on which Ethio-Chinese partnerships are founded in the telecom sector? What 
are the costs and benefits of Ethio-Telecom’s technical partnership with ZTE? Is Ethiopia 
benefiting from the Chinese partnership as much as the EPRDF claims it is? As Haroz 
(2011) questions, “is the Chinese motive symbiosis or exploitation” (p. 1)? 
Significance of the Study 
In his Foreign Affairs article, “Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?” Wolf 
(2001) raises a key question about the fate of the nation-state in the face of the “global” 
economy—an economy in which neither distance nor national borders impede 
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economic transactions. He explores the spillover effects of market forces, both 
predatory and benign, and asks whether governments have become weaker and less 
relevant than ever before. “Does globalization, by definition, have to be the nemesis of 
national government?” Does the state even matter? 
Wolf’s analysis on the significance of the nation-state in the global economy has 
been widely discussed and debated amongst different scholars (Bullard, 1997; Greenfeld, 
2011; Gritsch, 2005; Hankiss, 1999; Hirst & Thompson, 1995). While many, including 
Wolf, argue that the nation-state as an increasingly irrelevant entity is a far-stretched 
proposition, there is a sense of common understanding that today’s global economy has 
undermined—or at least complicated—traditional senses of sovereignty and autonomy. 
Today, transnational corporations are more global than ever as they relentlessly seek to 
acquire any remaining untapped markets. Regional economic integrations globally are 
commonplace as evidenced from the EU in Europe to NAFTA in North America to 
ECOWAS in Africa. Local trade regulations are growingly becoming subordinate to 
international trade standards set by the likes of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
While the tide of economic globalization may be unsettling to traditional structures 
of governance, particularly to politically and economically fragile countries in the 
developing world, I argue the demise of the nation-state is a flawed thesis. My hope is 
this study will provide useful insights into how countries, including those that are 
politically and economically weak, are adapting, evolving, and integrating into the global 
economy while they find ways to maintain their sovereignty. In this particular study, this 
will be illuminated through how a donor-dependent country like Ethiopia has withstood 
relentless pressures to privatize/liberalize its telecommunications sector. 
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This study also raises important discussions that are salient in the politics of 
development. The tensions between the interventionist policies of the Ethiopian 
government and the free market doctrines of the IMF and its associates indicate that the 
decades-old battle of Keynesian versus Hayekian ideals of economics and development is 
still relevant. The Ethiopian state rationalizes its refusal to open up the 
telecommunications sector by arguing that it views telecommunications as a vital driver 
of not only economic development but also equitable growth. Central to the Ethiopian 
government’s argument is that the notions of universal access and universal service in 
telecommunications are critical to collective economic development. Market forces, state 
officials argue, by the virtue of their profit driven ethos, will only seek the affluent and 
the privileged, marginalizing and further disenfranchising the poor.  This is consistent 
with Chomsky (1999), who criticizes the doctrines and development of pro-corporate 
system of economic and political policies that restrict the public arena and support private 
power perpetuated by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Trade 
Organization and the World Bank to the detriment of the global poor. Stiglitz (2002) 
reiterates that markets have failures and imperfections. These “failures” and 
“imperfections,” Stiglitz argues, should be corrected by the state: 
Behind the free market ideology there is a model, often attributed to Adam Smith, 
which argues that market forces—the profit motive—drive the economy to 
efficient outcomes as if by an invisible hand. One of the great achievements of 
modern economics is to show the sense in which, and the conditions under which, 
Smith’s conclusion is correct. It turns out that these conditions are highly 
restrictive. Indeed, more recent advances in economic theory—ironically 
occurring precisely during the period of the most relentless pursuit of the 
Washington Consensus policies—have shown that whenever information is 
imperfect and markets incomplete, which is to say always, and especially 
in developing countries, then the invisible hand works most imperfectly. 
Significantly, there are desirable government interventions [emphasis added] 
which, in principle, can improve upon the efficiency of the market. These 
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restrictions on the conditions under which markets result in efficiency are 
important—many of the key activities of government can be understood as 
responses to the resulting market failures (Stiglitz, 1999, p. 73). 
 
Although there is theoretical and scholastic validity to the arguments of the 
Ethiopian state in its interventionist economic policies, the self-proclaimed vanguardism 
of economic development by EPRDF has its critiques too. Profound levels of inefficiency 
have caused frustration and mistrust in the state-monopoly of telecommunications, 
casting serious doubts on whether the state is capable of delivering its lofty goals. More 
importantly, widespread reports about the state’s use of public telecommunications 
infrastructure to perpetuate political repression through mass censorship and surveillance 
are consistent with arguments about the dangers of dictatorship and neopatrimonialism 
under the guise of “state-led development.” Sen (1999) emphasizes the importance of 
freedom in achieving any meaningful development. Freedoms, he argues, “are not only 
the primary ends of development, they are also among its principal means” (p. 10). 
Development in this sense is not a predefined conception by the elite to be delivered to 
the helpless poor. Neither should it be solely judged in terms of notions such as gross 
national product. It should incorporate the impact of democracy and political freedoms on 
the lives and capabilities of the citizens. “Development requires major sources of 
unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic 
social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of 
repressive states” (Sen, 1999, p. 3). Critics argue that interventionist development runs 
the risk of a dictatorship and relegates freedoms and rights as inferior or residual targets: 
Authoritarian development is also a pragmatic tragedy. History and modern 
experience suggest that free individuals with political and economic rights—call it 
free development—make up a remarkably successful problem-solving system. 
Free development gives us the right to choose amongst a myriad of spontaneous 
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problem solvers, rewarding those that solve our problems. These public and 
private problem-solvers accomplish far more than dictators who implement 
solutions provided by experts. We see how free development allows a squeaky 
wheel to get the grease, while authoritarian development silences the squeaky 
wheel—perhaps with a police raid and a prison term (Easterly, 2014, p. 7, 
emphasis in original). 
 
The investigation of the role of the state in the Ethiopian telecommunications 
sector is a key theme of this study. Through an in-depth analysis of policies, documents 
and interviews, this study contributes to development scholarship, particularly in terms of 
providing empirical data that can provide useful premises in the politics of development. 
Does the interventionist state bring about the fast-track route to development or does it 
make way for political repression and dictatorship? Are rights the end products of 
development or are they the means to development? This study provides insights that 
weigh in on these questions by examining the implications of state-led development 
through a case study of the Ethiopian state and its monopoly of the telecommunications 
sector. 
The increasing accessibility of information communication technologies and 
services across the world has been lauded by many as the end of totalitarianism and 
dictatorships. Ronald Reagan, in his speech at London’s Guildhall on June 14, 1989, 
boldly predicted that “technology will make it increasingly difficult for the state to 
control the information its people receive…The Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought 
down by the David of the microchip” (Kalathil & Boas, 2003, p. 1). More than two 
decades after Reagan made this speech, the tendency to make a causal relationship 
between technological advances and democratization remains a powerful assumption in 
popular thinking.  
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This conventional wisdom has been particularly persistent in identifying the 
Internet as a key driver of democratization, even amidst a decline in the general 
“information age” optimism that characterized much of the 1990s. While the invention of 
communication technologies from the printing press to the Internet have disrupted central 
authority and control, governments—“democratic” and authoritarian alike—had 
historically learned to adapt to and adopt these technologies with the aim of strengthening 
their control further. In his New York Times article, “Imprisoned by Innovation,” 
Morozov (2013) argues the latest technologies in communication, through the illusion of 
“access,” have brought surveillance to our homes and made us voluntarily spied upon. 
“Smart technologies,” Morozov argues, “are not just disruptive; they can also preserve 
the status quo. Revolutionary in theory, they are often reactionary in practice.” In this 
sense, “access” has slowly become a much more illusive concept as it starts dragging the 
baggage of surveillance with it. The “solutionism” that technology was supposed to bring 
about is now the very tool that builds the most sophisticated and draconian system of 
censorship. As Morozov (2014) warns, “we must not fixate on what this new arsenal of 
digital technologies allows us to do without first inquiring what is worth doing” (p. 
124). This study offers an important insight into “unpacking” the notion of “access” that 
the Ethiopian states uses as a core rationale in defending its grip on the 
telecommunications sector. 
Overview 
The dissertation consists of nine chapters. Chapter II provides a discussion about 
the demographic, political and economic contexts of FDRE. It introduces the history of 
state formation processes of Ethiopia that led to the current political set-up of the country, 
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thereby shedding some light onto the root of ideologies and policies affecting the 
Ethiopian telecommunications sector. Other relevant contextual topics in this chapter 
include a discussion on the evolution of EPRDF as Ethiopia’s ruling elite and the party’s 
political and economic programs that have direct influence on the political economy of 
telecommunications in Ethiopia. 
Chapter III deliberates on theories relevant to the issues of economic development 
and the conceptualization of the interventionist state in development discourses. The first 
part of the chapter discusses the philosophical underpinnings of the modernization theory 
and neo-liberalism, and how they conditioned economic and development practices in the 
developing world. In an attempt to shed light on the developmental vis-à-vis 
dysfunctional attributes of the Ethiopian state, two contesting theories—the theory of the 
developmental state and that of the neopatrimonial state—are considered. Then, the 
chapter discusses some key issues in the political economy of communications that 
provides the framework for interpreting the findings of the study. Toward the end of the 
chapter, a review of previous research is presented and the research questions of the 
current study are outlined. 
Chapter IV deals with methodological considerations of the study. The first part of 
the chapter provides a philosophical rationale for employing a triangulated approach in 
this study. This is followed by a discussion on the background, processes, sampling, 
analysis and other important considerations in each of the data collection methods 
involved including survey, document analysis and semi-structured interviews. Issues of 
validity and reliability are also discussed, followed by an outline of the limitations of the 
study. 
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Chapters V through VIII present analysis and major findings of the dissertation. 
Chapter V provides an overview of the Ethiopian telecommunication sector from the 
introduction of the first telephone set in Ethiopia in 1894 to the establishment of the 
newly reformed Ethio-Telecom presently. This chapter gives particular emphasis to the 
history of telecommunications infrastructure development in Ethiopia over the past six 
decades. In doing so, it offers structural, administrative and financial peculiarities that 
defined telecommunications in Ethiopia in the pre-Chinese era.  
Chapter VI presents survey findings on the spillover effects of the state-monopoly 
of the telecommunications in Ethiopia. Chapter VII explores policy tensions between the 
IMF and the Ethiopian state in relation to state monopoly vis-à-vis deregulation 
discourses through a study of policy papers, development programs and other documents. 
Chapter VIII analyzes the Ethiopian state’s increasing economic partnership with China 
in the telecommunications sector. It examines the interest of both countries in the 
partnership and projects a cost-benefit analysis of China’s investment in Ethiopia’s 
telecommunications sector.  
The study’s concluding chapter, Chapter IX, summarizes the main findings of the 
study and highlights future research directions. 
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CHAPTER II 
A CONTEXTUAL SURVEY OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
ETHIOPIA  
The Ethiopian nation has gone through a long history of state formation process 
that involved contesting approaches that included assimilationist, secessionist and 
“accomodationist” camps (Abbay, 2004). Some of the existing political programs and 
economic policies that directly affect governance and operations of the state-controlled 
telecommunications sector are results of these historical precedents. As such, although it 
is not the goal of this study to explore state-formation processes, it is necessary to shed 
some light into the historical evolution of the Ethiopian state in order to understand 
contemporary centralist, top-down and quasi-authoritarian policy directions.  
The chapter begins by highlighting some key geographic, demographic and 
economic facts about Ethiopia. It then briefly explores some of the salient components of 
the Ethiopian constitution, which is the supreme law of the land. This is followed by a 
discussion on the historical evolution of the Ethiopian state that, among other things, 
looks into the proliferation of global capitalism, the roots of neopatrimonial governance 
and the rise and fall of Marxism-Leninism in Ethiopia. The last part of the chapter 
reviews the make up of the political and economic principles of Ethiopia’s ruling party 
presently. 
Ethiopian Geography, Demographics and Economy 
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) is a land-locked country in 
the Horn of Africa covering 1,133,380 sq. km. It shares a long border with Somalia in the 
east. Other neighbors include South Sudan and Sudan to the west, Eritrea to the north, 
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Djibouti to the north-east and Kenya to the south (see Figure 1). With a population of 
nearly 87 million at 2013, according to official estimates, Ethiopia is Africa’s second 
most populous country after Nigeria (Central Statistical Agency, 2008; World Bank, 
2014a)6. The official language is Amharic, but many other local languages are also 
spoken. English is widely used for official, educational and commercial purposes. While 
the Ethiopian Orthodox (Tewahido) Church, an ancient Christian sect, has a wide 
following in the north and on the central plateau, much of the southern and eastern part of 
the country adheres to Islam (“Location, climate, language,” 2014).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Political map of FDRE. Reproduced from GeoCurrents (2013) and U.S. 
Department of State (n.d.). 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The population statistics used here reflect official reports of FDRE. Other sources like the World Bank 
provide a significantly different data. See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL  
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Ethiopia’s capital city, Addis Ababa, is the largest city in the nation, with a 
population of 3,384,569 according to the 2007 population census with annual growth rate 
of 3.8% (Central Statistical Agency, 2008). Addis Ababa, as one of the two cities in 
Ethiopia that enjoys a chartered city status, is both a city and a state. Addis Ababa is host 
to the African Union (AU) and its predecessor the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
as well as the headquarters of numerous continental and international organizations 
including the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). As a result, it 
is commonly referred to as “the political capital of Africa” to signify its diplomatic and 
political significance to the continent (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 
n.d.). 
The Ethiopian economy predominantly relies on the agriculture sector, which 
accounts for 46.6% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 85% of total employment. 
According to the National Office of Population estimates, 83% of the population lived in 
rural areas, while 17% lived in urban areas in 2011 (see Table 1 and Table 2). As of 
2012, 48.4% of Ethiopia’s GDP stemmed from agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
(African Development Bank et al., 2013). With the lowest level of urbanization in Africa, 
Ethiopia heavily relies on its agricultural sector employs 75.7% of the labor force (Food 
and Agriculture Organization, 2013). 
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries of the world. According to a 2011 estimate, 
30.7% of the Ethiopian population lives below the poverty line (World Bank, 2014b). 
The country has the lowest road density in Africa that exacerbates the isolation and 
vulnerability of many rural communities, particularly in years of drought (Schmidt et al., 
2009). In recent years, Ethiopia has registered a sustained growth in GDP, although the 
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government’s double-digit growth figures had been contested by external institutions like 
the World Bank that put the figure to 8.5% for the 2012 fiscal year (Ministry of Finance, 
2010; World Bank, 2014c). 
 
 
Population (census results)  
11 October 1994 53,477,265 
28 May 2007  
Males 37,217,130 
Females 36,533,802 
Total 73,750,932 
Population (official estimates at July)  
2011 82,101,998 
2012 84,320,987 
2013 86,613,986 
Density (per sq. km) at July 2013 76 
 
Table 1: Major population size statistics of Ethiopia (1994-2013). Adapted from CSA 
(2013). 
 
 
Regional States! Population!
Male Female Total 
Tigrai  2,489,994 2,571,997 5,061,991 
Afar  917,999 732,000 1,649,999 
Amhara  9,633,991 9,578,003 19,211,994 
Oromia  16,227,993 15,992,008 32,220,001 
Somali  2,957,999 2,360,001 5,318,000 
Benishangul-Gumuz  522,997 504,997 1,027,994 
Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples  8,903,996 8,983,009 17,887,005 
Gambela  212,003 194,001 406,004 
Harari  108,000 107,000 215,000 
Chartered Cities      
1 Dire Dawa  198,000 197,000 395,000 
2 Addis Ababa  1,479,000 1,624,999 3,103,999 
Total 43,715,971 42,898,015 86,613,986 
 
Table 2: Administrative divisions and official population estimates of FDRE at July 
2013. Adapted from CSA (2013). 
 
Although growth in GDP put the country in a much more favorable condition in the 
past decade, it was accompanied by unprecedented inflation rates that reached as high as 
40% in the past few years (International Monetary Fund, 2008). The United Nations 
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Development Program ranks Ethiopia 173rd out of 187 countries with its Human 
Development Index (HDI) of 0.396 for the year 2012 (United Nations Development, 
2013). 
The Constitutional Framework of the FDRE 
Adopted in Addis Ababa by the Constitutional Assembly on December 8, 1984, the 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) establishes a 
federal and democratic state structure. It stipulates all sovereign power resides in the 
nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. It is the supreme law of the land and 
declares human rights and freedoms, emanating from the nature of mankind, are 
inviolable and inalienable. The constitution affirms all Ethiopian languages shall enjoy 
equal state recognition although Amharic shall be the working language of the Federal 
Government (Constitution of the FDRE, 1995). 
The Constitution stipulates that FDRE shall have a parliamentarian form of 
government. Structurally, the FDRE government and its member states comprise 
legislative, executive and judicial powers. The two Federal Houses, the House of 
People’s Representatives and the House of the Federation, have different but 
complementary responsibilities, organizations and constituencies. Members of the House 
of People’s Representatives are elected by the people for a term of five years on the basis 
of universal suffrage and by direct, free and fair elections. Members of the House, on the 
basis of population and special representation of minority nationalities and peoples, 
according to the Constitution, shall not exceed 550. The FDRE Constitution grants the 
House of People’s Representatives legislative power in all matters assigned by the 
Constitution to federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the political party or coalition of 
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political parties that has the greatest number of seats in the House of People’s 
Representatives shall form and lead the Executive (Constitution of the FDRE, 1995).  
The House of the Federation, on the other hand, is composed of representatives of 
nations, nationalities and peoples. The Constitution stipulates that each nation, nationality 
and people shall be represented in the House of the Federation by at least one member. 
Furthermore, it is stipulated in the Constitution that one additional representative for each 
one million of its population shall represent each nation or nationality. The House of the 
Federation shall have a mandate of five years, and no one may be a member of the House 
of People’s Representatives and of the House of the Federation simultaneously 
(Constitution of the FDRE, 1995). 
According to the Constitution, the President of the FDRE is the Head of State. The 
House of People’s Representatives shall nominate the candidate for President. The 
nominee shall be elected President if a joint session of the House of People’s 
Representatives and the House of the Federation approves his candidacy by a two-thirds’ 
majority vote. The Constitution specifies that the term of office of the President shall be 
six years and no person shall be elected President for more than two terms. The 
President’s duties include the opening of the Federal Houses; appointing ambassadors 
and other envoys to represent the country abroad; granting, upon recommendation by the 
Prime Minister and in accordance with law, high military titles; and granting pardons 
(Constitution of the FDRE, 1995). 
The highest executive powers of the Federal Government are vested in the Prime 
Minister and in the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister and the Council of 
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state functions, members of the Council of Ministers are collectively responsible for all 
decisions they make as a body. According to the Constitution, the term of office of the 
Prime Minister is the duration of the mandate of the House of People’s Representatives. 
The Prime Minister is the Chief Executive, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and 
the Commander-in-Chief of the national armed forces. The Constitution also empowers 
the Prime Minister to submit for approval to the House of People’s Representatives 
nominees for ministerial posts from members of the two Houses or from persons who are 
not members of either House and possess the required qualifications. The Council of 
Ministers is responsible to the Prime Minister and, in all its decisions, is responsible to 
the House of People’s Representatives. The Council of Ministers ensures the 
implementation of laws and decisions adopted by the House of People’s Representatives 
(Constitution of the FDRE, 1995). 
The Historical Evolution of the Ethiopian State 
The Horn of Africa nation of Ethiopia is one of oldest states in sub-Saharan Africa 
with records that evince prehistoric habitation.7 It is prehistoric in the sense that it 
provides archeological evidences for the oldest known human ancestors that date back 3-
5 million years like Ardipithecus ramidus kadabba, Australopithecus anamensis, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The term “Ethiopia” was first used by ancient Greek writers like Homer and Herodotus in reference to the 
east-central African kingdom south of Egypt (Herodotus, Rawlinson, & Bowden, 1998; Homer, Fagles & 
Knox, 1990; Homer & Fitzgerald, 1998). The original designation of the term was not exclusive to the 
landlocked country of today, but would have also included the present-day countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Central African Republic and Chad (Yamauchi, 2001). In his book “A 
History of Modern Ethiopia”, Bahru (2002) writes the term evolved to capitulate its present application 
after the subsequent translation of the Bible into Ge’ez, the ancient literary language. The fourteenth 
centaury account of k!brä nägäst (Glory of Kings) which recounts the origins of the Solomonic lines of the 
emperors of Abyssinia through the story of the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon is not only significant in 
terms of associating Abyssinian Kings with the House of Israel but also cementing the application of the 
term Ethiopia to the country (Prahlad, 2006). The name Abyssinia, on the other hand, is derived from the 
Arabic word Habesch, which signifies mixture. Although it is not uncommon for Ethiopians to refer to 
themselves as “Habesha” (Abyssinian), the original sense of the term is narrower in that it represents the 
northern highlanders of Semitic ethnicity (Toggia, 2008).  
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Australopithecus afarensis (Johanson & Edey, 1981; Sarmiento et al., 2007).8 The 
earliest recorded Ethiopian statehood dates back to the 8th century BC, to a kingdom 
known as Da’amat that ruled over present day northern Ethiopia and Eritrea (Tronvoll, 
2009). Although smaller successor kingdoms sprouted following the fall of the Da’amat 
in the 4th century BC, it is the emergence of the Axumite Empire, arguably the most 
important regional power by the end of the first AD, that lay the first blocks in the long 
evolution of the political, economic and social maps of contemporary Ethiopia 
(Phillipson, 1998). 
During its heyday between the third and seventh centuries AD, the Axumite Empire 
was a prosperous centralized kingdom that controlled economic and political relations in 
northeast Africa and Arabia. It established strong diplomatic and trading partnerships 
with Rome and Byzantine and became one of the four great powers of the time with 
Rome, Persia and China (Burstein, 1998; Henze, 2000; Phillipson, 2004). In the fourth 
century AD, Axum adopted Coptic Christianity, which would remain the most decisive 
institution in the political history of Ethiopia throughout the millennia (Crummey, 2000; 
Hastings, 1994; Taddesse, 1972). Even after the decline of Axum in the twelfth century 
A.D, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church continued the consolidation of its doctrine and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Some of the most famous and iconic hominid fossils have been discovered in Ethiopia, thereby commonly 
referred to as “Cradle of Humankind” by evolutionary theorists and scientists. Ethiopia has long provided 
critical missing links in the hominid evolution timeline. Australopithecus afarensis “Lucy” is arguably the 
most famous hominid fossil ever found. When it was discovered in northeastern Ethiopia in1974, it became 
the most compete hominid to be unearthed dating to roughly 3.2 million years ago. Ardipithecus kadabba 
(1997) is one of the earliest known hominid species with an age of about 5.8 million years. Older than 
Lucy, Ardi is the most complete skeleton of an early hominid. The first pieces of the 4.4-million-year-old 
Ardi were uncovered in 1992. Ardipithecus represents an early form of upright walking and reveals how 
apes went from living in the trees to walking on the ground. !
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organizational structure throughout the Zagwe Dynasty that ruled the country for about a 
century (Heldman, Munro-Hay, & Grierson, 1993; Lulé, 2010; Mengistu, 2004).9  
Toward the end of the 13th century, Yekunno-Amlak of the Amhara of the Wollo 
region overthrew the Zagwe to embark on what came to be known as the Solomonic 
Dynasty. The Solomonic rule would flourish for the next three centuries under the k!brä 
nägäst that backed the new rulers as legitimate heirs to the throne and portrayed the 
Zagwe as usurpers.10  
While the northern Semitic monarchy continued consolidating its grip on power, 
there was limited or sporadic tradition of centralized statehood in the remaining parts of 
what is now recognized as the territory Ethiopia. The eastern and northeastern lowlands 
are home to Somali and Afar peoples, who have traditionally lived in loosely 
institutionalized clan formations (Markakis, 2011). The south and west of the country are 
populated by dozens of different ethnolinguistic groups (Marcus, 1994).  
The Oromo provide a case for an exception. Presumably beginning their expansion 
from different directions in the Horn of Africa, the Oromo, the largest ethnic group in 
present day Ethiopia, controlled much of the southwestern parts of the country in the 
second half of the 16th century (Yates, 2009). This event coincided with the Muslim 
conquest of Christian Ethiopia. With the vigorously expanding Ottoman Empire 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 The Zagwe ruled approximately from1137 to 1270. The Zagwe were distinct from the Axumite in two 
fundamental ways: (i) its ruling class was made up of the Agaw people; and (ii) it was self-admittedly 
“non-Israelite” and did not claim Solomonic blood. According to Henze (2000), however, the Zagwe did 
not break with Axumite traditions but rather reaffirmed them in terms of upholding the concept of divine 
kingship, devotion of Christianity, and architecture. 
 
10 According to Marcus (1994), the k!brä nägäst is “a national epic that glorifies a particular monarchical 
line and tradition and also indelibly associates Ethiopia with the Judeo-Christian tradition” (p. 18). It 
recounts the visit of the Queen of Sheba (Makeda) of Ethiopia to King Solomon in Jerusalem and the 
subsequent birth of Menelik I, who would start the ‘Solomonic’ line of rulers in Ethiopia.  
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controlling most of its coast and internal ascendancy of Muslim sultanates and caliphates, 
the Ethiopian empire was experiencing an inevitable decline (Trimingham, 1965). The 
culmination was a continued assault on the Christian highlanders by forces loyal to 
Ahmad ibn Ibrahim “Gragn” of Harar between 1529 and 1531 resulting in severe damage 
to the former. In 1543, a combined Abyssinian-Portuguese coalition led by newly 
crowned Nigus Gal!wd"w#s defeated Ahmad and the Turks to restore Christian 
dominion (Henze, 2000; Milkias 2011). On one hand, the Oromos, who espoused neither 
the Christians nor the Muslims, suffered severely from the jihadic war. On the other 
hand, “the sedentary communities on both sides [Muslims and Christians] destroyed each 
other and by doing so destroyed the very dam that had checked the migration of the 
pastoral Oromo for many centuries” (Hassen 1990, p. 20). As a result, the Oromo, who 
had “a remarkably egalitarian culture with a complex age-class system, through which all 
men rotated in their lifetime” advanced significantly toward the north (Henze, 2000, p. 
91).11  
The Abyssinian-Portuguese alliance that reaffirmed the continuity of the Solomonic 
dynasty flourished after the death of Gal!wd"w#s with the arrival of Jesuit missionaries, 
albeit with disastrous consequences to follow. A few years after getting crowned in 1607, 
S$siny#s, then under mentorship by Jesuit advisors, declared his conversion to 
Catholicism and imminent structural transformation of Ethiopian Coptic Christianity. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The bedrock of the organizational structure of the Oromo was the gada system. The gada, according to 
Jalata, was “a preclass institution based on democratic principles” and “the pillar of Oromo culture and 
civilization” (1993, pp. 19-20). Although Hassen (1997) warns any definition of gada cannot be complete 
enough to describe the complex attributes of the system, he endorses Asmarom’s description that 
emphasizes the military and political aspect: “[It] is a system of classes (luba) that succeed each other every 
eight years in assuming military, economic, political and ritual responsibilities. Each gada class remains in 
power during a specific term (gada) which begins and ends with a formal power transfer ceremony. Before 
assuming a power of leadership, the gada class is required to wage war against a community that none of 
the ancestors had raided. This particular war is known as butta and is waged on schedule every eight years 
(p.8). 
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This resulted in a series of bloody resistance and rebellion, forcing S!siny"s to abdicate 
in favor of his son Fasiledes, who ordered the ejection of Jesuits out of the court and 
eventually out of Ethiopia (Pennec & Toubkis, 2004). In what some would refer to as the 
Abyssinian Renaissance, Fasiledes oversaw the emergence and prominence of the 
“Gondärine Era” after he established Gondar as the capital of his state (Tegegne, 2009).12 
The Gondarine period is significant in two major ways. On one hand, it reaffirmed the 
undisputed position of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church as the complementary accessory 
of the state (Crummey, 2000; Isaac, 2012). On the other, it facilitated the assimilation of 
the Oromo to Abyssinian feudal political economy, religion and political administration 
(Yates, 2009). 
The aftermath of the Gondärine era was marked by what came to be known as 
zamana mas#fint. It is an era when the country witnessed a major political instability that 
threatened the existence of central statehood.13 Although Gondar remained the capital, 
regional chiefs became king-makers, seeking advantages to themselves and their regions. 
Kings became mere symbols as evidenced by the crowning and dethroning of 28 reigns 
between 1755 and 1855 until the rise of Téwodros II (Abir, 1968).  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Two things are important to note here: (1) The establishment of Gondar as permanent capital marks a 
significant departure from Ethiopian imperial tradition. After the decline of Axum, monarchs and their 
entourage became mobile courts and ruled from their encampments. They moved when natural resources 
like firewood got depleted; (2) Henze and other historians argue the Gondarine civilization can be labeled 
as the Ethiopian Renaissance. The Gondärine’s keen interest in architecture made Gondar nicknamed by 
many as the “Camelot of Africa” for its castles that resembled that of medieval England. Literature, 
sculpture, music, pottery and fine art in general were encouraged and oftentimes state-sponsored. 
 
13 According to Abir (1968), the term zamana mas!fint literally means “Era of the Princes.” In Ethiopia, 
however, this period is understood by many to be the “Era of the Judges” because of its resemblance to the 
Old Testament time when “there was no King in Israel: every man did that which was right in his own eyes” 
(Henze, 2000, p.121). 
! 33 
Unification, Independence, and Modernization 
After the century old rule of the princes and a massively divided court, the first 
reaction toward unification came from Kassa Hailu of Qwara, a bandit-turned-emperor 
who set in motion the modern history of Ethiopia. After defeating all the chief princes, he 
was crowned as Emperor Téwodros II, King of Kings of Ethiopia.14 Téwodros’s military 
might was only equaled by his ambition for modern civilization. He strived to restructure 
the Ethiopian military in terms organization, discipline and armament, and was decisive 
in banning the brutal tradition of billeting by salary (Bahru, 2002). He is also credited for 
making the first attempt to end the then pervasive practice of slave trade in the Ethiopian 
society as well as outlawing concubinism. His reign also oversaw the rise of Amharic to 
become the official language of Ethiopia. However, the emperor’s most popular episode 
involved his fundamental religious, political and economic clashes with the clergy of 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church. He expropriated “what he deemed was land in excess of the 
clergy’s requirements” and distributed it among tribute-paying peasants (Bahru, 2002, 
p.35). This action marked the beginning of the end of Téwodros as it agitated the church, 
which then aligned itself with his conspirators and archrivals.  Frustrated by the church’s 
stubbornness against reformation, and insubordination and defection of regional lords, the 
latter days of the emperor were marked by ruthless retributions (Pankhurst, 2001). When 
he felt his repeated appeals to the Queen of England for technical and armament 
assistance was not adequately addressed, he imprisoned the British missionary contingent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14Because of the belief that their authority is elected by divine power, Ethiopian kings chose names that 
were connected to divinity or to previous kings. For example, according to Mehari (2007), Téwodros II 
carefully selected his name. The first Téwodros, though he had a short reign, left a lasting impression of 
saintliness and justice. In the fourteenth or fifteenth century, an apocalyptic book known as F!kkârê Iyäsus 
prophesied that another Téwodros would come, and that he would bring peace and justice after a difficult 
time. Kassa saw himself as someone who was destined to execute this, and henceforth adapted the name 
Téwodros.!
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in Ethiopia. This resulted in a British assault of Magdala, the emperor’s last stronghold. 
In defiance, the emperor committed suicide on April 11, 1867. In the words of Henze, “In 
his ideals [Téwodros] was woefully ahead of his time. In his methods of putting them into 
effect, he was still a medieval monarch” (2000, p. 142).  
Although the life of Téwodros came to a tragic end, his seeds of unification 
prevailed. His extraordinary accomplishments, short lived as they were, inspired his 
successors to envisage an Ethiopian empire rather than provincial lordship—a clear 
departure from zamana mas!fint reasoning. In the words of Bahru, Téwodros’s 
coronation “symbolized the end of the divorce between political power and political 
authority” (2002, p.42).  
In the immediate years after the death of Téwodros, two strong figures emerged as 
serious contenders to the crown—Kassa Mercha of Tigray and Menelik of Shoa (Henze, 
2000). These men would prove to be enormously significant in the modern Ethiopian 
state formation process, partly because they have learned from the futilities of 
Téwodros’s methodology to bring about unification (Shiferaw, Taddese, & Pankhurst, 
1990). In addition, they learned how to coexist for most of the time in spite of their 
evident egos to the crown, a rare treat in Ethiopian politics. A telling example of this is 
what came to be known as the Leche Agreement where Menelik unequivocally 
recognized the suzerainty of Kassa—now under the crown name of Y!"#nnis IV (Briggs 
and Blatt, 2009). On the face of it, Menelik seemed to have been defeated and humiliated. 
However, this very act would later prove Menelik to be the astute diplomat he was, a key 
trait that will eventually bring him unparalleled success compared to his predecessors 
(Marcus, 1994). 
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The reign of Y!"#nnis IV brought about a loosely unified Ethiopia. Unlike 
Téwodros, he didn’t conceive Ethiopia’s unification as a form of centralized nation but 
rather a feudal federation, an amalgamation of autonomous regions and their rulers under 
his suzerainty. Y!"#nnis’s liberal methods in politics did not extend to religious freedom, 
however. An uncompromising Coptic Christian himself, he personally presided over a 
meeting to successfully unify the Ethiopian Orthodox Church that was going through 
doctrinal turmoil since the zamana mas!fint. After helping consolidate the church, 
Y!"#nnis turned his attention to Islam, albeit violently. Islam was to be renounced and 
repressed, making the Y!"#nnis era to be one of the most difficult to be a practicing 
Muslim (Milkias, 2011). 
In the end, Y!"#nnis’s alternative bid for Ethiopian unification came to a tragic 
finale when he was killed by the Mahdists of the Sudan who were angered by the 
emperor’s implementation of the Hewett Treaty.15 It is essential, however, to recognize 
Y!"#nnis’s massive contribution to Ethiopian independence from foreign invasion in 
circumstances that were arduous, if not impossible. His was a reign that came up against 
persistent attempts of foreign invasion and provocation that, if successful, would have 
thwarted Ethiopian independence, leave alone state formation.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 The Hewett Treaty is a tripartite treaty involving Ethiopia, Britain and Egypt signed by Y!"#nnis IV on 
June 3, 1884. The treaty is deemed to be one of the most important in the international relations history of 
Ethiopia in that it ended the enmity between Egypt and Ethiopia that had resulted in a series of many battles, 
among which the battles of Gura and Gundet in the mid 1870s were the most important (Shinn and 
Ofcansky, 2004). Although Ethiopia defeated the invading Egyptian forces decisively both times, Y!"#nnis 
wanted a long-term peace and stability against an enemy that showed a protracted interest in controlling the 
Nile basin. What Y!"#nnis did not see coming was by taming one enemy, he arose another that would 
eventually cost him his life. Sudan was at the height of its resistance against Egyptian rule by then through 
the infamous Mahdist movement that arose as a combination of religious revivalism and Sudanese 
nationalism (Bahru, 2002). When Ethiopia signed the Hewett Treaty with Egypt, the Mahadists identified 
the former as an ally to their oppressor. The Mahadist anger escalated to war when Ethiopia gave a passage 
to cornered Egyptian garrisons that would have otherwise been destroyed by the Sudanese.      
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When it became clear that the quest for Ethiopian unification by both Téwodros and 
Y!"#nnis didn’t transpire, it was Menelik of Shoa who rose to the throne in an attempt to 
succeed where his predecessors failed. Although Y!"#nnis and Menelik had an uneasy 
relationship, they mostly refrained from open conflict.16 Their explicit mistrust of one 
another was only equaled by their calculated tolerance as evidenced by their tacit 
understanding that Y!"#nnis would independently oversee the affairs of the north while 
Menelik would expand to the south (Bahru, 2002)17. As a result, even before his 
coronation as n!gusä nägäst (King of Kings) of Ethiopia on November 1889, Menelik 
incorporated various Oromo groups, followed by the annexation of Guraghe, Arsi, and 
Harar. Others like Wolaita, Kafa, Beni Shangul and Asosa were added to his empire later 
on (Henze, 2000). While some of the annexations were negotiated, most of them involved 
bloody battles. In succeeding Y!"#nnis, Menelik effortlessly took over the north, 
annexed the south and made the center his political capital. In Menelik, Ethiopia found its 
closest form to its current map. 
Unfortunately for Ethiopia, there was little time to heal the bruises of incessant 
battles of unification internally as forces of colonization loomed externally. The opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869 meant the strategic and commercial importance of the Red Sea 
inflated, and in the eyes of Europe it was too valuable to be left alone (Marcus, 1994). 
This was followed by the infamous Berlin Conference (1884-1885) that formalized and 
validated the scramble of Africa by Europeans for Europeans. This meeting would have a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Under the premises of the Leche Agreement, Menelik agreed to be Y!"#nnis’s subordinate. By the same 
token, Y!"#nnis promised Menelik to recognize the latter’s autonomy: “I shall respect your sovereignty if 
you will faithful to the agreements decided between us” (Marcus, 1975, p.56). 
 
17 One of the reasons they avoided military confrontation was because both were aware of the external 
threats of provocation and invasion posed on the country, most notably by Egypt and Italy.!
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direct consequence for Ethiopia as Italy, under the blessing of Britain, began deploying 
its troops, on one hand, and negotiated with Menelik, albeit treacherously, on the other 
(Bahru, 2002).18 The two parties finally came to a diplomatic stalemate upon Menelik’s 
realization of the deceitful interpretation of the Treaty of Wuchale that was drafted by 
Italy and signed by the two parties in May 1889 (Jonas, 2011).19 Toward the end of 1895, 
Menelik, accompanied by his wife Empress Taitu, his generals and a nationwide army, 
marched to the north to meet the Italians in battle. In what would be remembered as an 
unprecedented victory not only for Ethiopia but also for Africans under colonial rule, 
Menelik and his troops decisively defeated the Italian forces at the Battle of Adwa to 
sustain independent Ethiopia (Milkias & Getachew, 2005).  
With colonial threats thwarted and internal centralization consolidated, Menelik and 
his political entourage succeeded where their predecessors failed. However, it is 
important to note that the tendency to treat Téwodros, Y!"#nnis and Menelik 
independently from one another that is commonplace in Ethiopian history writing 
sometimes steals the opportunity to see the unison in their trinity. The post zamana 
mas!fint Ethiopia that took its present shape by the turn of the 20th century was more of a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Italy, along with Germany, came to the colonial race late compared to Britain and France because they 
were going through internal struggles of unification until 1870 and 1871 respectively. As a result, Italy was 
desperate to catch up with her European counterparts and annexed the present territories of Libya, 
Somaliland and Eritrea, and made an unsuccessful attempt to occupy Ethiopia. Britain supported the Italian 
invasion of Ethiopia believing the Italians would perpetuate British imperialist interests both on the Red 
Sea and the Blue Nile. 
 
19 Article XVII of the Treaty of Wuchale stated that the emperor of Ethiopia “could” have recourse to the 
good offices of the Italian government in his dealings with other foreign powers. In the words of Bahru, 
“the role prescribed for Italy was little more than that of a glorified postman” (2002, p.75); but the Italian 
text of the treaty had the word “must.” Based on their own text, the Italians proclaimed a protectorate over 
Ethiopia (Rubenson, 1964). !
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slowly cooked stew than a quickly fried potato. It involved a relay of different ingredients 
and different cooks and at times different recipes, but always the same taste.       
The place of Menelik in the history of Ethiopian state formation remains significant 
but controversial. Assessing his legacy in the state formation process of contemporary 
Ethiopia, particularly in the context of the dominant political school of thought today in 
Ethiopia, is contentious. Three of the most challenging questions that stirred Ethiopian 
politics in the 20th century—that of land (Ellis, 1976; Gilkes, 1975; Merera, 2008); ethno-
nationalism (Aalen, 2011; Engedayehu, 1993; Gashaw, 1993) and Eritrea (Haile, 1987; 
Tekeste, 1997; Tekle, 1989)—were sown during Menelik’s Ethiopia. 
The Rise of Teferi: From Reformation to Absolutism  
When Menelik became ill and was clearly not capable of leading the country shortly 
after the turn of the 20th century, the question of peaceful succession was once again to be 
a grueling exercise. Prominent figures of Menelik’s cabinet became increasingly wary of 
the growing presence and ego of Empress Taitu, a woman of extraordinary and 
unrelenting strength in character and arguably the most assiduous strategist at the victory 
of Adwa (Bahru, 2002). Her incessant appointments and dismissals in the absence of her 
incapacitated husband were probably meant to validate her candidacy to the crown 
although it ended up antagonizing the Shoa dominated cabinet and nobility that 
eventually forced her complete retirement from Ethiopian politics (Milkias, 2011).  
The withdrawal of Taitu and the eventual death of Menelik officially opened the 
scramble to the throne amongst powerful factions that was eventually won by forces loyal 
to Abeto Iyasu. Iyasu’s rule that lasted for 5 years between 1911-1916, although short, 
was very significant for his distinctive and unconventional administrative methods that 
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also, unfortunately, brought forth his demise. Unlike his predecessors, the teenage ruler 
developed a benevolent and mutual relationship with marginal groups like the Somali 
(Milkias, 2011). His departure from the dogma of the aristocracy of Shoa and his 
inclusive policy toward historically estranged people occasioned reverence in the 
periphery but resentment in the center. Iyasu’s radical democratic experiments in terms of 
recognizing Ethiopian heterogeneity in faith and ethnicity was a clear deviation from the 
Téwodros-Y!"#nnis-Menelik administrative praxis, except that it was not tempered by 
political sophistication and method. His plotters, now gathered against what they viewed 
as a common enemy, would eventually propagate his blatant sexual lust and the 
unfounded story of his conversion to Islam, essentially alienating him from the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church and, therefore, legitimacy to rule (Bahru, 2002). They eventually 
prevailed bringing a premature end to the controversial ruler, and after a period of some 
uncertainty none other than the illustrious Ras Teferi Mekonen, a.k.a. Haylä S$llasé, 
would capitalize on the situation.  
Arguably, no single past leader in Ethiopian history divides pubic opinion more 
than Haylä S$llasé does. His followers speak of him in awe and adoration to this day. His 
global influence is such that he is practically worshiped in some cultures and places 
(Barrett, 1997). On the contrary, the younger and educated generation of his time alludes 
to him “with a degree of resentment and ridicule almost unprecedented in Ethiopian 
history” (Bahru, 1994, p.31).   
When Haylä S$llasé’s presence was starting to be strongly felt in Ethiopian politics 
in 1916, he was the personification of reformation. He understood the importance of 
institutions for a strong financial and economic base and instilled the foundation to 
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Ethiopian bureaucracy. His achievements in the education sector, oftentimes personally 
overseen, were unmatched. Landmark pubic institutions in areas like construction, 
transportation and communications still carry the emperor’s imprints. His was a reign that 
is remembered as the pillar of Ethiopian centralization, a line of thinking that is 
vociferously dismissed by the dominant ethno-nationalism political discourse of 
contemporary Ethiopia, but an extraordinary achievement when seen in the context of the 
era he operated (Marcus, 1987).  
Unfortunately, Haylä S!llasé’s reforms and achievements were negatively 
correlated with his political longevity. The longer he stayed in power, the more he 
became obsessed with it. He suffocated the educated elite to be extensions of his absolute 
rule and not agents of change (Marcus, 1999). Regions hardly had internal autonomy 
(with the exception of Eritrea), a clear relegation from the progress made during the 
Y"#$nnis and Menelik era. He aborted early signs of progressive land reform and tried to 
hold on to the feudal landlords and the nobility. Worst of all, his increasing concern with 
glamour and luxury was in stark contrast with the destitution of the peasantry and the 
famine-stricken community of northern Ethiopia (Bahru, 1995).  
International Relations, Modernization and the Proliferation of Global Capitalism 
One of the distinctive features of the Teferi era was the significant importance 
attached to international relations and diplomacy. Teferi always felt Ethiopian 
sovereignty and security depended on successful interpretation of global political and 
economic trends as well as integration into and representation in international platforms 
(Bahru, 2011). He incessantly sought to secure Ethiopia a membership at the League of 
Nations, thinking it would provide unquestioned sovereignty under international law and 
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abrogate the Tripartite power’s arms embargo. Ethiopia joined the League of Nations in 
1923, although this act didn’t bring the absolute sovereignty Teferi hoped it would as it 
failed to protect Ethiopia from Fascist Italy’s invasion in 1935 (Henze, 2000).  
Teferi’s astute attentiveness to international affairs led him to believe that 
Ethiopia’s economic dependence on Europe limited its bargaining potential both 
politically and economically. He sought on diversifying Ethiopia’s trade partners by 
turning to the likes of United States, India and Jamaica. He particularly singled out the 
United States to be the most important ally, correctly predicting it would be the most 
dominant power after WWII. The United States was also keen to support the emperor in 
light of the Ethiopia’s participation in the United Nation’s effort in Korea (Vestal, 2011). 
As a result, in addition to facilitating Ethiopia’s entry to the United Nations in 1943, the 
United States played a crucial role in the recovery of Eritrea to Ethiopia and the modern 
development of the Ethiopian military, among other things. So close was the relationship 
between the two countries that Ethiopian investment accounted for 70% of the Point Four 
program of the United States (Bahru, 1995).  
Haylä S!llasé’s partnership with the United States facilitated Ethiopia’s growing 
integration with the global capitalist order. His visit to the United States in 1954 may as 
well represent the peak of Ethio-American relations. Most notably, America became the 
primary destination of Ethiopian coffee and it became Ethiopia’s chief partner in military 
equipment, capital, education and technology. By the time he died in 1974, Haylä S!llasé 
would have made more than 80 official visits to different countries. Arguably, he remains 
the most important figure in the history of Ethiopia’s foreign affairs to this day (Levine, 
1961). 
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Feudal Aristocracy and the Rise of Neopatrimonial Governance 
While Haylä S!llasé’s African and global glory was ballooning, his local 
acceptance rate was slowly deteriorating. The issue of land is probably one of the most 
controversial and lingering themes in Ethiopian politics even to this day. This may not be 
surprising given the fact that it has been the principal generator of revenue for the 
Ethiopian State for centuries. When Haylä S!llasé returned from his exile in Great Britain 
after the ousting of Fascist Italy, his legitimacy to rule was scrutinized by a section of the 
population who believed he should have led the resistance against the Italians from 
inside. Circumspect of threats like these and others, Haylä S!llasé took different 
measures to stamp his absolute authority (Marcus, 1994).  
One such measure was the widespread practice of neopatrimonialism—the use of 
state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general public. Although 
neopatrimonalism is nothing new in Ethiopian political history, it was Haylä S!llasé who 
can be deemed to have systematically instituted it to assert his uncontested absolutism. 
He molded his government with a clientelistic design where progression toward the top 
could only be achieved through successfully recruiting patrons that fed the system 
(Kapu!ci"ski, 1983).  
At the same time, he successfully atomized his political appointees by reshuffling 
them constantly to ensure that potential rivals would remain competitive rather than 
collaborative. The result was exactly what he aspired for—extreme concentration of 
personal power around himself, and a minimal degree of independent bureaucratic 
policymaking (Bahru, 1995). He no longer embraced modernization as an agent of 
change for Ethiopia as he once used to but as a tool to buttress his absolutist regime. Even 
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when embracing modernization, Haylä S!llasé always understood the absolute 
importance of sustaining his celestial figure, as can be noted on his address, King of 
Kings, Lord of Lords, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah. This was a key discourse 
that kept the majority of the rather religious citizenry in complete submission even in the 
face of economic hardship (Bahru, 1995).  
One major method to reward patrons and cadres was the extensive privatization of 
government land. This was not surprising given the most important asset of any given 
feudal agrarian economy is land (Pankhurst, 2001). The aim, just like everything else in 
the political maneuvering strategy and apparatus of Haylä S!llasé, was to broaden the 
basis of support for the monarchy, although, more often than not, it reduced the peasantry 
into nothingness in the eyes of the feudal lords who were mostly the patrons of the 
Emperor (Henze, 2000). This process of privatization was mostly prevalent in the south 
where Menilek’s conquests had successfully secured vast acres of land. The most notable 
practice was the gabbar system where northern settlers acquired tributary rights over 
Southern peasants, the gebbar. In most instances, the land of the gebbar was forcefully 
seized or coercively bought with an extremely deflated price by the eventual feudal lord. 
Equally exploitative was the madarya system where “land given to those in government 
service in lieu of salary was made convertible to freehold” (Bahru, 2002, p.191). These 
practices created an unprecedented tenancy consisting of more than 65% of the 
population in most Southern regions and subjecting the peasantry to an unwavering trap 
of poverty (Bahru, 2002). Most feudal landlords subjected their tenants in absentia 
through different sharecropping arrangements. Between the cut to the landlord, the strain 
of the tithe and sometimes land tax, the Ethiopian tenancy had to endure an unbearable 
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burden. As the Emperor aged, however, this very act of turning a deaf ear to the 
peasantry will come to haunt him (Bahru, 2002).   
Revolts, Coups, and Revolution: The Decadence and Decline of Haylä S!llasé  
Although Haylä S!llasé’s obsession with absolute power created a strong central 
government, it woefully misconstrued and ignored the gravity of the many calls for 
reform (Henze, 2000). The very few attempts that were made by the Emperor to address 
these issues were perfunctory at best. One example was the revised constitution of 1955, 
a major disappointment for the progressive populace of Ethiopia who aspired for a 
transition toward a modern constitutional monarchy or a republic. Unsurprisingly, the 
revised constitution was only a reaffirmation of the Emperor’s ploy to perpetuate the 
status quo, a mere façade for a “modernizing” Ethiopia (Bahru, 2002). Not only did the 
constitution fail to appease the growing plea for reform, but also unequivocally sealed the 
divine immunity of the aging emperor.20  
One of the first serious challenges to the Emperor came from prominent members 
of the resistance against the Italian occupation. Leaders of the Resistance like Belay 
Zeleqe, Negash Bezabih and Tekle Wolde-Hawariat resented Haylä S!llasé because he 
chose exile over leading the resistance from within (Bahiru, 2000). Their bitterness 
toward the emperor was further compounded after his restoration when he, in a typical 
neopatrimonial fashion, rewarded his compatriots in exile with honors and political 
appointments while he systematically attempted to isolate and marginalize leaders of the 
resistance. The latter constantly showed their apathy by trying to delegitimize the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Article 4 of the Revised Constitution of Ethiopia of 1955 stipulates: “By virtue of His Imperial Blood, as 
well as by the anointing which He has received, the person of the Emperor is sacred, His dignity is 
inviolable and His Powers indisputable. He is consequently entitled to all the honors due to Him in 
accordance with tradition and the present Constitution. Any one so bold as to seek to injure the Emperor 
will be punished.” 
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Emperor’s restoration to power or in some cases by attempting to dethrone him. Haylä 
S!llasé’s retribution was swift that resulted in the imprisonment and execution of the 
opposition (Bahru, 2002). 
Between his restoration in 1941 and his dethroning in 1974, Haylä S!llasé never 
looked back in cracking down anything that came between him and his absolute rule. The 
attempted coup d’état of 1960 by Mengistu and Germame Neway was one such example. 
The Neway brothers challenged the regime for more eclectic reasons. Both were zealots 
of the Black Lion Organization21 and declared their concerns about the backwardness of 
the Ethiopian mass and the need to revamp the economic and political structure, although 
land, the most fundamental question of the mass, was missing in their discourse (Milkias, 
2011). The duo finally executed their coup while the Emperor was on an official visit to 
Latin America in December 1960. In the end the coup was an utter failure mainly because 
of lack of clear communication and inept organization.  
Although the attempted coup was instantly foiled, it played a significant role in 
undermining the Emperor’s invincibility. Different peasant rebellions sprouted in 
different parts of the country. While these rebellions may not have been necessarily 
related to each other, they represented discontent over the administration’s inefficiency 
and corruption on land allocation and multifarious taxation. These rebellions were no 
match for the emperor’s military and were averted swiftly, although they succeeded in 
reaffirming the system’s refusal to reform, and, in doing so, setting in motion a force that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 The Black Lions Organization led the anti-fascist resistance movement during the Italian occupation 
of Ethiopia. Although the organization had marginal impact in the resistance movement, it made “eloquent 
attempts to give the struggle coherent ideological and political direction” (Bahru, 2002, p. 74). !
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would finally bring down the Haylä S!llasé regime—the Ethiopian Students Movement 
(Kapu!ci"ski, 1983). 
When Haylä S!llasé expanded schools and higher institutions in Ethiopia with the 
belief that development can only be achieved through education, little did he knew that 
the force he had created through this system would occasion his demise.  So dedicated 
was the Emperor to Ethiopian scholarship that he personally oversaw the Ministry of 
Education and supervised the expansion of education facilities including high schools, 
colleges and universities.  Haylä S!llasé’s miscalculation in the purpose of the emerging 
educated elite, however, lay in his faulty assumption that the critical mass he was 
creating, by its very design, couldn’t be confined in the box of reform he hatched for it 
(Bahru, 1995). Haylä S!llasé envisioned the educated mass would serve his system and 
modernize it from within. The educated elite, on the other hand, believed the Emperor’s 
neopatrimonal system that is held together by clientalist networks and corrupt 
bureaucracy is incapable of reform. By the beginning of the 1970s the growing consensus 
among this group was that the system cannot be rectified and should be toppled (Marcus, 
1994).             
After the Ethiopian Student Movement evolved though various stages, its most 
critical phase of the early 1970 was characterized by radicalization, a legacy that still 
defines contemporary Ethiopian politics.  Although many circumstances including the 
worsening situation of the urban masses and escalation of imperial repression contributed 
to the revolutionary tone of the Ethiopian Student Movement, no other factor catalyzed 
the cause more vigorously than the situation in rural Ethiopia. The Ethiopian University 
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Service (EUS)22 played a significant role in this regard by exposing the abysmal 
condition of the peasantry to university students. The mission of the movement 
crystallized in the minds of students and progressive sections of the community under 
one of most emblematic slogans of modern Ethiopian history, “Land to the Tiller” 
(Bahru, 2002).   
Military Rule, Socialism and Command Economy 
The Ethiopian Student Movement was unparalleled in its resolution for progress 
and change at many different levels. Its commitment to social justice and equity was 
contagious across urban Ethiopia, as evidenced by its mustering civil servants and service 
providers to its cause. However, this movement also left a thorny legacy to the Ethiopian 
political culture by sowing the seeds of political mistrust, intolerance and animus that 
repeatedly consumed buds of democracy and dialogue (Bahru, 2010). It was 
characterized by the “you-are-with-us-or-against-us” narrative where embracing the 
farthest left was not only advocated but expected. Reminiscent to Lenin’s declaration on 
the undisputed dictatorship of the proletariat and the perils of neutrality, the movement 
interpreted ideological differences as reactionary to change. 23 Questioning Marxism-
Leninism was seen as betrayal to the cause. In the words of Bahru, “Marxism-Leninism 
was embraced as a creed rather than as a system of thought to help interpret the Ethiopian 
reality” (2002, p. 226). In essence, the movement, under a Marxist-Leninist ideological !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 The Ethiopian University Service (EUS) was a program inaugurated by the then Haylä S!llasé I 
University in September 1964 “calling upon students to interrupt their university studies to serve their 
country for one year… primarily as teachers in the rural areas of Ethiopia” (Korten & Korten, 1966, p. 1). !
23 In a speech discussing the Chief Committee for Political Education, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin told the 
assembled delegates that “It is with absolute frankness that we speak of this struggle of the proletariat; each 
man must choose between joining our side or the other side. Any attempt to avoid taking sides in this issue 
must end in fiasco.” !
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façade, unwittingly reinvented the long-standing culture of dissenting alternative views 
practiced by the crown.  
Even more unfortunate in this process of change was the ill fate the Ethiopian 
people had to live through, as the agenda for change set forth by the unsuspecting 
students was disowned by a lurking military caucus. So focused were the students on 
challenging the crown that they didn’t quite envisage the Ethiopian political trajectory 
once the Emperor is gone. The removal of the crown was treated as an end rather than an 
episode in the movement to create an inclusive and egalitarian nation. 
Focused on averting the popular unrest, the crown was oblivious to the brewing 
dissatisfaction in the military and miscalculated the latter’s standing. At first, the military 
was remotely following the growing pubic discontent on the government’s failure to 
bring about meaningful political and economic reform. Eventually, sections of the 
military started raising their concerns about rising inflation and corruption in the 
government (Tiruneh, 1993). Whereas these concerns came to prominence gradually, the 
immediate causes of the inevitable revolution came from two directions. The first one 
was the famine that affected several provinces in the north, and that—to the fury of the 
public—was concealed from the outside world in what many believed to be an attempt to 
keep the prestige and eminence of the emperor at the expense of thousands of lives 
(Tiruneh, 1993). The second—and more climacteric—immediate cause for the 1974 
revolution surfaced as a result of a mutiny by a section of the military in the south over 
poor food and water conditions (Tareke, 2008). The protest resulted in an immediate 
dynamo effect where other units throughout the military in the country showed their 
support.   
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The Ethiopian military had its own inner factional tensions on and before the 
prelude to the revolution. This was a deliberate strategy inducted by the Emperor in order 
to prevent a person or a group from becoming too powerful. This strategy worked to a 
certain extent until the military started uniting in support of demands for better salaries 
and working conditions. In an array of perturbed responses, the government introduced 
some changes to appease both the public and the military. It reshuffled the cabinet, 
changed personnel in the prime minister position, revised the constitution, introduced 
substantial reforms, postponed unpopular changes in the education system, instituted 
price rollbacks and controls to check inflation and installed a series of salary increments 
to the military (Bahru, 2002). 
These measures were not enough to appease both the public and the military who 
sensed an increasingly weakening government. By now the military has largely organized 
itself and formed the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and 
Territorial Army that soon came to be called the Derg. The Derg was mainly comprised 
of junior officers who broke away from senior officials whom the former thought 
sympathized with the crown. None of these junior officials, who totaled about 120, were 
above the rank of major and remained largely anonymous during the time. They elected 
Major (later Colonel) Mengistu Haile Mariam chairman, the man who would rule over 
Ethiopia for the next 17 years with absolute power and despotism (Henze, 2000).  
The Derg’s discreet organizational structure and its carefully designed 
representative composure from all over the country were critical elements in its success 
to mobilize the entire military establishment, thereby effectively decapitating the 
government’s executive power. In the propaganda ground, the Derg also played smartly 
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by professing its allegiance to the Emperor to buy time while at the same time arresting 
members of the aristocracy, military, and government who were closely associated with 
the crown. By the end of July 1974, the Derg engineered to win a series of political and 
administrative concessions from the crown that effectively made the Emperor and his 
associates non-factors in the affairs of the country (Tiruneh, 1993).    
The “creeping coup” by the Derg had all the necessary conditions to succeed. 
Seizing on the momentum of the public’s unrelenting demand for change, the Derg 
adopted a nationalist persona by proclaiming Etiopia Teqdäm (Ethiopia First) as its 
guiding philosophy (Milkias, 2006). It soon abandoned the revised constitution and the 
plan to create a constitutional monarchy, arrested more affiliates of the emperor, and 
nationalized imperial holdings (Clapham, 1988). The final act of the Derg was to accuse 
the Emperor of covering up the famine of the early 1970s that allegedly had killed 
100,000 to 200,000 people, much to the outrage of the people that demanded the 
Emperor’s arrest (Bahru, 2002). The Derg finally imprisoned the Emperor on September 
12, 1974, and eventually transformed itself into the Provisional Military Administrative 
Council (PMAC) under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Aman Mikael Andom, 
and proclaimed itself the nation’s ruling body (Tiruneh, 1993).  
The formation of the PMAC was one of the first signs that the popular revolution 
led by students, teachers and proletarian supporters was hijacked by the military. 
PAMC’s subsequent and swift violent actions gave a prelude to the grim trajectory of the 
Ethiopian state for the next 17 years. First came the assassination of the ailing Emperor in 
1975 in his captivity under the allegation that his loyalists could galvanize support 
against the revolution. This was followed by the assassination of PAMC’s elected 
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chairperson Lieutenant General Aman Mikael Andom by a clique loyal to Majors 
Mengistu Haile Mariam and Atnafu Abate. Scores of other assassinations and 
disappearances involving former cabinet members, aides of the royalty and critiques of 
the Mengistu leadership became commonplace (Henze, 2000).  
In a short period of time Mengistu Haile Mariam assumed total military, 
administrative, and political control of Ethiopia. To his credit, the major the revolution’s 
chief demand and the Ethiopian students’ primary slogan “land to the tiller” was 
implemented. All lands—rural and urban—were nationalized and overseen by gäbäré 
mahbärs (peasant associations) and qäbäles (smallest administrative divisions). While 
this move was originally celebrated and embraced by many, the peasant associations and 
qäbäles soon became tools of control and oppression (Bahru, 2002). Qäbäles and gäbäré 
mahbärs became very powerful bodies that collected taxes and assumed “free action” 
endorsements that gave them the power to hunt and kill government opponents without 
judicial proceedings (Bahru, 2002).  
Mengistu, now an absolute strongman of the Derg, advocated for hebrätäsäbawinät 
(socialism) as the political and economic directive of the state (James et al., 2002; 
Makonen, 2001). In collaboration with radical student groups from Ethiopia and abroad, 
Marxist scientific socialism infiltrated into every government, social, political, economic 
and even cultural facets of the Ethiopian society. In a move to strengthen its communist 
credentials, partly with the aim of ensuring Soviet support, the Derg established the 
Commission to Organize the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE) that was 
eventually replaced by the more civilian Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE) in 1984 
(Tiruneh, 1993). This was followed by the formulation of a new national constitution that 
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formed the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) in 1987, formally 
abolishing the PMAC. The new constitution gave extraordinary powers to the President. 
The power of the state at the local government level was limited to executing the central 
government’s decrees and orders. Although Mengistu’s government attempted to give 
WEP a civilian façade, more than 50% of the Party Congress was composed of military 
affiliates. Practically, “the seemingly civilian Ethiopian Workers’ Party served the Derg 
only as an instrument of political control” (Milikias, 2011, p. 70).  
From the onset the Derg’s path to totalitarianism faced some serious challenges. A 
number of Marxist parties of varying political programs and interpretations of the 
Ethiopian socio-economic context emerged, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party 
(EPRP) and the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON) being the most active and 
conspicuous (Kiflu, 1993; Pausewang and Tronvoll, 2002). The EPRP was ruthlessly 
crushed during the time the Derg launched the Red Terror, which gave license to its 
followers to capture and kill the rebels (although EPRP also made a similar offensive 
through its “White Terror” campaign). On the other hand, MEISON took a more 
diplomatic direction initially by giving critical support to the Derg. However, MEISON 
soon had a falling out with the Derg as well and its leaders were killed in combat or 
executed after being captured (Gebre-Yesus, 1980; Tareke, 2008; Tibebu, 1991). 
It was, however, a guerilla offensive from the north that would bring the Derg to its 
demise. In early 1988, two Marxist-oriented insurgent groups, the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), began to 
coordinate their attacks against the Derg. With changing global geopolitical trends and 
pressing civil war in the north, Mengistu Haile Mariam was forced to throw his Soviet 
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cloak and embrace free market economy (Milkias, 2011). In the meantime, the TPLF 
created an umbrella organization called the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary 
Front (EPDRF) by bringing together major ethnic dissidents. In 1991, EPRDF defeated 
the Derg’s army and entered Addis Ababa in May. Almost all major Derg leaders were 
soon arrested and jailed with the exception of Mengistu Haile Mariam who fled to 
Zimbabwe shortly before Addis fell to the rebels. Once the EPRDF seized full control of 
the country, it collaborated with EPLF, which had already occupied Eritrea for the latter 
to carry out a referendum and secede (Henze, 2000). 
Ethiopia since EPRDF 
EPRDF and the Rise Ethno-nationalism 
When the Derg was under a verge of collapse and news of northern insurgents 
reached the masses, people who were critical of the regime hardly put any resistance to 
the tide and the military apparatus disintegrated quickly. In the meantime, TPLF 
underwent a process through which it reformed its agenda of liberating Tigray and 
Tigrayans to removing the leadership of the Derg from the entire nation. In order to 
garner legitimacy for its newfound nationwide cause, TPLF sought to forge a united front 
by collaborating first with the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM), a 
breakaway organization of the EPRP constituting mainly of Amharas from Gondar, 
Wallo, and northern Shoa regions that later renamed itself the Amhara National 
Democratic Movement (ANDM) (Vestal, 1999). Later TPLF brought together military 
captives of Oromo lineage from the war with the Derg, and together with defectors form 
the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), it created the Oromo People’s Democratic 
Organization (OPDO) to claim legitimacy in the Oromia region (Habtu, 2003; Merera, 
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2007). The front was completed when the Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Front 
(SEPDF) comprising 46 linguistic groups from southern Ethiopia was added. This 
coalition formed the EPRDF (Vestal, 1999). 
Once Mengistu fled, the EPRDF led by the TPLF took control of Addis Ababa 
without much resistance and bloodshed. The relatively peaceful proceedings that 
followed were helped by the adoption of a provisional charter signed in London in July 
1991 that subsequently formed the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) 
constituting the EPRDF, the Eritrean and Oromo Liberation Fronts, and about 20 other 
ethnic-based organizations and political factions (Vestal, 1999). However, what seemed 
to start as a democratic venture cultivated a tenacious clout when the Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF) expressed its concern about TPLF’s indefinite interest of political 
domination despite the latter’s minority standing (Pausewang, Tronvoll & Aalen, 2002). 
Part of OLF’s discontent stemmed from TPLF’s move to cultivate, endorse and 
popularize OPDO, which the former believes is deliberately designed to nurture TPLF’s 
minority rule instead of advancing the cause of the Oromo, the largest ethic group in the 
Ethiopian populace. OLF eventually departed from the government and announced its 
return to armed struggle. In a similar fashion, members of the Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ 
Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) also left the government (Vestal, 1999). 
When the attempt to address the question of Ethiopian ethno-nationalism, first 
through cultural homogenization and state centralization and later by means of a Marxist-
Leninist framework failed, the third experiment was unleashed by EPRDF on the basis of 
ethnic federalism (Habtu, 2003; Mengisteab, 1997; Tesfaye, 2002). As briefly discussed 
earlier, the history of state formation in Ethiopia is a contested discourse that comprises 
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some profound divisions among its stakeholders. At one extreme, pan-Ethiopian 
nationalists argue Ethiopia is a nation-state of a 3,000 years old history of the Ethiopian 
state that has successfully developed an “Ethiopian” identity and assimilated other 
“periphery” cultures into the Amhara-Tigray core culture. For some, the ruling classes of 
this core “Ethiopian” identity “cannot be identified with a particular ethnic group. They 
are a multi-ethnic group whose only common factors are that they are Christians, 
Amharic speakers, and claim lineage to the Solomonic line” (Gashaw, 1993, p. 42). 
At the other extreme lie ethno-nationalist groups like the Oromo Liberation Front 
(OLF) who argue contemporary Ethiopia is created by the expansion of Abyssinia 
(central and northern Ethiopia, the historic core of Ethiopian polity) that “colonized,” 
through the conquests of Menelik II, most of the southern nations and peoples in the last 
quarter of the 19th century. Ethno-nationalist groups therefore believe that contemporary 
Ethiopia is “a colonial empire that needs to undergo decolonization where ‘ethno-
national’ colonies become independent states” (Lewis, 1993, p. 160). The image of 
Ethiopia for this camp is conclusively that of colonial-state (Hassen, 1990; Jalata, 1993; 
1995, Lewis, 1993; Smith, 2013). 
A third, “more sensible” (Habtu, 2003, p. 9) and constructivist alternative to the 
previous state formation theses of Ethiopia is that of a non-colonial, historically evolved 
empire-state. “The ancient Ethiopian state, short-term contractions in size 
notwithstanding, expanded, over a long historical period, through the conquest and 
incorporation of adjoining kingdoms, principalities, sultanates, etc., as indeed most states 
in the world were formed” (Habtu, 2003, pp. 9-10). This group sees Ethiopia as a 
multicultural collage where its polity draws sense of nationhood from the salient bonds 
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that hold it together (Levine, 1974; Yates, 2009). 
Consequently, EPRDF’s ethnic-nationalism experiment carved up the nation into 
ethnic regions along with a new constitution that provides some radical ethnic self-rule 
provisions. Such was the unprecedented endorsement of ethnic nationalism under the 
TGE that Article 39 of the 1994 Ethiopian constitution stipulates “Every nation, 
nationality or people in Ethiopia shall have the unrestricted right to self determination up 
to secession” (Constitution of the FDRE, 1995). This makes the Ethiopian state the only 
country with such a provision globally. The rationale for adopting this resolution by 
EPRDF and other participants of the TGE was to satisfy the ideological and ethnic 
differences of the stakeholders involved in the making of the post-Mengistu era. It was 
believed that such provisions would forge a long-lasting political framework that would 
be acceptable to all. The flipside, however, is that “if this pragmatic formula failed to 
work, the country might implode and catapult Ethiopia toward an ethnic quagmire” 
(Milikias, 2011, p. 82). 
The leader of both TPLF and EPRDF at the time, Meles Zenawi, who would 
become the grand connoisseur and architect-in-chief of EPRDF’s Ethiopia until his death 
in August 2012, became the President of the TGE. Internally, the power structure of the 
EPRDF assumed, both at politburo and central committee levels, equal votes for the three 
ethnic entities (TPLF, ANDM, and OPDO) and the multiethnic entity SEPDF although in 
reality many commentators agree TPLF to be the mover and shaker of the Front. Soon 
after EPRDF added other “affiliate” parties to its roster in the remaining five regions 
including Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, Afar, Somali, and Harari. 
! 57 
One of the first lines of duty under the new regime was overseeing the separation of 
Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1991. Between 1991 and 1995, the political space grew narrower 
as many EPRDF unaffiliated parties left or were pushed out of the TGE (Vestal, 1999). In 
May 1995, the first national elections took place in which EPRDF won the majority votes 
and Meles Zenawi was sworn in as Prime Minister. The EPRDF formed the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) government and remained at the helm of 
Ethiopian political power since then. 
Assessing the legacy of EPRDF in the unfolding evolution of the Ethiopian state is 
not only a daunting task but also methodologically unsound given the unfinished and 
active role it still is playing in the country. However, it is fair to conclude that perceptions 
and attitudes toward EPRDF’s rule, archetypal to modern Ethiopian political history, are 
controversial, if not polarized. Supporters claim that Ethiopia took some progressive and 
brave steps in the right path under the leadership of EPRDF. They argue equitable state 
building and electoral democratization are slowly being implemented with elections 
taking place in 1992, 1994, 1995, 2000, and 2005. They contend private and independent 
media are constitutionally allowed to operate; the right to free speech was granted in a 
departure from the totalitarian Derg period; long-standing group identity questions were 
constitutionally addressed and ethnic groups were empowered through self-governance 
and cultural and linguistic autonomy, replacing unitary authoritarianism with a 
multiethnic egalitarian nation state; and a relatively robust free market economy with 
large-scale privatization was put in place abandoning the inefficient and sterile command 
economy (Berhanu, 2008; Hammond, 1999; Henze, 2000; Young, 1997; Young, 2000). 
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On the other hand, dissidents point out that the EPRDF ethnic coalition doesn’t 
truly reflect a legitimate representation of the Ethiopian populace but is rather a pretext to 
sustain TPLF’s minority hegemony. They accuse TPLF of deliberately amplifying ethnic 
tensions that has the aim of creating insecurity for other groups, which in turn affords 
TPLF uncontested power. They argue constitutionally guaranteed human rights have 
been violated every year; the press, though free to operate constitutionally, has been 
harassed, with editors being regularly incarcerated or exiled; political parties that EPRDF 
considers threatening to its hegemony have been outlawed, and those that chose to 
compete have been systematically hunted down with their members reportedly getting 
harassed, arrested, made to disappear or flee; elections have been marred by 
irregularities, harassment, intimidation, ballot rigging, and even outright murders by 
supporters of the government; the EPRDF-led government appoints and refused to 
reorganize the election board into a neutral body; and extra-judicial arrests and even 
killings have been reported over the years. Critics charge EPRDF of: favoritism to 
unaudited TPLF-owned mega-business empires and parastatals that monopolize key 
sectors of the Ethiopian economy; intimidation of the rural masses are prevalent through 
confiscation of farmlands and denial of fertilizers in retribution to opposition party 
support; widespread jamming, content filtering, blocking, online surveillance over 
information communication technologies have been practiced targeting dissidents; and 
diversion of international aid as a tool to maximize control and submission (Albin-
Lackey & Human Rights Watch, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 1998; Human Rights 
Watch, 2005; Kendie, 2003; McCracken, 2004; Pausewang, Tronvoll, & Aalen, 2002; 
Rawlence, B., Lefkow, L., & Human Rights Watch, 2010; Vestal, 1999). 
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The Politics and Economy of Abiyotawi Dimokrasi 
When EPRDF assumed power in 1991, some of its initial public declarations were 
the disbanding of command economy, the championship of pluralism, and establishment 
of free market civil society. For historians who follow the origins and evolution of 
EPRDF and particularly TPLF, this was more of a strategic rather than ideological move 
that had the aim of, on one hand, appeasing the West which supplied Ethiopia with 
economic aid, and on the other hand, distancing itself from the global fall of communism 
with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Regardless, EPRDF’s core values remained 
to be influenced by Marxist-Leninist tenets (Tadesse & Young, 2003).  
TPLF’s Marxist-Leninist affiliations date back to its founding. Like most of the 
leftist political parties of Ethiopia, the TPLF had grown out of the Ethiopian Student 
Movement of the 1960s and 1970s in Addis Ababa University (AAU) (Berhe, 2004). 
After the establishment of Tigray Student Association in 1971, students of Tigrayan 
origin aspired to expand their association to a larger Tigrayan constituency by creating 
the Tigray National Organization in 1974, which in turn transformed itself into TPLF in 
1975. Between 1975 and 1991, TPLF revised its political program a number of times 
(Berhe, 2004). At first, it sought to struggle for the liberation and independence of Tigray 
based on discourses of oppression as outlined in its 1976 manifesto. In the latter years of 
the 1970s TPLF embrace a more nationwide liberation agenda in which Tigray would 
gain autonomy. In order to mobilize the Tigrayan rural mass and find an alternative to 
Soviet socialism due to USSR’s alliance with the Derg regime, TPLF rebranded itself 
under Maoist lines. In the 1980s, however, Maoism was rejected for being 
accommodative to the bourgeois and was replaced by a “purer”, “less revisionist” and 
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unapologetic Albanian socialism (Young, 1996). During the same decade the Marxist 
Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) was created within TPLF under the influence of 
Meles Zenawi and Abay Tsehaye. This ideological wing of TPLF had been largely 
influential in adopting the eventual guiding principle of EPRDF “abiyotawi dimokrasi” or 
“revolutionary democracy” (Abbink, 1995). 
As Bach (2011) discusses, the notion of bringing about democratic platforms 
through revolutionary means “emerged from a Leninist interpretation of Marx’s 
Proletariat Dictatorship thesis” (p. 641). Revolutionary democracy is henceforth an 
opposition to capitalist liberal ideology juxtaposed with Lenin’s revolutionary project. 
Championing the writings of Nikolay Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky, a 
Russian revolutionary democrat, utopian socialist, and leader of the revolutionary 
democratic movement of the 1860s, Lenin emphasized the central role enlightened elites 
need to play in leading the unconscious masses to revolution. “Proletariat dictatorship” 
was to be distinct and antithetical to “parliamentary bourgeois democracy”. Lenin’s 
“elitist” approach champions the vitality of a vanguard party that should circumvent 
internal factions, maximize ideological homogeneity and adopt “democratic centralism.” 
Revolutionary democracy has thus been interpreted as “a bridge between pre-capitalist 
and socialist societies” (Bach, 2011, p. 642). 
Discourses of revolutionary democracy later became popular with “Third World” 
countries during the cold War. As Bach (2011) states: 
The notion of revolutionary democracy was then used by the USSR to designate one 
tendency of not-capitalist countries or movements which had nevertheless not 
achieved their revolution yet. This quite unclear step en route to socialism was 
conceptualized in the notion of National Democratic Revolution (NDR), or National 
Popular Democratic Revolution in its Stalin-Maoist version (N(P)DR). Many 
“liberation” movements in Africa adopted this ideology and even defined themselves 
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as revolutionary democrats, showing that they were “more revolutionary” than this 
N(P)DR appellation defined from Moscow. This appellation was abandoned by most 
of the “liberation movements” or “socialist regimes” after the fall of the Eastern 
bloc. In fact, the world capitalist offensive that followed let no choice for most of the 
former Marxist-Leninist or Maoist movements but to adopt political and economic 
liberal principles and abandon revolutionary democracy in a context where “There is 
No Alternative” to capitalism (p. 642). 
 
These philosophical premises of “revolutionary democracy” are mostly consistent 
with the notion of single-party vanguardism that is central to EPRDF’s structure. As 
Milkias (2011) explains: 
Similar to the Bolshevik Social Democratic Party of Russia, [TPLF] is run by a 
vanguard central committee, politburo, and secretariat. And, as Meles Zenawi tried 
to explain in his year 2000 treatise on “Bonapartism,” a concept borrowed from Karl 
Marx, and “What Is to be Done,” another model adopted from Vladimir Ilyich 
Lenin, the authority to rule is acquired by struggle not only between classes but also 
between elites. In the latter case, corruption might occur. But once power is garnered 
by the oppressed classes or their vanguard party, it has to be exercised through a 
hierarchical system of democratic centralism. Thus, the opposition claims, it comes 
as no surprise that it is the TPLF leadership, which defines itself as the vanguard of 
the revolution, that not only oversees the public bureaucracy but also guides and 
gives orders to all governing political factions (pp. 91-92). 
 
As briefly mentioned before, however, it was not tactically perspicacious for TPLF 
to embrace and implement outright Marxist-Leninist political programs and economic 
policies when it took power in 1991, a time that coincided with the downfall of the Soviet 
Union and global communism. Instantly, an ideological detour was in place; the Albanian 
model was abandoned and was replaced by the free market economy. The Ethiopian 
Privatization Agency (EPA) was established in 1994 in order to facilitate the privatization 
of public enterprises and re-privatization of formerly nationalized businesses. Although 
TPLF-EPRDF declared economic liberalization toward the beginning of its 
administrative tenure, it was far from abandoning its abyotawi dimokrasi credo (Abbink, 
1995; 2006). Bach (2011) writes: 
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Once TPLF-EPRDF affirmed its position as Ethiopia’s ruling elite, nevertheless, 
not only did it verbally promote abyotawi dimokrasi as its direction but also 
published and circulated its program entitled YeEhadig abyotawi dimokrasi 
program (The Revolutionary Democracy Program of EPRDF) in 1991. Meles 
continued advocating abyotawi dimokrasi as a necessary doctrine that ‘‘had to be 
firmly grasped if Ethiopia was to embark on sustainable economic development” (p. 
643).  
 
According to some observers, the notion of liberal democracy and to some extent 
that of free market was a veil that successfully appeased Western neo-liberal pressures 
while in fact TPLF-EPRDF remained staunchly committed to its revolutionary 
democracy cause. Others argued that TPLF was pragmatic about its Marxist-Leninist 
stance even before coming to power. De Waal (2012) contends that, for Meles, Marxism-
Leninism was “not a dogma but a rigorous method for assembling evidence and 
argument, to be bent to the realities of armed struggle and development” (p. 151). As a 
result, in spite of his erudition in Marxist-Leninist thought, Meles “clearly stated that 
there should be no confusion that the EPRDF’s mission was to build a capitalist state” 
(De Waal, 2012, pp. 151-152). Gill (2010) quotes former TPLF Lieutenant-General and 
close ally of Meles, Tsadkan Gebre-Tensae, who recounts that Marxism-Leninism had to 
be relegated for EPRDF to gain legitimacy inside and outside Ethiopia. “When we 
entered Addis Ababa, the whole Marxist–Leninist structure was being disgraced…We 
had to rationalize in terms of the existing political order...capitalism had become the 
order of the day. If we continued with our socialist ideas, we could only continue to breed 
poverty” (p. 75). 
In explaining the differences between liberal democracy and Ethiopian abyotawi 
dimokrasi, the EPRDF leadership usually highlight two main points. While the former, 
they argue, aims at securing individual rights, the latter defends collective rights through 
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the notion of nations, nationalities and peoples as stipulated in Article 39 of the 1995 
FDRE Constitution. Secondly, abyotawi dimokrasi “is not considered representative, but 
one in which the people is governing” (Bach, 2011, p. 644). 
The dualism of the 1991 “liberal” reforms and the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist inspired 
abyotawi dimokrasi apparent in EPRDF’s 23 years grip at the helm of Ethiopian political 
power represents a contradictory treatise for many commentators. Abbink (2006, p. 195) 
argues that EPRDF has found the matrix of balance between conventional elements of a 
liberal democracy like multiparty elections and maintaining its hegemony as a vanguard 
political force. This way, the multiparty system is designed in a manner that doesn’t 
threaten the hegemony of the vanguard party: 
The current democratization process is structurally and ideologically limited in that it 
is too closely supervised by the party in power, which—a fact often forgotten—is 
one advocating ‘revolutionary democracy’, not liberal democracy. Revolutionary 
democracy aims at the collective mobilization of the people, led from above by the 
party. It derives from a combination of Marxist and ethno-regional ideology and has 
no negotiated, evolutionary basis in Ethiopia. It was functional in the anti-Derg 
guerrilla struggle, but after the TPLF–EPRDF victory in 1991, it was imposed 
nationwide by default. It envisages the party as a vanguard political force, which is 
not inclined to compromise with opposition forces because it is convinced that it has 
the solution for everything (Abbink, 2006, p. 195). 
 
EPRDF’s hibridization of liberal democracy and vanguard party hegemony through 
abyotawi dimokrasi brings about a “rethought authoritarianism” today and, as Bach 
(2011) contends, it is “far from being clear and cannot only be interpreted in terms of so-
called ‘liberal institutions’ (constitution, political parties, elections, etc.) on the one hand 
and authoritarian practices or ‘culture’ on the other.” He further warns against the danger 
of falling into the trap of treating contemporary Ethiopian authoritarian “culture” as 
static. In this sense, for Bach, post-1991 Ethiopian institutions, practices and ideology are 
both liberal and revolutionary democratic. Consequently, abyotawi dimokrasi today has 
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evolved from its original meaning to represent “an important discursive tool of 
legitimation as well as fighting tool for EPRDF against internal and external opponents or 
critics” (Bach, 2011, p. 644). Bach further asserts: 
In the Ethiopian context revolutionary democracy, quite surprisingly, is 
institutionalized by dint of a federal constitution guaranteeing the establishment of a 
multi-party and parliamentary system in which elections and parties are presented as 
keystones. Bearing in mind the attempts by EPRDF to establish a revolutionary 
democracy via elections in Ethiopia in the past two decades, abyotawi democracy 
has appropriated these liberal tools to legitimate the survival of the EPRDF 
leadership (still in power). Thus, both structures and practices have become 
revolutionary and liberal (p. 644).  
 
For others like Vaughan (2001), abyotawi dimokrasi represents a deliberate and 
conscious effort on the part of EPRDF to promote political choices that are ideologically 
and socially reinforced. Vaughan’s assessment of abyotawi dimokrasi is consistent with 
EPRDF’s self-proclaimed goal of creating a society where the hegemony of the 
“developmental state” ideology prevails. The notion of the developmental state and its 
relationship with abyotawi dimokrasi is further discussed in latter chapters. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a contextual treatment of major political programs and 
economic policies that have significant relevance to the governance and operations of the 
state-controlled telecommunications sector in Ethiopia. After a brief introduction to the 
geographic, demographic, economic and constitutional context of FDRE, this chapter 
explored the historical evolution of the Ethiopian state up to the current ruling party of 
EPRDF. The discussion on abyotawi dimokrasi, a cornerstone of EPRDF’s political 
program, provides a useful background to telecommunications operations and governance 
in Ethiopia. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The global telecommunications system has undergone dramatic change under the 
neo-liberal order of globalization in the past three decades. A swift restructuring of the 
telecom industries, which began in the early 1980s, was possible because governments 
around the world adopted free market telecommunication polices as they confronted 
intensifying pressure not only from corporations but also directly from International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and the IMF. This practice of free 
market forces that minimizes government restrictions on businesses is consistent with the 
premises of neo-liberalism. In order to explore the foundations of the Western rationale 
and ethos in pushing an agenda of privatization and liberalization to the developing 
world, including the external push for the liberalization of the telecommunications sector 
investigated in the present study, a review of foundational literature and theories is 
necessary. This chapter provides such a base by discussing the theoretical underpinnings 
and historical developments of modernization theory and related discussions in 
development communication followed by the subsequent rise and hegemony of the global 
neo-liberal order.  
In spite of the aforementioned neo-liberal push, the Ethiopian government 
maintains state monopoly of key enterprises including the sole telecommunications 
service provider, Ethio-Telecom. As discussed in Chapter VI, the Ethiopian government 
defends its state monopoly of telecommunications by arguing that the sector, among 
other things, is key for the country’s economic development program. The ruling party, 
EPRDF, 
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model lines. In order to shed light into this narrative, this chapter provides a discussion of 
the theory of the developmental state. 
A contesting theory, also discussed in this chapter, is the theory of the 
neopatrimonial state. While the ruling party rationalizes its monopoly of the 
telecommunications sector through its developmental state ideology, critics argue 
EPRDF’s Ethiopia is not a developmental state but rather a neopatrimonial state that uses 
public resources like the telecommunication sector to extend individual and party 
interests. For these critics, state monopoly of telecommunications sets rent-seeking 
behavior, expedites state-sponsored mass surveillance and limits the right to free speech 
granted by the Ethiopian Constitution.    
Toward the end, the chapter provides a discussion on the political economy of 
communication with the aim of providing a framework of analysis for the present study.  
Finally, a brief survey on telecommunications research is offered to frame the 
significance of this study and to highlight its vantage point from the pool of existing 
literature in the area.  
Modernization Theory 
Modernization as a Dominant Paradigm 
The modernization paradigm, which arose soon after World War II, argues that 
the best, if not the only, way to achieve successful development rests in the adoption and 
diffusion of those values and approaches that ensured the success of Western economic 
development and civilization. At the individual level, modernization requires a high 
degree of “empathy” and an “psychic mobility” to abandon traditional beliefs and 
embrace change (Lerner, 1958, p. 52). At a cultural level, it requires an open mentality 
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guided by faith in the “scientific” approach, whose roots can be found in the principles of 
enlightenment. At the political level, it requires the adoption of the democratic system 
(Latham, 2000). Finally, at the economic level, it advocates a strong belief in the virtues 
of the free market and in the liberal doctrine.  
Modernization, also known as the dominant paradigm, considers development as 
a linear, cumulative, evolutionary and unidirectional process (Servaes, 1991). 
Underdeveloped countries are considered as mostly responsible for their conditions. 
Hence, the assumption is that it is in their interest to bridge the gap that divides them 
from the so-called developed ones. The only way to achieve this would be to take 
advantage of the assistance offered by the richer countries and try to follow in their 
footsteps. Many of the core elements of modernization, even if criticized through the 
years, have achieved a powerful hegemonic dimension and are still permeating most 
aspects of life (Mody, 2003).  
Development Communication and Modernity 
Communication has been regarded as a primary instrument needed to achieve, 
maintain and strengthen modernity. Communication in this paradigm has been conceived 
as a one-way process passing messages from one point to many others, usually in a 
vertical, top-down fashion (Servaes, 1999). Development was equated with economic 
growth, and communication was associated with the dissemination of information and 
messages aimed at modernizing “backward” countries and their people (Mefalopulos, 
2006). Because of the overestimated belief that they were extremely powerful in 
persuading audiences to change attitudes and behaviors, mass media were a center of 
communication initiatives that relied heavily on the traditional vertical one-way model: 
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Sender-Message-Chanel-Receiver (SMCR). As Mefalopulos (2006) argues, this has been 
“the model of reference for the diffusion perspective, which has been adopted to induce 
behavior changes through media-centric approaches and campaigns” (p. 6).  
After World War II, a number of scholars started to devote increasing attention to 
communication processes and effects including Lasswell (1948), Katz and Lazarfeld 
(1955), and Klapper (1960). Some of them, such as Lerner (1958), Rogers (1962) and 
Schramm (1964), had a specific interest in studying how communication could be used to 
foster national development, which at that time was considered predominantly in 
economic terms. These were among the most prominent scholars promoting the core 
beliefs of the dominant paradigm, i.e., blind faith in science, liberal democracy, free 
market, and in the need for people to be able to adapt to a fast-changing world. To be 
effective, all of these would be channeled through the institutions of the nation-state. 
Similar characteristics about modernization are identified by Melkote and Steeves (2001), 
who underline “the importance of economic growth through industrialization, capital-
intensive and machine-intensive technology, a top-down structure of authority with 
economists in charge, and a certain attitude and mind-set among individuals” (p. 114) 
Debacle, Criticism, and Consequences 
Despite all the financial and human resources poured into developing countries, 
the modernization approach has not resulted in significant success. The decade of the 
1970s did not witness the expected outcomes in poverty alleviation and increase in 
production. As a result, the optimism based on the scientific and modern approaches of 
theoreticians, practitioners and leaders around the world gradually faded away (Burkey, 
1993). In the 1980s, macroeconomic setbacks like unemployment and inflation got even 
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worse as large number of people in many developing countries experienced a significant 
decline in their living standards (Chambers, 1997). The modernization paradigm 
eventually started to receive criticisms from various perspectives and for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, modernization was considered to be highly ethnocentric, or better 
“Western-centric,” disregarding other possible values and approaches to life different 
from those of the West. In this respect, Servaes (1991) notes how the dichotomy between 
modernity versus tradition is a biased one, with no real scientific or objective grounds to 
justify it. He considers the modernization paradigm theoretically flawed, as it puts the 
blame on developing countries without solid arguments. From a methodological point of 
view, he criticizes it because it is rooted in the tradition of evolutionism that does not pay 
particular attention to the source of change. From a logical point of view, he criticizes its 
theoretical assumptions that wrongly appear to imply that a sequence of events in 
chronological order is enough to establish a “link of cause-effect” (Servaes, 1991, p.56). 
Finally, one of the major points raised against modernization by many of its critics lies in 
the predominant, if not exclusive, focus on the economic dimension, thus neglecting 
other aspects of human life (Mody, 2003). And yet, this paradigm appeared to have 
greatly failed precisely in its main mission, i.e., to foster economic growth in the 
developing world. 
Criticisms of this paradigm became so intense that even its main proponents 
started to re-evaluate some of their major assumptions. Rogers (1976) openly 
acknowledged some of the main flaws of the dominant modernization school by 
highlighting “the discouraging realization that development was not going very well in 
the developing countries that had closely followed the paradigm” (1976, p. 14). He 
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started to reflect upon those flaws and paid more attention to the people at the other end 
of the development equation by recognizing the need for a different, more people-based, 
approach. Nevertheless, he still could not escape from the boundaries of the traditional 
vertical and linear communication model. The attempt to rethink the dominant paradigm 
resulted in an ambiguous approach (e.g. Rogers’ references to Maoist China), which on 
one side supported the need for popular participation and, on the other, was unable to step 
out of the old one-way linear flow of communication.  
The history of telecommunication infrastructure development in Ethiopia between 
1952 and 1992 was highly influenced by a line of thinking that is consistent with the 
modernization paradigm. The Ethiopian government received a significant amount of 
assistance in the form of loans from the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) and International Development Association (IDA) for the purpose 
of expanding modern communications systems in Ethiopia (see Chapter V).  
The Hegemony of the Global Neo-liberal Order 
The Washington Consensus 
The term “Washington Consensus” was coined in 1989 by the economist John 
Williamson to describe a set of ten relatively specific economic policy prescriptions that 
he considered constituted the “standard” reform package promoted for “salvaging” crisis-
wracked developing countries (Serra and Stiglitz, 2008; Williamson & Institute for 
International Economics, 1990). The prescriptions encompassed policies in such areas as 
macroeconomic stabilization, economic opening with respect to both trade and 
investment, and the expansion of market forces within the domestic economy. The 
Washington Consensus essentially became the practical interpretation of the broader neo-
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liberalism movement (Held, 2004; Jomo and Fine 2006). 
The Washington Consensus is a convergence of the policies of the World Bank, 
the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, and subsequently other institutions such as the WTO and the 
European Central Bank. In an extreme sense, neo-liberalism as a hegemonic project 
cannot be analyzed in isolation from globalization and imperialism, and concentrates 
power and wealth in local and transnational elite groups around the world by transferring 
state-owned assets to private people and transnational corporations (Saad-Filho & 
Johnston, 2005). 
Tenets of Neo-liberal Economics 
Neo-liberalism is an updated version of the classical liberal economic thought that 
was dominant in the U.S. and U.K. prior to the Great Depression of the 1930s. From 
roughly the mid 1930s to the mid 1970s, a new interventionist approach—Keynesian 
economics—replaced classical liberalism, and it became the accepted belief that 
capitalism requires significant state regulation and central planning in order to be viable. 
In the 1970s, classical liberalism made a rapid comeback, first in academic economics 
and then in the realm of public policy (Chomsky, 1999; John, 2010; Leitner, Peck, & 
Sheppard, 2007). 
Many progressive economists viewed the 1970s leap toward liberalism as a 
temporary response to the economic instability of that decade (Harvey, 2005). As 
corporate interests decided that the Keynesian regulationist approach no longer worked to 
their advantage, they looked for an alternative and found only the old liberal tenets, 
which could at least serve as an ideological basis for cutting those state programs viewed 
as obstacles to profit-making (Touraine, 2001). However, neo-liberalism has proved to be 
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more than just a temporary response. It has outlasted the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
culminating in right-wing political victories in Margaret Thatcher’s United Kingdom and 
Ronald Reagan’s United States. Even with Thatcher and Reagan gone, neo-liberalism 
solidified its position of dominance under a Democratic Party administration in the U.S. 
and a Labor Party government in the U.K. in the 1990s and into the new millennium.  
An economic theory that has redefined Western capitalism since the turn of the 
last quarter of the 20th century, neo-liberalism formed the bedrock of American and 
British-led global economic reform. It advocated a largely unregulated capitalist system 
(a free market economy), which not only embodies the ideal of free individual choice but 
also claims to achieve optimum economic performance with respect to efficiency, 
economic growth, technical progress, and distributional justice (Chomsky, 1999; Davis & 
Monk, 2007). The state is assigned a very limited economic role: defining property rights, 
enforcing contracts, and regulating the money supply. State intervention to correct market 
failures is viewed with suspicion, on the ground that such intervention is likely to create 
more problems than it solves. The policy recommendations of neo-liberalism are 
concerned mainly with dismantling what remains of the regulationist welfare state. These 
recommendations include deregulation of business; privatization of public utilities and 
assets; elimination of, or cutbacks in, social welfare programs; and reduction of taxes on 
businesses and the investing class. In the international sphere, neo-liberalism calls for 
free movement of goods, services, capital, and money but not people across national 
boundaries (Campbell & Pedersen, 2001; Steger & Roy, 2010; Touraine, 2001). That is, 
corporations, banks, and individual investors should be free to move their property across 
national boundaries, and free to acquire property across national boundaries, although 
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free cross-border movement by individuals is not part of the neo-liberal program.  
The neo-liberalism project has had a tremendous effect on most people around the 
world. It penetrates private homes through the dominant media, shapes working 
environments in the form of fierce competition and anti-labor legislation, increases the 
gap between rich and poor and determines the architectural design of public and private 
spaces in form of gated communities and increased surveillance systems (Chomsky, 
1999).  
Dependency, Debt amd Structural Adjustments: Neo-liberal Prints in Africa 
The globalization of neo-liberalism, as profitable as it has been for the West’s 
gigantic banks and transnational corporations, has brought detrimental dependency to 
African and Latin American countries. By the end of the 1990s, the world’s poor in 
developing countries owed more than US$1.3 trillion to industrialized countries. Among 
the largest debtors were Brazil ($116 billion), Mexico ($97 billion), and Argentina ($61 
billion). As George (1990) notes: 
Debt is an efficient tool. It ensures access to other peoples’ raw materials and 
infrastructure on the cheapest possible terms. Dozens of countries must compete for 
shrinking export markets and can export only a limited range of products because of 
Northern protectionism and their lack of cash to invest in diversification. Market 
saturation ensues, reducing exporters’ income to a bare minimum while the North 
enjoys huge savings. The IMF cannot seem to understand that investing in … [a] 
healthy, well-fed, literate population … is the most intelligent economic choice a 
country can make (p.143). 
 
Of the total developing-country debt, roughly half is owed to private creditors, 
mainly commercial banks (Duggan, 2003). The rest consists of obligations to 
international lending organizations or neo-liberal flagship institutions such as the IMF 
and the World Bank, and to governments and government agencies—export-import 
banks, for example. The world’s poorest countries, mostly in Africa and South Asia, were 
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never able to borrow substantial sums from the private sector and most of their debts are 
to the IMF, World Bank, and other governments (Duggan, 2003). 
IMF and the World Bank: The Institutional Couriers of Global Neo-liberalism 
The debt crisis took a large toll in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the IMF and 
World Bank’s claim that their chief target is to reduce poverty, their SAPs have been 
imposed to ensure debt repayment and economic restructuring. SAPs basically required 
poor countries to reduce spending on things like health, education and development, 
while debt repayment and other economic policies have been made the priority. In effect, 
the IMF and World Bank have required that poor countries reduce the living standards of 
their citizens (Bauzon, 1992). The aggressive prescription of SAPs was most felt since 
the early 1980s in many developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa when they 
experienced an economic depression. This depression manifested itself in a decreasing 
per capita income, an increase in foreign debts and an increase in government deficits 
(Duggan, 2003). The gravity of the problem was profound as most African countries had 
to contend with inefficient production processes and inadequate institutions.  
Africa’s poor economic development from the end of the 1960s onward continued 
during the 1980s. The World Bank introduced adjustment loans that were to finance 
reform programs for the given country’s entire economy or a specific sector of the 
economy based on conditionalities. Since its establishment in the 1950s, but mainly after 
the end of the 1980s, the IMF has had a considerable influence by means of stabilization 
loans on policies in developing countries faced with economic difficulties. Presently, in 
almost all African countries, stabilization and SAPs have been put into effect, all of 
which are determined by World Bank and IMF conditionalities. In effect, the stringent 
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SAPs devised by the IMF and World Bank in response to this poor economic 
development forced 29 of these countries to adopt the neo-liberal model before the 
decade was over (Danaher, 1994).  
As economist Robin Hanhel (1999) summarizes, the SAPs prescribed by the IMF 
for troubled Third World economies basically include: (a) monetary austerity to squeeze 
the money supply “to increase internal interest rates to whatever heights needed” to 
stabilize the value of the local currency; (b) fiscal austerity to increase tax collections and 
reduce government spending dramatically; (c) privatization to sell off public enterprises 
to the private sector; and (d) financial liberalization to remove restrictions on the inflow 
and outflow of international capital as well as restrictions on what foreign businesses and 
banks are allowed to buy, own, and operate. Only when governments sign this “structural 
adjustment agreement” does the IMF agree to (a) lend enough itself to prevent default on 
international loans that are about to come due and otherwise would be unpayable; and (b) 
arrange a restructuring of the country’s debt among private international lenders that 
includes a pledge of new loans. 
Despite Africa’s adoption of free-market imperatives constructed in the global 
North, the continent saw a free fall in commodities trade between the 1970s and the 
1990s (Danaher, 1994). Instead of economic recovery and repayment of all external 
debts, the neo-liberal prescription has seen the lowest rates of economic growth ever 
recorded in Africa, along with rapidly rising disparities in wealth and well being (Bush, 
2007). 
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The Theory of the Developmental State 
After the end of WWII, many developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America were engaged in independence, decolonization, and nation building processes. 
When independence movements were coming to an end, nations had to immediately 
embark on the challenge of nation building. In the absence of a meaningful private sector 
and strong public institutions, these nations embraced a state-led model of development 
in order to bring about industrialization, entrepreneurship and macroeconomic stability. 
The centrality of state intervention in the development schemes of these fragile 
economies was endorsed by the formation of UN regional commissions like United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (UNECLA). A central idea associated with this 
“structuralist” development theory was the belief that because an underdeveloped 
economy is inherently prone to market failure, the state should play a central role in 
correcting it. 
By the end of the 1970s, however, many of the African and Latin American 
countries that adopted state-led development policies started experiencing devastating 
strings of economic crises. Although there was a tendency to hastily ascribe the cause of 
these crises with what came to be known as “state capture”—political corruption in 
which private interests significantly influence a state’s decision-making processes—a 
combination of different factors including deteriorating terms of trade, increase of real 
interest rates in external debt, reduced inflow of resources, accelerated capital outflows, 
political disorder, civil wars, misguided protectionist policies and other external and 
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internal considerations contributed to the setback (Bates, 1981; Ghai & Alcántara, 1990; 
Lockwood, 2006).  
When countries that embraced state-led development were going through a series 
of economic recessions in the 1970s and 80s, neo-liberal policies of market 
fundamentalism were gaining momentum in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
A resurgent neoclassical paradigm and the neo-liberal economic measures attacked 
structuralism on the ground that state intervention aimed at facilitating import-
substituting industrialization was bound to germinate inefficient industries that cannot 
compete with international benchmarks and that leech state resources through perpetual 
subsidization. Extensive government intervention, neo-liberal theorists argued, escalated 
“rent seeking” substantially which, in turn, oriented economic agents to focus on 
lobbying for increased subsidies and protectionist policies (Öni!, 1991). Consequently, 
neo-liberal groups led by the IMF and the World Bank rebuked state intervention as an 
antithesis of development and insisted that poor countries eliminate government controls, 
promote trade liberalization, and foster the private sector. In a nutshell, the role of the 
state was to be demoted so that markets, with the private sector at the driver’s seat, can 
thrive (World Bank, 1991). The results brought by these recommendations to many 
African and Latin American countries that adopted privatization and liberalization were 
mostly disastrous. In the end, state capacity was severely impeded and the welfare of the 
poor was retracted.   
Whereas Latin American and African countries that were dragged into the 
Washington Consensus experiment underwent deteriorating economic and human 
conditions, a handful of the Asian countries that persisted on a unique design of state-led 
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development were consistently thriving in the 1980s and 1990s (Chan, Clark, & Lam, 
1998; Chari & Corbridge, 2008; White & Gray, 1988). Over the past 30 years, the so-
called “Asian Tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and later China 
transformed from poor agrarian societies into become highly industrial countries. Since 
then, the development paths of these countries, particularly in terms of understanding the 
role of the state, has been studied and scrutinized by development policy makers, 
politicians and academics. Recognition of the economic success of East Asia rejuvenated 
interest in the vitality of the state in engineering developmental strategies and directions. 
The prominence of programs like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) since the beginning of the 21st century 
emphasize the need for a state with a committed agenda to providing, among other things, 
universal healthcare and education. The re-emergence of state-led development also gave 
birth to discussions emphasizing the need for the state to engage heavily in institutional 
capacity building. Institutions were singled out as key factors in the development 
trajectories of nations. Strong and capable institutions started to be seen as prerequisites 
of economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001; North, 1990; Rodrik, 
2003). 
This institutionalist counter-critique of market fundamentalism should be 
understood as a process in which “states have played a strategic role in taming domestic 
and international market forces and harnessing them to national ends” (Öni!, 1991, 
p.110). In other words, although rapid industrialization was a key component of East 
Asian development strategy, the industrialization process was not left to be conditioned 
by market rationality, but rather by a directional thrust of a strong autonomous state. The 
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institutionalist construct, therefore, rejects the either-or proposition of the state-market 
dichotomy and explores ways to strike balance between state intervention and market 
forces for optimal development results. As Öni! (1991) argues, the institutionalist 
countercritique debunks the assumption that the state and markets are mutually exclusive 
forces: 
At a very crude level, to propose market-oriented and state-led development as 
alternatives is simply ahistorical and misleading. All successful cases of "late 
industrialization" have been associated with a significant degree of state 
intervention. The problem, therefore, is to find the appropriate mixture of market 
orientation and government intervention consistent with rapid and efficient 
industrialization. Equally central is the issue of which set of institutional and 
political arrangements is compatible with the appropriate mix of state intervention 
and market orientation in the economy. Hence what we observe in the context of 
the institutionalist countercritique is a fundamental shift of the problem from the 
state-versus-market dichotomy towards differences in the ways that market-oriented 
or capitalist economies are organized and towards how these organizational 
differences contribute to the contrasts in both policies implemented and the 
subsequent economic performance (p. 110). 
 
Within this institutionlist approach rests the theory of the “developmental state” that 
has been used to make sense of the East Asian industrialization. “Developmental state,” 
Woo-Cumings (1999) writes, is “a shorthand for the seamless web of political, 
bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist Northeast 
Asia” ( p. 1). Chalmers Johnson (1982), who is credited as a pioneer in the theory after 
his 1982 seminal work MITI and the Japanese Miracle describes the concept as a “plan-
rational” state where “the politicians reign and the state bureaucrats rule” (Johnson, p. 
19).  According to Johnson, the “plan-rational” state shaped socio-economic development 
as it intervened in the development process and established “substantive social and 
economic goals” (p. 19). Loriaux (1999) contends the developmental state is “an 
embodiment of a normative or moral ambition to use the interventionist power of the 
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state to guide investment in a way that promotes a certain solidaristic vision of national 
economy” (p.24). Similarly, Ha-Joon Chang (1999) argues “economic development 
requires a state which can create and regulate the economic and political relationships 
that can support sustained industrialisation [sic]—or in short, a developmental state” 
(p.183). In this sense, the appropriation of the developmental state model as a 
development strategy by a nation essentially implies departure from a neo-liberal 
economic thinking and drifting toward the direction of state interventionism.  
State intervention here, however, shouldn’t be confused with centrally planned 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe where socio-economic development was 
seriously hampered. Instead, the developmental state is a strong-disciplinary state, which 
directs and guides private businesses with “unusual degree of bureaucratic autonomy” 
(Öni! 1991, p. 114). In turn, this political autonomy from the short-term interest of 
private sector” makes it possible for the state “to shift policy toward a more outward-
looking growth strategy” (Haggard & Harvard University, 1990, p. 40) as well as to 
“avoid becoming the captive of its major clients” (Johnson 1985, p. 81). However, Chang 
(2003) warns that although a politically authoritarian regime is usually a necessary 
precursor of the developmental state, this scenario doesn’t always supply a sufficient 
condition. In order for an authoritarian state to successfully transform into a 
developmental state, economic decision making bodies need to be shielded from all 
political and economic pressure groups. This is to be complemented by “an authoritarian, 
executive-based political structure” that can guard “the feebleness of the legislature” 
(Wade, 1988, p. 159).  
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Mkandawire (2001) argues the developmental state has two components. In terms 
of ideology, the developmental state is self-explanatory in that it presumes economic 
development precedes and trumps all other priorities. In this sense, the developmental 
state “establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote sustained 
development, understanding by development the steady high rates of economic growth 
and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship 
to the international economy” (Castells, 1992, p. 55). The role of the elite, Mkandawire 
(2001) contends, is “to establish an ‘ideological hegemony,’ so that its development 
project becomes, in a Gramscian sense, a ‘hegemonic’ project to which key actors in the 
nation adhere voluntarily” (p. 290). The structure component involves institutional, 
technical, administrative and political capacities to implement economic policies 
effectively and efficiently. “Underlying all these is the autonomy of the state from social 
forces so that it can use these capacities to devise long-term economic policies 
unencumbered by the claims of myopic private interests” (Mkandawire, 2001, p.290, 
emphasis in original). While the developmental state, Mkandawire argues, should be a 
“strong state” as opposed to what Myrdal (1968) referred to as the “soft state” that lacks 
administrative power and political will to advance its development goals, it should also 
have some “social anchoring that prevents it from using its autonomy in a predatory 
manner and enables it to gain adhesion of hey social actors” (p. 290). In other words, 
given the developmental state concentrates substantial power within the leading political 
elite by its very design, it may be prone to incubate clientalist and rent seeking tendencies 
that, if not contained, may hijack economic development altogether. 
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Although the developmental state embraces a capitalistic ethos, its motive is not 
driven by profit. “A disciplined (or developmental) state refers to one that advances 
capital rather than accumulating it, or at least does not allow its own enrichment to derail 
the development effort” (Amsden, 1989, p. 148). In this sense, not all interventionist 
states are developmental states. A genuine developmental state doesn’t intervene in all 
matters of the economy. Effective state intervention in the developmental state is, 
therefore, not haphazard and unmethodical, but is founded, according to Öni! (1991), on 
the grounds of “unusual degrees of bureaucratic autonomy and public-private 
cooperation” (p.114) that defend against deliberate or unintentional abuse of power by 
political and economic decision makers:  
The coexistence of these two conditions allows the state and the bureaucratic elites 
to develop independent national goals and, in the subsequent state, to translate these 
broad national goals into effective policy action. The coexistence of these two 
conditions is critical. In fact, in the absence of bureaucratic autonomy public-
private cooperation easily degenerates into situations in which state goals are 
directly reducible to private interests (Öni! 1991, p. 114). 
 
The Developmental State Experiment in Africa 
A key question that naturally followed after the East Asian economic success story 
is whether the developmental state model is transferable or replicable in different national 
contexts. According to some commentators, the transferability of this model is a result of 
distinct historical circumstances that are difficult to replicated elsewhere. Some elements, 
like “the unusual degree of bureaucratic autonomy and capacity, and the equally unique 
and unusual degree of public-private cooperation,” according to Öni! (1991), are difficult 
to be emulated. Others have argued that the East Asian developmental state lacks stability 
in that bureaucratic autonomy and public-private cooperation—necessary conditions for 
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the success of the developmental state—have a naturally tense relationship (Amsden, 
1989). 
The notion of the development state was particularly appealing for Africa and Latin 
America where overall economic development, aggravated by global market conditions, 
hit hard times in the course of the 1970s. In the case of Africa, although this posed a 
serious setback in the development agenda of many nations, Mkandawire (2001) 
contends, “for most of the first generation of African leaders ‘development’ was certainly 
a central preoccupation” (p. 295). Mkandawire also argues that Africa didn’t develop not 
because nations didn’t embrace a developmental state ethos but because of unfortunate 
circumstances that didn’t make possible the minimum conditions for a development state 
to flourish:  
In Africa, we have many examples of states whose performance until the mid-1970s 
would have qualified them as ‘developmental states’ (…), but which now seem anti-
developmental because the hard times brought the economic expansion of their 
countries to a halt (pp. 291, 295). 
 
This view is contested by others like Ake (1996) who view the postcolonial ruling 
elite as leaders who were primarily interested to consolidate their own power instead of 
pursuing socio-economic development. For Ake (1996), these states implemented 
policies so as “to facilitate the appropriation of wealth by means of state power” (p. 6), 
thereby becoming “the greatest impediment to development” (p.2) instead of forces of 
development. He adds: 
The politics that rendered development improbable has made the adoption of an 
ideology of development inevitable. For the political elites struggling to maintain 
their power and to produce their dominion amid the problems of the postcolonial 
era, the ideology of development has been an effective strategy of power that 
addresses the objective necessity for development (p. 16). 
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It is amidst these conflicting interpretations that reflect the varying developmental 
experiences of postcolonial Africa that the East Asian development state model has come 
under intense debate. As Meyns and Musamba (2010) highlight, African postcolonial 
developmentalism may fall short if it is compared against the defining features of the 
developmental state. In addition, given the rapid transformations in global economy in 
the past decade, the perception of the developmental state may have died particularly 
after the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s (Fine, 2006). 
In spite of the developmental state model setback, there is evidence for the 
possibility of developmental states to work in the African continent. It is true that many 
governments in Africa characterize themselves as developmental states to put a positive 
light into their policies, although this self-assigned characterization doesn’t necessarily 
prove the existence of the development state. However, there are some African states like 
Botswana that have been regarded as successful developmental states (Lockwood, 2006). 
In this sense, the developmental state is still conceivable if the right conditions are 
hatched, which in turn gives some validity to the argument that the notion of the 
development state is not necessarily ahistorical and unique per se, but rather deliberately 
constructed and effectuated: 
Lessons from other parts of the world clearly suggest that appropriate institutional 
structures did not always exist, but that they could be socially engineered. The 
experience elsewhere is that developmental states are social constructs 
consciously brought about by political actors and societies. As difficult as the 
political and economic task of establishing such states may be, it is within the 
reach of many countries struggling against the ravages of poverty and 
underdevelopment (Mkandawire, 2001, p. 310).  
 
The problem with the developmental state model, for some critics, is not 
necessarily in its theoretical raison d’etre but rather in its execution. This is particularly 
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evident in the case of the Ethiopian state that characterizes itself as a developmental state 
where the ruling elite EPRDF has designed a political program according to the 
propositions of the model. While EPRDF argues that the notion of development trumps 
all other priorities, critics argue that the party’s adoption of the developmental state 
theory into a political program is nothing more than an attempt to institutionalize rent 
seeking interests of the ruling elite. Consequently, for these critiques, what we have in 
Ethiopia is not a developmental state per se, but rather a neopatrimonial state that lodged 
a complex legal-rational bureaucracy to appropriate public resources into the group and 
individual interests of the ruling elite. 
The Theory of the Neopatrimonial State 
The Weberian Roots of Neopatrimonialism 
In the process of making inquiries and offering explanations about the African 
economic challenge, one of the mainstream lines of thinking that came to dominate 
Western scholarship toward the African development is neopatrimonialism. Although 
neopartimonialism has evolved and expanded to embrace a wide variety of connotations, 
it was originally used as part of Weber’s notion of  “patrimonialism” which refers to “a 
type of government organized as an extension of the ruler’s own household” (Van de 
Walle, 1994, p.131). Whereas kinship and family ties are common ways of consolidating 
a patrimonial order, Le Vine (1980) argues patrimonialism transcends blood relationships 
to grant “fictive kinship to those whose ties with the head of the household may be based 
on other than biological or family liaisons—for example, contract, alliance, coercion or 
titular service”  (p. 658). In other words, patrimonialism involves: 
…an instrumentally profitable lack of distinction between the civic and personal 
spheres. The ruler allocates political office to his clients on the basis of patronage, 
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rather than according to the criteria of professionalism and competence which 
characterize the civil service (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, p. 5) 
 
The addition of the prefix “neo” implies neopatrimonialism has now a new dimension 
of meaning from the historical connotation of what patrimonialism represents particularly 
in association with Weber (Bach, 2011). In other words, neopatrimonialism embraces a 
façade of modern governance through bureaucracy and institutions although these entities 
are deflected to serve the interest of the ruling elite:  
As with classic patrimonialism, the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than to 
an office. In contemporary neopatrimonialism, relationships of loyalty and 
dependency pervade a formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy 
bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and 
status. The distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred. The 
essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favours 
[sic.], both within the state … and in society … (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994, p. 
458) 
 
The concept of neopatrimonialism essentially encompasses a dualistic nature 
where “the state is characterized by patrimonialisation and bureaucratization” (Bach, 
2011). This fusion, a quintessential characteristic of the neopartimonial state, assumes a 
scenario where the “patrimonial logic coexists with the development of bureaucratic 
administration and at least the pretence [sic] of legal-rational forms of state legitimacy” 
(Van de Walle, 1994, p. 131). Such dualism can effectively translate into a wide array of 
empirical situations. These mirror variations in the state’s failure or capacity to produce 
“public” policies. 
Neopatrimonialism, in this sense, is a modern, sophisticated form of patrimonialism 
in which “patrimonial logic coexists with the development of bureaucratic administration 
and at least the pretense of legal-rational forms of state legitimacy” (Van De Walle, 1994, 
p.131). The emphasis on the coalescence between “patrimonial logic” and “legal-rational 
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forms” is also shared by Clapham (1985), who describes neopatrimonialism as a form of 
organizations in which “relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political 
and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials 
hold positions in bureaucratic organisations [sic] with powers which are formally defined, 
but exercise those powers…as a form…of private property (p. 48).  
Although neopartimonialism and patrimonialism share a basic attribute in that both 
imply a clientalist order, their manifestation is different. Under partimonialism, there is 
no distinction between the private and the public and all political, administrative as well 
as economic relations between the ruler and the ruled are personal. The ruler doesn’t 
distinguish between his/her resources from that of the public. All power relations 
between the ruler and his subjects are meant to serve the personal interest of the former. 
Under neopatrimonialism, however, there is at least a formal division between what is 
public and private, and as Erdmann and Engel (2007) argue, neopatrimonial rule “takes 
place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or 
‘modern’ stateness” (p. 105). In essence, the ruling elite appropriate and condition what 
seems to be a legal bureaucratic system that reflects the interest of the public to their own 
ends. Erdmann and Engel (2007) elaborate this sophisticated infiltration of the personal 
into the public as follows: 
Formal structures and rules do exist, although in practice the separation of the 
private and public sphere is not always observed. In other words, two role systems or 
logics exist next to each other, the patrimonial of the personal relations, and the 
legal-rational of the bureaucracy. These spheres are not isolated from each other. 
Quite to the contrary, they permeate each other: the patrimonial penetrates the legal-
rational system and twists its logic, functions, and output, but does not take exclusive 
control over the legal-rational logic. That is, informal politics invades formal 
institutions. Informality and formality are intimately linked to each other in various 
ways and by varying degrees; and this mix becomes institutionalised [sic] (p.105).  
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Another interpretation of what constitutes the neopatrimonial state as highlighted by 
Davies (2008) incorporates two key features of governance. Firstly, the neopatrimonial 
state personalizes political authority significantly both as an ideology and as an 
instrument.  Secondly, such governments develop a conflicting legal-rational bureaucratic 
system and clientelistic relations with the latter usually dominating over the former. A 
number of scholars treat clientelism and patronage as integral components of 
neopatrimonialism (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994; Erdmann and Engel, 2007; 
Eisenstadt, 1973). Clientelism represents “the exchange or brokerage of specific services 
and resources for political support, often in the form of votes” involving “a relationship 
between unequals, in which the major benefits accrue to the patron” and “redistributive 
effects are considered to be very limited” (Erdmann and Engel, 2007, p. 107). In a broad 
sense, it is the complexity and sophistication of this “brokerage” that distinguishes 
neopatrimonial clientelism from patrimonial clientelism. Unlike the “direct dyadic 
exchange relation between the little and the big man” (Erdmann and Engel, 2007, p. 107) 
that is characteristic of patrimonialism, the neopatrimonial state needs a network of 
brokers that are permeated into a bureaucratic nexus where they can render the interest of 
the political center to the periphery (Powell, 1970; Weingrod, 1969). In addition to the 
level of complexity, another important factor that distinguishes a neopatrimonial order 
from that of patrimonial lies in the object of the exchange involved: 
The transactions are less about the exchange of private or personal goods and 
services but more about the transfer of public goods and services by the patron. 
Although clientelism can be linked to kinship, often it is not. It can be based on 
some kind of ‘traditional’ relations, but it has to be understood as a modern 
phenomenon, linked to the existence of a state (Erdmann and Engel, 2007, p. 107).  
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According to Erdmann and Engel (2007), the conceptual relationship between 
neopartimonialism and clientelism lies in “uncertainty.” This uncertainty is usually 
created by the unpredictability, capriciousness or inability of public institutions, which in 
turn prompts the client to come to the patron in search of protection “either to avoid 
something or to be assisted in gaining something which otherwise would not be 
obtainable” (Erdmann and Engel, 2007, p. 108). When clients pursue the path of patrons 
at the expense of institutions, uncertainty is bound to be reproduced, disseminated and 
instituted. The result is the creation of a bureaucratic structure which is utterly inept, 
thereby manufacturing more uncertainty for the client who in turn flocks to the ever 
preoccupied patron who now accumulates unprecedented power. In this sense, clientelism 
is to be understood as “an answer to the institutional uncertainty created by 
neopatrimonial rule” (Erdmann and Engel, 2007, p. 108). This, however, doesn’t 
necessarily imply the neopatrimonial state and its clientelist machinery would reach an 
impasse:   
[T]he situation created by a widely used clientelist strategy is not necessarily one 
of chaos, because if officials or official institutions are confronted with competing 
clientelistic demands, they can take refuge in the formal rules that they are 
supposed to exercise. It is also important not to forget that there may be 
circumstances in which the interests of the politically or economically strong are 
better supported by the official legal-rational rules than by informal political 
relations. The result can be that the formal rules will be supported and advanced 
rather than circumvented and diminished (Erdmann and Engel, 2007, p. 108). 
 
The Postcolonial African State as a Neopatrimonial State 
Although most postcolonial African political elites elevated economic development 
as the most important agenda of their nations—at least at the level of discourse and 
policy—the economic conditions of most of these countries remained unchanged or, in 
some cases, turned into chronic underdevelopment.  Between the 1960s and the 1980s, 
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most African states have experimented state-led development paths and later free market 
policies to a detrimental effect. Whereas the East Asian economic success inspired many 
African countries to adopt the “developmental state” construct, critics of postcolonial 
African governance essentially characterized African states as neopatrimonal and anti-
developmental. At the heart of the neopatrimonial and anti-developmental 
characterization of postcolonial Africa is the assumption that Africa’s developmental 
challenges and economic misfortunes are inherently caused by internal factors. 
The notion of neopatrimonial governance was originally used by European scholars 
in the late 1970s to justify why the postcolonial African country is essentially an “anti-
development” state. More notably, it was French political scientist Jean-François Médard 
who was one of the first to provide an analysis of neopatrimonial rule in an attempt to 
explain causes of underdevelopment in Cameroon (Bach & Gazibo, 2011). Médard saw 
Cameroon as a strong, authoritarian yet impotent state where private patrimony took 
political administrative authority and bureaucracy hostage. For Médard, political 
discourses, institutions and legal frameworks were only instruments to give a mirage of a 
legal-rational bureaucratic logic where in reality the distinction between public domain 
and private interest contradicted and made to lose substance (Bach, 2011). 
Such predominantly Eurocentric characterization of postcolonial Africa as 
“neopatrimonal” and “anti-developmental” was proposed, among others, by Richard 
Sandbrook who directly linked “the private appropriation of the state’s powers” to the 
developmental failure of African states (Sandbrook, 2000, p. 59). For Sandbrook, the 
neopatrimonial state is a quintessence of the anti-developmental state, with “economic 
objectives [subordinated] to the short-run exigencies of political survival” for the ruler 
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and his regime (Sandbrook, 2000, p. 59). Others would go as far as referring to the so-
called neopatrimonial rule in Africa as an “institutionalised curse” (Hyden, 2000, p.19). 
Peter Evans, who identified different archetypes of development trends cites Mobutu 
Sese Seko’s Zaire as the typical predatory and anti-developmental state where “the 
preoccupation of the political class with rent seeking has turned the rest of society into 
prey.” The African neopatrimonial state is thus a model anti-developmental state where a 
clear demarcation between an “effective public arena,” private interests, organizations 
and loyalties is absent (Kohli, 2004, p. 408). In essence, the sole interest of the rulers of 
the neopatrimonial state rests upon “maintaining power” and “privatizing public 
resources for personal gain or gain by [their] ethnic communities” (Kohli, 2004, p. 289).  
Postcolonial Africa experienced a number of instances where rulers exerted 
complete authority over their populace. The colonial experience sowed the first seeds of 
neopatrimonialism where the colonizer ruled the state with arbitrary and capricious 
political and economic decisions that oscillate based on what outcome best represents its 
interests. Such treatment of the state as a private property crept into postcolonial Africa’s 
leaders who were remotely detached from the actual circumstances of their state. As 
Sandbrook (1985) states, such self-centered rule created an atmosphere of suspicion and 
intrigue where “the chief can become isolated…and grows increasingly divorced from 
reality” as a result of believing his own propaganda” and “uncritically accepting the 
praises sung by his sycophants” (p. 92). 
Because the colonial state was essentially a traditional state with certain features of 
an old empire, Erdmann and Engel (2007) argue, “the legal-rational sphere was confined 
to the centre [sic] of power in the colonial capital and its reach to the population of 
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European descent and some small immigrant groups” (p. 106). This left the vast majority 
of the population under the indirect rule of intermediaries that include kings, chiefs and 
elders. With little time for Africans to get an “education” about legal-rational 
bureaucratic governance, the continent was destined for neopatrimonial design: 
It was only during a short period that lasted hardly a decade after World War II that 
the colonial powers made an effort to build up a legal-rational bureaucracy that 
included and extended to Africans to some degree. The period was too short and the 
resources too small for there to have been a major and lasting move to an 
‘autonomous’ legal-rational bureaucratic culture. After independence, with the 
Africanisation [sic] of the bureaucracy and the establishment of authoritarian rule, 
the bureaucracy was extended and at the same time challenged and invaded from 
above and below by informal relationships. Thus, the state in Africa has always 
been a hybrid one, a mixture of patrimonial and legal-rational domination (Erdmann 
and Engel, 2007, p. 106). 
 
In addition to being a colonial residue, the rise of the “big-men”24 in Africa, 
according to Davies (2008), had been facilitated by the consent and endorsement of these 
rulers by the people along ethnic lines.  Davies argues this situation reflects a “vertically 
integrated, ethnically aligned nature of the patron-client system” where “big-men” are 
embraced as “legitimate representatives of their ethnic client groups, provided they vie 
for their ‘collective’ interests at the national level, and redistribute some of their wealth 
back down the chain” (p. 75).  
Regulatory vs. Predatory Neopatrimonialism 
For scholars who characterize postcolonial African states as neopatrimonial, not all 
instances of ‘big-men’ rule constitute a uniform manifestation of neopatrimonialism, if 
there is such a thing. Bach (2011) distinguishes between two types of African 
neopatrimonal states: regulated and predatory. Regulatory neopatrimonialism is related to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 In political science “big man” usually refers to corrupt, autocratic and often totalitarian rule of countries 
by a single person. !
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what he calls “ethnoregional balance,” in which “the distribution of resources and 
prebends by the ruler is sometimes formalised [sic] and can take place on an inclusive 
base” (p. 278). Regulatory neopatrimonialism has a potential to cultivate a sense of 
mutual coexistence because the method involved is usually based on cooptation and 
redistribution as opposed to coercion. In this sense, regulated neopatrimonialism, 
although traditional manifestations of public ethics and common good are undermined, 
provides its own make of “moral economy” so long as compliance is ensured (Bach, 
2011, p. 278). 
Predatory neopatrimonalism, on the other hand, refers to “systems where personal 
rule and resource control reach a paroxysmic level” with a consequent institutionalization 
and therefore the state” (Bach, 2011, p. 279). In predatory neopatrimonalism, the notion 
of the public sphere is practically inconceivable or lost. “The privatisation [sic] of the 
public sphere is carried to such extremes that it becomes conducive to its dissolution” (p. 
279). With unrestricted control at the disposal of the ruler, such a state is bound to be 
coercive and lacks the limited public sphere window afforded by regulated neopatrimony: 
The ultimate outcome of such a pattern may be the combination of kleptocracy 
with a narrowly defined distributive bias. The very notion of a ‘neopatrimonial 
state’ becomes then an oxymoron. Conversely, regulated neopatrimonialism infers 
some capacity to craft ‘public’ policies but this may, over time, build-up into an 
increasingly ‘legal-rational’ modus operandi of the state. To put it differently, an 
operational distinction has to be drawn between patrimonial practices within the 
state and the patrimonialisation of the entire state (Bach, 2011, p. 280, emphasis in 
original). 
 
As I discussed earlier, the self-proclaimed “developmental state” characterization 
of the Ethiopian state has received strong criticism from different scholars (Bach 2011; 
Easterly, 2014; Vestal 1999) who accuse the ruling party of EPRDF of abusing human 
rights and appropriating public resources for the purpose of sustaining control. EPRDF’s 
! 94 
“hegemonic development” ideology and its critiques, represented by telecommunications 
(de)regulation debates involving the Ethiopian state and IMF in the present study, inform 
the analysis presented in Chapters VI and VII. The purpose of the discussion on these 
contesting theories has therefore been to make sense of the nature and motives of the 
Ethiopian ruling elite presently. I will now discuss the philosophical tenets of critical 
political economy, which will be useful in framing the analyses of some of the key 
themes of this study including the commodification of surveillance and deregulation in 
telecommunications. 
Approaching Global Neo-liberalism through Critical Political Economy 
The tension between IMF and the Ethiopian state in the regulation-deregulation 
debate regarding the Ethiopian telecommunication sector—a central theme of 
investigation in this study—represents a tension between the neo-liberal agenda of 
aggressive privatization and that of an independent nation state’s policy of 
“developmental statism” and market regulation. It is in this context that a critical political 
economy approach is essential to understand the global telecommunications domination 
race and the motives of the stakeholders involved. 
What Is Political Economy? 
Amidst a prevailing profit-driven global capitalist order, it is hardly surprising that 
the global communication infrastructure is increasingly becoming privatized (Thussu, 
2007; McChesney and Schiller, 2003; and Winseck, 1998). This allows the production 
and distribution of media content to be controlled by a small number of international 
multi-media organizations that treat the production and distribution of media as 
commodities.  
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Mosco defines political economy as “the study of the social relations, particularly 
the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and 
consumption of resources” (1996, p. 25, emphasis in original). Expanding on this 
definition Babe (1995) notes that the relationship between power relations and the market 
is quite complex and that it is the goal of the political economist to clarify the nature of 
this relationship. The political economy of communication, then, entails the study of 
power and its relationship between the production, distribution and consumption of 
communication. Communication in this circumstance is defined as a social process of 
exchange where the product of that exchange is information which contains within it the 
embodiment of social relationships (Mosco, 1996). In this sense, the study of the political 
economy of communication is the study of how structural and institutional forces 
influence the process of communication. 
There is a wealth of literature that uses the political economy of communication 
approach to examine the possible impact of treating the production and distribution of 
media content as a privatized commodity in an increasingly free market capital system. 
For example, Mosco (1996) summarizes the claims of the neo-liberal perspective, whose 
advocates argue that the privatization of media in increasingly free markets will stimulate 
the production and distribution of a wider variety of media content, thereby providing 
consumers with endless amounts of information that will help society progress. Critics of 
this view, however, argue how the race for privatization can have a dystopian effect on 
society by concentrating the control of media production and distribution within a small 
select group who only produce content that benefits themselves (Bagdikian, 2004; 
Herman & Chomsky, 1988; McChesney, 1997; McChesney 2007; Raboy & Dagenais, 
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1992). According to this Marxist and institutional perspectives this can limit the diversity 
of information, which in turn can inhibit societal progress. 
Approaches in Political Economy of Communication 
According to Mosco (1996) and Babe (1995) there are three different, but related 
strands to the study of the political economy of communication. They are: the neo- 
conservative/liberal perspective; Marxist perspective; and institutional perspective. Each 
strand provides a different understanding of the process of communication and its 
relationship with the structural and institutional forces of a given society. 
The neo-conservative/liberal strand traces its roots back to the work of Adam Smith 
(1723-1790), and in particular his “Theory of Moral Sentiment” and “An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.” According to the neo conservative/liberal 
perspective, the relationship between social relations and the market is a struggle for 
individual autonomy from centralized or monopolized power, i.e., the state. Proponents 
of this view see the transfer of market control from the state to the private sector as a 
means of enhancing individual autonomy by providing increased opportunity to be 
involved in the market, thereby stimulating and enhancing economic and social 
prosperity for all. The notion of communication as a resource that is produced, distributed 
and consumed was not acknowledged until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when 
the economic and social potentials of communication were first being recognized. This 
occurred specifically during the transformation of the press, electronic media and 
telecommunication from family owned enterprises into major private businesses. It was 
argued that communication, as a private resource, could produce a tremendous amount of 
wealth by creating competitive markets that would stimulate the development and 
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production of communication technology and provide access to an increasingly diverse 
array of information that would provide many benefits to society. 
Researchers within the political economy of communication who consider 
themselves neo-conservative/liberal political economists view communication as a 
resource that should be privatized to stimulate production and provide access to an 
increasingly diverse array of media content. In other words, they view the state as having 
monopoly power over the production and distribution of communication and thus 
accumulating power to limit the diversity of media content by only communicating 
information that enhances its control over society. Put simply, neo-conservatives/liberals 
view the production and distribution of communication as a resource to be deregulated 
and privatized in order to provide increased levels of market competition which they 
claim would, in turn, produce and communicate a more diverse array of media content 
throughout society. For instance, Christopherson and Storper (1989) argue that the 
deregulation and privatization of media structures offer greater production flexibility to 
provide increased market competition.  
The race for deregulation and privatization in neo-liberal political economy and its 
emphasis on competition is hardly credible and has been critiqued by several 
commentators. As Wilkin (2001) points out, neo-liberal political economy model offers 
neither an accurate description of prevailing trends in global communication nor a 
prescriptive vision of the good society that allows for the idea that a good society is one 
in which all people can be seen as winners. For the neo-liberal world-view, Wilkin 
contends, “life is ultimately a competition in which the rewards go to the winners in what 
is (ideally) a race in which all can compete on an equal basis” (p. 74). 
! 98 
Contrary to neo-liberal capitalism’s “free competition” narrative, Wilkin (2001) 
reflects on what he calls a form of “corporate mercantile capitalism” (p. 74). According 
to Wilkin, a mutually reinforcing relationship exists between the interests of the world’s 
major political and corporate agents results in a coalition of political-economic forces that 
structure the rules and regulations that shape the world’s capitalist markets. 
Unsurprisingly, these rules and regulations are not intended to promote a general 
competition in which these already powerful core states and corporations might 
conceivably “lose out” to lesser rivals. On the contrary, the rules and regulations are 
specific: they are intended to allow for the continued dominance and control of markets 
by the already powerful corporate actors that are largely based in the core Western states. 
The neo-conservative/liberal school of political economy conceals underlying 
issues of power relationships and profits. This has been challenged by the Marxist strand 
of political economy. The Marxist strand views the relationship between politics (power) 
and economics (the market) as a manifestation of class exploitation and class struggle. 
According to this view the relationship between the state and the market is focused 
around the upper class’s ability to control the production, distribution and consumption of 
resources in order to maintain its dominance over the lower classes of society. Marxist 
political economists view communication as a resource that, when privatized, is used by 
private interests to exploit consumers by only producing media content that “sells” in 
order to enhance their corporate well-being, while enhancing elite power over the 
subordinate classes. For instance, Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that the production 
and distribution of media content, specifically news content, is used as propaganda to 
enable large corporations, who are increasingly in control of the media industry, to 
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increase capital profits and thus their power and influence over society. This type of 
market dominance, it may be argued, distorts the types of media content produced and 
limits content diversity by only producing content that “sells.” 
The third strand of political economy, the institutional perspective, is rooted in the 
work of Max Weber, Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons. Proponents of this 
approach focus on institutions and their influence on processes of production, distribution 
and consumption. Unlike the Marxist perspective which views the acquisition of capital 
as the dominant force affecting power relations, the institutional perspective sees 
institutional growth as the dominant force affecting power. In Mosco’s (1996) words, 
“institutionalists view the maximization of power within bureaucratic structures as a 
more potent driving force, for better or for worse, than the maximization of profit (1996, 
p. 56). Put simply, power is defined by institutional status rather than capital wealth. 
According to the institutional perspectives, communication may be viewed as a 
resource used to manipulate the production and distribution of market goods, including 
media content, in a way that enhances the dominant institutions’ power over others. For 
example, Gandy (1992) argues that dominant institutions define and communicate tastes 
and preferences within the market to influence price and supply, and their status within 
society. Institutional analysis of communication organizations will, for example, illustrate 
interlocking relationships between media organizations and other market related 
organizations in order to constrain information choice to influence market behavior to 
favor the dominant institutions.  
The increasing supremacy of capitalism and globalized markets is at the center of 
the neo-liberal agenda. With capitalism expanding unchecked, it is inevitable that, as 
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Wasko, Murdock, & Sousa (2011) point out, “the tension between private interest and 
public good has been significantly exacerbated” (p. 2). The powerful influence capitalist 
agents exert on governments leads to the weakening and eventual insignificance of public 
policies. This facilitates increased privatization where “the abuse of private power is 
blatant and commonplace” (Wasko, Murdock, & Sousa, 2011, p. 2). Where neo-liberal 
political economy fails to reflect on these issues, the importance of critical political 
economy cannot be stressed enough in dealing with contemporary global media and 
communications.  
Related Literature and Research Questions 
Research in telecommunications studies in Africa hasn’t kept up with the ever-
increasing importance of the sector. However, there are a few studies that have 
investigated certain aspects of telecommunications in Africa. 
Cox (2011) examines why governments in Ghana, South Africa and Zambia did not 
formulate telecommunication policies that gave mobile cellular equal status with the 
fixed line with similar rights and responsibilities up to 2005. Cox argues equal status 
would have enabled mobile cellular telephony to play a primary role in the achievement 
of universal service. The study focuses on how the treatment of mobile cellular telephony 
as a complementary network and service in the international telecommunication sector 
became a valued group standard that consequently influenced policymaking in the 
domestic telecommunication sector.  
Cogburn (1996), on the other hand, assesses the impact of globalization, the 
information technology revolution and the changing world economy on the autonomy of 
the national state by explaining the political economy of telecommunications sector 
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restructuring in South Africa, from 1985-1995. The study explored the changes in the 
South African telecommunications sector and the result of the restructuring of the global 
political economy. He concludes that the complex mix of global and domestic forces in 
South Africa has led to a tenuous balance between the restructuring needs of the global 
economy and the domestic demands for social and economic development, evidence of 
the relative autonomy of the state.  
Other studies that have some significance to this research are not directly related to 
telecommunications but they do show IMF’s historical intervention in the African 
continent. Akokpari (1996) investigates how African governments since the 1980s have 
been compelled by international donor conditionalities to pursue IMF-sponsored SAPs; 
these sought to liberalize the state-controlled market and to advance political 
liberalization which aimed at dismantling the authoritarian state and establishing 
democratic conditions. He concludes that the Ghanaian experience challenges 
conventional assumptions about the market-democracy partnership and suggests the need 
for a fundamental rethinking of Bank/Fund conditionalities for Ghana and Africa in 
general.  
Musa (1990) undertakes an inquiry into the social, political, and economic 
implications of the Structural Adjustment Program in Nigeria. The study evaluates the 
effectiveness of the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the World Bank vis-à-
vis Nigeria, from June 1986 to 1990—the period when President Ibrahim Babangida’s 
adjustment program has been in effect. It sheds light on the dynamics of the world 
economy in relation to Nigeria in the wake of crises and radical transformations that gave 
rise to the drastic changes we witness today. 
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Kassahun (2002) explores whether or not structural adjustment reform measures 
implemented in 1992 have helped improve the economic and social environment. She 
examined to what extent the reform measures have been successful in meeting the six 
core objectives of structural adjustment programs: raising the rates of saving; securing 
macroeconomic stability; liberalizing trade; reducing government intervention and the 
promotion of the private sector; the reorientation of government spending and 
restructuring of revenues; and mobilizing external resources. The study also explored 
whether or not reform has made it easier or more difficult to expand services in health 
care and education.  
These studies offer useful analyses about telecommunications and global capitalism 
in the Third World, albeit with a separate treatment. This is where this study’s point of 
departure surfaces; it addresses overarching global and local political and economic 
policies and their implications on telecommunications operations in developing countries 
and emerging economies. Consequently, the following research questions are used to 
guide this study: 
RQ1: What is the institutional history of telecommunications in Ethiopia? 
RQ2:To what extent does the Ethiopian public endorse/denounce state 
monopoly of the telecommunications sector? 
 
RQ3:What are the underlying reasons behind the differences in telecom 
liberalization policy between IMF and the Ethiopian state, and why?  
 
RQ4:What are the premises on which Sino-Ethiopian partnerships in the 
Ethiopian telecommunications sector are laid? 
 
Conclusion 
The study of the politics surrounding the telecommunication sector in Ethiopia 
requires a comprehensive treatment of overarching narratives in communication, 
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development studies and political science theories. This chapter provided some key 
theoretical foundations that attempt to explain the external push of telecommunication 
deregulation in Ethiopia including modernization and neo-liberalism. It also explored 
contesting perspectives on the nature of the characteristics Ethiopian state and its 
rationale in maintaining state monopoly of the telecommunication sector through the 
discussion the developmental state versus the neopatrimonial state theories. This is 
followed by a discussion on political economy of communications that provides the 
framework of analysis for the study. The chapter ends with a review of previous research 
and a presentation of the research questions guiding the current study.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
It is not a matter of starting from certain theoretical or methodological 
problems: it is a matter of starting from what we want to do, and then 
seeing which methods and theories will help us to achieve these ends 
(Eagleton quoted in Lindloff, 1995, pp. 25-26). 
Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that 
counts can be counted—Albert Einstein, attributed (German-born U.S. 
physicist, 1879 to 1955) 
Mixed methods, in which quantitative and qualitative methods are 
combined, are increasingly recognized as valuable, because they can 
capitalize on the respective strengths of each approach. Pairing 
quantitative and qualitative components of a larger study can achieve 
various aims, including corroborating findings, generating more 
complete data, and using results from one method to enhance insights 
attained with the complementary method (Curry, Nembhard, & Bradley, 
2009, p. 1442). 
 
As noted in Chapter I, this study explores contesting perspectives, rationales and 
implications in the regulation vis-à-vis liberalization of telecommunications operations 
by existing and emerging, local and international players in the developing world.  By 
investigating the case study of Ethio-Telecom—the only and state-controlled telecom 
provider in Ethiopia—the study seeks to investigate public opinion about the 
ramifications of the state-monopoly of the telecommunication sector; external and 
internal pushes for liberalization and the state’s implicit and explicit justification for 
monopoly; and the processes and rationales in Sino-Ethiopian partnerships in the 
Ethiopian telecommunications sector. With a view to generating empirical data with 
respect to the aforementioned research foci, a triangulated three-stage research process 
was designed, combining quantitative and qualitative methods. After providing a brief 
discussion on procedures related to human subjects, this chapter describes and discusses 
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the three stages of this research process as well as sampling procedures and modes of 
data analysis. I will also discuss some salient issues in methodology such as the rationale 
in combining qualitative and quantitative methods in a single research design. The final 
sections will highlight important aspects of data collection and analysis processes, as well 
as some limitations encountered in these processes. 
Human Subjects Research and the Institutional Review Board 
Two of the data collection tools employed in this study involving contact with 
human subjects—the online survey and individual interviews—were reviewed by the 
Office for Protection of Human Subjects (OPHS) at the University of Oregon. The 
protocol (09132013.014) effective November 14, 2013, through November 13, 2018, was 
determined to be exempt by OPHS on November 14, 2013. I was the sole investigator for 
this study, and I completed the necessary Collaborative IRB Training Initiative (CITI) on 
August 10, 2011 (expiring two years later). All interactions with human subjects strictly 
adhered to the regulations and ethical considerations set forth by OPHS. I will address 
processes and protocols approved for each of the data collection tools involving human 
subjects later in this chapter. 
Methodology 
Philosophical Underpinnings in Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Philosophically, qualitative and quantitative research methods draw on distinct 
methodologies. Survey research epitomizes quantitative analysis with its emphasis on 
measurement standardization and representativeness. It draws on the Durkheimian 
tradition of broad, comparative analysis and the search for social facts (Alexander, 1998; 
Durkheim & Thompson, 1985; Levy & Gurevitch, 1994; Schmaus, 2004). Qualitative 
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research approaches, on the other hand, draw on the Weberian tradition, and emphasizes 
the importance of finding the subjective meanings of actors in a social context (Collins, 
1986; Wallace, 1994; Weber & Runciman, 1978). In qualitative analysis, conclusions 
about meaning are interpretive and dependent on the context in which the actions take 
place.  In contrast to quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis resists either quantification 
or standardized comparison (Morgan, 1993). In the next two sections, I will discuss each 
of these methodologies.   
Quantitative Research. The quantitative research tradition has often been 
referred to as the classical empiricist point of view. Its roots are commonly traced from 
the norms of logical positivism that is central in natural science research (Stempel & 
Westley, 1989). A fundamental principle amongst adherents of this research tradition is 
the belief that there is little difference in principle to investigating the natural and social 
worlds and that one can apply the same basic research procedures to both. According to 
Bryman (1988), this belief draws on the principle of “methodological monism or 
methodological naturalism” (p. 14). In this sense, humans are seen as the objects of the 
social sciences, and their different attributes human like language, feelings, attitudes, etc. 
can be codified and studies through a scientific method. The doctrine of 
“phenomenalism,” also referred to as “empiricism,” is another central component of 
positivism. For this doctrine, only those phenomena that are observable phenomena are 
considered knowledge while the subjective experiences of the observed does not count as 
scientific knowledge unless they can be rendered observable (Bryman, 1988).  
The doctrines of “inductivism” and “deductivism” are important tenets in 
positivism. Positivism through inductivism proposes scientific knowledge is arrived at 
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through the accumulation of verified facts, which then feed into the general body of 
theoretical understandings pertaining to the particular domain of knowledge being 
investigated. A theory, for example, is derived at through the inductive logic of 
positivism. It expresses and reflects the accumulated findings of empirical research. 
These findings point to empirically established regularities, often referred to as “laws” 
(Bryman, 1988, p. 15). Deductivism, on the other hand, seeks to make specific 
propositions from general accounts of reality. The logic of deduction seeks “to construct 
a scientific theory to explain the laws pertaining to a particular field; a hypothesis (or 
possibly more than one) is derived in order to enable the scientist to test the theory; if the 
hypothesis is rejected when submitted to rigorous empirical examination the theory must 
be revised” (Bryman, 1988, p. 15). Consequently, positivism involves inductive as well 
as deductive logic, a process whereby hypotheses are deduced from general theories and 
submitted to empirical test, with the results being absorbed into general theories. This 
principle, taken together with the doctrine of phenomenalism, makes a sharp distinction 
between theory and observation. “Empirical verification is taken to entail devising 
observations which are independent of scientific theories and are hence neutral. 
Observations are viewed as uncontaminated by the scientist’s theoretical or personal 
predilections” (Bryman, 1988, p. 16).    
Objectivity and neutrality are critical tenets in the collection of scientific facts in 
the positivist tradition. The goal is for the researchers’ own values not to influence his or 
her work. This stance on values means drawing a distinction between scientific issues and 
statements and normative ones. As Bryman argues, positivism “denies the 
appropriateness of the sphere of the normative to its purview because normative 
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statements cannot be verified in relation to experience. While positivists recognise [sic] 
that they can investigate the implications of a particular normative position, they cannot 
verify or falsify the position itself” (1988, p. 15). In summary, the positivist approach to 
social inquiry assumes an independent reality that can be discerned by an objective, 
detached, and value-free inquirer, and a process that requires “the ability to be objective 
and a real world to be objective about” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). 
Qualitative Research. The 1960s saw the popularity of qualitative research 
tradition that has taken different labels including critical theory, interpretive social 
science, hermeneutics, and naturalistic enquiry. In contrast to positivism, in which the 
researcher tends to view events from the outside and to impose empirical concerns upon 
social reality, qualitative research stresses the need to see through the eyes of one’s 
subjects and to understand social behavior in its social context (Bryman, 1984). In 
specifying the distinct characteristics that distinguish qualitative inquiries to positivism, 
Bryman (1988) singles out two salient points. Firstly, the subject matter of the social 
sciences, i.e., people and their social reality, is seen as fundamentally different from the 
subject matter of the natural sciences. Qualitative research thus rejects the application of 
scientific methods to society. Secondly, any attempt to understand social reality must 
proceed from people’s understanding of their own reality as opposed to the singular, 
independent “reality” sought by positivists. This means that the social scientist must 
grasp the interpretive devices by which the individual makes sense of his/her reality, as 
these provide the motivation for his/her actions. In further singling out differences 
between quantitative and qualitative methodologies, Bryman (1988) distinguishes 
between their respective “nomothetic” and “ideographic” modes of reasoning:!!
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A nomothetic approach seeks to establish general law-like findings which can be 
deemed to hold irrespective of time and place; an ideographic approach locates its 
findings in specific time-periods and locales. The former mode is taken to be 
indicative of the scientific approach, whereas ideographic reasoning is often more 
closely associated with the historian’s method. By taking random, and hence 
representative, samples, survey research is taken to exhibit a nomothetic approach 
because of the investigator’s ability to infer findings to larger populations…By 
contrast, the qualitative researcher frequently conducts research in a specific 
milieu (a case study) whose representativeness is unknown and probably 
unknowable, so that the generalisability [sic] of such findings is also unknown (p. 
100). 
 
Central to the goal of qualitative research is “thick” description and the attention 
to detail as opposed to issues like “representativeness” and “generalization” that are 
pillars of positivism. Ang (1996, p. 71) writes qualitative inquiry “favours [sic] 
interpretive particularization [sic] over explanatory generalization, historical and local 
concreteness rather than formal abstraction, ‘thick’ description of details rather than 
extensive but ‘thin’ survey.” Accordingly, it is hardly surprising for many qualitative 
researchers to reject positivist techniques like the survey which they believe provide 
“think” and “superficial” evidence of the social world. As Strelitz (2002) illuminates, 
“while they [qualitative researchers] acknowledge that surveys can point to causal 
relationships between arbitrarily chosen variables, they argue that these findings may 
have little meaning to those individuals whose social worlds they are meant to represent” 
(p. 93). 
In fact, the notion of “generalizability” in qualitative research is not about 
representativeness but rather the extent to which one can extend the account of a 
particular situation or population to other people, times, or settings than those directly 
studied. “Generalisation [sic] in qualitative research usually takes place through the 
development of a theory that not only makes sense of the particular persons or situations 
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studied, but also shows how the same process, in different situations, can lead to different 
results” (Maxwell, 1992, p. 293).  
Generalizability in qualitative inquiry, therefore, assumes that theory may be 
useful in making sense of similar situations. In this sense, the positivist critique on 
qualitative research on the latter’s “lack” of generalizability, therefore, misses the central 
point. The critical issue, Bryman (1988) argues, is the cogency of the theoretical 
reasoning, and this should be judged by the generalizability of cases to theoretical 
propositions, rather than to populations or universes. In describing what constitutes 
generalizability in qualitative research, however, Maxwell (1992, p. 294) distinguishes 
between “internal” and “external” generalizability. Whereas internal generalizability 
involves generalizing within the community, group or institution studied to persons, 
events, and settings that were not directly observed or interviewed, external 
generalizability refers to generalizing to other communities, groups or institutions. For 
Maxwell, qualitative research rarely makes a case for external generalizability.  
The constructivist approach to research (Ang, 1996; Lindloff, 1995) has been 
widely criticized by positivists for the “lack” of validity in its results. Qualitative 
researchers, however, argue back by pointing out there are criteria for validity in 
qualitative research if one applies the concept of validity primarily to accounts, not to 
methods: 
The applicability of the concept of validity…does not depend on the existence of 
some absolute truth or reality to which an account can be compared, but only on 
the fact that there exist ways of assessing accounts that do not depend entirely on 
features of the account itself, but in some way relate to those things that the 
account claims to be about (Maxwell, 1992, p. 283). 
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For Maxwell (1992, pp. 285-288) the notion of “descriptive validity,” or the idea 
that researchers should not make up or distort what they saw or heard is, constitutes an 
important measure of validity in qualitative research. He also refers to “interpretive 
validity”—the accuracy of the concepts used by the researcher in relation to the 
perspective of the individuals included in the account. The core issue regarding validity 
in qualitative research is whether or not we are providing a valid description of what 
events, utterances, and behaviors mean to the people engaged with them (Strelitz, 2006). 
In contrast to the deductive reasoning of quantitative research, qualitative research 
is based on inductive reasoning. It proceeds inferentially from particulars to more general 
statements, with a flexibility of research design. Qualitative researchers often favor a 
relatively open and unstructured research strategy as opposed to one which has been 
decided in advance, which dictates what ought to be investigated or how it ought to be 
done. As a result of a flexible approach researchers often come across important topics, 
which may be worth further investigation. In my study, the importance of some issues 
only arose as worthy of pursuit during the qualitative interview stage of the research.  
The Idea of and Argument for Triangulation. In social science research, the 
notion of triangulation generally denotes the use of more than one method of 
investigation and the analysis of two or more types of data. Triangulation involves the 
use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to address the same research 
problem but with different processes (Bryman, 1984). The notion of triangulation has had 
both its supporters and critiques. Methodological purists have argued quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches are mutually exclusive in their ontological and 
epistemological assumptions and the nature and appeal of their end product. As a result, 
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combining these “divergent” approaches in a single research design is counterproductive. 
In asserting the argument for methodological distinctiveness, Egon Guba writes, “we are 
dealing with an either-or proposition, in which one must pledge allegiance to one 
paradigm or the other” (Bryman, 1988, pp. 107-108, emphasis in original). “The 
methodological question cannot be reduced to a question of methods: methods must be 
fitted to a predetermined methodology” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 108).  
Researchers who employ triangulation, on the other hand, argue that the 
methodological differences between quantitative and qualitative approaches shouldn’t be 
seen as antithetical but rather as complementary. As Strelitz (2002) argues, technical 
rather than epistemological issues should determine which research methods are 
appropriate, and the issues being examined should ultimately decide the style of research 
that is to be employed. Bryman (1988) writes:  
In some treatments they are viewed as competing views about the ways in which 
social reality ought to be studied, and as such, they are essentially divergent 
clusters of epistemological assumptions, that is, of what should pass as 
warrantable knowledge about the social world. For other writers, quantitative and 
qualitative research are simply denotations of different ways of conducting social 
investigations and which may be conceived of as being appropriate to different 
kinds of research question and even as capable of being integrated. When this 
second view is taken, they are more or less simply different approaches to data 
collection, so that preferences for one or the other or some hybrid approach are 
based on technical issues (p. 5).  
 
For Bryman (1984) methodological determinism along a strict quantitative vis-à-
vis qualitative divide conceals the common characteristics of the two approaches. An 
either-or proposition only for the sake of epistemological and ontological and purposes is, 
therefore, sterile. According to Bryman (1988), the decision in favor of a singular or 
fused approach should be adopted based on “technical” reasons rather than dogmatic 
logic where researchers who reject combining the approaches are in “doctrinaire 
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posturing” (p. 173) Thus, approaches should be chosen in a manner that addresses the 
complexity of the research problem rather than through the pursuit of “methodological 
purity”:   
If some research topics are more suited to a survey, while others would be better 
served by a qualitative approach, still others will be even better served by a 
marriage of the two traditions, whereas the integrated strategy may not fit some 
issues. The critical issue is to be aware of the appropriateness of particular 
methods (or combinations of methods) for particular issues (Bryman, 1988, p. 
173).  
 
Others like Wolff et al. (1993) argue that both qualitative and quantitative 
techniques not only have different strengths and weaknesses, but the strengths of one tend 
to be the weakness of the other. In this sense, although qualitative and quantitative 
methods such as interview and survey techniques are derived from divergent theoretical 
approaches, “there is nothing inherent in the methods themselves that forbids their 
combination. In fact, the particular strengths and limitations inherent in different methods 
might suit them ideally to complement one another in a unified research design” (Wolff 
et al., 1993, p. 119).  
In general, quantitative research is best suited to the elucidation of structural 
regularities in social life, while qualitative investigation provides access to processes 
which link the variables, putting flesh on the bones of statistical findings (Bryman, 1998; 
Deacon et al., 1999). If one accepts that each has a perspective to offer, a combination of 
the two traditions can readily be envisioned. 
Data Collection Methods 
I have used a triangulated, three-stage approach to investigating, among other 
things, public opinion, internal and external stakeholders’ points of views and policy 
documents in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector. The three stages were: 
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(i) A systematic random sample online survey, conducted between 
November and December 2013, which examined, amongst other things, 
the Ethiopian public’s opinion about key themes in the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector including ownership model, access, service 
and surveillance; 
(ii) A series of semi-structured individual interviews partially based on 
preliminary findings of the online survey involving high-ranking 
Ethiopian government officials, telecommunication infrastructure 
development advisors and consultants to the Ethiopian government, 
International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization 
directors/representatives, International relations researchers and 
scholars; 
(iii) Document analysis involving government policy papers, IMF country 
reports and consultation documents, World Bank country reports and 
staff appraisals, etc. 
I will now discuss each of these research stages.  
The Online Survey 
Background. The social survey is the research method preferred by the 
quantitative researcher in the social sciences. As Harvey and MacDonald (1993, p. 101) 
note, it gives one access to large amounts of data which are representative of the 
population, and from which one can generalize one’s findings. Bryman (1988) writes in 
this regard: “The survey’s capacity for generating quantifiable data on large numbers of 
people who are known to be representative of a wider population in order to test theories 
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or hypotheses has been viewed by many practitioners as a means of capturing many of 
the ingredients of science” (p. 11). Furthermore, it is believed that if one is measuring 
social phenomena, then the only instrument that can provide reliable and valid data is the 
survey. Here reliability refers to the extent to which the method of data collection is 
consistent and repeatable by the same or other researchers, while validity refers to 
whether or not the data collected reflect the concept being measured. 
According to Bryman (1988), in a triangulated research design, qualitative 
research is usually a precursor to the formulation of problems and the development of 
instruments for quantitative research. The findings from the qualitative phase act as a 
source of hunches or hypotheses to be tested during the quantitative phase. However, as 
Brent Wolff et al. (1993) note, it is not uncommon to make qualitative inquiries after 
survey results have been analyzed, with the aim to corroborate findings or explore in 
greater depth the relationships suggested by the quantitative analysis. I took this latter 
approach.  
In this study, the quantitative research preceded and provided an aid to the 
collection of qualitative data. One of the key factors that necessitated designing the 
research in this manner is the lack of a think tank or publicly available data that provides 
information on social issues, public opinion, and demographic trends shaping the 
Ethiopian public.25 Although the Ethiopian public is a de facto client of Ethio-Telecom, 
there are hardly any studies that attempted to measure public perceptions about access !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 The Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA) is a government enterprise that is responsible for a 
number of national socio-economic and demographic surveys on annual basis. Although CSA has a good 
reputation of producing reliable data, its surveys are limited to descriptive statistics related to the different 
sectors of the Ethiopian economy and population census. The lack of a nonpartisan think tank (like Pew 
Research Center) leaves an enormous gap in data related to public opinion polling, demographic research, 
media content analysis and other empirical social science research.  !
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and service and user experience in an organized and empirical fashion. Through 
conducting the survey, I hoped that the results would provide me with a “cartography” of 
users’ experiences, perspectives, and perceptions, and, in the process, allow me to 
identify significant trends and preferences that would be helpful in conducting my 
interviews in a more informed manner. 
Although there were different ways of administrating the survey including via 
phone and face-to-face conversations, several factors tipped the balance in favor of an 
online survey. A major rationale in choosing a web based survey was the relative ease it 
offered in reaching the target population (in Ethiopia) of the study which otherwise 
would have been nearly impossible to recruit. The limited budget of the study meant 
expensive alternatives like phone and face-to-face tools were hardly desirable. As 
Schonlau, Fricker, & Elliott (2002) affirm, although online surveys have a larger initial 
start-up cost than mail or phone surveys, they have a lower marginal cost per survey 
respondent, especially if large number of respondents are involved. The option to use 
online survey in the present study was particularly attractive because I was able to use 
Qualtrics, a web-based application and fourth-generation survey software, free of charge 
courtesy of licensing through the University of Oregon.  
Another reason to use an online survey is to protect the anonymity of participants 
and increase confidence of respondent participation. Given the political nature of some of 
the questions, there was a chance that significant number of respondents might have 
declined to participate in alternative formats that might incur notoriety. This logic is 
consistent with the recommendation of Schonlau, Fricker, & Elliott (2002) who argue 
that online survey is preferable when the questionnaire contains “questions of a 
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particularly sensitive nature” (p. xv). The most important factor in opting to use an online 
survey in favor of other formats was probably because of the object of the study, i.e., 
measuring user experience of the service provided by Ethio-Telecom. This conforms to 
Selm and Jankowski’s (2006) proposition that “online surveys are often employed in 
studies of Internet use in order to reach a population with Internet experience” (p. 437). 
The Questionnaire Design. My questionnaire conformed what Wimmer and 
Dominick (2011) refer to as “descriptive survey.” The aim of a descriptive survey is “to 
describe or document current conditions or attitudes—that is, to explain what exists at the 
moment” (p. 185).  Unlike an “analytical survey” that attempts to describe and explain 
why situations exist, a descriptive survey seeks to discover “the current situation in the 
area under study” (p. 185).  
The questionnaire constituted 47 items that mainly included multiple-choice 
questions and matrix tables with Likert scale designs. Respondents were asked to respond 
to each question by placing their responses on (typically) on a five-point Likert scale. 
There were no open-ended questions. 
The questionnaire was written in Amharic, the official language of the Ethiopia. It 
is reproduced in Appendix D (English) and Appendix E (Amharic). The first part of the 
questionnaire constituted questions related to demographics of participants. Variables 
here included gender, age, place of residence, monthly income, educational level, 
employment status and marital status.  
The second part of the questionnaire was constructed with the aim of gathering 
information related to the extent to which participants are dependent on the services of 
the Ethiopian telecommunications sector and how actively they use the information and 
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communication technology and services in their daily personal and professional lives. 
Items in this section included questions like: “How much of your monthly income do you 
spend on top-up cards for your mobile phone services?” or “Where do you use Internet 
regularly?” Automatic skip logic was applied in this section in order to make participants 
as comfortable as possible in responding to questions that were relevant to them. For 
example, if a respondent answered negatively to the question “Do you use the Internet?,” 
he/she wouldn’t be asked to respond to subsequent follow-up questions that would have 
appeared if they had responded affirmatively.   
The third and most important section of the questionnaire was comprised of 
questions related to three themes namely, public attitudes toward services provided by 
Ethio-Telecom; issues in government interference in users’ online experience; and public 
opinion about telecommunications proprietorship policy.  In relation to public attitudes 
related to Ethio-Telecom, the aim of the survey was to measure the extent to which public 
dissatisfaction on the performances of the state-owned service provider26 could be 
supported statistically. Some of the questions that reflected this aim of the survey 
included Likert scaled questions such as “How satisfied are you with the service you get 
from Ethio-Telecom?” or rank-order questions that asked respondents to compare and 
rate the performances of Ethio-Telecom with other state owned enterprises.  
Another focus of the third section of the survey was to measure the extent to 
which users identify their beliefs with individuals and groups that accuse the Ethiopian 
government of using its state-owned telecommunication facilities for mass surveillance 
and filtering purposes. International groups like Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#!See Chapter V!
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Privacy International, Tor, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ), Reporters Without Borders, The Citizen Lab at the University 
of Toronto and many other government opposition groups and netizens locally and 
internationally have reported, among other things, malicious malware surveillance 
practices at the hands of the Ethiopian government.27 Items in this category included 
Likert-scaled statements such as: “I believe people or organizations monitor the activities 
I perform over the Internet” or “The ability to share and access information privately 
using the Internet is important to me.”  
Finally, the survey aimed at exploring public opinion about the state monopoly of 
the Ethiopian telecommunications sector and views toward liberalization. I was 
particularly interested in exploring this variable as debates and narratives concerning 
government monopoly vis-à-vis liberalization of the Ethiopian telecommunication sector 
have hardly paid attention to what should be the most important perspective of all—that 
of the public. Whilst government monopoly vis-à-vis liberalization debates heavily 
involved elitist platforms that accommodated political figures and institutions like the 
IMF, de facto clients of the Ethio-Telecom have been neglected. With the view of filling 
this gap, Likert scale statements like “Having a choice of telecom service providers is 
important” were included in the survey. Participants were also provided with an item that 
asked them to check statements that came closest to their views regarding the telecom 
sector in Ethiopia. For examples, contesting statements like “The state needs to continue 
its monopolistic control of the telecom sector” and “The telecom sector should be 
liberalized” were provided.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 See Chapters V & VIII 
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Sampling. The sampling procedure employed in this study is probability 
sampling. According to Wimmer and Dominick (2011), “mathematical guidelines 
whereby each unit’s chance for selection is known” (p.185) are used in probability 
sampling. The most basic type of probability sampling is random sampling where each 
subject, event, or unit in the population has an equal chance of being selected. Although 
there are several methods of random selection, Wimmer and Dominick (2011) stress that 
“each unit or subject in the population must have an equal chance of being selected” and 
“the selection procedure must be free from subjective intervention by the researcher” 
(p.97). The specific random sampling procedure applied in the present survey is 
systematic random sampling, in which “every nth subject, unit, or element is selected 
from a population” and the researcher randomly selects a starting point and a sampling 
frame.  
The target population of the survey was Internet users in Ethiopia, estimated to 
make up 1.5% of the total population or 1.2 million people. A sampling frame—a list of 
the members of a particular population—was then generated from a 2007-2012 email list 
of alumni and existing faculty of four colleges in Ethiopia namely, Addis Ababa 
University, Arba Minch University, St. Mary’s College and Jimma University. The 
rationale behind generating this sampling frame is the relative ease in obtaining e-mail 
list of participants from existing records. My prior affiliations with these institutions were 
also helpful in obtaining the available e-mail lists.  
I opted to seek e-mail lists for my sampling frame not only because of the ease 
that e-mail communication provides in distribution efficiency but also because of what it 
offers in terms of eligibility criteria. Note that the eligibility criterion for participants of 
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this survey, in addition to being 18 years and older, is being at least an internet service 
client of Ethio-Telecom. The rationale here is an e-mail account holder is an Internet 
user, and Internet users in Ethiopia get their services from the only available provider—
Ethio Telecom. 
After the entire e-mail list from the four sources was aggregated, the sample 
frame constituted a list of 3,874 emails. In order to determine the sample size, I used Taro 
Yamane’s (1967, p.886) formula:  
! ! !!! !!!!! 
Where: 
n=sample size 
N=population size 
e=sampling error 
 
 
With a 95% confidence level and ±5% margin of error, the sampling size of the 
survey is calculated as follows:28  
! ! !!! !!!!! ! !!!"#!! !!!"#!!!!"!! ! !"#!!" 
The above procedure resulted in the minimum required sample size for the 
specified population. If a researcher has a captive audience, this sample size may be 
attained easily. However, as Bartlett, Kotrlik and Higgins (2001) highlight, since many 
social research studies often use data collection methods such as surveys and other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 According to Wimmer and Dominick (2011), the confidence level indicates a degree of certainty (as a 
percentage) that that the results of a study fall within a given range of values. Typical confidence levels are 
between 95% and 99%. The confidence interval (margin of error or sampling error) is a plus-or-minus 
percentage that is a range within the confidence level. For example, if a 5% confidence interval is used, and 
50% of the sample gives a particular answer for a question, the actual result for that question falls between 
45% and 55% (50±5). !
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voluntary participation methods, the response rates are typically well below 100%. One 
method that is common amongst social scientists to account for this loss is oversampling. 
Salkind (1997) suggested oversampling when he stated, “If you are mailing out surveys 
or questionnaires…count on increasing your sample size by 40%-50% to account for lost 
mail and uncooperative subjects” (p. 107). One can assume the same principle can be 
applied for online surveys. Fink (1995) stated, “Oversampling can add costs to the survey 
but is often necessary” (p. 36). Cochran (1977) argued, “A second consequence is, of 
course, that the variances of estimates are increased because the sample actually obtained 
is smaller than the target sample. This factor can be allowed for, at least approximately, 
in selecting the size of the sample” (p. 396). In mitigating the potential loss in response 
rates, I followed Bartlett, Kotrlik and Higgins’s (2001) recommendation of using pilot 
study results to anticipate response rates and amend the sample size accordingly. Hence, 
the 57% response rate recorded in the pilot study was used to calculate the adjusted 
sample size: 
!! ! !! 
Where: 
n2=sample size adjusted for response rate 
n=sample size 
r=anticipated return rate !! ! !! ! !"!!!!" ! !"!!!" 
Once the adjusted sample size of 637 participants was determined, the e-mail list 
was organized randomly. This was followed by calculating the sampling interval, which 
was obtained by dividing the number of the total population by the number of the 
adjusted sample size (3,874/637=6). After the sampling interval was determined, the 
! 123 
systematic random sampling procedure was complete with every sixth e-mail address 
being selected until the required sample size was reached. 
Participants’ Profile and Demographics. Tables 3-9 and Figures 2 and 3 
summarize key demographics information about participants of the survey including 
gender, age, place of residence, monthly income, educational level, employment status, 
marital status and political orientation. 
Gender No of Participants Percent 
Male 320 77.69% 
Female 94 22.31% 
Total 415 100% 
 
Table 3: Gender distribution of participants. !
Age No of Participants Percent 
18-24 35 8.43% 
25-34 312 75.18% 
35-44 59 14.22% 
45-54 5 1.20% 
55-64 1 0.24% 
65-74 1 0.24% 
75 years 
or older 2 0.48% 
Total 415 100.00% !
Table 4: Age distribution of participants. 
 
Place of Residence No of Participants Percent 
Addis Ababa 271 65.30% 
Dire Dawa, Mekelle, Adama, Gondor or Hawassa 31 7.47% 
Bahir Dar, Jimma, Dessie, Jijiga, Shashamane, Bishoftu or Harar 23 5.54% 
Wolayita Sodo, Arba Minch, Hasanna, Nekemt, Assela, Dilla, Debre Birhan 50 12.05% 
Another place 40 9.64% 
Total 415 100.00% 
 
Table 5: Participants’ place of residence. 
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Monthly Income No of Participants Percent 
Less than 1,000 ETB29 15 3.66% 
1000-2000 ETB 26 6.34% 
2000-3000 ETB 34 8.29% 
3000-5000 ETB 148 36.10% 
5000-10000 ETB 84 20.49% 
More than 10,000 ETB 103 25.12% 
Total 410 100.00% 
 
Table 6: Participants’ monthly income distribution. !
Educational Level No. of Participants Percent 
No schooling completed 1 0.24% 
Nursery school to 8th grade 0 0.00% 
Some high school, no 
diploma 0 0.00% 
High school graduate, 
diploma or the equivalent 2 0.48% 
Some college credit, no 
degree 13 3.13% 
Trade/technical/vocational 
training 11 2.65% 
Bachelor’s degree (BA, BSc, 
Bed) 156 37.59% 
Master’s degree (MA, MSc, 
MPhil) 216 52.05% 
Professional degree (MD, 
JD) 7 1.69% 
Doctorate degree (PhD) 9 2.17% 
Total 415 100.00% 
 
Table 7: Participants’ educational level. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) is the national currency of Ethiopia. At the time of writing (April 28, 2014), 1 ETB 
was equivalent to 0.05 USD.  
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Employment No. of Participants Percent 
A student 30 7.23% 
Employed for wages 322 77.59% 
Self-employed 49 11.81% 
Out of work and looking for 
work 11 2.65% 
Out of work but not currently 
looking for work 0 0.00% 
Retired 0 0.00% 
Other 3 0.72% 
Total 415 100.00% 
 
Table 8: Participants’ employment status. !
Marital Status No. of Participants Percent 
Single 271 65.62% 
Married  142 34.38% 
Total 413 100.00% 
 
Table 9: Participants’ marital status !!!!
Figure 2: Participants’ orientation toward government’s political direction. !! !!!
 
Figure 3: Participants’ orientation toward government’s economic policy 
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Questionnaire Administration. As Roger Wimmer and Joseph Dominick (2011) 
note, self-administered questionnaires should be pre-tested with the type of respondents 
who will participate in the study. Any problems should be noted immediately and areas 
of misunderstanding or confusion corrected. With this in mind, a first draft of the 
questionnaire was put online for participation and comment, and suggested changes were 
incorporated into its final draft. Participants of the pre-test were recruited through a 
technique similar through snowball sampling where a handful of participants who met the 
eligibility criteria were identified and were then asked to refer someone else with a 
similar profile for the survey. I also posted invitations to the pre-test on my personal 
social media pages including Facebook and Twitter. 
The pre-test provided some very important feedback for revising the 
questionnaire. Some of the problems detected included difficulty in Amharic font 
readability and obstacles in accessing the survey in mobile and tablet platforms. Both 
problems were resolved decisively in order to optimize participants’ experiences. There 
were also important changes in choice of words and sentence construction. Participants of 
the pre-test made some important recommendations about potential missing alternatives 
in some of the multiple choice questions. 
In order to increase the response rate, an introduction to the survey along with a 
consent form was written, which explained the purpose of the survey and ensured 
respondents of the anonymity of their answers (this is reproduced in Appendices A and 
B). Once the necessary adjustments were made after the pre-test, an invitation to the 
survey was sent to the selected e-mail list.  
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Data Collection and Analysis. A total of 415 completed questionnaires were 
returned, representing a 65% response rate. Different strategies were employed to boost 
response rates including reminders about the anonymity of respondents. This was 
particularly important to increase the confidence of respondents in completing some of 
the questions that sought participants’ political and policy orientations. A total of five 
invitation and reminder e-mails were sent to participants in weekly intervals. Regardless, 
a 17% dropout rate was reported. Questions seeking political perspectives like, “How 
much of the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right?” 
attracted more dropout rates. The remaining was recorded as incomplete responses. The 
incomplete responses could partly be due to intermittent Internet connection at the 
respondents’ end.  
I analyzed the survey data using the Qualtrics web-based software and SPSS. The 
findings that emerged during this initial quantitative phase partly provided the themes 
that were explored during the interview phase, discussed further below.  
Document Analysis 
Background. “Doing research” usually means that we are collecting new material 
to analyze using questionnaires, interviews, group discussions or observation of people’s 
daily routines (Deacon et al., 1999). While all of these methods are central to researching 
contemporary communications, we can take advantage of existing data. Being given 
direct access is a particular problem when research focuses on key centers of control over 
communications like this study does, as it involves very cagey state-controlled 
telecommunications, inaccessible financial institution and tight-lipped Chinese 
businessmen that would provide first-hand knowledge. As such, researchers have to fall 
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back on information and commentary available in the public domain. Relying on 
secondary sources does not mean that we can say nothing useful about media structures 
and overarching ideologies.  
Document analysis played a significant role in the methodological design of this 
study. It provided bedrock data for some of the crucial analyses of this study, on which 
additional methods like the interview added rich layers of “thick description.” For Scott 
(1990), documents are “physically embodied texts, where the containment of the text is 
the primary purpose of the physical medium” (p. 13). Given that the term “document” 
covers a wide range of texts produced and consumed by a wide range of individuals or 
organizations, methodologists oftentimes distinguish between different types within that 
broad field. One of the most common ways of classifying documents probably is between 
“primary” and “secondary” sources. Primary sources “comprise the testimony of 
eyewitnesses of the events described” (Madge, 1965, p. 89).  While primary sources are 
“usually preferred when the facts of an event need to be established…secondary sources, 
which are based on indirect (or hearsay) evidence—such as media stories about an event 
or the expressed opinions of social actors who are affected by, but not directly involved 
in, an event—may be exactly the kind of data one needs” (Lindlof and Taylor, 2011, p. 
234).  
Lindlof and Taylor (2011) point out that other ways of categorizing documents 
include objective versus subjective, solicited versus unsolicited, edited versus completed, 
and so forth. They warn, however, that forcing such a primary versus secondary 
dichotomy may result in complexities, contradictions, and exceptions: 
A text considered “primary” source in another context (a deposition in a court 
case) could be a “secondary” source in another context (the rumors reported by 
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the witness in a deposition). Some artifacts contain both records and personal 
documents (e.g., a newspaper that publishes obituaries as well as op-eds), and the 
line between a record and a personal document can be very fine (e.g., lecture 
notes). The purity of mutual exclusivity of categories is less important than 
whether they are useful for finding documents and thinking about their purposes 
in a cultural scene (p. 234). 
 
Lindlof and Taylor’s (2011) critique of any forced dichotomization of forces is 
observed in this study. While this categorization of primary versus secondary may be 
generally important, it was hardly relevant to the different organizational reports and 
policy papers used in this paper since these documents constitute characteristics that can 
easily be attributed as both primary and secondary.  
Another categorization of textual materials is made between “records” and 
“personal documents” (Hodder, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Madge, 1965). The 
organizational documents employed in the present study resonate with records. A record 
is defined as “any written or recorded statement prepared by or for an individual or 
organization for the purpose of attesting to an event or providing an accounting” 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 277; emphasis in original). According to Lindlof and Taylor 
(2011), records are designed to “capture” a wide array of events and activities, including 
“the codification of procedures and policies” (p. 233). The political and economic 
programs of EPRDF consulted in this study are consistent with this function of records. 
Another peculiar purpose of records singled out by Lindlof and Taylor (2011) is that they 
can provide “the routine formatting of an individual or group performance” (p. 233). The 
IMF Ethiopia country reports and consultation documents that assessed the monetary 
performance and economic policies of the Ethiopian state—and examined in this study—
are quintessential exemplars of this function of records.  Thirdly, records are important 
sources of “the historical accounting of an organization or person” (Lindlof & Taylor, 
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2011). This is particularly most noticeable in this study in the intensive use of recently 
declassified World Bank documents that detailed some of the most original accounts of 
the foundation and transformation of telecommunication services in Ethiopia (See 
Chapter V). Fourthly, Lindlof and Taylor (2011) point out that records capture “the 
rendering of an event” (p. 234). The various online and print newspaper/magazine articles 
that documented parliamentary sessions, bilateral deals, business agreements and 
interviews with political figures and lawmakers resonate with the specified function of 
records.  
One of the most important advantages of using documents lies in their richness 
and resourcefulness of providing information. As Lincoln and Guba (1985) highlight, 
documents offer “contextually relevant and grounded in the contexts they represent” (p. 
277). This is especially true if a sizable number of documents are gathered and analyzed 
as is the case in this study where, in most instances, years of organizational documents 
are examined. 
Sampling. The documents explored in this study for preliminary analysis were 
selected with a purposive sample of institutional documents, policy papers and secondary 
documents. These documents were selected and examined in line with theoretical 
thematic considerations of the study. I will outline and discuss the procedures involved in 
the selection of these documents below. 
Institutional documents: The absence of rich literature about telecommunications 
infrastructure development and the role of external actors in the process called for 
scavenging and scrutiny of available documentary resources to outline the historical 
development of the Ethiopian telecommunications sector. Given the importance of the 
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World Bank as the most important actor in financing Ethiopian telecommunication 
development prior to the 1990s, I sought to access related archival documents from the 
institution that recorded relations with the Ethiopian state. My request for documents at 
the World Bank was duly granted with information that explained on how I could access 
the resources digitally. I was particularly fortunate to access these documents digitally as 
the World Bank very recently announced that it will implement a new Open Access 
policy for its research outputs and knowledge products, effective July 1, 2012.30 In this 
sense, this research highly benefited from what Lindlof and Taylor (2011) call “the 
epochal transition from stand-alone, analogical media to networked, digital media” (p. 
235). The digital accessibility of these documents avoided what could have been a costly 
and unrealistic venture in getting hold of records in their print version. As Lindlof and 
Taylor (2011) attest, documents that only existed in printed forms and moved through 
physical delivery channels “now exist almost entirely in digital formats that flow 
seamlessly across a variety of Internet-enabled platforms (p. 235). 
As a result of trends in the digitization of information, documents sought by 
qualitative researchers may be only a few “clicks” away, eliminating the vexing issues of 
document access and the transport of the documents (or the investigator) to and from the 
physical sites. Computerized collections, however, are not totally free of problems. 
Online archives suffer from similar challenges that physical archives do. Physical 
archives, Webb et al. (1966) pointed out, are prone to selective deposit and selective 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 The first phase of the World Bank’s open-access policy was launched in 2012 with an Open Knowledge 
Repository that adopted a set of Creative Commons copyright licenses. As a result, anybody is free to use, 
re-use and redistribute most of the Bank's knowledge products and research outputs for commercial or non-
commercial purposes. !
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survival of texts, resulting in potential bias. In addition, “online archives may be 
incomplete, difficult to search, or occasionally purged with little or no notice, especially 
if the items are perceived as having little value to the host organization (Lindlof and 
Taylor, 2011, p. 236). This potential problem is mitigated and harnessed in this study by 
individual in-depth interviews that provided “unofficial”—albeit critical—perspectives of 
institutional ideals.   
Upon contacting the Department of the Archivist/Access to Information at the 
World Bank, I received detailed guidelines on how to access documents I requested (see 
Appendix I). I then chose to focus on the more comprehensive and rich “Documents and 
Reports” section of the World Bank database at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home (which holds 145,000 documents 
online). Next, I performed a preliminary search with the key words “Ethiopia 
telecommunication.” This search yielded 164 results. This was followed by a manual 
survey of the contents of each document. In the end, 15 documents produced between 
1951 and 1993 were selected for examination based on their direct concern over he 
Ethiopian telecommunications sector. These documents mainly included project appraisal 
and credit recommendation reports.       
The IMF, on the other hand, didn’t have an open-access policy to most of its 
documents and reports. Fortunately, I was able to get a limited time access to these 
documents, courtesy of the University of Oregon Knight Library. Through the library’s 
trial subscription, I was able to access IMF’s e-library (http://www.elibrary.imf.org/) 
which aggregates thousands of memoranda of understanding, country reports, official 
communiqués, and institutional directives.  A preliminary search yielded 126 documents, 
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of which 11 were selected for further examination based on their direct relevance to the 
Ethiopian telecommunications sector. Most of these documents included yearly bilateral 
discussion papers and country reports between 1991 and 2013. 
Policy papers: Although state control of telecommunications in Ethiopia has 
historically been justified along natural monopoly narratives, the current rationale in 
continuing this practice is largely attributed to policy. In other words, the state monopoly 
of telecommunications today is directly related to the political program and the economic 
policies of the ruling party of Ethiopia since 1991, EPRDF. Subsequently, five key 
documents were identified and later examined. 
Two of these documents are what are commonly known as Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs).31 The first, the Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Reduction Program (SDPRP), was FDRE’s guiding strategic framework between 
2002/03-2004/05. It details FDRE’s comprehensive development and poverty reduction 
strategies. It incorporates, among other things, a thorough treatise of FDRE’s key sector 
policies and strategies including telecommunications. The second is the Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). PASDEP’s aims 
particularly emphasize the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and strategies of 
achieving them through infrastructure and human development, rural development, food 
security, and capacity building.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 PRSPs are prepared by member countries in broad consultation with stakeholders and development 
partners, including the staffs of the World Bank and the IMF. Updated every three years with annual 
progress reports, they describe the country's macroeconomic, structural, and social policies in support of 
growth and poverty reduction, as well as associated external financing needs and major sources of 
financing.  !
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The third policy document selected for examination is the Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP), a medium term strategic framework for the five-year period 
(2010/11-2014/15). GTP, the first of three five-year plans, aims to propel the country 
toward a middle-income economy. It places a special emphasis on agriculture and rural 
development, industry, infrastructure, social and human development. Produced by the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) of FDRE, the GTP aims to 
achieve a projected gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 11-15% per year from 2010 
to 2015. The plan includes details of the cost (estimated at US$75-79 billion over five 
years) including extensive telecommunications infrastructure development plans that aim 
to increase mobile telephone subscribers from 7 to 40 million and Internet service 
subscribers from less than 200,000 to 3.7 million under the auspices of the state. 
The two other documents, both written in Amharic, are EPRDF’s political and economic 
programs. The first one, “YäIndustri Limat Strateji,” details the guiding economic ideals 
and principles of EPRDF. Published in 2001, this policy document details the ruling 
party’s economic outlook in relation to the role of the state and the significance of the 
private sector in economic development. This document is particularly relevant given its 
treatise of EPRDF’s rationale in maintaining an interventionist approach in some of the 
major state monopolized sectors including telecommunications. The second one, entitled 
“YäTähad!sow Mäsmär!na YäItyop’ya H!dase,” is of paramount significance for this 
study because it provides a thorough analysis of the ruling party’s economic development 
ideology. It details the assumptions behind EPRDF’s characterization and self-
appointment of the Ethiopian state as a “developmental state.”  
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Secondary sources: As Lindlof and Taylor (2011) highlight, official documents 
are a site of claims to power, legitimacy, and reality. As a result, it is important to study 
these texts in relation to “the institutional settings in which they are constructed, 
interpreted, and used” (p. 78).  Given the significance of capturing the context under 
which these documents are produced and the importance of mitigating “institutional 
bias,” I incorporated opinion pieces, editorials and articles from local newspapers in the 
analysis. Most of these articles provided a reflection on the state’s monopolistic policy 
toward the telecommunication sector and critically examined the government’s rationale 
in adopting an interventionist policy. The articles were particularly drawn from two local 
newspapers, namely Addis Fortune and The Ethiopian Reporter, arguably two of the 
most widely read English newspapers in Ethiopia.  
Data Analysis. In analyzing documents, truth and accuracy are crucial 
benchmarks. Lindlof and Taylor (2011) highlight that information contained in 
documents “is vetted for accuracy, is used as a reliable basis for organizational decisions 
and actions, and/or is validated (or audited) by internal and external authorities, we may 
regard it as a trustworthy source” (p.237). They also warn, however, that the evaluation 
of a document’s truthfulness depends on the researcher’s analytical goal in using it. 
While institutional and policy documents are of paramount importance in this study, 
caution should be taken not to fall in the trap of taking issues of credibility, 
representativeness and meaning for granted. Scott (1990) writes: 
“Official documents are shaped by the structure and activities of the State, both 
directly and indirectly. Public documents are most obviously shaped in this way, as 
they are often the by-products of policy and administration and, as the creation of 
public bodies, they reflect on the organization and interests of state 
agencies…Administrative records therefore are not, and never were, merely neutral 
reports or events. They are shaped by the political context in which they are 
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produced and by the cultural and ideological assumptions that lie behind it” (pp. 59-
60). 
 
Given the controversy surrounding telecommunications liberalization in Ethiopia 
and vested political and economic interest by the different actors explored in this study, it 
will be naïve to assume the official records that these institutions (FDRE, IMF, World 
Bank, etc.) make accessible to the public are completely value-free and credible. It is 
plausible to assume the presence of underlying motives that are deemed too sensitive to 
be disclosed to the public.  
Of particular advantage to this research in analyzing these documents is my 
familiarity with the context within which most of these documents are written, 
particularly in terms of the political culture within the Ethiopian state. This is consistent 
with the proposition of Lindlof and Taylor (2011), who argue that, “the more intimate 
knowledge you have of the culture or individual being studied, the more adept you will 
be at assessing the truth value of a document, as well as detecting (or otherwise 
accounting for) and deviations from the truth” (p. 237). In addition, the examination of 
documents from varying sources and potentially competing ideologies helps to maintain 
accuracy in interpretation and analysis. In mitigating potential loss of meaning in 
translating Amharic to English, note that a translation appendix is attached for 
referencing text in original language (Appendix J). 
Semi-structured Interviews 
Background. My decision to conduct intensive interviews primarily arose from 
the object of the study that seeks to explore the rationale behind the differences in 
telecom liberalization policy between the IMF and the Ethiopian state. While policy 
papers, annual reports and official communiqués were studied to explore this subject, 
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document analysis is not particularly strong in explaining the thinking process behind 
these carefully worded, filtered and “politically correct” productions. When it comes to 
studying political documents of a sensitive nature related to some of the most restrictive 
targets of this study (IMF, the Ethiopian state), the availability of key documents is 
incomplete if not impossible (see “Limitations” section in this chapter). In addition, 
documents are usually representative only of the perspective of their authorship, and 
more importantly, they may not provide insight into the thinking behind the physical 
data.  
In complementing the measured, “politically correct” and usually “polite” data 
gathered from documents, individual in-depth interviews provide an excellent insight in 
explaining how processes work, how policies are formulated and how decisions are 
made. While policy documents show end products, interviews illuminate the processes 
and premises leading to the end product. In this sense, the individual in-depth interviews 
complemented the shortcomings of data gathered from document analysis and the 
electronic survey.  
The semi-structured design of the interviews allowed me to cover a list of key 
themes, issues, and questions. Depending on how the interview flows, I altered the order 
in which I conceived my questions. Although I used an interview guide, I took the 
freedom of asking additional questions when unexpected yet interesting themes arose. 
Corbetta (2003) describes semi-structured interviews as follows: 
The order in which the various topics are dealt with and the wording of the 
questions are left to the interviewer’s discretion. Within each topic, the 
interviewer is free to conduct the conversation as he thinks fit, to ask the 
questions he deems appropriate in the words he considers best, to give 
explanation and ask for clarification if the answer is not clear, to prompt the own 
style of conversation (p. 270). 
! 138 
 
Designing my interviews along semi-structured lines permitted additional 
questions to be asked including questions that were triggered by unanticipated themes. As 
Kajornboon (2004) notes, “the researcher conducting a semi-structured interviews is freer 
than one conducting a structured interview in that the interviewer does not have to adhere 
to a detailed interview guide” (p.138). This is very important in this particular research 
since the aim is not to prove/disprove a hypothesis but explore relationships and construct 
a narrative. Patton (2002) recommends to “…explore, probe, and ask questions that will 
elucidate and illuminate that particular subject…to build a conversation within a 
particular subject area, to word questions spontaneously, and to establish a conversational 
style but with the focus on a particular subject that gas been predetermined” (p. 343). 
I found semi-structured interviews to be particularly conducive as they allowed 
me to conduct a profound level of examination into the theme under the given discussion. 
Semi-structured interviews let the researcher bring up spontaneous questions into the 
discussion. The interview guide in this sense is just a loosely designed manual to help 
frame the discussion rather than structure it tightly. Semi-structured interviews also allow 
the researcher to elaborate and futher explain questions if the interviwee finds them 
ambiguous or uncomfortable.  
Consequently, the semi-structured design of my interviews was premeditated to 
allow extended conversations with interviewees. This is because intensive interviews are 
particularly rewarding when the subject under discussion is potentially sensitive. As 
Schroder et al. (2003) further contend: 
The individual interview also avoids the ‘spiral of silence’ effect that may 
prevent…controversial views and experiences from being expressed in a group 
context. The individual interview may thus be the best choice for a researcher 
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who wishes to illuminate a sensitive issue, located beyond the discursive range of 
the socially acceptable or the politically correct – or an issue that is felt by the 
individual to be too sensitive to talk about in the presence of others, other than a 
researcher who grants the informant full anonymity (p. 153). 
 
As Seidman (2006) explains, interviewing “provides access to the context of 
people’s behavior and thereby provides a way for researchers to understand the 
meaning of that behavior (p. 10).” In using in-depth interviewing as a research tool, the 
significance is that the meaning people make of their experience affects the way they 
carry out that experience (Blumer, 1969). Interviewing allows us to put behavior in 
context and provides access to understanding individuals’ action. While policies and 
ideologies shape people’s attitudes, it is important to note that policies are formulated 
by people and their political, social, and economic predispositions as well. In this sense, 
individual in-depth interviews play a quintessentially unique role. 
Intensive interviews provide some unique advantages in the data collection 
process. They provide detailed context about respondents’ specific answers and 
elaborate data concerning respondents’ opinions, values, motivations, recollections and 
experiences. Intensive interviews can be customized to individual respondents. This 
was of particular significance to the present study as I was able to design different 
interview guides for the different interviewees who represented varying ideologies in 
the Ethiopian telecommunications sector’s liberalization debate, for example.  
Intensive interviews are also unique because their success can be significantly 
influenced by the interview climate and the rapport established between the interviewer 
and the respondent. A conducive climate in the interviewing process usually results in a 
wealth of detail that can hardly be generated by more traditional methods like surveys. 
On the negative side, interviews are not generalizable. However this is not a problem if 
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the objective is—as it is in this study—not to generalize but rather to describe and 
explore processes within existing sets of ideologies. Wimmer and Dominick (2011) 
also warn that in-depth interviews may especially be sensitive to interviewer bias. In 
other words, it is possible for a respondent to learn a good deal of information about the 
interviewer in a long interview and adjust his/her responses to the interviewer’s 
“liking.” This challenge was mitigated in the present study as no interviews were 
conducted more than once with the same interviewee, which is typical of this data 
collection method. Yet another disadvantage of intensive interviewing is that its 
challenge may extend to the data analysis phase as well as “an interview may wind up 
with interpretations significantly different from those of the original investigator” 
(Wimmer and Dominick, 2011, p. 139).  Once again, the challenge in this regard was 
minimal because of the diversity of interviewees in the institutions and ideologies they 
represented. 
Sampling and Recruitment of Individual Interviewees. Following much 
qualitative research, I drew on a small, non-random sample of unknown 
representativeness. In keeping with the research aims of qualitative research, as already 
discussed, generalizability to populations or universes is not at the object of individual 
in-depth interviews. 
In total I conducted seven semi-structured in-depth individual interviews with 
different stakeholders of and commentators on the Ethiopian telecommunications sector 
and related issues. Interviewees were predetermined in accordance to their relevance to 
the objectives of their study. They were: 
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(i) Debretsion Gebremichael, Minister of Communication and Information 
Technology and Deputy Prime Minister of FDRE; 
(ii) Jan Mikkelsen, IMF Resident Representative in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
(iii) David Shinn, former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and Adjunct Professor of 
International Affairs at The George Washington University's Elliott School of 
International Affairs;  
(iv) Josefita Pardo de León, Legal Affairs Officer, Accessions Division, World 
Trade Organization;  
(v) Mereid Bekele, IP Next Generation Network (NGN) Project Consultant at 
Ethio-Telecom; 
(vi) Woldeloul Kassa, Data and Network Design Consultant at Ethio-Telecom; 
and 
(vii) Me’aza Fanta, Technical Trainer, ZTE32  
The Interview Guides. To ensure that the discussion remained focused on the 
subjects and issues relevant to my research, I drew up multiple interview guides for the 
different interviewees specified in the previous section. These interview guides are 
reproduced in Appendix H. This is consistent with Wimmer and Dominick (2011, p. 139) 
who argue that—as opposed to personal interviews in a survey research where all 
respondents are usually asked the same questions—intensive interviews “allow 
interviewers to form questions based on each respondent’s answers” (p. 139). I conducted 
the interviews after a preliminary analysis of the survey results and documents with the 
aim of corroborating findings and exploring in greater depth the data generated from the 
survey and document analysis. As a result, my interview guide was shaped by these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Name changed at interviewee’s request for anonymity. 
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considerations. I isolated the main themes of my survey and used them to construct some 
of my question in the interview guide.  
However, I did not follow the guide in too rigid a fashion. I felt free to probe 
more deeply when necessary, and to follow new topics if they arose. This is to be 
expected in qualitative interviewing where evidence can allow the processes which link 
the variables, revealed in the quantitative stage of the research, to be revealed. In this 
sense, the model of my interview guide is similar to a semi-structured interview design 
where the interview is decided by the researcher and focus is given to areas the researcher 
is interested in exploring. The objective is to understand the respondent’s point of view 
rather than to make generalizations about behavior. I was particularly drawn to this model 
in order to accommodate unanticipated themes that typically emerge during extended 
interviews.  
Analyzing and Reporting the Interview Results. The interviews—some of 
which needed to be transcribed and translated into English from Amharic—were 
categorized and labeled. As the interviews generated a number of unexpected themes, 
these had to be categorized accordingly as well. Having categorized the responses from 
all the interview transcripts, I consolidated these thematically. When reporting the 
interviews in my study, I had to maintain a balance between “letting the data speak for 
itself,” summarizing, and analyzing the material. In giving verbatim quotes I generally 
limited these to representative illustrations. As different commentators observe, it is the 
researchers’ task to interpret the meaning of these the data generated from the interviews 
and present their most salient features in critical and coherent form (Ruddock 2001, pp. 
138-139).  
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Validity and Reliability 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, this research followed a mixed approach of 
both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect data. The application of mixed 
methods in research—also known as triangulation—contributes to the validity and 
reliability of the study. Triangulation is typically a strategy (test) for improving the 
validity and reliability of research or evaluation of findings. Patton (2001) advocates the 
use of triangulation by stating “triangulation strengthens a study by combining methods. 
This can mean using several kinds of methods or data, including using both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches” (p. 247). However, to improve the analysis and 
understanding of construction of others, triangulation is a step taken by researchers to 
involve several investigators or peer researchers in interpreting the data at different time 
or location.  
The association of a quantitative paradigm with qualitative research through 
validity and reliability has changed our understanding of the traditional meaning of 
reliability and validity from the qualitative researchers’ perspectives. Reliability and 
validity are conceptualized as trustworthiness, rigor and quality in the qualitative 
paradigm. Triangulation in this sense is “a validity procedure where researchers search 
for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or 
categories in a study” (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p. 126). Therefore, reliability, validity 
and triangulation, if they are to be relevant research concepts, particularly from a 
qualitative point of view, have to be redefined in order to reflect the multiple ways of 
establishing truth. 
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Limitations 
Although the methodological limitation of each data collection tool has been 
mentioned in this chapter, there are other noteworthy limitations that are important to be 
recognized. The interview process was the most challenging in terms of access and 
transparency of interviewees. The physical remoteness of most of the interviewees forced 
me to conduct the interviews through mediated communication that oftentimes was 
unsuccessful. Bad Internet connections at the other end forced the cancellation of some of 
the interviews. A couple of these interviewees opted out of the interview process entirely, 
potentially frustrated by repeated interruption of voice over Internet protocol (VOIP) 
communication.  
The most challenging aspect of the data collection process was probably related to 
requesting documents from some of the institutions in which I was interested. While I 
was fortunate to have access to documents from the World Bank and IMF, I have had the 
least luck when it came to Ethio-Telecom. Although I spent weeks trying to get access to 
the publication, financial strategic planning archives of the company, my requests were 
never successful. The fact that Ethio-Telecom was transitioning from its predecessor ETC 
during the time of my visit in 2011 also compounded the problem. 
With regard to the online survey, it is important to point out the bias of the 
delivery method of the questionnaire toward the urban mass. In light of this limitation, 
the results of the survey may not be generalizable to the majority of the population, who, 
by the very nature of the delivery method were automatically discriminated from 
participating in the survey. On one hand, participating in the survey required access to the 
Internet. On the other hand, it also required basic literacy on how to use the Internet even 
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if there is access. With an abysmal Internet penetration rate of 1.5% and a huge 80% rural 
majority, the survey administration, therefore, had a default urban bias. Thus, results may 
not be extended to represent those without Internet access and experience. 
Finally, as Rubin and Rubin (2005), among others, emphasize, neutrality in 
qualitative research is impossible, and the researcher’s position and personal biases 
undoubtedly influence his/her interpretation of data. My critical perspective toward 
global neo-liberalism, on one hand, and state-sponsored repression through different 
means including telecommunications, on the other, has potentially conditioned my 
analysis and interpretation of results. While I fervently champion the need and right of 
countries like Ethiopia to develop, I do not believe economic development should come 
“at all costs,” which include costs in human rights and dignity. In this sense, as much as I 
am critical of Western neo-liberalism, I am critical of the Ethiopian state and its approach 
to development that seems to treat development as mutually exclusive to freedom. I 
believe it is important to acknowledge my personal theoretical orientations and 
viewpoints as they could affect the interpretations and conclusions of the study. As I 
discussed earlier in this chapter, however, I have triangulated my methodology in order to 
mitigate possible harmful effects of personal bias. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a discussion on the methodological approaches considered 
for this study. It also offered a detailed description of procedures in data collection 
methods employed in the study, namely, the online survey, document analysis and semi-
structured interviews. Toward the end, it highlighted key issues related to validity, 
reliability and limitations of the methods involved. 
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As indicated earlier in this chapter, different methods were employed in order to 
appropriately address the four research questions that guide the objectives of this study. 
Each of these four research questions will be addressed in the following four chapters. As 
I transit to report my findings in the next chapters, I find it useful to map out the 
relationship between my research questions, my analysis chapters, and the methods 
involved. Table 10 provides a summary of each research question, the chapter related to 
the question under investigation, and the method(s) employed to address each research 
question: 
Research question Analysis  Methods used 
RQ1: What is the institutional history of 
telecommunications in Ethiopia? 
Chapter V: Overview of the 
Ethiopian Telecommunications 
Sector 
Document 
analysis 
RQ2: To what extent does the Ethiopian 
public endorse/denounce state 
monopoly of the 
telecommunications sector? 
Chapter VI: Public Perceptions 
of the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Sector 
Survey 
RQ3: What are the underlying reasons 
behind the differences in telecom 
liberalization policies between 
the IMF and the Ethiopian state?  
Chapter VII: Actors and 
Disparities in (De)regulation 
Discourses of the Ethiopian 
Telecommunication Sector 
Document 
analysis; 
interview 
RQ4: What are the premises on which 
Sino-Ethiopian partnerships in 
the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector are 
laid? 
Chapter VII: Chinese 
Multinationals in the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Sector 
Interview 
 
Table 10: Summary of research questions, corresponding analysis chapters and 
methods 
 !!!!!!
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CHAPTER V 
HISTORICIZING TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN ETHIOPIA 
More than a century after starting its operations, telecommunications in Ethiopia 
still remains to be a state-run enterprise. Until the latter part of the 20th century 
telecommunications was considered to be a natural monopoly where the state was seen as 
the only capable entity to invest on and govern telecommunications infrastructure. 
However, widespread privatization and liberalization policies that accompanied neo-
liberal capitalism in the United States and Britain changed this line of thinking. 
Subsequent adoptions of legislations like the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the 
United States that “let anyone enter any communications business” and “let any 
communications business compete in any market against any other” opened the 
telecommunication market for private ownership (Federal Communications Commission, 
1996). As with other neo-liberal policies, these trends in the global North had significant 
influences in telecommunications governance in the rest of the world. 
The Ethiopian telecommunications sector remains an exception to this ubiquitous 
global practice. This chapter provides a historical overview of the state-owned 
telecommunication enterprise Ethio-Telecom—the oldest Public Telecommunications 
Operator (PTO) in Africa. Through an analysis of secondary documents that include 
company profiles, institutional reports and press archives, this chapter attempts chronicles 
the institutional history of telecommunications in Ethiopia. In doing so, it highlights 
processes and stakeholders involved in state-sponsored telecommunications infrastructure 
development from 1894 to the present day.  
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The Formative Years (1894-1935) 
The two decades between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century represent an important juncture in the modernization history of the Ethiopian 
state. These two decades coincide with the reign of Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913), 
who was depicted as a staunch modernizer with a “child-like interest in innovations of all 
kinds” (Pankhurst, 2001, p. 195). The period was particularly convenient for 
infrastructure development because Ethiopia had an unusual streak of peaceful years after 
the Battle of Adwa.  
The founding of Addis Ababa in 1881 was an important precedent to the 
development of telephony and other communication facilities in Ethiopia as it triggered a 
domino effect on the construction of urban infrastructure. In Addis Ababa, what used to 
be a mobile court found a settled civilized life after decades of warfare and campaigns 
internally and externally. As a result, most members of the community including the 
nobility and the clergy started building permanent residences. The newfound capital 
hosted an estimated population of 70,000 permanent and 30,000 to 50,000 temporary 
inhabitants by 1910 (Pankhurst, 2001). Because of the increased stature and prestige of 
Emperor Menelik as a result of his victory against the Italians in the Battle of Adwa, 
foreigners started coming to Addis Ababa in numbers. Soon after, foreign legations set up 
consulates and craftsmen launched small businesses (Pankhurst, 2001).  
However, the most important factor that sealed the fate of Addis Ababa as the 
permanent capital city of Ethiopia was the construction of a railway system that 
connected Djibouti with Addis Ababa. The construction of the railway was significant 
because it facilitated the incorporation of telecommunications in the Ethiopian political 
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economy. In 1894 work commenced on the first telephone line between the capital city of 
Addis Ababa and the eastern regional trade hub Harar covering a distance of 296 miles. 
The installation, which was completed in 1897, was undertaken by the technicians 
working on the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway system. Once the telephone line was 
completed, it was immediately followed by an installation of a telegraph line along the 
Ethio-Djibouti railway between 1897 and 1899, connecting Harar and Addis Ababa. 
When seen against the instability of the country for much of the 19th century as well as 
the invention of the electronic telephone in the 1870s, it is fair to say that the introduction 
of telephone services in Ethiopia was not significantly late (Tsigie & Feyissa, 1999). 
In 1902, the Addis Ababa-Asmara telephone line work involving Italian 
electricians was started. This line, completed in 1905, runs 547 miles to the north of the 
country. Both the projects interconnected the center to the east and the north. This was 
followed by another network expansion that saw western and southern provincial capitals 
like Gore and Jimma in the former provinces of Illubabor and Kaffa, respectively, 
connected to the national grid. The court in Addis Ababa saw that the development of 
communication systems was not only crucial for industrialization and development but 
also for consolidation of power and instant foreign relations at a time when the Ethiopian 
empire-state was going through the early stages of nation building (ETC, 2009). As a 
result, the Dire-Dawa-Djibouti telegraph line was completed in 1906, essentially giving 
the court in Addis Ababa direct communication capabilities internationally. Similar 
developments were made in postal service as well. In 1894, the first postage stamps 
printed in France were introduced to the court although their circulation was limited to a 
few philatelists. The Ethiopian postal system grew substantially in the next 15 years. As a 
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matter of fact, in 1908 Ethiopia joined the International Postal Union, the first 
international organization to which Ethiopia was admitted. Realizing the importance of 
internationalization, Emperor Menelik actively advocated for Ethiopia to join the 
International Telegraph Union in 1907 (ETC, 2009). 
The seemingly rapid incorporation of basic communication facilities was not 
without its setbacks, however. One of the most visible challenges was the excessive 
suspicion and apprehension of the public, the nobility, and, more significantly, the clergy 
on new and modern technological appropriation. Emperor Menelik’s fascination with 
modern developments and advances stood in a stark contrast to the orthodox views of his 
court, which regarded foreign influence with distaste and suspicion. Always wary of the 
motive of the Europeans, Menelik’s wife, Empress Taitu, was displeased when running 
water and electricity were installed in the palace and spread through Addis Ababa. 
Clifford Hallé in his memoir To Menelek in a Motor-Car recounts his story on how state 
ministers “almost prostrated themselves” (Hallé, 1913, p. 267) when the Emperor decided 
to test-drive the first motor car to reach Addis Ababa. In a similar manner, the first 
telephones brought to Ethiopia in 1890 from Italy by Ras Mäkonnen, general and the 
governor of Harar province in Ethiopia, caused some havoc within the clergy. Upon 
receiving the telephone apparatus from Ras Mäkonnen, Menelik ordered that a line be set 
up between his rooms and the house of his treasurer. However, the apparatus was only 
operational for a day since it was destroyed by local priests who proclaimed the phone 
the work of the devil after the treasurer reported of a blow coming out of the phone in 
what actually was an electric shock. It was reported that the Emperor was livid and 
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responded with disdain before setting up more telephones to communicate with his 
provincial governors (Tsigie & Feyissa, 1999).  
The construction of roads in different parts of the country also played a significant 
role in the expansion of telephone services. The first decade of the 20th century saw the 
construction of Ethiopia’s first two modern roads linking Addis Ababa with Addis Alem, 
Harar and the new railway town of Dire Dawa. Most telephone lines were erected in 
advance along the anticipated routes of roads to be constructed with large mobilization of 
labor and the use of pack animals for transporting installation equipment (ETC, 2009). 
The installation of telephone networks was particularly difficult not only because of the 
lack of know-how and basic transportation infrastructure but also because of the 
extremely rugged nature of the Ethiopian landscape. As a result, an inter-urban network 
was established in all directions from the capital, “thus facilitating long distance 
communication with the assistants or operators at intermediate stations frequently acting 
as verbal human repeaters between the distant calling parties” (ETC, 2009, p. 21). In the 
end, about 4350 miles of telephone networks were completed and over 170 towns or 
provincial centers were connected by 1930 (Figure 4). 
Originally the Ethiopian telecommunications system was highly integrated with 
the duties of the imperial court. The Emperor himself overlooked the operation and 
administration of the then Ethiopian Telephone & Telegraph Central Administration 
(1894-1908) from his palace aided by his foreign—mostly French—experts and, later, 
trained Ethiopians (ETC, 2009). Between 1909 and 1911, the Ethiopian Telephone & 
Telegraph Central Administration changed its name to Ethiopian Telephone & Telegraph 
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Central Bureau, and was led by Alfred Ilg, a Swiss engineer and a confidant to the 
Emperor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: First urban and interurban telephone and telegraph connections (Source: 
International Bank for Reconstruction & Development, 1951). 
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However, there was soon a realization that the communication system was not 
only important to the government but also to the public sector as well, as evidenced by 
the Addis Ababa telephone exchange, which began to serve some 100 subscribers in 1914 
(International Bank for Reconstruction & Development [IBRD], 1951). As a result, it 
needed to be restructured and institutionalized in order to respond to the growing demand 
for services from the sector propelled by increased trade, urbanization and small 
industries. Consequently, a group of French consultants studied and designed a roadmap 
to the restructuring of Ethiopia’s telecommunications and postal administrations between 
1909 and 1911, resulting in the birth of the first ministerial level inauguration of 
communications-related institution—the Ministry of Posts, Telegraph and Telephone 
(PTT). Although the French first administered PTT, Lij Gizaw Bezabih took over 
immediately to become the first Ethiopian national to administer the sector at the highest 
level (ETC, 2009). The restructuring of PTT resulted in the gradual incorporation of 
Ethiopian communications systems into the global network as evidenced by Ethiopia’s 
participation of the Congress at Madrid in 1920 of the 7th Postal, Telegraph and 
Telephone service (ETC, 2009).  
Although telephone connectivity gained momentum during the Menelik years 
after Adwa, external and internal developments within the political center presented some 
complicated challenges in communications infrastructure development. On one hand, 
Ethiopia’s post-Adwa independence was not as unconditional as the Ethiopian nobles 
assumed it would be. European colonial powers found it counterproductive to treat and 
negotiate with Ethiopia as an independent and sovereign nation, and attempted to exert 
their influence through backdoor negotiations among themselves as evidenced by the 
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case of the “Tripartite Agreement” of 1906 (Bahru, 2002).33 An important example in this 
regard is the disruption of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway project for six years partly 
because of the Ethiopian ruling elite’s frustration with the decision of the French 
government to take-over what has been originally a private undertaking. As a result, other 
infrastructure development schemes that critically depended on the import of modern 
machinery and equipment including telecommunications were hindered. Internally, the 
deteriorating health condition of Menelik and subsequent succession power struggles 
following his death relegated ventures in institution building and basic infrastructure 
development to lesser priorities, at least until the coronation of Haylä S!llasé I in 1930 
(Pankhurst, 2001). 
One of the lingering challenges the new leadership faced in relation to the 
telecommunications sector was its dependence on colonial powers controlling 
neighboring countries for international communication. Both Djibouti and Asmara, the 
only two outlets of telephone communication to the rest of the world, were under the 
control of the French and the Italians respectively. This was doubly disconcerting not 
only because Ethiopia’s uninterrupted international communication interests depended on 
the will of unreliable colonial powers, but also on account of potential interception of 
confidential state matters by these powers. This convinced Haylä S!llasé to actively look 
for more sustainable solutions. On one hand, he was involved in increasing the global 
visibility of the country. In this regard Ethiopia became the first independent African 
member of the League of Nations, and, since 1932, joined the then International !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 The Tripartite Agreement was a sort of “memorandum of understanding” signed between Britain, France 
and Italy on December 13, 1906 where the three powers divided the Ethiopian empire-state into different 
spheres of influence that conceived of “the Blue Nile Basin for Britain, the hinterland of Eritrea and Italian 
Somaliland that would connect the two territories to the West of Addis Ababa to Italy and the then under 
construction Djibouti-Addis Ababa zone to France” (Lemma, 1979, p. 120).   
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Telegraph Union (ETC, 2009). On the other hand, a radio-telephone station was set up 
within the compound of the old post office in Addis Ababa linking the country with 
Cairo, Djibouti, London and Aden in 1934 (ETC, 2009). This was complemented by the 
foundation of a local radio communications training center for Ethiopians. The aim was 
for Ethiopian nationals to take over radio communication facilities and traffic that were 
operated by expatriates who most probably had access to confidential state content. Haylä 
S!llasé’s search for an independent and self-administered telecommunications sector was 
short-lived, however, as Ethiopia was once again faced with the return of Italian colonial 
aggression (Bahru, 2002; IBRD, 1951; Pankhurst, 2001). 
Occupation & Resistance: The Erratic Years (1936-1942) 
Although the defeat at the battle of Adwa kept colonial aggression at bay, this was 
only to last a couple of decades as Italy’s interest in Ethiopia got reinvigorated again. The 
coming to power of Benito Mussolini and his National Fascist Party in 1922 rescinded 
Italy’s policy of retrenchment in relation to colonial expansion in the Horn of Africa. On 
one hand, the new fascist government deemed it necessary to annex Ethiopia so that 
Italian prestige can be restored in Europe after the humiliation of Adwa. On the other 
hand, the Italians increasingly saw Ethiopia as a geographically natural and economically 
profitable target to be incorporated to their other Horn of Africa colonies Eritrea and 
Italian Somaliland (Pankhurst, 2001). It was important for Mussolini to find a motive to 
invade Ethiopia, a fellow full member of the League of Nations. Mussolini then moved 
on to invade under the false premise that Walwal belonged to Italian Somaliland (Bahru, 
2002).34 Ethiopia’s appeal to the League of Nations was to no avail as key members like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Walwal is a town in the Somali region of eastern Ethiopia. It was the immediate cause of the Italian-
Ethiopian war of 1935 as Benito Mussolini used this incident as a pretext to invade Ethiopia. 
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Britain and France were “ready to sacrifice Ethiopia” in an effort to “woo Mussolini 
away from Hitler” (Zewde, 2002, p.153). As a result, after a series of battles in the north 
and the east of the country, the Italians entered Addis Ababa in May 5 1936. 
Although the Italians proclaimed a new “Fascist Empire,” Ethiopia was hardly at 
peace for the next 5 to 6 years. While the Italians controlled urban parts of Ethiopia, vast 
plots of the countryside remained in the hands of Ethiopian fighters and anti-Fascist 
activity. Remaining forces of the imperial army under the commands of Ras Imiru and 
Ras Desta stationed in the south actively engaging in warfare with the Italians. Guerilla 
fighters grouping together in the central and northern highlands led by the likes of Abebe 
Arregai in Shewa, Belay Zelleke in Gojjam, and “Amoraw (The Hawk)” Wubineh in the 
then Beghemidir led coordinated and successful attacks against the Italians repeatedly. 
Worn by five years of guerrilla warfare and the eventual decision of Britain to join the 
Ethiopian resistance, the Italians were defeated and Addis Ababa was liberated on April 
6, 1941 (Bahru, 2002). 
The five-years-long fight between the Ethiopian resistance and Italian forces in 
Ethiopia had a devastating effect on communication infrastructures. Communication 
infrastructures were targets of destruction by both groups as part of their strategies to 
weaken the enemy’s coordination strategies. Originally, it was the fascist forces that 
sought to destroy communication facilities in order to deprive resistance forces access to 
information. This resulted in the demolition of PTT’s installations in order to disrupt both 
local and international communication. Later, the Italians restored most of the 
telecommunications facilities they destroyed realizing communications systems were 
crucial for their operations. The restoration was jeopardized significantly, however, as 
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Ethiopian resistance forces took a leaf from the Italians to destroy restored facilities out 
of service and at times obstructed refurbishment efforts (Tsigie & Feyissa, 1999).  
In spite of the earlier damage they caused to telecommunications facilities, 
“toward the end of the period of occupation the Italians had begun to restore Ethiopia's 
telecommunications system, installing automated telephone exchanges in Addis Ababa 
and Asmara (with a capacity of 1,500 and 1,200 lines, respectively” (Tsigie & Feyissa, 
1999, p. 24). When defeat looked certain and retreat began in 1941, Italian forces started 
destroying telephone service all over the towns they controlled leaving the country’s 
system in a pitiful condition. 
Postwar Restoration and Restructuring (1941-1957) 
Although the joint British-Ethiopian liberation campaign that drove the Italians 
out and restored Haylä S!llasé I to power reaffirmed Ethiopia’s sovereignty in principle, 
the British preponderance over the internal and external affairs of Ethiopia was strongly 
visible. Britain found it critical to intimidate and coerce the Ethiopian political center in 
order to execute its vested interest of remapping the Horn of Africa. Taking advantage of 
their military presence after the liberation campaign was over, the British occupied 
Eritrea in the north and Ogaden in the East with the aim of integrating whole or parts of 
these regions with British colonies in the Horn of Africa. As part of this scheme, “the 
British exercised stringent fiscal control over the country” in addition to “taking 
precedence over all other diplomatic representatives” of the government (Bahru, 2002, p. 
179).  
As a result, the majority of the 1940s preoccupied the Ethiopian government with 
diplomatic undertakings to reverse the British agenda and reclaim complete political and 
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economic sovereignty. This exercise jeopardized the rehabilitation prospects of PTT, at 
least until the prominence of Ethio-American relations in the 1950s. As Bahru (2002) 
notes, “Distressed by the stringent control exercised by the British after the liberation, the 
emperor sought the Americans as a counter-weight” (p.184). Haylä S!llasé had 
established an amicable relationship with then U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
since 1945 when the two met in Egypt.  The Emperor expressed his frustration over 
British imposition and his eagerness to “develop relations with the U.S.” because he 
believed that “the US, unlike most European countries, had no colonial aspirations” 
(Getachew, 2009, p.40). Bahru (2002) adds: 
The British had come to exercise administrative and fiscal control over the 
country incommensurate with the financial or military assistance they rendered. 
While grateful to them for giving him asylum and restoring him to the throne, the 
emperor became aware that the proper reinstitution of his autocratic power could 
only come about through tying Ethiopia’s fate to the generous ally that the United 
States was expected to be (p. 184). 
 
Although Ethio-American relations date back to 1903, American involvement in 
Ethiopia was at its peak during the 1950s and the 1960s, which Bahru (2002) calls “the 
American era” (p.186). The Fellows Mission of 1944 was particularly important because 
it laid the foundation for subsequent Ethio-American relations in infrastructure 
development (Spencer, 2006).35 On May 15, 1952, Ethiopia signed a Four Point 
Technical aid agreement, and since 1961, USAID has continued and expanded on U.S. 
economic and development assistance to Ethiopia. The Americans were instrumental in 
strategizing and financing some of the institutions that still play an influential role in the 
Ethiopian political economy including Ethiopian Air Lines (EAL) and Imperial Highway 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 The Fellows Mission was named after Perry Fellows who led an American contingent to Ethiopia in 
1944 with the aim of assisting Ethiopia with large foreign economic assistance including making a survey 
of the economic, agricultural, and mineral potential of Ethiopia. 
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Authority (IHA).  Their presence in the military and educational systems was also 
significant (Bahru, 2002). 
The war-stricken telecommunications sector was another area that benefited from 
the growing Ethio-American relations. Given the vast amount of financing the 
rehabilitation of the telecommunications system needed, it was impossible for the scanty 
coffers of the Ethiopian treasury to fund the project. As a temporary solution, lend lease 
arrangements were made in order to purchase transmitters that would establish radio 
communication between major towns. This was followed by a contractual agreement with 
the American multinational corporation International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) in 
order to maintain ruined telephone lines (ETC, 2009). However, there was a recognition 
that a more sustainable solution was not only restoring the network but also 
institutionalizing the sector. For this purpose, the American-dominated International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (International Bank) was approached for 
assistance. In 1950 a high level IBRD team consisting of the organization’s prominent 
loan officer Eric Beecroft and other key bankers came to Ethiopia for a needs assessment 
survey that aimed at strategizing restoration processes of telecommunication services and 
potentially restructuring PTT. After successful negotiations between IBRD 
representatives and delegates of the Ethiopian government—Lij Yilma Deressa, Minister 
of Commerce and Industry and Menassie Lemma, Vice Minister of Finance—a loan for 
the telecommunication project was discussed in December 1950 in Addis Ababa. In 
February 19, 1951, a loan in the amount of US$1.5 million was made although it did not 
become effective until February 2, 1954 due to “initial organizational difficulties” 
(IBRD, 1954, p. 15). It was concurred that the loan would be used to finance the 
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acquisition of equipment, supplies and services to “rehabilitate the Ethiopian 
telecommunication system and to add urgently needed extensions” (International Bank, 
1951). The loan was also contingent on the establishment of an independent 
telecommunications authority that would be charged with carrying out activities of all 
Ethiopian telecommunications systems with the exception of those related to military or 
aeronautical operations. 
For the ailing Ethiopian telecommunication sector, this was a significant course of 
action that made rehabilitation efforts possible. By 1950, only about 1,700 telephones 
were operational in Ethiopia, which at the time had a population of 12 to 16 million. 
Close to 1,250 of these lines were concentrated in the capital city of Addis Ababa and 
fewer than 100 communities could be reached by telephone or telegraph across the 
country (IBRD, 1951). Although the acute incapacity of telecommunication operations 
adversely impacted multifarious economic performances of the state, some challenges 
were more prominent. Among these were the impediment of commercial activities born 
out of lack of knowledge of prices and market conditions; confusion and losses caused by 
mistakes in transmission; and delays in state order, instruction and reports transmissions 
that also significantly suffered from confidentiality (IBRD, 1951). 
The agreement with IBRD set up three independent sub-projects that all aimed at 
the expansion and improvement of the existing system. The first sub-project—the Addis 
Ababa telephone system sub-project—involved upgrading the number of telephone lines 
from 1,500 to 2,400, rehabilitating damaged plants and buildings and supply of 
equipment to ensure sustainability of maintenance. The second was the provincial system 
sub-project that aimed at, among other things, the rehabilitation and extension of the 
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2,500 mile network of toll lines, small local telephone systems in about 20 selected towns 
and installation of public telephone stations to nearly 130 towns. The third was the 
international system sub-project that sought to provide a new radio telephone circuit to 
European, American and other foreign telephone systems (IBRD, 1954). 
It is in light of these circumstances that IBRD’s recommendation was put into 
effect when the Imperial Board of Telecommunications of Ethiopia (IBTE) was 
established in October 1952 by Proclamation No 131/52, putting an end to the old 
practice of administrating telecommunications operations and postal services together 
under the auspices of PTT (IBRD, 1954). Although IBTE had a chartered, share company 
ownership façade as stipulated in the proclamation, it was essentially a government 
enterprise as all shares ended up being bought by the government. Upon inauguration, in 
addition to building capacity to provide basic telecommunications maintenance and 
support services, the IBTE was tasked with objectives to: rehabilitate, extend, and 
maintain Ethiopia’s telecommunications facilities and to engage on a for-profit basis in 
the civilian telecommunications business; act as an agent for the Ethiopian government in 
all matters relating to telecommunications services in and outside the country; and 
establish appropriate training procedures and a training institute for present and future 
board personnel (IBRD, 1954).36 
When IBTE officially disclosed its charter in October 15, 1952, its capital was set 
at US$ 2.7 million of which US$ 1.5 million represented “the counter-value of the loan 
and the rest was domestic currency to be paid in by the Government in three equal 
installments from 1952 to 1954” (IBRD, 1954, p. 17). As per the agreement with IBRD, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 The United Nations was involved in the assisting IBTE in the establishment of a permanent and 
comprehensive training institution that catered to the technical and administrative staffing needs of the 
company. 
! 162 
the IBTE took over from the Ministry of PTT telecommunications operations and 
telephone and telegraph facilities on January 1, 1953 in Ethiopia and March 1, 1953 in 
Eritrea. Structurally, the governing body of IBTE was a Board of Directors appointer by 
the Emperor, with the Minister PTT being the ex officio chairman (IBRD, 1954). 
The IBTE had 1,179 employees by the early beginning of 1954, out of which 96 
were expatriates who were largely involved in management and technical operations. 
Since its establishment, as part of the agreement with IBRD, the Swedish Telephone and 
Telegraph Administration have supplied the management staff of IBTE (IBRD, 1954).  
Because the IBTE had a policy of terminating the contract of an expatriate when an 
equally qualified Ethiopian becomes available, a Telecommunications Institute was 
established in 1953 that offered in-service training for telephone and radio operators, 
line-construction foremen, cable splicers, exchange installers, and line testers. In addition 
to technical training, the institute was also involved in the instruction of high 
administrative personnel. The Board was responsible, in consultation with IBRD, for 
appointing a General Manager responsible for management and operations (IBRD, 1954). 
Between 1953 and 1954 the IBTE had completed its administrative organization 
that consisted of six headquarters divisions including technical, traffic, commercial, 
financial, personnel and training; and sic regional divisions centered on Addis Ababa, 
Asmara, Dessie, Dire Dawa, Jimma, and Gondar (IBRD, 1954). 
The IBRD and IDA Years (1958-1992) 
Although IBTE operated at a loss between 1953 and 1955, by 1958 “the 
accumulated profits of 1956-58 had exceeded the losses up to the end of 1955” (IBRD, 
1962, p. 8). This positive growth in profits was largely due to rapidly expanding volume 
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of businesses made possible by the construction and rehabilitation program. Between 
1952 and 1961, telephone subscriptions more than doubled from 3,588 to 8,819 and the 
number of telephone sets almost tripled from 4,556 to about 12,400. Between 1955 and 
1959, interurban calls interurban calls increased by 70% and international calls more than 
doubled. 
After the completion in 1956 of the reconstruction and expansion project mostly 
financed by the IBRD, the IBTE continued to add new facilities out of retained earnings. 
It was soon realized, however, that the demand for IBTE’s services caught up with the 
capacity of its facilities. It was estimated that between 1962 and 1965 the demand for 
telephone and telegraph services from IBTE would increase by 10% and 9% respectively, 
a burgeoning market the sector couldn’t simply cater for (IBRD, 1962). In addition to the 
demand-supply incompatibility, the services provided by the IBTE were suffering from 
frequent interruptions. The urban, long interurban, and international telephone and radio-
telephone services experienced increased rates of outages due to rainy seasons, 
maintenance problems in mountainous terrains and strong atmospheric static over the 
eastern Africa region (IBRD, 1962). 
As a result, the Ethiopian government decided to launch the Second 
Telecommunications Project of 1962-1964. IBTE, by now endowed with the authority to 
negotiate and secure loans independently,37 approached IBRD for a loan of the equivalent 
of about US$ 2.9 million to cover most of the foreign exchange cost (IBRD, 1965). Upon 
approval of the loan, the project aimed to upgrade the existing capacity of IBTE in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Proclamation No. 170/60 (June 22, 1960) established the authority of IBTE to borrow funds required for 
operation and expansion, with the limitation that the outstanding debt should not exceed three times the 
paid up share capital, and with the proviso of government’s ratification of each loan. The proclamation also 
increased IBTE’s capital to US$3.1 million.  
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areas of urban telephone, interurban telephone, and telegraph services. When combined 
with other costs in land, buildings, broadcasting services, vehicles, tools, etc. the total 
cost of the project was estimated at US$6.244 million (IBRD, 1965). 
In 1965 negotiations between the Ethiopian government and the IBRD started in 
Washington, D.C., for a loan in the amount of US$5.6 million that would finance the 
Third Telecommunications Project (1965-1967) of the IBTE. Represented by Emmanuel 
Abraham (Minister of PTT), H. Rudd (General Manager of IBTE) and Yawand-Wossen 
Mangasha (Vice Governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia), the Ethiopian government 
in the end settled for US$4.8 million (International Bank, 1965).  
One potential factor for the reduced loan was IBRD’s refusal to finance IBTE’s 
order for new 10,000 line central exchange and other works placed with 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson in 1964 (International Bank, 1965). This was because, 
according to IBRD, the order was made “without consultation with the Bank and without 
calling for international tenders” (International Bank, 1965, p.6). In the end the Ethiopian 
government made financial arrangements with Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson to the 
amount of US$0.9 million in order to cover the cost of the sub-project. In addition to the 
financial arrangement made with Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, IBTE secured 
US$1.6 million funding from USAID for procurement and installation of broadcasting 
equipment (IBRD, 1965).!
Between 1962 and 1965, demand for IBTE’s services accelerated by 19% per 
annum, which is more than double earlier estimates of a rather conservative 9% (Figure 
5). In fact, the ratio of 0.07 telephones per 100 people was one of the lowest compared to 
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other African countries at the time (IBRD, 1965).38 In order to respond to this demand, 
the Third Telecommunications Project aimed at the installation of 13,200 additional lines 
of new automatic exchange equipment (IBRD, 1965). About 10,000 of these lines were to 
be installed by the financial arrangement made between IBTE and Swedish telecom 
company Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson. In addition to these lines nearly 6,000 lines 
were set to be installed from the dismantled equipment recovered from the central 
automatic exchange in Addis Ababa (IBRD, 1965). Other aspects of the Third 
Telecommunications Project included the extension of the outside plant including 
underground cables, aerial wires and telephones for new subscribers; provision for the 
addition of some toll lines and a considerable quantity of career telephone equipment to 
increase the number of toll circuits between the main centers of population; extension of 
telegraph and telex services; and extension of the radio services covering mainly 
international communications (IBRD, 1965). 
One of the conditions set by the IBRD in this and the previous loans was for IBTE 
to hire expatriates for key managerial and technical positions. As a result, it was agreed 
that the Swedish Telephone and Telegraph Administration should continue supplying key 
personnel to IBTE, at least until the completion of the project related to the IBRD’s loan 
(Figure 6). The positions of General Manager, Network Planning Advisor, Transport & 
Workshop Advisor and other key positions were held by Swedish and Norwegian 
nationals (IBRD, 1965). 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 In comparison, other African countries had the following figures of telephones per 100 people by 1965: 
Nigeria 0.15; Tanganyika (Tanzania) 0.18; Liberia 0.20; Uganda 0.21; Kenya 0.49; South Africa 6.02 
(International Bank, 1965). 
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Figure 5: Telephone subscription statistics 1955-1964. Adapted from World Bank 
(1965). 
 
There was little gap between the 1965-1967 Telecommunications Development 
Project and the following Fourth Telecommunications Project (1968-1973). The Fourth 
Telecommunications Project was at that time the largest infrastructure expansion venture 
undertaken by IBTE. Once again, the IBRD was contacted for loans although the sources 
for financing in this round of the project involved other stakeholders as well. Of 
particular importance was the joint financing scheme that involved the Swedish 
government when IBTE entered negotiations with IBRD officials in Washington, D.C., in 
March 1969 (International Bank, 1969a). At the end of the negotiations, the 
representatives involved—Yawand-Wossen Mangasha, Vice Governor of the National 
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Bank of Ethiopia, Betru Admassie, General Manager of IBTE, John Wingstrand of the 
Swedish Embassy in Washington, D.C., Bengt Sandberg and Gosta Westring of the 
Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA)—agreed upon a financial scheme 
to undertake the Fourth Telecommunications Project (International Bank, 1969b). Out of 
the US$25 million total cost of the project, IBRD and SIDA agreed to provide loans and 
credits amounting to US$4.5 million each (IBRD, 1969b). It was also agreed that IBTE 
would use US$2.8 million from expenditure from the previous third Bank loan and 
US$1.1 million from a supplier’s credit (Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson) in order to 
fulfill the foreign exchange cost of US$16 million (IBRD, 1969b). In addition, IBTE 
agreed to finance the total local currency cost of the program and about 20% of the 
foreign exchange component from internally generated funds (IBRD, 1969b).  
The Fourth Telecommunications Project aimed at increasing the capacity of the 
urban telephone lines by 29,000 and expanding long-distance communication facilities 
that included installation of microwave and very high frequency (VHF) systems and 
automatic trunk exchanges. Telegraph, telex and international communication facilities 
were also part of the expansion program (IBRD, 1965a). Even with this expansion rate, 
the proposed program would only satisfy demand for services in line with a growth rate 
of 12% a year, a rather conservative figure compared to the actual growth rate of 17% 
that was registered between 1960 and 1965 (IBRD, 1965a). When the Fourth 
Telecommunications Project was completed, 343 cities and towns were connected 
through IBTE’s telephone network (Figures 7 and 8). Total subscriptions for telephone 
and telex reached 47,263 and 271 respectively, and the number of telephone sets totaled 
63,689 (Tsigie & Feyissa, 1999). 
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Although the four telecommunications development programs helped the IBTE to 
become a satisfactory and efficient organization toward the end of the 1960s, the 
Ethiopian telecommunications sector notably trailed other African countries both in terms 
of coverage and quality of services. For example, in 1973, Ethiopia had a telephone 
density of 0.2 per 100 people (International Development Association [IDA], 1975). To 
put this into perspective, only five of the other 38 African countries for which data is 
available had lower densities at the time. The pace in which industrialization, 
urbanization, modernization and commerce grew was not replicated in the development 
of telecommunication infrastructure.  
The need for telecommunication infrastructure during that time was particularly 
of paramount importance since the country had a relatively large land area of about 1.2 
million square kilometers and an approximate population size of 26.5 million 
(International Development, 1975). Because of the large distances involved between 
different provinces of the country and the sparse road network, economic integration and 
improvement in administration were becoming increasingly dependent on expansion of 
telecommunications. While the Ethiopian rugged topography both necessitated and 
undermined the development of telecommunication infrastructure, the wide area over 
which agriculture—the backbone of the Ethiopian economy—was distributed and the 
scarcity of good all-weather roads made “telecommunications particularly important for 
coordinating the movement, distribution and marketing of agricultural products” 
(International Development, 1975, p. 7).  
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Figure 6: Imperial Board of Telecommunications of Ethiopia organizational chart at 
1968. Adapted from IBRD (1969b). 
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Figure 7: Interurban and international carrier circuits as at the end of 1967. Adapted 
from IBRD (1969b). 
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Figure 8: Main open wire lines at the end of 1967. Adapted from IBRD (1969b). 
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It is in the midst of this constant pressure to expand the telecommunication 
infrastructure that IBTE approached the IBRD and its member institution the 
International Development Association (IDA) for what would become the Fifth 
Telecommunications Project (1974-1978). What was unique about this program 
compared to the previous projects was that it was divided into two overlapping phases—
the first one between 1974-1977 and the second one between 1975-1978—due to 
“shortage of IDA resources” (IDA, 1973, p. 10). IBTE was confident of its 
creditworthiness given its increment of its share capital within a short period of time from 
US$ 8 million to US$16 million between 1967 and 1973 (IDA, 1973).39 The cost of the 
first phase of the project, US$37.1 million, was once again split between IBTE and 
IBRD. From the total amount, IDA supplied US$ 21.4 (58%) million to cover the foreign 
exchange requirement exclusive of certain facilities worth $1.4 million which IBTE has 
already contracted to other vendors. The remaining 42% of the financing was provided 
from internal sources (IDA, 1973). The Fifth Telecommunications Project included the 
addition of 39,800 automatic and 4.500 manual exchange lines, four new microwave 
systems, expansion of the telex network, and, for the first time in the history of 
telecommunications development in Ethiopia, an earth satellite station that boosted 
capacity in international communication (IDA, 1973). A special attention was given to 
telex during this phase of expansion because the number of telex subscribers increased by 
about 14% between 1969 and 1973. With the exception of the satellite earth station, IBTE 
was almost in charge of all facets of the project including preparation of bidding 
documents, bid evaluation and detailed engineering of the project.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Proclamation No. 246/67 (June 27, 1967) declared the share capital of IBTE to increase from US$4.9 
million to US$8 million. This share capital was increased to US$16 million by Proclamation No. 319/73 
(Tsigie & Feyissa, 1999). 
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Administratively, one of the agreements between IBTE and the Bank as part of 
the proceedings of the loan was to revise the organizational structure of the former. 
Particular emphasis was given in the areas of planning and accounting. To this end, on 
November 1, 1972, IBTE appointed a Manager of Planning reporting directly to the 
General Manager. The Bank was particularly insistent on the transfer of the planning staff 
under the Engineering Department to the newly established office of the Manager of 
Planning. This remained a point of contention between IBTE and the Bank for some time 
as the latter constantly declared its dissatisfaction with the understaffing of the newly 
appointed position (IBRD, 1973; IDA, 1973, 1975a, 1975b).  
Meanwhile steps were taken in modernizing the Accounting Department as well 
in light of responding to the expansion of IBTE and subsequent growth in financial 
transactions. As accounting practices were largely backward, it was common for financial 
reports to be issued several months after the closure of accounting periods. This was a 
serious challenge both to the Collection Department, and auditing, which was performed 
by Getachew Kassage Co., a firm of certified accountants (IBRD, 1973). Subsequently, 
IBTE established the position of Finance Manager who directly reported to the General 
Manager. Furthermore, the Supply Division as well as the Accounting and Data 
Processing Division were put under the direction of the Finance Manager (International 
Bank, 1973). The organizational structure of IBTE remained unchanged to a large extent, 
however, with the governing body of the corporation being the Board of Directors, 
composed of five to seven members appointed by the Emperor (Figure 9). The de facto 
chairman of the Board was the Minister of Communications. The Board appoints the 
General Manager who is responsible for IBTE’s management and operations.  
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Figure 9: Imperial Board of Telecommunications of Ethiopia organizational chart at 
1972 (Source: IBRD, 1973). 
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Between 1973 and 1975, the Fifth Telecommunications Project underwent some 
lapses in effective execution because of a series of political instabilities at the helm of the 
Ethiopian Empire and popular uprisings across the country. After a period of civil unrest, 
the Emperor was removed from his position in 1974 and was replaced by the Provisional 
Military Administrative Council (PMAC), or simply referred to as Derg. The monarchy 
was formally abolished in May 1975, and Marxism-Leninism was proclaimed the 
ideology of the state. This was followed on January 1, 1975 by a decree that nationalized 
the financial sector including banks, insurance companies and savings associations. 
Similar measures were taken against manufacturing and distributing firms that were 
privately owned by Ethiopians and foreign nationals (IDA, 1975a). Imperial names of 
public institutions were soon revised along with the new order of the day. As a result, the 
Imperial Board of Telecommunications of Ethiopia was provisionally renamed Board of 
Telecommunications of Ethiopia (BTE) by the PMAC (IDA, 1975a). 
The credit for the first phase of the project only became effective on August 1974 
approximately six months behind schedule due to a six-month delay caused by labor 
disturbances. Although political stability was yet to be realized, the transition period 
didn’t affect the official business of the government considerably. The civilian cabinet 
and the Ethiopian bureaucracy continued to function reasonably well allowing ongoing 
development projects to resume with acceptable efficiency (IDA, 1975b). In the 
meantime BTE remained a government-owned commercial corporation under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Communications. In spite of changing political and economic 
developments of Ethiopia that probably were not to the liking of international financial 
institutions, the IDA declared it is “satisfied that the project is still of a high priority and 
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is economically, technically and financially justified in the changed circumstances” 
(International Development, 1975b, p. 12). Consequently, between March 31 and April 3 
1975, an Ethiopian delegation led by Ato Legesse Tickerher, Economic and Financial 
Counselor of the Ethiopian Embassy in Washington, D.C., and Ato Girmaw Ingidayehu, 
Acting General Manager of BTE negotiated for a credit equivalent to US$16 million as 
part of the second phase of the Fifth Telecommunications Project. Between BTE’s own 
funds of US$23.2 million, the previous loan of US$21.4 issued for the first phase of the 
project and the newly granted credit of US$16 million, the total cost of the project 
amounted to US$60.6 million (IDA, 1975b). 
The 1974 revolution brought significant challenges to the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Authority (ETA).40 A significant number of senior staff left the 
organization causing setbacks in technological development and operational efficiency. 
As a result, ETA was busy with filling its vacant positions for the next six years. This 
meant a relegated priority to infrastructure development and network expansion for a 
company that barely kept up with demand. Moreover, the tenacity in which the PMAC 
executed extreme socialist reforms particularly in terms of nationalizing manufacturing 
companies and banks previously owned privately was not popular with the World Bank. 
This has affected the Ethiopian telecommunications sector significantly as its momentum 
in expanding according to the increasing demand of the services was held back at least by 
five years because of loan delays to the Sixth Telecommunications Project (1984-1988). 
This was evident when ETA, upon preparing a telecommunications development 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 After shortly changing its name to the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia 
Telecommunications Service, BTE was soon renamed again as the Ethiopian Telecommunication Authority 
(ETA) (ETC, 2009). 
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program for the period 1981/82-1985/86, found out IDA has rejected its credit 
application on June 30, 1981 (World Bank, 1984a). IDA’s reluctance to fund the project 
was particularly a hard blow to ETA because it scared off other potential sources of 
financing. The discontinuity of the expansion project, although provisional, had enduring 
costs to the Ethiopian telecommunications sector as ETA was left behind the rapidly 
changing technology, computerization and service diversification of global 
telecommunications infrastructure.  
In spite of being the first public telecommunications operator in Africa, ETA was 
drifting behind many of its continental counterparts. By mid 1982, Ethiopia’s telephone 
density was 0.25 per 100 people, a figure that is much below the 0.42 per 100 average for 
developing countries in Africa (World Bank, 1984a). In addition, telecommunications 
infrastructure exhibited a steep urban bias in that the capital city of Addis Ababa, despite 
having only 4.3% of the total Ethiopian population, had 43, 266 number of main lines 
that account for 56.7% of the total nationwide cumulative (World Bank, 1984b). The 
other thirteen regional capitals shared 21.8% of the total telephone lines whereas 93.9% 
of the population living in the rest of the country only got 21.5% of the service (World 
Bank, 1984a). The problem was exacerbated by the poor quality of the service that was 
mainly caused by the large excess demand, which in turn congested circuits and 
prevented call completion at significantly. Still, new subscribers continued to apply for 
services. The formal waiting list of new applicants was in thousands and it took years for 
subscribers to get a telephone line (World Bank, 1984b). 
Although the PMAC has identified the expansion of the telecommunications 
sector as a priority in its economic program, unrelenting internal and external factors and 
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incidents left little room for undeterred development commitment to occur. Externally, 
PMAC’s political and economic ideology was unpopular amongst traditional Western 
lenders, making loan possibilities limited and conditions tight. Furthermore, Ethiopia was 
dragged into a costly war with neighboring Somalia when the latter invaded much of the 
southeastern part of the country in July 1977. Internally, immediately after the end of the 
war against Somalia, the Derg was engaged in a brutal fighting against ethno-nationalist 
groups including the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan 
Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) and other groups that ranged from the conservative and 
pro-monarchy Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) to the far leftist Ethiopian Peoples 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) (Bahru, 2002).  
When seen against such backdrop of political and economic instability, ETA’s 
challenges in performance optimization were unsurprising. Regardless, attempts were 
made to reinvigorate ETA to overcome its financial, institutional and operational 
problems. Structurally, ETA retained its share company façade although it was fully 
owned by the government and established by proclamation. Like its predecessor, ETA 
was administered by Board of Directors (World Bank, 1984b). The Board of Directors, 
nominated by the government, had the Minister of Transport and Communication 
(MOTC) as its ex officio chairman (Figure 10). The responsibilities of ETA remained 
unchanged as it continued to: plan and coordinate all civil communications within the 
country; coordinate with military authorities for their facilities; issue licenses to end 
users; and represent Ethiopia globally in telecommunications related associations line the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU). In terms of direction, the 
telecommunication sector was assigned with two objectives: to support national 
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economic development providing required services to agriculture, industry, trade, tourism 
and other sectors; and to assist in implementing national social goals, particularly in the 
fields of health and education. To meet these objectives, ETA designed service objectives 
that ranged from raising service quality to an acceptable level in accordance with ITU 
recommendations to providing adequate staff training (World Bank, 1984b).  
After its initial attempt in 1981 to finance its Sixth Telecommunications Project 
was rejected by IDA, PMAC’s second revised loan application was accepted in 1983 with 
the understanding that the implementation period of the project would fall between 1984 
and 1988 (World Bank, 1984a). The proceedings in loan negotiations for the Sixth 
Telecommunications Project were long and complicated as they involved multiple 
stakeholders including PMAC, IDA, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the 
Government of Italy and the Government of Sweden. In the end, it was agreed that the 
total cost of the project, US$151.8 million, would be covered by a parallel co-financing 
in the amount of US$40 million from IDA, US$25 fro the government of Italy, US$12 
from the Government of Sweden, and US$ 26.4 from the AfDB. The remaining US$48.4, 
majority of the financing (31.9%), was covered by ETA’s internal coffers (World Bank, 
1984a, 1984b). The average 12% annual interest of the loans was very high—more than 
two times of the previous loans—which probably is an indication of how PMAC was 
limited and cornered in its financial options particularly at a time when the country was 
facing severe foreign currency reserves. In spite of all the challenges, the project 
delivered results as shown in Table 11.  
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Figure 10: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation organizational chart. Adapted from World Bank (1984b).
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Indicator At project 
commencement 
Projected at 
completion 
Actual 
Subscriber connections (direct 
exchange lines) 
90,000 139,000 147,00041 
Telex subscribers 585 1,000 1,022 
Fault rate per direct exchange line 2.8 1.0 1.4 
Local call completion (%) 65% 95% 84% 
Inter-urban call completion (%) 30% 80% 63% 
 
Table 11: Sixth telecommunications project goals and results. Adapted 
fromWorld Bank (1984a, 1984b). 
 
Project 
Year of 
loan 
approval 
Total 
cost 
Internal 
financing 
External 
Loan Lender Status 
Closure 
date 
1st Telecomm-
unications 
Project 
1951 1.5  1.5 IBRD Completed 12/31/56 
2nd Telecomm-
unications 
Project 
1962 6.24 3.34 2.9 IBRD Completed 12/31/65 
3rd Telecomm-
unications 
Project 
1965 10.8 3.5 
4.8 
 
IBRD 
Completed 12/31/69 
1.6 USAID 
09 L.M. Ericsson 
4th Telecomm-
unications 
Project 
1969 25  
4.5 IBRD Completed 12/31/79 
4.5 SIDA   
1.1 L.M. Ericsson   
2.8 IBRD   
5th Telecomm-
unications 
Project 
1974 
(Phase I) 
 
60.6 
 
 17.4 IDA Completed 06/30/81 
1975 
(Phase II) 
  16.0 IDA Completed 06/30/83 
6th Telecomm-
unications 
Project 
1984 151.8 48.4 
40.0 IDA 
Completed 06/30/88 25.0 Italy 
12.0 Sweden 
26.4 AfDB 
 
Table 12: Summary of all telecommunication expansion projects until 1993. Adapted 
from International Bank (1962, 1965a, 1965b, 1969a, 1969b, 1973); International 
Development (1973, 1975a, 1975b); World Bank (1984a, 1984b, 1993). 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Includes lines in Eritrea. 
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Consolidation of a State Monopoly and the Localization of Financing (1992-2009) 
The 1980s and 1990 saw the majority of telecommunication operators 
across the developed world embracing liberalization and privatization. The 
divestiture of AT&T in the USA, the privatization of NTT in Japan and BT in the UK 
1984 signaled the end of the global telecommunication sector as a natural monopoly 
(Abbott & Brady, 1999). By the early 1980s British and American governments, joined 
by large segments of the media and intelligentsia, declared the futility of the state and 
endorsed free markets could do nearly everything better than government, leading to the 
popularity of deregulation and privatization as flagship ethos of the OECD States and 
global financial institutions (Bergman et al., 1998; Comor, 1994). More importantly, the 
fate of global telecommunications as a private entity was sealed w hen sixty-nine 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) signed an agreement on February 15, 
1997, to provide market access to their basic telecommunications services. The WTO 
Agreement on Telecommunications Service became the first global pact on the 
deregulation of basic telecommunications service. At the time, the countries that signed 
the Agreement account for about ninety-three percent of the global market in basic 
telecommunications service (Forestier, Grace, & Kenny, 2002). 
These new developments in the global economy in general and in the 
telecommunications sector in particular made deregulation the cornerstone of loan 
conditions. This was particularly a challenging proposition for EPRDF, the ruling party 
of FDRE since 1991, given its unwavering insistence on consolidating state monopoly of 
the telecom sector and fending off external and internal pushes of deregulation (see 
Chapter VII). Consequently, it became apparent that traditional financial sources like the 
! 183 
World Bank were reluctant to provide loans to the Ethiopian government so long as the 
latter insisted on upholding state monopoly of the telecom sector. It is partly because of 
this tension of ideology between the Ethiopian government and traditional Western 
financial institutions that the Seventh Telecommunications Project was rescheduled for 
implementation between 1992/1993 and 1996/1997 from its original scheme of 
implementation between 1990 and 1994. 
The original cost of the Seventh Telecommunications Project was estimated at 
US$250 million, a figure that far exceeds any of the prior six telecommunication projects 
(Table 12). Out of this amount, ETA was looking to secure the foreign exchange 
component of the investment in the amount of US$170 million from external sources. In 
spite of different attempts, ETA’s effort for favorable terms and conditions for loans fell 
short until it finally obtained US$ 64 million from Africa Developoment Bank (AfDB) 
(AfDB, 2006). However, this was still an amount that fell short of ETA’s plans. 
Eventually, both ADB and the World Bank ceased financing the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector, making GoE to look internally for fund generation mostly 
through credit from commercial banks and selling bonds. Between 2004 and 2005 alone, 
the sector raised funds in the amount of US$ 615 million through sale of bonds (AfDB, 
2006). 
In the meantime, the EPRDF-led government found it necessary to restructure 
ETA with the aim of separating regulatory branches from operational entities. 
Accordingly, two separate bodies, the Ethiopian Telecommunications Authority (ETA) 
and the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC), were established by 
Proclamation No. 49/1996 on November 1996 (ETC, 1999). The separation of regulatory 
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and operational activities that were altogether exercised by the former Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Authority (ETA) was consistent with international trends in 
telecommunications management structure as the number of independent regulators 
increased dramatically from 13 in 1990 to 140 in 2005. Established under the then 
Ministry of Transport and Communications, the new ETA was tasked “to ensure the 
implementation of government policy, to create a conducive atmosphere for private 
investment in the telecom sector as well as to set standards for services and types of 
communication equipment-imported, assembled or locally” (ETC, 2009, p.23). ETA’s 
major powers and duties included: ensuring the telecom services are operated in a manner 
that best serve and contribute to the country’s economic and social development; 
ensuring that telecom services conform to the specified standards of quality; authorizing 
and supervising the use of frequencies allotted to Ethiopia; specifying technical standards 
and procedures for the provision of telecom services; regulating tariffs related to basic 
telecom services; regulating types of telecom equipment, which may be connected to a 
telecom system; and licensing and supervising operators of telecom services (ETC, 
2009). 
Upon its establishment in 2002, ETA granted ETC with monopoly rights that 
provided the latter with fixed-line, mobile, Internet, and data communications services as 
well as related training services. Audited by the Audit Services Corporation (ASC), ETC 
as a state-owned company had management autonomy, a separate legal personality, a 
supervising authority, and a management board (ETC, 2009). Its responsibilities included 
design of the telecommunications network, procurement of telecommunications 
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equipment, construction, installation, and maintenance of the equipment and provision of 
telecommunications services to the public (ETC, 2009). 
Between 1997 and 2007, ETC invested significantly in infrastructure development 
in a region of US$14 billion. In recent years, GoE’s investment on telecommunications 
infrastructure had been increasing continuously to the extent that it comprised nearly 10 
percent of the country’s GDP in recent years. The majority of ETC’s investment went 
into fixed wireless and mobile network infrastructure, including third-generation (3G) 
mobile technology as well as a national fiber-optic backbone. ETC also sponsored the 
establishment of the Graduate School of Telecommunications and Information 
Technology that provides training, research, and education in the specialized fields of 
telecommunications and information technology, offering three postgraduate programs, 
namely, Telecom Engineering, Information Technology and Telecom Management 
(Figure 12). Also important was the establishment of the Ethiopian Information and 
Communication Technology Development Authority (EICTDA) in 2003 (ETC, 2009). 
EICTDA was tasked with completing and implementing Ethiopia’s National Information 
and Communications Technology (ICT) Policy that was first drafted and submitted to the 
Council of Ministers in 2002 (Figure 11). The policy strategized, among other things, a 
roadmap to e-government that aimed for public access to information and government 
services, enhancing good governance and strengthening the democratic process. In 2006, 
EICTDA finalized and published an information and communication technology (ICT) 
policy and related detailed ICT action plan for 2006–10 (Ministry of Information and 
Communication [MICT], n.d.). 
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Figure 11: Institutional setting of ETC. Reproduced from Plummer (2012). 
ETC streamlined its development strategy with the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) that served as FDRE’s guiding 
strategic framework for the five-year period 2005/06-2009/10. The PASDEP defined the 
nation’s overall strategy for development during the course of the five years. The 
PASDEP program aimed to reinforce telecommunications development propositions laid 
out by the previous Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) 
that included the provision of broadband, multimedia and internet services; laying 
underground fiber-optics cables covering large areas; conversion of hand operated semi-
automatic telecommunication centers into digital systems; undertaking preliminary 
preparations to implement rural telecommunication expansion projects, extending 
telephone services at the qäbäle level; major expansion of telephone coverage, from 
about 400,000 lines at the beginning of SDPRP to over 1 million by the end of 2004/05 
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(Table 13); and, reductions in the cost of international calls and of Internet connections, 
and corporate reforms of Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (ETC) to increase 
efficiency (MoFED, 2006). 
Specifically, PASDEP aspired to deploy “a world-class backbone and 
connectivity network” that included a full digitized national transmission microwave and 
switching system; 4,000 km of fiber along the major national route and 122+ 
interconnecting stations; 1,200+ broadband Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) 
nationwide; a broadband multimedia Internet Protocol/Multi Protocol Label Switching 
(IP/MPLS) core network with footprints all over the nation; and a broadband Internet 
network with points of presence nationwide; and Wireless Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA) to 5,000 rural villages (MoFED, 2006, p. 41).  
Regions 
Landline Mobile 
By the end 
of 2004/05 
By the end 
of 2009/10 
By the end 
of 2004/05 
By the end 
of 2009/10 
Tigray 29,250 215,247  350,000 
Afar 2,745 36,448  110,000 
Amhara 64,345 623,764  1,300,000 
Oromia 117,391 977,424  1,600,000 
Somali 5,307 191,833  270,000 
Benishangul-
Gumuz 
1,936 17,851  60,000 
SNNPR 42,264 386,144  890,000 
Gambella 1,797 12,127  40,000 
Harari 7,691 29,204  50,000 
Addis Ababa 332,369 681,711  1,660,000 
Dire Dawa 14,305 71,590  80,000 
Total 620,000 3,243,343 560,00 6,470,000 
 
Table 13: Regional distribution of landline and mobile phones. Adapted from ETC 
(2009) and MoFED (2006). 
 
The PASDEP also had schemes to promote e-governance through applying 
modern ICT to the delivery of services and administration of government, thereby 
improving effectiveness and reducing costs. SchoolNet was one of the largest programs 
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that was developed through this initiative providing educational satellite television 
broadcasting to 1,710 high schools in Ethiopia through a total of 15,600 Plasma TVs 
(MoFED, 2006). According to the MICT of the FDRE, the SchoolNet program delivers 
1482 television programs in subjects like Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics, 
Civics and Ethical Education and English to grades 9-12 students across the country 
(MoFED, 2006). WoredaNet is another product of PASDEP and provides terrestrial and 
satellite-based network linking 950 districts. Its purpose is “providing ICT services such 
as video conferencing, directory services, messaging, Voice over IP, and Internet 
connectivity to the Federal, Regional, and Woreda level government administrative units 
across the country” (MICT, n.d.). Similar other nationwide ventures like AgriNet, 
HERNet and HealthNet were undertaken to create communication network between 
agricultural research centers, institutions of higher learning and major referral hospitals 
respectively. 
The operationalization of PASDEP’s proposal was mainly carried out through a 
vendor credit agreement GoE signed with ZTE in 2007 in the amount of US$1.5 billion. 
The ZTE project resulted in the rollout of 10,000 km backbone fiber optics cable across 
the country that would enable the aforementioned programs like SchoolNet and 
WoredaNet. The project also created a mobile network capacity of over 30 million 
subscribers and a CDMA wireless network covering rural areas (MoFED, 2006). 
While SDPRP had outlined and executed some lofty schemes in the infrastructure 
development of ICTs, particularly in laying a nationwide backbone of fiber-optics, 
coverage of telecommunications in Ethiopia was still among the lowest in the world, with 
approximately 5 lines per 1,000 persons, and 87% of the rural population living more 
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than 5 km from the nearest telephone service facility by 2006 (MoFED, 2006). 
PASDEP’s end goal was to increase fixed telephone subscribers from 620,000 to over 
3.23 million, and cellular mobile subscribers from about 410,000 to over 6.76 million, 
and in Internet connections from 17,000 to 0.193 million. It also aspired for the 
percentage of population with access to telecommunications within 5 km to reach 100% 
(MoFED, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: ETC organizational chart as of May 2006. Reproduced from Plummer 
(2012). 
 
Rebranding, Outsourcing and the Chinese Influx (2010-Present) 
With the expiration of the PASDEP in 2010, GoE introduced the Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP) that set the nation’s economic and development agenda 
between 2010 to 2015 (Figure 15). The GTP encompasses a lofty communications 
program that proposed the objectives of finishing ongoing network infrastructure building 
and applications and commence service, intensifying the need based network expansion 
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work, expanding of rural universal telecommunication access program, improving and 
maintaining the quality in fixed line, mobile phone, internet and data service provision; 
and creating a conducive environment to use latest telecommunication technologies and 
fair and economical utilization of National Frequency, Telecommunication number and 
IP addresses and increase the revenue from these services (MoFED, 2010a). 
Indicators Base Year 
(2009/10) 
Annual Target 
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
Fixed line telephone density (%) 1.36 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.4 
Mobile telephone coverage (%) 8.7 11.9 16.6 23.1 32.2 45 
Number of mobile telephone 
subscribers (mln) 
6.52     40 
Wireless telecom service 
coverage (%) 
50 56 63 71 80 90 
Global link capacity (Gb/s) 3.255 4.680 6.729 9.675 13.910 20 
Number of fixed line telephone 
subscribers (mln.) 
1 1.25 1.56 1.95 2.44 3.05 
Number of internet service 
subscribers (mln) 
0.187 0.34 0.62 1.12 2.03 3.69 
Rural telecom access within 5 
km radius of services (%) 
62.14     100 
 
Table 14: Ethio-Telecom capacity targets 2009-2015. Reproduced from MoFED 
(2010a). 
 
In order to execute the GTP’s telecommunications infrastructure schemes, GoE 
found it crucial to revamp ETC administratively, operationally and structurally. In 
November 2010, Ethio-Telecom was established under Proclamation 197/2010 under the 
Council of Ministers with a capital of 40 billion ETB.42 According to the Proclamation, 
the purposes for which Ethio-Telecom was established are: to provide and make 
accessible next generation network based world class standard information technology 
services; to build a competent next generation network based workforce with appropriate 
knowledge, skill, attitude and work culture to provide work class telecom service; to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 On December 2010, 1USD=16.636ETB. 
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engage, in accordance with development policies and priorities of he government, in the 
construction, operation, maintenance and expansion of telecommunications networks and 
services; to provide domestic and international voice, data, video, and other related value-
added services; to provide communication services using integrated information 
technology platform, including rebroadcast of telecommunication services; in line with 
directives and policy guidelines issued by the MoFED, to sell and pledge bonds and to 
negotiate and sign loan agreements with local and international financial sources; and to 
engage in other related activities necessary to the attainment of its purposes (Federal 
Negarit Gazeta, 2011).  
 
Service Type Subscribers 
in 2013 
Users per 
1,000 people 
Fixed line 
telephone 
790,188 9.123 
Public telephone 5,359 0.062 
CDMA telephone 136,744 1.579 
Dialup internet 76,504 0.883 
Internet and data 221,000 2.551 
Mobile telephone 23,637,007 272.9 
WCDMA telephone 296,897 3.428 
AgriNet 49 0 
Multimedia 6,500 0.075 
Roaming 444 0.005 
CDMA 1X 104,003 1.2 
GPRS 4,208,989 48.595 
EVDO 76,445 0.882 
Gota 1,010 0.012 
Internet bandwidth 8.686 Gbps - 
 
Table 15: Ethiopian telecommunications sector subscription and 
density statistics. Reproduced from MoFED (2010b). 
 
Today Ethio-Telecom has monopoly over fixed, mobile, Internet and Value 
Added Services (VAS) like Domain Name registration and distribution over .et country 
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code top-level domain (ccTLD), the Domain Name System, Web hosting, and Internet 
Protocol Address Service (Ministry of Communication, n.d.). It offers dialup Internet, 
CDMA 2000 wireless Internet, Asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL) and wireless 
Internet using AIRONET, very small aperture terminal (VSAT), and Enhanced Voice-
Data Optimized (EVDO) (Table 14). Very few facets of Ethio-Telecom are available for 
private sector participation like the resale of airtime vouchers and Internet services 
through cyber cafés. Since the establishment of Ethio-Telecom. Mobile 
telecommunications subscribers surged from 1.2 million to 23.7 million between 2007 
and 2013. According to MICT, voice communication geographic coverage has reached 
64% with fixed telecommunciation netword comprising 790,188 subscribers, a figure that 
represents 1% of the population (MICT, n.d.).  
Administratively, Ethio-Telecom’s management was outsourced to France 
Telecom-Orange for a two year contract (Figure 13) in 2010 for a fee of US$ 40 million. 
Under France Telecom’s management between 2010 and 2012, Ethio-Telecom’s 
customer base reached 18.28 million subscribers, nearly a 60% increase from 2010 
(Abiye, 2013). Mobile services, which constituted the vast majority of the customer base 
passed the 20 million mark and fixed line numbers reached 805,000—81.4% of projected 
performance target.  
Financially, Ethio-Telecom’s overall gross revenues by the end of France 
Telecom’s tenure reached US$ 690 million, with two thirds coming from mobile services. 
This accounted for 70 percent of the US$980 of the target set in the agreement between 
France Telecom and GoE. By the end of 2012, Ethio Telecom’s net profits, the money 
actually earned after taxes and other fees, amounted to US$ 495 million, a profit margin 
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that fell short of the US$600 they hoped to net (Yewondwossen, 2012). Almost one 
quarter (22.4%) of Ethio-Telecom’s profits came from international traffic 
interconnection with the rest primarily coming from fixed telephone lines. France 
Telecom’s contract, which had a potential to be extended if certain goals were met, was 
not renewed after MICT announced the former’s tenure would end on December 13th 
and Ethiopian staff would take over the management of the state owned monopoly 
(Yewondwossen, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Organizational chart of Ethio-Telecom. Reproduced from Ethio-Telecom 
(2009).!
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In 2013 Ethio-Telecom has made a landmark agreement between Chinese telecom 
giants Huawei and ZTE for a nationwide telecommunications infrustructure development 
with a US$1.6 billion vendor credit arrangement involving the EXIM Bank of China 
(Essa, 2013; “Pros and Cons,” n.d.). 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the historical development of the telecommunications 
sector in Ethiopia from the introduction of the first telephone apparatus in 1894 to the 
present day. It particularly gave emphasis to the six major telecommunication 
infrastructure development projects between 1952 and 1992 that were made possible by 
financial arrangements secured from the IBRD, IDA and the World Bank. With the 
Ethiopian government’s refusal to liberalize the telecommunications sector in the 1990s 
against the rising tide of laissez faire economics, traditional financial sources were 
reluctant to provide funding for further infrastructure development projects. As a result, 
the EPRDF-led Ethiopian government was forced to localize its funding sources for 
investing on the telecommunication sector until the emergence of Chinese assistance in 
the past decade. This chapter also provided the evolution of the state owned 
telecommunications provider in Ethiopia in terms of organizational structure and 
institutional reform from the birth of the first ministerial level inauguration of 
communications-related institution, Ministry of Posts, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT), 
to Ethio-Telecom presently. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCONTENT, DISSONANCE AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE ETHIOPIAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
It was terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you were in 
any public place or within range of a telescreen. The smallest thing 
could give you away. A nervous tic, an unconscious look of anxiety, a 
habit of muttering to yourself—anything that carried with it the 
suggestion of abnormality, of having something to hide. In any case, to 
wear an improper expression on your face…was itself a punishable 
offense. There was even a word for it in Newspeak: FACECRIME, it 
was called. 
—George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 
 
The Ethiopian government has long defended its monopolistic control of the 
telecommunication sector by arguing liberalization will bring about an unbalanced 
distribution of access where communication infrastructure would be concentrated in 
economically affluent areas. A free market modeled telecommunication sector, EPRDF 
officials argue, further marginalizes people that are less advantaged and, therefore, 
“unattractive” to market forces. The assumption here is that the state is the only sensible 
actor that can bring about universal access and universal service to a country where more 
than 80% of the population lives in infrastructure deprived rural areas.  
The Ethiopian government is also of the opinion that the telecommunications 
sector is a “cash cow” that generates a substantial amount of revenue for the state (see 
Chapter VII). Officials argue deregulating the sector will dry up this source of revenue, 
thereby jeopardizing infrastructure development and expansion projects that get their 
funding from profitable state-owned enterprises like Ethio-Telecom. In this sense, 
monopoly is a sensible course of action to take for the Ethiopian government in order to 
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fend off competition that can substantially reduce the sector’s uncontested revenue. 
Ethiopia, being the second most populous country in Africa, presents an untapped market 
that the government wants to capitalize on. 
The problem, however, is that the government has struggled to provide a 
reasonably sound service through its sole service provider for many years now. There 
have been reports that singled out the state-monopoly structure of the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector as the cause for the inefficiency of Ethio-Telecom. The 
argument here is that lack of competition makes the government unchecked and 
unaccountable, leaving a room for incapacity and mediocrity. While these observations 
are widely shared by critics of state monopoly including the likes of the IMF (see Chapter 
VII), the analysis provided by these groups is largely based on elitist or institutional 
policies and/or interests. Largely missing in understanding challenges of state-monopoly 
of the telecom sector is the need of the Ethiopian public, who are the de facto customers 
of Ethio-Telecom. Through analysis of responses collected through an online survey, this 
chapter principally addresses the research question: To what extent does the Ethiopian 
public endorse/denounce state monopoly of the telecommunications sector? In doing so, 
it attempts to provide an analysis of the pros and cons of state-monopoly of the Ethiopian 
telecommunication sector from users’ perspective. 
The Service Woes of Ethio-Telecom 
The Ethiopian government has prioritized the expansion of telecommunications 
and information communication technologies infrastructure in the past decade. This is 
evident from the huge investment made on the sector as per the provisions of the two 
latest development benchmark papers of EPRDF, the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained 
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Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) of 2005-2010 and the Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP) of 2010-2015.  
While Ethio-Telecom took the ascending path in infrastructure development in the 
past few years, its track in quality of services, delivery capacity and support system has 
been in a continuous downhill. In fact, such is the sub-standard quality of the current state 
of telecommunications services in Ethiopia that Ethio-Telecom is one of the very few 
subjects critics and supporters of the government alike agree to disapprove in near 
unanimous proportions. In the past decade, even state-owned enterprises like the 
Ethiopian Revenues & Customs Authority (ERCA) and Ethiopian Airlines have sought 
for a network system that is independent from Ethio-Telecom in order to avoid the erratic 
network services. Public opinion is extremely dismissive about Ethio-Telecom with 
nearly 80% of respondents to the survey of this study expressing various degrees of 
disapproval, including 33% who categorically said they are “not satisfied” (see Figure 
14). 
The intensity in which the problems related to Ethio-Telecom’s undependable 
services have been debated by the traditionally unassertive EPRDF monopolized 
parliament puts the gravity of the issue in perspective. In May 2013, members of the 
Ethiopian House of Representatives have uncharacteristically challenged and criticized 
the minister of Communication and Information Technology’s 10-month work 
performance for the “poor quality of telecom services” and frequent interruption of 
mobile networks (Abiye, 2013b). As recently as February 2014, members of the 
Ethiopian House of Representatives have strongly criticized the poor performance of 
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Ethio-Telecom for its recurrent network disconnection problems and its poor 
implementation of budget (Abiye, 2013c).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Public attitude toward Ethio-Telecom 
 
However, nowhere in the public sphere is the grievance on Ethio-Telecom’s poor 
service more evident than social media. Among many others, for example, a Facebook 
group that goes by the name “ETC Sucks: Disconnecting Ethiopia from the Future!” 
(Figure 15) has been active since its launch in 2009.43 It has 2063 members at the time of 
writing. It is mainly a platform for sharing posts ranging from anecdotes related to Ethio-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 When the group was launched in 2009, Ethio-Telecom was referred by the name of its predecessor, the 
Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC). “Disconnecting Ethiopia from the Future!” is a 
mockery of ETC’s motto “Connecting Ethiopia from the Future!” 
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Telecom’s service failures to policy recommendations. The following are selected 
comments posted by members of the group:44 
I wish ETC would realize that the development of the country relies on their 
service. What the hell are they doing to make their services better? Unfortunately 
nothing! We're forced to wait for one sad progress like little kids. WAKE UP 
ETC!! We deserve a quality service!!!! 
 
It [ETC] really really does suck and unfortunately we can do nothing about it. 
Poor us. 
 
We pay 75 cents per minute and 800 birr (per month) for a dial up internet that 
barely works. It is a daylight robbery cuz you r neither getting the quality nor the 
right price. In my opinion calling the Etc guys they suck is like a compliment to 
them. They super suck! 
 
Ethio Telecom operates one of the lousiest communication networks around the 
world. If you spend $50 birr a day a lot of providers around the world allow you 
unlimited voice, text & data with LTE speed to boot. Here your connection is so 
unreliable you wonder who's managing this behemoth with incompetence that 
wouldn't be allowed anywhere else. The frustration doesn't end there water has 
been gone since yesterday morning and I'm looking for a nearby river to take a 
shower. To say this society is tolerant of incompetence is an understatement. 
 
In the middle of an online exam, the connection failed. I failed my exam..damn 
Ethio Telecom! 
 
ETC is driving me crazy! When i want to call someone, it says, you dont have 
sufficient balance. I know i have, but they steal it. When i want to fill credit, it 
says, “sorry the operation is failed” (a very bad English). After some time, when i 
want to call again (after filling credit, which probably takes 1 hr), they return back 
my previous credit, but they tell me that "i can't reach the person am calling". 
What is wrong with them?  
 
you know sometimes i miss the time when we didn't have mobile service in this 
country at least we'll have one more less thing to fume about. you have no idea 
how many times i threw my phone.  
 
10 phone calls to 994 interrupted...every and each other call interrupted regularly 
since morning..monopoly is the only way they survive, in another country I was 
going to change service provider immediately 
   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 All posts are reproduced as they were written. 
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Figure 15: Profile picture of the Facebook group “ETC Sucks” 
 
To put the public rating of telecommunications services in Ethiopia in 
perspective, participants in the online survey of this study were asked to rank the service 
competency of Ethio-Telecom as compared to other major state-owned service providers. 
The other three enterprises selected for comparison were the Ethiopian Electric Power 
Corporation, Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency and Water and Sewage Authority.45 
These enterprises are selected based on the rationale that they are, like Ethio-Telecom, 
state-owned monopolies that have exclusive rights to cater their respective services to the 
public. Another common characteristic these enterprises share with Ethio-Telecom is 
their low public approval in relation to the unreliable services they provide.46 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 While the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation and Water and Sewage Authority are outright state 
owned monopolies, the Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency enjoys a preferential treatment from the 
government as other electronic media options are largely kept at bay.  
 
46 In what is indicative of the poor state of the aforementioned state-owned enterprises one participant of 
the survey, in a personal email message, wrote: “I personally am highly and equally dissatisfied with all the 
government providers and I was unable to rank them” (N. Gebretsadik, personal communication, 
November 10, 2013).  
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Interestingly, even when compared to these state-owned enterprises with low public 
approval ratings, Ethio-Telecom manages to average an unflattering 3rd position with 
only the Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency getting a worse standing (Figure 16). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Comparative public rating of Ethio-Telecom to other state-owned 
enterprises. 
 
Internet Governance Policy Framework in Ethiopia 
The Ethiopian government has adopted various legal frameworks that have direct 
and indirect implications on how people shall use the Internet. Most of these laws that 
govern Internet freedoms in Ethiopia are characterized by their restrictive provisions and 
claw-back clauses. The purpose and effects of these laws are different and complex. On 
one hand, they play a proactive role by dictating what kind of activities users should and 
should not perform, and what type of content they should or should not use, process or 
produce. On the other hand, they play a more reactive, practical role of criminalizing 
alleged offenders. They provide a legal framework or façade for the government to 
prosecute individuals that are deemed to have committed an offense. Critics opine these 
laws institutionalize the Ethiopian government’s crackdown of dissidents (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014). 
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Perhaps one of the most important laws adopted by the Ethiopian government that 
has a direct bearing on users is the Telecom Fraud Offense Proclamation No. 761/2012. 
Section 9 of this controversial proclamation that attracted considerable international 
criticism provides absolute and exclusive rights to the established telecom service 
provider in Ethiopia and criminalizes whoever is establishing any telecom infrastructure 
(“Telecom Fraud Offence,” 2012).  According to the proclamation, anyone who bypasses 
the telecom service provider’s infrastructure and provides “any domestic or international 
telecom service” can be sentenced to 10-20 years in jail (“Telecom Fraud Offence,” 
2012, p. 6551). A financial fine that is ten times the revenue the infringer has potentially 
earned will complement imprisonment as well. Users of these services are also subject to 
a sentence between three months and two years in addition to a fine of US$134-
US$1,070.  
What this means is that an internet kiosk along with its users in Ethiopia, for 
example, will be charged and sentenced with this law if it is found providing services 
related to, among other things, Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) services. While the 
government claims telecom fraud “is a serious threat to the national security beyond 
economic losses,” dissidents argue it is adopted to target activists who use services like 
Skype and Google Hangouts (“Telecom Fraud Offence,” 2012, p. 6547). 
Section 4 of this law stipulates anyone who provides telecom service without a 
valid license commits an offense and shall be punishable with imprisonment of 7-15 
years plus a monetary fine. Section 5 states whosoever without the authorization of the 
service provider or lawful user, or any other competent authority obstructs or interferes 
with any telecom network, service or system; intercepts or illegally obtains access to any 
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telecom system; or intercepts, alters, destroys or otherwise damages the contents of 
telephone calls, data, identification code or any other personal information of subscribers 
commits an offense and shall be punishable with imprisonment from 10 to 15 years and 
will be fined fine from $5,500-$8,300. Section 15 of the proclamation, however, 
stipulates it is admissible to use digital or electronic evidences; evidences gathered 
through interception or surveillance; and information obtained through interception 
conducted by foreign law enforcement bodies in courts as evidences (“Telecom Fraud 
Offense,” 2012). 
Perhaps a clause that is one of the most vague and concerning in the proclamation 
under Section 6 states “whosoever uses or causes the use of any telecom network or 
apparatus to disseminate any terrorizing message connected with a crime punishable 
under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation” (“Telecom Fraud Offence,” 2012, p. 6550). For 
critics, not only does this provision migrate the offender to the highly controversial and 
obscene anti-terrorism law, but also makes him punishable under the Criminal Code 
under which a number of journalists, bloggers, and democracy activists have been 
charged and sentenced. 
The Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No.652/2009 that came into force in August 
2009 has probably been put into retributive effect more than any other legal framework 
related to communication involving electronic media. One of its provisions states 
whosoever publishes a statement “likely to be understood by some or all of the members 
of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other 
inducement to them to the commission or preparation or instigation of an act of 
terrorism” can be imprisoned for 10-20 years (“A Proclamation On,” 2009, p. 4831). The 
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proclamation empowers the state with the authority to intercept communication under 
Section, and endows the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), upon getting 
court warrant, to: intercept or conduct surveillance on the telephone, fax, radio, internet, 
electronic, postal and similar communications of a person suspected of terrorism; enter 
into any premise in secret to enforce the interception; or install or remove instruments 
enabling the interception.  
The proclamation further stipulates communication service providers are obliged 
to cooperate NISS when interception and surveillance is requested. Failure to comply can 
lead to imprisonment between three and ten years (“A Proclamation On,” 2009). Eleven 
journalists have been convicted and sentenced to date since 2011 under the Anti-
Terrorism Proclamation. Three of these journalists are currently in prison, three are 
sentenced in absentia, and the remaining two are currently on trial under the anti-
terrorism law (Human Rights Watch, 2013a).47  
This similar proclamation was invoked in December 2009 to prosecute two 
Swedish journalists, Martin Schibbye and Johan Persson, who were convicted for 
“rendering support to terrorism” and entering the country illegally “to commit an act that 
is a threat to the well-being of the people of Ethiopia” (Human Rights Watch, 2013b). 
The anti-terrorism  proclamation has received widespread criticism from rights groups 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Perhaps the most prominent victim of the anti-terrorism proclamation is Eskinder Nega Fenta, a 
journalist and blogger who received the 2012 PEN Freedom to Write Award who is sentenced to 18 years 
in prison. Reeyot Alemu Gobebo, a journalist for Feteh and winner the prestigious 2013 
UNESCO/Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize, was convicted on three counts under the terrorism 
law for her writings. Her sentence was reduced from 14 years to 5 years on appeal, and she remains in 
prison. Another convicted journalist is 2012 Hellman-Hammett Award winner Woubshet Taye Abebe, who 
is serving a 14-year sentence under the anti-terrorism law. Temesgen Desalegn, editor and writer of the 
now defunct independent magazine Feteh, is one of the journalists tried for offenses under the criminal 
code. Other journalists and media practitioners facing charges under the anti-terrorism proclamation 
include Mastewal Birhanu, Yusuf Getachew and Solomon Kebede. 
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across the world including HRW and CPJ that deem the law to be too “broad” and 
“vague” and one that blurs that difference between dissidence and terrorism (Committee 
to Protect Journalists, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2013b).48 
The Ethiopian Information and Communication Technology Development 
Authority Establishment Proclamation No. 360/2003 mandates the stated Authority to use 
ICT “in such a way that it contributes to the nation’s socio-economic development and 
the building of democracy and good governance” (“Ethiopian Information And 
Communication,” 2003, p. 2327). While the proclamation provides clauses that uphold 
support to concerned stakeholders to protect violations of social and individual 
constitutional rights that may be caused by the use of the technology and, therefore, 
sustain internet freedoms, it also empowers the Authority “to deter and offset national 
security problems that may arise from the utilization of information and communication 
technology” (“Ethiopian Information And Communication,” 2003, p. 2327). The latter 
provision clearly capacitates the state to filter and block content that it deems 
“dangerous,” or “inappropriate,” thereby curbing online freedom significantly.  
Surveillance, Censorship and Content Filtering in the Ethiopian Online Sphere 
While the problems in lack of access and quality of service constitute the 
significant chunk of public apprehension toward Ethio-Telecom, issues related to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Perhaps the most prominent victim of the anti-terrorism proclamation is Eskinder Nega Fenta, a 
journalist and blogger who received the 2012 PEN Freedom to Write Award who is sentenced to 18 years 
in prison. Reeyot Alemu Gobebo, a journalist for Feteh and winner the prestigious 2013 
UNESCO/Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize, was convicted on three counts under the terrorism 
law for her writings. Her sentence was reduced from 14 years to 5 years on appeal, and she remains in 
prison. Another convicted journalist is 2012 Hellman-Hammett Award winner Woubshet Taye Abebe, who 
is serving a 14-year sentence under the anti-terrorism law. Temesgen Desalegn, editor and writer of the 
now defunct independent magazine Feteh, is one of the journalists tried for offenses under the criminal 
code. Other journalists and media practitioners facing charges under the anti-terrorism proclamation 
include Mastewal Birhanu, Yusuf Getachew and Solomon Kebede. !
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surveillance, censorship and content filtering committed by the Ethiopian government 
have further exacerbated the distrust of users toward the state monopoly of the sector. In 
fact, respondents to the survey have identified “government control and interference” and 
“violations to privacy” as the two most important challenges facing the Internet in 
Ethiopia today next to “lack of access” (Figure 17). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Major challenges facing the Internet in Ethiopia. 
 
Reports about the Ethiopian government’s involvement in filtering of content 
have been rampant in the past few years. Some of the more detailed reports came from 
OpenNet Initiative (ONI), a joint project involving the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre 
for International Studies, University of Toronto; Berkman Center for Internet & 
Society at Harvard Law School; the Oxford Internet Institute (ONI) at University of 
Oxford; and the SecDev Group, which took over from the Advanced Network Research 
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Group at the Cambridge Security Programme, University of Cambridge. Through the use 
of a variety of technical means and an international network of investigators, ONI 
monitors and reports on Internet filtering and surveillance practices of nations, and the 
nature and extent of government-run Internet filtering programs. ONI reported that, 
between 2006 and 2007, a range of political and news-related websites were blocked, 
including opposition political sites, critical political blogs, independent Ethiopian media, 
human rights sites, and sites with content related to ethnic minorities in addition to the 
entire domain of several blogging platforms, including the international Blogspot 
(OpenNet, 2009). Another test conducted between 2008 and 2009 on Ethiopia’s then sole 
ISP provider Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) by ONI revealed that a 
number of independent Ethiopian news sites were blocked (OpenNet, 2009). ONI’s tests 
in 2012 produced an even larger list of blocked websites totaling 73 including 
independent media, critical political blogs and some foreign media outlets (OpenNet, 
2009).49 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 ONI produced a complete list of what it claimed were blocked URLs in Ethiopia ranging from critical 
political organizations like the Solidarity Committee for Ethiopian Political Prisoners 
(http://www.socepp.de/) to the websites of Oromo independence organization Oromo Liberation Front 
(http://www.oromoliberationfront.org) and Ginbot 7 (http://www.ginbot7.org). Other targets of the 
blocking consisted of a number of anonymization and circumvention tools, such as the Tor Project 
(https://www.torproject.org), Ultrasurf (http://ultrasurf.us), and Psiphon (http://psiphon.ca). Only two 
international news sites were included in the list of blocked websites, namely Al Jazeera 
(http://www.aljazeera.net) and Al Arabiya (http://www.alarabiya.net). Other prominent blocked websites 
were related to imprisoned or convicted journalists critical of the Ethiopian government. Of these, Ethio 
Media (http://ethiomedia.com), a news site contributed to by imprisoned blogger Eskinder Nega, and Addis 
Voice (http://www.addisvoice.com), founded by prominent sentenced dissident Abebe Gellaw, and 
Ethiopian Review (http://www.ethiopianreview.net), whose editor Elias Kifle was convicted in absentia for 
allegedly violating the country’s anti-terrorism laws are most notable. Addis Neger Online 
(http://addisnegeronline.com/), the site at which former weekly newspaper Addis Neger editors Mesfin 
Negash and Abiye Teklemariam (both in exile in relation to their practice of journalism) posted content 
was also reportedly blocked (OpenNet, 2009).  !
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Figure 18: General attitude toward the effects of Internet. 
 
In 2012, reports from the developers of Tor, a network of virtual tunnels designed 
to allow people and groups to improve their privacy and security on the Internet, claimed 
that the Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation has deployed or begun testing Deep 
Packet Inspection (DPI)50 of all Internet traffic (“Ethiopia Introduced Deep,” 2012). 
During the same year, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an international non-
profit digital rights group based in the United States, alleged the Ethiopian government 
practices widespread Internet filtering with the assistance of Chinese intelligence and 
infrastructure (Kaiser, 2012). Earlier in 2012, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), 
an American independent nonprofit organization that promotes press freedom and 
defends the rights of journalists, reported Elias Kifle, Reeyot Alemu and Woubshet Taye 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is a form of filtering that enables advanced network management, user 
service, and security functions as well as Internet data mining, eavesdropping, and Internet censorship. Ralf 
Bendrath writes DPI introduces “intelligence” into the routers and switches, “which allows for 
discrimination of traffic and implies the end of the end-to-end principle.” At stake is therefore our 
conception and usage of the Internet. “If broadly deployed, ISPs who use DPI could monitor, throttle, 
censor, filter, or otherwise treat all Internet traffic of their users, based on the content. This could 
potentially have a massive impact on the free flow of information and on the end-to-end principle, which is 
until today regarded a founding idea of the internet: Give the users and content providers dumb pipes, and 
they will come up with amazing ideas on how to use them, while at the same time this will keep the 
network architecture as simple and open to innovation as possible” (Bendrath, 2009, p.4). 
 
 !
7.93% 
92.07% 
The internet solves more problems than it 
creates 
The internet creates more problems than it 
solves 
! 209 
were convicted based on their writings about political dissent. Although the persecution 
of journalists by the government is common in Ethiopia, this trial was unique in the 
government prosecutors’ presentation of “evidences” that included, among other things, 
intercepted emails and phone calls between the journalists.  
A research report entitled “You Only Click Twice: FinFisher’s Global 
Proliferation” published by the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the 
University of Totonto in 2013 details the discovery of a campaign using FinFisher, 
surveillance software marketed by Gamma International, in Ethiopia used to target 
individuals linked to an opposition group. According to the report, a FinSpy campaign in 
Ethiopia uses pictures of popular figures of Ginbot 7, an Ethiopian opposition group 
based in the United States and Europe, to cheat users into migrating the virus into their 
computers and in turn ship personal data from the computers to a central server at Ethio-
Telecom. The malware “communicates with a FinSpy Command & Control server in 
Ethiopia” where “the server has been detected in every round of scanning, and remains 
operational” (Marquis-Boire et al., 2013). 
In early 2014, Citizen Lab published yet another report about the Ethiopian 
government’s use of commercial spyware that targeted political activists, human rights 
workers and journalists in the United States. The spyware employed in this operation 
“appears to have been made by Hacking Team, an Italian company with a regional sales 
office in Annapolis” whose products are capable of “stealing documents from hard 
drives, snooping on video chats, reading e-mails, snatching contact lists, and remotely 
flipping on cameras and microphones so that they can quietly spy on a computer’s 
unwitting user” (Timberg, 2014). 
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The legalization of state-sponsored surveillance through broad provisions and 
ensuing penalties that range from financial fines to short to long-term imprisonment have 
had a notable impact on the nature and extent of internet usage behavior and practices of 
Ethiopians. Recurrent reports about the Ethiopian government’s use of malicious 
malware and website blocking have also conditioned the way users conduct their 
businesses online. An overwhelming majority of participants of this study’s survey (74%) 
have some degree of awareness that their activities over the Internet are monitored while 
40% are certain that they are being spied upon (Figure 19). 
 
Do you agree with the claim that your activities over the Internet are monitored by people or 
organizations? 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 19: Public perception toward the existence of Internet monitoring. 
 
When asked about who they think is capable of monitoring their online activities, 
the majority of the respondents have identified the government as the most likely entity 
with the potential to exercise surveillance. Of particular significance here is how 
respondents rate the government higher than web page administrators in its liklihood to 
monitor their activities (Figure 20).  
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How capable do you think each of the following people or organizations are in monitoring 
your online activities? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 20: Public perception on potential Internet monitoring bodies. 
 
Although the Ethiopian government hasn’t officially admitted to its role in 
extensive monitoring of its citizens, results show the public thinks otherwise. Previous 
practices by the government in insulating information that it deemed “counterproductive” 
from the public set an important precedent here. For example, in 2010, ex-Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi has admitted to his government’s will to and endorsement of the jamming 
of the Voice of America’s (VOA) broadcasts in Amharic after several members of his 
high-ranking officials denied of the accusations. Zenawi went as far as saying how the 
government have been “trying to beef up” its capacity in dealing with the “destabilizing 
propaganda” of the VOA through techniques including jamming (Malone, 2010). 
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Similarly, after the officials’ continued denial of its online censorship involvement, 
Brigadier General Tekleberahan Weldearegay, director of the Information Network 
Security Agency (INSA), highlighted the importance of blocking online content that his 
government sees undesirable (Freedom House, 2013). For the public, the government’s 
surveillance practices are unpopular with two-thirds of respondents saying they would be 
“worried” if they know the government monitors their online and phone activities. This 
concern over state-sponsored surveillance is particularly serious when seen from the low 
level of trust the public has over the government, with 64% of respondents saying they 
only trust the government to do what is right only some of the time while 22% claimed 
they don’t trust the government as all (Figure 22). 
 
How does it make you feel if you were to know the government monitors your online and 
phone activities? 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Public attitude toward online surveillance. 
 
The perception of widespread surveillance committed by the Ethiopian 
government has an obvious impact on the behavior of Internet users in Ethiopia. Nearly 
two-thirds of respondents said they have refrained from posting content online fearing the 
risks involved (Figure 23) which they believe includes verbal abuse and intimidation; 
detention, arrest, or criminal investigation; and loss of employment or demotion (Figure 
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24). Similarly, a reasonably significant number of respondents reported they have used 
circumvention tools to access blocked contents (Figure 25). 
 
How much of the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right? 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Public attitude on government trust. 
 
 
 
Have you ever exercised self-censorship in posting content because of the risks 
involved? 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Trends in Internet self-censorship. 
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What do you think are the risks of posting material critical of the government in Ethiopia? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Risks associated with posting critical material on the government. 
 
Do you or have you ever used circumvention tools in order to access blocked content? 
 
 
 
   
Figure 25: Experiences in circumvention tools for accessing blocked content. 
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religious and social networking sites. This is in stark contrast to the online ecology 
devised by the Ethiopian state where pornographic content is accessible and admissible 
while most political websites are blocked. On a surface level, the mistrust directed toward 
the government on the latter’s interference of online information and the public’s 
recognition of the need to have a national filtering scheme seem contradictory. There is 
little contradiction, however. What this rather shows is an indication of the public’s 
realization of the importance of regulating the harmful aspects of the Internet, but the 
little confidence it has in assigning the task to a government that sees the online sphere as 
an extension of its offline political engagement. Simply put, the public endorses national 
filtering but it doesn’t want the government to do it.   
 
“There should be no restriction on accessing lawful 
content/ services via the Internet.” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Public perception toward information access/filtration on the Internet. 
 
“The ability to share and access information privately using the Internet is an 
important right.” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Public perception toward access and usage of Internet as a right. 
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“National filtering in my country is beneficial to society.” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Public perception toward national filtering of online content. 
 
 
Figure 29: Public perception in favor of/against national filtering of 
Internet in select categories. 
 
Public Perceptions vs. State Policy 
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be entrusted with the task. Only a tenth of the participants of this study’s survey 
responded favorably to trusting the state and its developmental rationale of maintaining 
monopolistic control of the telecommunication sector. In contrast, two-thirds of the 
respondents replied in favor of the liberalization of the sector while more than 80% 
believe the availability of multiple telecommunications service providers can bring about 
better quality of services and cheaper prices. In addition to service unreliability and 
delivery failures, skepticism on the monopolistic state ownership of the 
telecommunications sector is also exacerbated by trends of mass surveillance at the hands 
of the government. One in two respondents believe that state control of the 
telecommunications sector evokes surveillance of citizens by the government, thereby 
appropriating public resources to the political and economic interests of the ruling elite 
(Figure 43). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Public attitudes on the liberalization of the telecommunications sector. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter presented findings of the online survey conducted to assess public 
perceptions about state monopoly of the Ethiopian telecommunication sector. In doing so, 
it explored the relationship between state monopoly of telecommunications and service 
delivery in the Ethiopian context. The chapter also looked at effects of government 
control of the sector on surveillance, censorship and freedom of speech. 
The following chapter explores the chief actors, justifications and motives 
surrounding the deregulation vis-à-vis state monopoly of the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ACTORS AND DISPARITIES IN (DE)REGULATION DISCOURSES OF THE 
ETHIOPIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
The issue is always the same: the government or the market. There is no 
third solution (Von Mises, 1951, p. 537). 
 
The times are too difficult and the crisis too severe to indulge in 
schadenfreude. Looking at it in perspective, the fact that there would be 
a financial crisis was perfectly predictable: its general nature, if not its 
magnitude. Markets are always inefficient (Chomsky quoted in 
Steingart, 2008). 
 
Deregulation is a transfer of power from the trodden to the treading 
(Monbiot, 2010). 
 
Since the 1980s and the 1990s, state monopoly models of telecommunication are 
becoming rare across the international arena. The American experiment with telecom 
deregulation through the 1996 Telecommunications Act was probably the most 
influential factor that facilitated the deregulation of international telecommunications. As 
Shaw (2001) writes: 
Should the American economy enjoy robust economic growth and expansive 
employment, it is likely that precedent will have been established for decisive 
deregulatory experimentation elsewhere. However, should a narrow elite of 
oligopolies control market share and minimize competitive benefits while 
enhancing their own profit margins, it may well be that other nations will eschew 
such legislation and pursue a strategy of government-sponsored monopoly (p.155). 
 
The end of telecommunications privatization and competition was also quickly 
adopted by Great Britain where the state monopoly British Telecom was privatized in 
1984. The American and British experiences were repeated, in different ways, by other 
countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, although the nature, motivation and 
arrangements of the deregulation process were different in each situation. As Katz and 
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Darbishire (2000) assert: “countries differ in the extent to which they are open to 
international competition and the extent to which international competition emerged as a 
new source of pressure” (p. 4). Therefore, although strongly conditioned by technological 
revolution, the path followed by each country for opening up services to competition and 
globalization was also influenced by social, political and economic factors. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized power, the issue of telecommunications liberalization 
has been an ongoing theme involving different actors internally and externally. In many 
instances, leading officials of the EPRDF have ruled out the privatization of Ethio-
Telecom, the only state-owned telecommunications provider for Ethiopia’s 83 million 
people. Amidst continuous attempts of coercion and cooption by IMF for the sector to be 
liberalized, EPRDF claims to remain unfazed by repercussions of cuts in loans and aids.  
The aim of this chapter principally is to address the question: What are the 
underlying reasons behind the differences in telecom liberalization policies between the 
IMF and the Ethiopian state? In doing so, it explores the motives, extent and rationale of 
the external (IMF, WTO) and internal (general public, private sector) push for telecom 
liberalization in Ethiopia. In doing so, it will also explore and assess the political and 
economic rationales projected by Ethiopia’s ruling party in the past two decades for 
strengthening the government’s tight grip of the sector and refusing to consider 
deregulation and competition.  
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Putting the Tense IMF-Ethiopia Relationship into Context 
One of the most difficult aspects that makes understanding development discourse 
originating from FDRE presently lies in the duality of EPRDF’s proposition on what 
makes a sound economic policy. Many argue that such duality of economic policy by the 
ruling party is manifested, on one hand, by its association to the ideals of free market, and 
on the other hand, by its strong grip on areas that it identified as “critical” to economic 
development like the financial sector, aviation, power and electricity, and, more 
importantly, telecommunications51. Discourses that resonate with the latter have been 
prevalent in EPRDF’s vigorous resistance to IMF’s deregulation recommendations as 
evidenced by the IMF’s criticism of, among other things, EPRDF’s five-year Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP). 
In fact, so adamant is the EPRDF about its interventionist policy that it has now 
transformed its strategy from defensive to offensive. Meles Zenawi, chief architect of 
EPRDF’s economic program, had reiterated in many instances about his belief that neo-
liberalism’s relegation of the role of the state to mere spectatorship levels is 
fundamentally flawed and keeps developing economies in a constant cycle of poverty. 
Gill (2010) offers an interesting insight on the ideological contention between the 
Ethiopian state and the IMF. At one point, the series of disputes between the Ethiopian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 In an editorial entitled “Ideology Impedes Business” (December 30, 2012) the weekly Ethiopian 
newspaper Addis Fortune attributes such dichotomous duality as a custom quintessentially embedded in the 
Ethiopian social fabric. It proposes EPRDF’s evolution to embrace markets as an ostensibly exterior 
projection while it continues to exert strong state-led economy: “Prime Minister Meles Zenawi proved to be 
much more flexible and pragmatic than most early observers would have guessed. Faced with the 
contradictions between the expectations of the West and his Marxist ideology, he came up with an 
eminently Ethiopian solution; embrace the Western model of markets and democracy on the surface whilst 
rethinking and adjusting the true ideology underneath.” Coherent with ‘Wax and Gold’, the long highland 
Ethiopian tradition of saying one thing on the surface, whilst meaning something completely different 
underneath (see Levine 1965), “the state and party system could be organized along a similar principal; 
with official positions often held by powerless figureheads to fill the ethnic quotas, whilst the real power 
often lay with relatively minor state officials, who were powerful within the party.” 
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state and IMF reaches so confrontational that the latter suspended 88 million Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs) to Ethiopia and officially communicated the suspension to the 
World Bank and other donors that “Ethiopia was an unreliable partner, a bad bet” (Gill, 
2010, p. 82).52 In summarizing the “ideological chasm” between the government of 
Meles Zenawi and the IMF, Gill writes: 
One side favoured opening up Ethiopia’s financial markets to western competition; 
allowing foreign exchange and interest rates to float free; and privatizing industry 
and the utility companies. The other side favoured only cautious moves into the 
marketplace; only modest relaxation of government control over the economic 
levers of power; and only partial privatization (Gill, 2010, p. 83). 
 
The 1990s were particularly marked by an array of confrontations between the 
IMF and the Ethiopian state. The Ethiopian resistance to adjust the economy along free 
market lines was becoming clear. The government of Meles Zenawi was resolute in 
rejecting neo-liberal prescriptions. It rejected the IMF’s opposition to Ethiopia’s early 
repayment of foreign bank loans and disagreed on the IMF’s position that Ethiopia was 
relying more on foreign aid than on taxes. The IMF also wanted Ethiopia to float its 
currency to which the Ethiopian government disagreed by suggesting such action would 
cause “‘a vicious circle’ of inflation, depreciation, and devaluation” (Gill, 2010, p. 85). 
At one point, the IMF fought to the last moment to prevent Ethiopia’s entry into the debt 
relief scheme of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), an initiative set up by the IMF 
and the World Bank in response to a popular tide of western objections to the burden of 
debt in the Third World. 
In the end, Meles’s government was able to maintain its rejection of the IMF’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 SDRs are supplementary foreign exchange reserve assets defined and maintained by the International 
Monetary Fund. According to the IMF, the SDR is “neither a currency, nor a claim on the IMF. Rather, it is 
a potential claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF members. (International Monetary Fund, 2014). !
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prescriptions that were consistent with the principles of market fundamentalism partly 
because of its move to successfully align the World Bank along its propositions. Of 
particular importance was the role played by Professor Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the 
2001 Nobel Prize for economics and then chief economist at the World Bank; Stiglitz 
unapologetically spelled out the deficiencies of market fundamentalism and essentially 
discredited the policies of the IMF in his most popular book, Globalization and its 
Discontents. In his chapter entitled, “Broken Promises,” Stiglitz (2002) details what he 
calls “the astonishing world of IMF politics and arithmetic” (p. 25) in his treatise of the 
strained relationship between the IMF and the Ethiopian state. Stiglitz points out that the 
IMF is particularly concerned about inflation, an aspect of macroeconomics that “is not 
so much an end in itself, but a means to an end” (p. 27). The IMF, Stiglitz continues, 
“often seems to confuse means with ends, thereby losing sight of what is ultimately of 
concern” (p. 27). He argues that although Ethiopia did extremely well in macroeconomic 
measures, the IMF showed little interest in these figures: 
Not only did Ethiopia have a sound macroeconomic framework but the World Bank 
had direct evidence of the competence of the government and its commitment to the 
poor. Ethiopia had formulated a rural development strategy, focusing its attention on 
the poor, and especially the 85 percent of the population living in the rural sector. It 
had dramatically cut back on military expenditures—remarkable for a government 
which had come to power through military means—because it knew that funds spent 
on weapons were funds that could not be spent on fighting poverty. Surely, this was 
precisely the kind of government to which the international community should have 
been giving assistance. But the IMF had suspended its program with Ethiopia, in 
spite of the good macroeconomic performance, saying it was worried about 
Ethiopia’s budgetary position (p. 28). 
 
Stiglitz contends that, even though Ethiopia devised a sensible and working 
macroeconomic policy, the IMF was operating under the conviction that “countries 
receiving money from it had an obligation to report everything that might be germane” 
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(p. 30) regardless of how immaculate their approach may be. He further notes that the 
IMF had a tradition of suspending programs on grounds of such noncompliance. “To 
Ethiopia, such intrusiveness smacked of a new form of colonialism; to the IMF, it was 
just standard operating procedure” (p. 30).  
The dispute between the Ethiopian government and the IMF was probably most 
evident in the Fund’s 2005 Ethiopia country report (International Monetary Fund, 2005), 
where the Ethiopian authorities used strong language to defend their development 
policies and critique the IMF’s ideological determinism and “lack of new thinking.” They 
accuse the Fund of still applying the “old paradigm” of the “Washington consensus.” The 
Ethiopian authorities also denounced the Fund’s singular representation of its views that 
attempts to apply similar narratives to different contexts and challenges. The differences 
in policy “should be presented as being based on the results of their own concrete 
analysis and developmental strategy rather than due to an inherent gradualist approach or 
suspicion of markets” (International Monetary Fund, 2005, p. 57).  
The government of Meles has since grew bolder in its dismissal of notions such as 
market fundamentalism, small government, and the entire construct of neo-liberalism. A 
2011 EPRDF publication written in Amharic and widely rumored to be written by Meles 
Zenawi himself entitled “YäTähad!sow Mäsmär!na YäItyop’ya H!dase” (“The Reform’s 
Path and Ethiopia’s Renaissance”) provides a detailed criticism of neo-liberalism and 
commentary on Ethiopia as a “developmental state.”  It unapologetically singles out neo-
liberalism as one of the most important factors that sabotaged the prospect of African 
development:  
From its very beginning, neolibealism hardly delivered growth and development but 
rather exacerbated economic crisis, reinforced Africa’s economic dependency, and 
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diminished Africa’s hopes of industrial development and structural transformation 
(“YäTähad!sow Mäsmär!na,” 2011, p. 15).53 
 
One of the specific attacks of EPRDF on neo-liberalism and its adherents is 
related to the role of the government and the extent to which it involves in certain aspects 
of development ventures. It vehemently rejects the notion that big governments are 
doomed to be preditory and rent seeking, and underlines the fallacy in the generic 
treatment of all interventionist states as neopatrimonial or clientalist: 
Because it is inconceivable for neolibealism to correctly identify the fundamental 
source of the preeminence of rent seeking political economy, it is impossible for it to 
correcly propose a remedy. What neo-liberalism has proposed as a remedy is to 
shrink big government to small government and limiting the role  of government to 
principally be that of a law-enforcing body. This proposition is fundamentally 
flawed and stalemated (“Yä Tähad!sow Mäsmär!na,” 2011, p. 17).  
 
EPRDF believes that because neo-liberalism is opposed to the notion of state 
intervention in its entirety, it is not disposed to consider the alternative of a limited level 
of intervention even if the state is to change its behavior in fundamental ways. For 
EPRDF, foreign inetervention doesn’t provide a sustainable platform on which 
democratization and development processes in Africa can thrive. EPRDF dismisses 
African democracies influenced by foreign aid conditionalities as weak states that sold 
their poltical and economic self-determination for external interests. In this sense, 
EPRDF is propagating that the external push for democracy in Africa is not based on a 
genuine interest in democratic reform but rather a misguided track that spreads rent-
seeking practices. According to this proposition, external neo-liberal policy pushes are 
the sources of the rent-seeking political economy, not the remedies of it: 
The democracies that neo-liberalism carved out in Africa respirate with foreign 
caretaker lungs. The parties receive their orders from foreign caretakers; if they 
refuse assistance will stop and they are doomed to wither. The countless NGOs in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 For original Amharic text, refer to Appendix J. 
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these countries multiply rent seeking nets and make the politics waltz with foreign 
tunes (“YäTähad!sow Mäsmär!na,” 2011, p. 75).    
 
For EPRDF, the enduring alternative to the “flawed” neoiberal logic is that of the 
developmental state, a state in which development is treated by everyone as an affair that 
precedes any other priority and one that should be treated as as a matter of survival. For 
this reason, EPRDF believes it is imperative that the lifestyle, thinking and culture of 
each citizen has to be wired to a unitary primacy of developmentalism. This is only 
possible when such a direction, EPRDF proclaims, is owned by and aligned with the 
thinking and culture of the general polity. Otherwise it is inevitable that the people 
demand for and bring about change in due course. EPRDF believes Ethiopia today fullfils 
what it calls the three fundamental pillars of a developmental state, namely, the 
determination to view development as a question of survival, political and economic 
independence from the private sector, and forming the hegemony of developmental state 
ideology. As a result, because the developmental state is not externally motivated and is 
self-sufficient in Ethiopia, it will eventually bring about democratic governance that is 
strong and sustainable, unlike the ephemeral targets of neo-liberalist trajectories that are 
based on weak foundations:54 
While neo-liberalism makes African democracy quintessentially non-democratic 
and one without an opportunity to sustainable growth by subsuming it into an 
entire external caretaker arrangemet, developmental states create an infinite 
opportunity for opportunities of development and advanced democracy through 
internal development and transformation capacities. As a result, neo-liberalism, 
beyond merely declaring democracy can be created in poor countries, projects a 
catastrophic, deadlocked path of democratic system building that falls miserbly 
short even when compared to states that started as anti-democratic (“Yä 
Tähad!sow Mäsmär!na,” 2011, p. 65).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 EPRDF recognizes that the first few years of the developmental state will be challenged. 
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Because of its rejection of neo-liberalism, EPRDF believes it is being penalized 
by agents of the doctrine like the IMF in different ways, most significantly through some 
kind of cuts or entire denials of loans and grants. The way EPRDF has seen it, Western 
international financial institutions’ conditionalities were aimed at bringing about the 
submission of the Ethiopian state to neo-liberal “modalities.” The strategy made sense 
because a significant chunck of FDRE’s annual budget relies on foreign assistance. 
EPRDF also considered that the IMF and its associates were under the impression that the 
neo-liberal push for reform would prevail in Ethiopia as it did in the rest of Africa: 
From the beginning our party has relied on the support of the people and never on 
external assistance, thus following a fundamentally different direction from that 
of neo-liberalism. Today it is carrying out its developmental and democratic 
objectives successfully. Even when its adherence to a different course resulted in 
cuts in assistance and loans or when it receives aid that is less than half what other 
African countries get individually on average, it is marching suceessfully, 
determined with the course it paved. Inspite of the relentless campaign of radical 
neo-liberals from all directions, it [EPRDF] has prevailed, resisting such an 
offensive (“Yä Tähad!sow Mäsmär!na,” 2011, p. 75). 
 
Today, the confrontational exchanges between the IMF and the authorities in 
Addis have significantly subsided. This is not, however, a marked manifestation of 
mutual accord. It is rather an indication of recognition on the part of the IMF that the 
notion of a unitary path of economic development is no longer a viable option in 
engaging with countries like Ethiopia that consider themselves as “developmental states” 
and that give a significant credence to the idea of “big government,” or one that sees 
itself as an essential, active and inherently interventionist actor in economic development. 
With the increasing availability of alternative financial sources, it is plausible for the IMF 
and its associates to be mindful of the danger of pushing developing countries like 
Ethiopia to the periphery. Consequently, IMF’s critical modus operandi to the Ethiopian 
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state’s development path is not based on complete rejection of ideology per se, but rather 
on specific policies and methods within EPRDF’s broader “developmental state” 
ideology enclave. Jan Mikkelsen, Resident Representative of the IMF in Addis Ababa, is 
clear about this changing approach of engagement: 
I think where we stand today is that we as the IMF recognize that there are 
different models that work in different places and there is not only one model that 
works for all countries…In terms of relationship with Ethiopia, we recognize that 
there is a developmental state model and we have tried to find ways to provide 
recommendations to make some policy adjustments but still keeping the 
fundamental pillars of that model (J. Mikkelsen, personal communication, 
December 5, 2013). 
 
While the IMF seems to recognize the ideological autonomy of the Ethiopian state 
presently, certain critical themes prevail in recent exchanges between the two parties, 
particularly in relation to the operationalization of EPRDF’s Growth and Transformation 
Plan (GTP). One area about which the IMF grows increasingly critical is the “ambitious” 
GTP projects the Ethiopian government is undertaking and the large sum of financial 
demands that are involved. While Ethiopia’s public sector led developmental strategy 
“has delivered robust growth and rising standards of living,” an assessment on the 
execution of the first two years of the GTP, according to the IMF, indicates that “the 
required external financing is not materializing, and the investment drive in the priority 
projects through directed domestic credit is squeezing the availability of credit and 
foreign exchange for the rest of the economy” (International Monetary Fund, 2013, p. 
5).55 For Mikkelsen, the problem with this policy is that it is not sustainable and won’t 
allow the private sector to thrive: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 The dam is estimated by the authorities to cost 10% of 2012/13 GDP and is intended to be entirely 
financed domestically. !
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We recognize and have agreed in the past that the public sector is playing a major 
role in the economy...But we are also concerned about the sustainability of it...The 
government of Ethiopia argues that the state’s involvement in many sectors—not 
only in infrastructure but in productive industries like sugar, fertilizer, and so 
on—is something that is necessary because the private sector is not able to 
deliver, and the only solution is for the public sector to do it. We feel that the 
capacity and the financing available for the public sector can be a problem. There 
are efficiency issues as well. So what we have argued is that while we recognize 
the public sector should play a major role in in infrastructure, energy, roads, 
education and health where the government and the state have a comparative 
advantage to do well, there may be other sectors where the private sector could do 
more in terms of bringing knowhow and financing like telecom, metal industries 
and so falls (J. Mikkelsen, personal communication, December 5, 2013).  
 
The GTP’s proposed structural transformation of the country that involves large-
scale investments in housing, roads, railroads, hydro-electric generation plants, 
telecommunications infrastructure, sugar factories and other projects require enormous 
financing. According to the World Bank, disbursements of external borrowing are 
projected to average US$2.3 billion (7! percent of GDP) annually over the GTP period, 
of which about US$500 million would be nonconcessional over the next three years and 
US$585 million on average over the medium-term (World Bank, 2011). The IMF has 
reiterated the “ambitious” schemes of the GTP and is adamant about its “unsustainable” 
financing scheme that the IMF says may end up putting the rest of the economy into a 
significant distress. While the detailed financing of the GTP hasn’t been specifically 
spelled out, it is quite evident that the Ethiopian government planned to collect a 
significant chunk of funding from local banks. The IMF warns that this expansion of 
domestic credit to public entities not only constrains the availability of credit and foreign 
exchange for the private sector but also leads to a large accumulation of public debt. 
The financing requirements of the GTP are huge. They amount to about 50% of 
GDP per year. It is a substantial amount of financing. About half of the GTP is 
most likely to financed externally and the other half is planned to be financed 
domestically. That creates a lot of problems for the domestic economy since there 
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is not enough domestic financial resources available. That puts a lot of pressure 
on the banking system, and particularly on the state owned banks. It creates risks 
related to the unavailability of financing for the rest of the economy. It unbalances 
the macro-economy where there are certain sectors that have been experiencing 
difficulties to develop while certain other sectors like energy and sugar are doing 
better. What we have said is you should try to rebalance this so that it becomes 
more a development process where both the private and public sector are 
developing in line with each other and comfortable with each other. So our 
recommendation has been, in the event that external financing is not available, it’s 
probably advisable to try to spread out this big investment program over a slightly 
longer period of time. This will make it sustainable and it will make sure that 
different sectors have the opportunity to have some resources so that they can 
develop at the same time (J. Mikkelsen, personal communication, December 5, 
2013). 
 
IMF’s Deregulation Logic for the Ethiopian Telecommunications Sector 
The IMF has been one of the most vocal proponents of telecommunication 
liberalization in Ethiopia. Since EPRDF’s rise to power a little over two decades ago, 
IMF’s recommendations for the liberalization of the Ethiopian telecom sector have been 
ubiquitous in many of its Ethiopia Country Reports, Article IV Consultations and Staff 
Appraisal Reports (International Monetary Fund, 2002; 2004; 2005). In spite of these 
recommendations, the Ethiopian government remained apathetic to the Fund’s aggressive 
privatization approach. Based on comments from the Minister of Communication and 
Information Technology of the FDRE, it is safe to say that both the IMF and the 
Ethiopian government have reached a resolution where they, to use the old cliché, agreed 
to disagree: 
In principle, we do not get funding from them [the West] anymore for 
telecommunications infrastructure development. It is zero. There is hardly any 
push in this area now since they finally came to understand our unwavering 
position. The $200-300 million we probably can get from financial loans with 
conditional arrangements may seem attractive temporarily. This is inconsistent 
with our development model and is therefore unacceptable. We will not get into a 
deal that will compromise our long-term interest (D. Gebremichael, personal 
communication, December 12, 2013). 
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One of the recurring arguments set forth by the IMF is based on how an efficient 
telecommunications sector can trigger a domino effect not only in the information 
communication technology industry but also in all other sectors that are now highly 
integrated with information communication technologies. Mikkelsen opines that the 
Ethiopian economy is losing from the current arrangement of Ethio-Telecom’s state 
monopoly. He singles out the private sector to be most affected by the lack of quality and 
the inefficiency of Ethio-Telecom’s services that fail to deliver basic financial 
transactions. While lauding the country’s ambitious development agenda, Mikkelsen is 
wary of the shortcomings of the telecommunication sector in negatively affecting the 
critical role the private sector could play in meeting economic development goals and the 
potential failure to attract foreign direct investment that brings knowhow and financing 
with it. 
[If we agree on the decisiveness of the private sector in the growth of the 
Ethiopian economy], there are a number of sectors that need to be performing 
well because these are things investors, both domestic and local, look for. That 
includes good IT services and access and logistics to financial services. Since 
there have been shortcomings in terms of delivering high quality telecom services 
in Ethiopia, it has been discussed that there needs to be some improvement in 
overall IT services in the country.  And that applies both to access to the Internet 
and mobile services and so on (J. Mikkelsen, personal communication, December 
5, 2013). 
 
There is an understanding within the IMF camp that the Ethiopian government 
recognizes the inefficiency and incompetence of the Ethiopian telecommunications 
sector. The government’s direction of addressing the problems affecting the 
telecommunication sector both at quality and capacity levels remains outside a 
privatization framework. This includes contracting and/or outsourcing infrastructure 
development and institutional management to foreign companies. The Chinese have 
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particularly been active not only in infrastructure development and implementing the 
operation but also in supplying the financial requirements of Ethio-Telecom’s expansion 
project. According to Mikkelsen, the IMF sees this as a positive move where the sector 
“is still interesting enough for certain international companies” like the Chinese who can 
provide “knowhow, financing and supply at the same time” (J. Mikkelsen, personal 
communication, December 5, 2013). Nevertheless, it seems there is little doubt in the 
IMF caucus that the ultimate solution to the Ethiopian telecommunication sector 
predicament lies in liberalization. As Mikkelsen points out, liberalizing the telecom 
sector in some capacity doesn’t necessarily mean privatizing the state-monopoly of 
Ethio-Telecom, which is a proposition the Ethiopian government doesn’t want to listen 
to: 
[A more sustainable solution is] trying to open up the telecom sector to other 
operators. We are not necessarily saying privatize the state-owned monopoly but 
one possibility would be to open up the sector for other mobile phone and IT 
operators to operate in the sector by selling licenses. And the government would 
earn quite a substantial amount of money by selling licenses since Ethiopia is a 
fairly new untapped market and a big country as well. That will be a big 
opportunity to get some financing that can be used to implement other programs 
in Ethiopia in health, education, infrastructure while at the same time improving 
IT which in turn will improve other sectors and foreign direct investment (J. 
Mikkelsen, personal communication, December 5, 2013).  
 
Although the IMF is less insistent on the privatization of Ethio-Telecom, this, 
according to Mikkelsen, doesn’t necessarily reflect a shift in the Fund’s recommendation 
in how Ethiopia’s telecommunications sector should be restructured. Rather, it 
demonstrates a desire to engage with the Ethiopian government in the framework it 
designed. In fact, there is little doubt in Mikkelsen’s mind that privatization would 
substantially resolve Ethio-Telecom’s woes: 
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If you ask me about privatization, there is no doubt that it will improve the sector. 
Across the world, privatization of telecom has been explosive including in many 
countries that had state owned telecom providers. There is a demand for telecom 
technology, which is why there is an interest for the private sector. And the 
private sector has a lot of experience and a lot of money to invest particularly in 
Africa. So my personal view is that this is an obvious opportunity to privatize and 
that would generate a better service (J. Mikkelsen, personal communication, 
December 5, 2013). 
 
Nonetheless, the IMF concedes that privatization is not at the horizon for now. 
IMF officials speak about some “nervousness” in the Ethiopian government when it 
comes to liberalizing the telecom sector or privatizing Ethio-Telecom. The IMF is quite 
aware of the Ethiopian government’s position of seeing the telecom sector as a “cash 
cow” that is too lucrative to let go. While there is an understanding that the service 
probably needs to improve, the position of the Ethiopian government remains 
uncompromised as it seeks to invest in the sector further within the state monopoly 
framework. Regardless, the “cash cow” logic that has been reiterated in the past few 
years by Ethiopian government officials remains unconvincing and unsustainable for 
Mikkelsen and the IMF: 
Of course telecom is an important sector in terms of control and that may be part 
of the [Ethiopian government’s] argument. The thing with the cash cow argument 
is there are other ways you can generate cash and at the same time be more 
efficient about it. For example, if you sell licenses or if you privatize the state 
monopoly, you can get a whole lot of money. You will get one or two providers 
here that will compete and be more efficient. So you are getting money—that 
again supports the rest of the economy—while becoming efficient at the same 
time. But of course there is some government regulation and control still in place 
in privatization (J. Mikkelsen, personal communication, December 5, 2013). 
 
The IMF has previously expressed its concern that state monopoly of the 
telecommunications sector could potentially add stress to local borrowing. Because other 
public enterprises like the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation and Ethiopian Airlines 
have also been engaged in local borrowing, the IMF has repeatedly warned against 
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commercial loans to public enterprises that could dry up financial resources for the 
private sector (International Monetary Fund, 2006; 2007; 2009).  
The Domestic Push for Telecom Liberalization 
While EPRDF might have “tamed” or even “kept at bay” IMF’s aggressive free 
market “recommendations,” the latter has had its major share of sway in molding the 
texture of discourses in the liberalization of the Ethiopian telecommunications sector and 
the privatization of Ethio-Telecom. Recently, however, the more vocal force in favor of 
liberalization has been more domestic than foreign. Three groups have particularly been 
vocal in this domestic camp, namely the public, the media, and the private sector.  The 
public, particularly the urban mass, has shown profound levels of dissatisfaction in the 
services of telecom services in Ethiopia and showed a strong inclination in favor of 
liberalization as an ultimate solution to the poor quality of the sector (see Chapter VI). 
The press, particularly the private press, has for some time been vocal about the 
need for opening up the service sector for foreign investment. A central argument for this 
proposition is the need to account for the permissive behavior of local enterprises that 
have operated in sub-standard levels severely impeding quality and accessibility of 
service. In an editorial entitled “Open, Competitive Service Sector Essential for 
Sustainable Growth” (2013) Addis Fortune weighed in on the cost of protectionism and 
the opportunities in competition: 
Having an open and competitive regime would unleash the innovating and 
enterprising potential of citizens. This would eventually enhance the productive 
capacity of the economy and take it through the coming phases of development. 
Apparently, more people could benefit from growth that is achieved through their 
own participation…Opening the service sector up to foreign players would also 
enhance the rate in adoption of advanced production technologies, management 
approaches, marketing strategies and customer care services. It would also 
significantly reduce production costs and boost service quality. 
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Under this proposition, state protectionism under the guise of empowering the 
domestic private sector and incapacitating state owned enterprises has resulted in utter 
inefficiency and stagnation: 
Typical of the existing service sector is widespread protectionism. All the major 
sectors of the economy; from finance to telecommunications and from tourism to 
transportation, live under the guardianship of the state. Preferential investment 
laws, tax regimes, indirect incentives and tariffs continue to exclude them from 
the dynamics of competition. It all seems to have created a widespread comfort 
zone for local businesses (“Open, Competitive Service,” 2013). 
 
Let foreign companies into the banking sector; even the telecommunications 
‘sacred cow’ should be opened up. Ethiopian businesses will rise with the tide. 
Stop the incessant, “we are not ready yet, we are not ready yet.” Be, at least, as 
brave as China! (“Reform, reform, reform,” 2013). 
 
While EPRDF’s protectionist policy toward sectors such as banking, 
telecommunications and aviation has been justified by former Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi as an important step to bring about capacity and competitiveness both to private 
and public enterprises, it is dubious whether this was to be a permanent policy or a 
strategic direction—as Meles claimed—to give time to the state and businesses to “catch 
up” with global standards before opening up. For some commentators, the death of Meles 
in 2012 has left a chasm in EPRDF’s leadership in correctly interpreting and executing 
the purpose of protectionism and “big government”: 
The ruling party will soon be at crossroads. The high targets set in the Growth & 
Transformation Plan (GTP) are unlikely to be met. The focus on the public sector 
means that infrastructure will be built, but unless there is a strong and flourishing 
private sector too, the use of that infrastructure will not be maximized. To obtain 
‘Chinese rates’ of economic growth on a sustainable basis, not only does one need 
infrastructure, but too there is a need for an unleashed public sector. This was the 
direction that Meles was heading in, against all of the traditional and ideological 
anti-business attitudes surrounding him. This is the direction that [Prime Minister] 
Hailemariam needs to take; the next logical step from Meles…If the ruling party 
interprets the legacy of Meles as one of ‘restricting and hobbling’ the private 
sector, the economy will falter. If they interpret it, rather, as movement towards 
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greater freedom and support for the private sector, then the long-term growth 
rates, achieved by China, are also possible here (“Reform, reform, reform,” 2013). 
 
It is important to point out that, although increasingly becoming controversial 
between those in favor of it in the EPRDF camp and the general public (and particularly 
the private sector), the logic of protectionism has some strategic support and endorsement 
from the latter. For example, local private banks are profitable from this arrangement 
because they do not have to face competition from foreign banks, which are not allowed 
to operate in Ethiopia. When it comes to EPRDF’s seemingly unwavering position in 
maintaining the state monopoly model of the Ethiopian telecommunication sector, 
however, the rejection from the general public, the private sector and the media is nearly 
unanimous. Even if one may be so inclined to sympathize with EPRDF’s ideological 
logic for state monopoly of the telecommunications sector, the chaotic, utterly abysmal 
services of Ethio-Telecom are so profound that anything less than liberalization is 
doomed to be considered lethargic and defunct:    
At stake is, then, the future of the nation and its people. And the only way out to 
make the future prospective is to liberalise [sic] the sector. Liberalizing the sector 
would bring the essential ingredients of competition within the system. It would 
infuse an inherent systematic incentive that could promote innovation and flexibility. 
Such a system would also bring change to the workings of the regulators as it would 
dismantle the structural causes of passivity and complacency. By diversifying 
interests, it would incubate responsibility and transparency. A similar incentive for 
regulatory innovation would also be realized with liberalisation [sic]. These changes 
would benefit the consumer a lot. Competition would certainly reduce cost and 
enhance service quality by initiating innovation. It would also drain inefficiency, 
promote introduction of new services, accelerate outreach, and expand market size. 
Sitting at the heart of all these changes would be the very forces of economies of 
scale. All indications are that it is time to change the track of the sector for better. 
And the right track, if seen from the prism of reality, is liberalisation [sic]  (“Piling 
Telecom Problems,” 2012).  
 
A journalist for The Reporter also comments: 
! 237 
The telecommunication sector is highly monopolized, with Ethiopian Telecom (ET) 
and ETV the sole providers of mobile services and television respectively. With this 
monopoly comes a great deal of government control, poor services and poor 
accountability…If Barclays Bank and Safaricom expanded into Ethiopia along with 
their tried and tested services, wouldn’t ET improve its bad network, high charges 
and low bandwidth internet? Wouldn’t the customer care services improve? 
Wouldn’t ET introduce new services like Mobile Money to compete with 
Safaricom?56 And how many jobs would Safaricom create as a result of its entry into 
Ethiopia? Wouldn’t the tax base increase as a result of direct taxes paid by 
Safaricom, Barclays Bank and all their employees? If you answered these questions 
correctly, then trust me, their profit repatriation will be the least of your concerns 
(Nsubuga, 2013). 
 
In addition to the media, the private sector in Ethiopia has actively lobbied for the 
liberalization of the telecommunications sector. In a comprehensive research report 
entitled “The Impact of Telecommunications Services in Doing Business in Ethiopia,” 
the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectorial Associations criticized the poor 
quality of fixed, mobile, national, and international services and poor broadband ADSL 
and wireless Internet facilities, among other things, of the incumbent operator. In the 
view of the private sector, the operator “must adjust the telecommunication services to 
market expectations” in the short term (Baron, 2010, p. 71). A more sustainable and 
“pragmatic” solution would be for the government to “create conditions to encourage a 
reduction in the price of services, especially in the broad- band sector, either by 
liberalizing the activity within the public sector (as in Vietnam) or through Public-Private 
Partnerships” (Baron, 2010, pp. 71,73). While the push for liberalization is widely upheld 
by the private sector, the interest in some of the strongest associations of local private 
investors like the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce & Sectorial Associations (ECCSA) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Safaricom, a mobile network operator in Kenya, is one of the success stories of foreign investment in 
East Africa. It has revenue of $1.25 billion and employs over 3000 workers directly and over 500,000 
indirectly as mobile money agents. It is managed by the British company Vodafone, which has a 40 percent 
stake, with the Kenyan treasury owning 35 percent, and is known all over the world for revolutionizing 
Mobile Money services. Such kind of success wouldn’t have happened was it not for the favorable foreign 
investment policies.  
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for the liberalization of the telecommunication sector is not necessarily to partake in the 
ownership of it; but rather, the intention is to benefit from projected efficacy that would 
come with global telecommunications operators: 
ECCSA considers strongly that it is in the interest of Ethiopian businesses and 
consumers to open up the telecommunications sector, as the quality and reliability 
of services currently provided are inadequate and a source of many complaints. 
Recognizing that basic telecommunications, as well as coordinates and backbone, 
are restricted to state provision through Ethio-Telecom, ECCSA suggests that 
consideration should be given to how this sector will eventually be opened to 
foreign suppliers, albeit under joint venture arrangements (Ethiopian Chamber of 
Commerce, 2013, p. 5). 
 
In addition to seeing an efficient and vibrant ICT-assisted business environment, 
the private sector is also keen to see the liberalization of the telecommunications sector in 
the hope of expediting Ethiopia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Ethiopia started its WTO accession application in 2003 and submitted a Memorandum of 
Foreign Trade Regime to the WTO Secretariat in December 2006. Between 2006 and 
2012, a series of exchanges were made between the two parties. Ethiopia held its first 
working party meeting in May 2008 and submitted its goods market access offer in 
February 2012.  
The optimism on the part of the Ethiopian government in joining the WTO while 
maintaining its grip on state owned enterprises like the telecom sector is related to the 
former’s conviction that the WTO has lowered the bar for the world’s least developed 
countries to join the organization by agreeing to new membership standards. This is 
probably not a correct interpretation of WTO proceedings by the Ethiopian officials. 
Josefita Pardo de León, Secretary of the Working Party on the Accession of Ethiopia and 
Legal Affairs Officer at the Accessions Division of the World Trade Organization, asserts 
that the 2002 LDCs’ Accessions Guidelines and an Addendum from 2012 to which 
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Ethiopian officials may be referring do not offer a unique package for a separate 
treatment of LDCs like Ethiopia and that the original Uruguay Round Agreements still 
form the backbone guidelines for accession processes: 
Accession to the WTO focuses on ensuring compliance of the trade regime of the 
acceding government with the disciplines contained in the Uruguay Round 
Agreements.  It will remain like this until new/updated agreements are reached by 
Members.  With regard to LDCs, WTO Members agreed on the “2002 LDCs’ 
Accessions Guidelines” and an Addendum in 2012.  None of these documents 
alters the substance of WTO Agreements or the accession process itself (J. Pardo 
de León, personal communication, August 27, 2013).     
 
It is also important to note that the Ethiopian accession to the WTO is at a very 
early stage. As far as the official proceedings of Ethiopia’s accession is concerned, Pardo 
de León confirmed, “There has been no discussion on the telecom sector in the Working 
Party, as Ethiopia has not yet presented its initial offer on market access for services.” 
The Ethiopian government’s hope in joining the WTO is not a de facto no in the absence 
of a commitment to liberalize its services sectors, as “many WTO Members actually do 
have State-trading Enterprises” and that “accession commitments in any area are the 
result of negotiations” (J. Pardo de León, personal communication, August 27, 2013). 
For now, despite Ethiopian government officials’ hope to realize WTO accession 
by 2014 or 2015 at the latest, all indications are this is a far-stretched proposition. For 
example, ECCSA is of the opinion that the likelihood of requests from other WTO 
members regarding the liberalization of the telecommunications sector is “high.” This has 
proven to be a correct assessment as some key members of the WTO have since 
expressed their views about the need for Ethiopia to open its telecommunications sector if 
it is serious about joining the elite group of global trade.57 Although WTO accession is a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Canada, the U.S., and some European states are among the countries that posed a series of questions on 
the goods offerings of Ethiopia. As well, the Republic of South Korea leveled some 168 questions at 
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target of the GTP, it is unlikely that the EPRDF-led government will prioritize sectors such 
as telecom, finance and energy before 2015.  
EPRDF’s Defense 
Telecommunications as Universal Service 
The concept of universal service originally represented the idea of connecting 
every household to the telephone network. Today, the platform has grown to incorporate 
other information and communication technologies including voice, television, radio, fax, 
data, etc. At the core of the thinking behind universal service is the availability and 
accessibility of communication technologies to customers at access points. Universal 
service aims to ensure the wide distribution of services at affordable costs instead of 
forcing the customer to pay for unwanted services. Affordability, availability and access 
to ICT services are therefore the key components of universal service. 
A closely related notion to universal service is universal access. Universal access 
may be understood as access to a medium of communication, such as telephone, fax or e-
mail or it may represent access to information with regard to various contents accessible 
through Internet or other computer network based applications. For access to have added 
value, however, appropriate initiation programs on the use of ICT services like computer 
literacy must be considered. Other issues like relevance of content to the user including 
language are critical to the purposefulness of universal access. For access to be 
meaningful, therefore, initiatives and programs to promote the development of value 
adding, local and adopted content need to be produced. Universal access is usually the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Ethiopia as well. Peter Allgeier, U.S. representative to the WTO, recently commented that Ethiopia should 
liberalize its protected banking and telecom sectors as a step toward joining the World Trade Organization. 
“For a country like Ethiopia, this is extremely important in establishing the competitiveness of its 
economy…Our expectation would be there are some movements in these areas” (McLure, 2009). 
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natural step toward achieving universal service as it aims to increase access to ICT 
services on a community-wide level through a balanced geographic distribution of points 
of presence for ICT services that are offered.  
The Ethiopian government’s self-characterization of being a developmental state 
puts the notions of universal service and universal access at the center of its 
telecommunications policy. Prominent EPRDF officials have reiterated that it is only 
through the intervention of the state that access to communication services and content 
can become universal. EPRDF has argued that market forces, by their very nature, cannot 
bring about universal service and universal access since they are not obliged to set up 
prices in line with a level that a large part of the population can afford. These market 
forces are therefore prone to “imperfections” that are discriminatory by design and are 
bound to serve only sections of the population where capital is accumulated: 
When a private investor engages in any kind of sector, the motive is get profit 
from every dollar it spends; and it should. In order to do this, the easy way is to 
provide a service that is available by major cities and customers that have a 
relatively higher income. This arrangement cannot deliver a telecom service that 
plays a superior role in our development agenda by reaching out to all Ethiopians 
including those in small cities and rural areas. This is why telecommunications 
services in many countries are kept under state control with the aim of achieving 
universal access, during which the private sector can be involved. The state can 
uphold this objective without being counterproductive to the principle of 
profitability by operating in big cities and providing services to customers with a 
higher income so as to use the profit it collects here in order to expand its services 
all over the country. Private investors cannot advance this cause (Yä Industri 
Limat Strateji, 2001, pp. 146-147).58 
 
Given the amount of investment made in the past decade on the 
telecommunications sector, there is little doubt that the Ethiopian government believes 
the expansion of the telecommunications infrastructure produces a positive effect on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 For original Amharic text, refer to Appendix J. 
! 242 
growth. There is a recognition that the telecommunications infrastructure generates 
spillovers to other sectors; complementarities, reduction of transaction costs, and 
improvement in human capital. These spillovers are magnified through network effects. 
This is in contrast to mainstream development economics theory, which argues 
government shouldn’t attempt to expand access to the level of universality and that there 
is no conclusive evidence that expanding telecommunications infrastructure is a panacea 
for growth. Debretsion Gebremichael, Minister of Information and Communication of the 
FDRE, argues otherwise: 
Under private ownership arrangements, [universal access] is difficult to be 
achieved because rural areas are less attractive in terms of their profit margins. 
But if the sector is under government control, the state can build infrastructure in 
rural areas where there is extreme poverty and affordability can be taxing. For 
example, there is better gross coverage in countries like Kenya. But in terms of 
coverage in rural areas we are far better. Our SchoolNet educational program 
connects every high school in the entire country through ICTs. I doubt if there are 
many countries in Africa that have their entire high schools networked in this 
manner (D. Gebremichael, personal communication, December 12, 2013). 
 
In this sense, the Ethiopian government considers liberalization and privatization 
of the telecommunications sector as a betrayal to the principles of universal access and 
therefore that of equitable development. Gebremichael continues: 
We do not open the telecommunications sector because we understand what is at 
stake. We believe telecommunications, just like roads, is an instrument and 
accelerator to development as much as it is an indicator of development. Because 
we view telecommunication as a public good, it should be structured along 
universal access principles. When we invest on telecommunications, our 
calculation is not based on how much profit we make from it but how soon it can 
help us get out of poverty. The quality of our service is a work in progress; our 
penetration is low; and our capacity is yet to reach a satisfactory level. When it 
comes to access, however, we have got the entire country covered including 
border areas. The only exceptions in this regard are the deserts in the Afar and 
Somali regions (D. Gebremichael, personal communication, December 12, 2013). 
 
Chief Data and Network Design Consultant at Ethio-Telecom Woldeloul Kassa 
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argues that it is difficult to execute a universal access scheme in the presence of a 
telecommunications service provider that is driven primarily by profit maximization: 
Telecom investment is not chump change. It is a lot of money in billions of 
dollars. The current push for privatization assumes for the state to build the 
infrastructure and the sell it to service providers. If you tell them [companies] to 
build the infrastructure they will say, “Oh, let me see my return of investment” 
first. If you tell them to go to Ogaden and set up fiber optics or mobile data, they 
will not do it (W. Kassa, personal communication, December 15, 2013).  
 
The participation of the private sector in the Ethiopian telecommunications 
services at a major level will be conditioned by how soon the universal access/service 
challenge will be met. EPRDF’s view of the state as a vanguard of equitable development 
assumes markets facilitate concentration and centralization of resources in areas where 
capital is accumulated. This “market failure” can thus only be corrected by the strategic 
intervention of the state. In a nutshell, the government’s doctrine is that the private sector 
will be allowed to partake in the provision of telecommunications services once 
infrastructure is spread out and resources are decentralized to the least developed 
peripheries of the country. Ex-Prime Minister Meles Zenawi highlights: 
We want telecommunication in every school and in every village, and we want it 
cheap, not at 30% discount rate…but at 2%, 3% discount rate. That is why we 
have not yet opened up the telecommunications sector to private investment. Is 
that going to be the permanent future? No.  Once the market failure there is 
overcome, we move out. There were times we owned breweries in this country. 
Now we have privatized all of our breweries because that is not our business. 
Private sector can do an excellent job (World Economic Forum, 2008).  
 
The challenge with the Ethiopian government’s universal access program, 
however, is the little regard that is given to the “last mile,” or the final leg of 
telecommunication networks delivering communications connectivity to retail customers. 
While many commentators agree there is a significant amount of commitment on the part 
of the government to the universality of access of mobile, fixed line and Internet 
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communications, similar levels of commitment in service delivery and quality are 
neglected at large. In the absence of targeted marketing of available services, sufficient 
customer support, and efficient delivery, the mere expansion of infrastructure 
development for universal access is self-defeating. 
Telecommunications as a “Cash Cow” 
Perhaps the most widely publicized opinion among senior EPRDF officials in 
relation to the state monopoly of the telecommunications sector is related to revenues. 
EPRDF is of the opinion that the telecommunications sector is too lucrative for the state 
to let it go to private proprietorship. In 2007, ex-Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was 
quoted saying: “Privatizing cell phone service is equal to issuing license to print money” 
(Tessema, 2007). As recently as May 2013, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam 
Dessalegn reiterated the Ethiopian government’s resolve to keep privatization and 
liberalization at bay: 
This sector [telecommunications] is a cash cow, and that’s why the private sector 
wants to get in there, and they’re trying to tell us all kinds of stories ... to get the 
license…We want to use that money for infrastructure development” (Manson, 
2013). 
 
Ethiopian officials are well aware of the recommendations made by the likes of 
the International Monetary Fund for the liberalization of the telecommunication sector 
including the estimated $3 billion the state could earn if it decides to sell licenses. The 
Ethiopian government’s “cash cow” logic considers this arrangement as an inadmissible 
deal compared to the more than $600 million in revenue Ethio-Telecom generates 
annually. The predominant thinking among Ethiopian officials in this regard is to sustain 
the profitability of Ethio-Telecom by keeping competitors at bay and using the revenue to 
subsidize other projects like the development of railways or reinvesting the money into 
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telecommunication infrastructure development. Gebremichael asserts: 
The profit we get from Ethio-Telecom won’t be redirected elsewhere but is rather 
reinvested and recycled within the sector. We multiply it and use the surplus to 
maintain and develop the sector. This way, the sector can feed itself and withstand 
financial pressure (D. Gebremichael, personal communication, December 12, 
2013). 
 
Similarly, Kassa is of the opinion that while privatization and competition isn’t a 
bad idea by itself, the highly likely scenario of foreign companies taking over the 
telecommunications sector will most definitely result in a massive amount of capital 
flight abroad and the hemorrhaging of the already tight foreign currency reserve: 
This [telecom liberalization] is like the abortion debate. There is an ideological 
motive behind it that is very difficult to discern. Personally I do not have a 
religious view about privatization (or not) as some do. I am not against 
privatization per say if the guy or the group that is going to own [Ethio-Telecom] 
is going to be Ethiopian. The reason is simple. Telecom is nothing but a service 
for talking and conversation. Of course this is not to say it doesn’t have an impact 
on industrialization. This doesn’t change the fact that billions of dollars are spent 
by people simply chitchatting. It is in this sense that I cannot imagine giving it 
[telecom] to MTN or Orange and shipping out dollars overseas at this time when 
the country doesn’t even have foreign currency. But if it is a local company, the 
collected revenue will be reinvested in the economy. In my view giving the sector 
to foreign companies is like going back to the colonial era (W. Kassa, personal 
communication, December 15, 2013). 
 
Kassa also argues that the notion of liberalization is a recent trend and that most 
countries in the West have been operating under state monopoly models until recently: 
The [external] criticism [against state monopoly of telecommunication in 
Ethiopia] is disingenuous. For all I know, [telecom in] half of Europe before 
fifteen years was all a state-owned monopoly. The only motive I see in the 
external push for liberalization is the desire to scramble the profitability of the 
sector. 
 
An “Unready” Local Private Sector 
In defending its vehement resistance to the liberalization of the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector or the privatization of Ethio-Telecom, one of the threads the 
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Ethiopian government singles out is the absence of an able and competitive local private 
sector that can take over the sector. In principle, EPRDF officials are of the opinion that 
the government should only intervene in the economy when the market and the private 
sector are not able to deliver services at the desired level. There is also the recurring 
theme that the government needs to puts a lot of effort in elevating markets and the 
private sector to be competent service providers. Officials have, at least in principle, 
declared the irrationality for the state to operate parellel to the private sector and waste its 
limited financial and managerial capacity when markets and the privae sector are in a 
condition to deliver services efficiently. When looking at telecommunciations services, 
however, they argue that the private sector has not matured enough and ready to rise up 
to the challenge, therby necessitating the state to intervene in the sector. One 
interpretation of this argument, for EPRDF, is that the incapacity of the domestic private 
sector implies a justification for seeing telecommunications as a natural monopoly in the 
local context. 
A monopoly represents a condition where all sales in a given industry or market 
are dominated by a single firm or service provider. A natural monopoly is a characteristic 
of an industry or market where it is believed the presence of a single firm that is 
responsible for all production is most efficient since it involves the lowest production 
costs. Baumol (1977), one of the pioneers in the modern theorization of natural monopoly 
theory, defines the concept as a condition that exists when “[a]n industry in which 
multiform production is more costly than production by a monopoly” (p. 810). 
Traditionally, natural monopolies have usually occurred when there was a need for a vast 
bedrock infrastructure to start a given operation business (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1996). 
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In these kinds of situations, natural monopoly is usually enacted in order to protect a 
given firm that made initial and expensive large-scale investments from competition. 
Traditional examples of natural monopolies included transportation, communication and 
postal networks and utilities that involve exorbitant costs.  
During the first instances of application, natural monopolies generally referred to 
those types of monopolies not artificially enforced by law but rather instances that 
emerge because of the limited quantity of the resource that is available including talent 
and location (Mosca, 2008).  Although there is no unanimity, Sharkey (1982) argues that 
John Stuart Mill was the first to speak of natural monopolies in 1848. In his Principles of 
Political Economy, Mill (1899) indeed discusses about natural monopoly in this 
paragraph regarding labor and wage disparity:  
The superiority of reward is not here the consequence of competition, but of its 
absence: not a compensation for disadvantages inherent in the employment, but an 
extra advantage; a kind of monopoly price, the effect not of a legal, but of what 
has been termed a natural monopoly... independently of... artificial monopolies 
[i.e. grants by government], there is a natural monopoly in favour [sic] of skilled 
labourers [sic] against the unskilled, which makes the difference of reward 
exceed, sometimes in a manifold proportion, what is sufficient merely to equalize 
their advantages. If unskilled labourers [sic] had it in their power to compete with 
skilled, by merely taking the trouble of learning the trade, the difference of wages 
might not exceed what would compensate them for that trouble, at the ordinary 
rate at which labour [sic] is remunerated. But the fact that a course of instruction 
is required, of even a low degree of costliness, or that the labourer [sic] must be 
maintained for a considerable time from other sources, suffices everywhere to 
exclude the great body of the laboring [sic] people from the possibility of any 
such competition (p. 236). 
 
According to Posner (1969) natural monopoly “does not refer to the actual 
number of sellers in a market but to the relationship between demand and the technology 
of supply” (p. 548). On the other hand, Carlton and Perloff (2004) argue, “[w]hen total 
production costs would rise if two or more firms produced instead of one, the single firm 
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in a market is called a ‘natural monopoly’” (p. 104). Natural monopolies are also 
associated with supply-demand characteristics that included scenarios where the product 
or service supplied must be essential; the products must be non-storable; and the supplier 
must have a favorable production location (Sharkey, 1982). 
If the proposition of the Ethiopian government’s treatment of telecommunications 
as a natural monopoly is valid, this means that the state monopoly of telecommunications 
in Ethiopia is not a result of a deliberate protectionist intervention through policy but 
rather a natural course of action that assumes the absence of a capable actor (in this case 
the domestic private sector) urging the state to solely carry out the service. However, 
while the state contends it remains the only viable actor with the capacity to carry out 
telecommunications operations along universal access and universal service principles, 
experience thus far locally and globally indicates quality will suffer under such 
arrangements. A long-term, sustainable solution should involve the private sector in some 
capacity, as Kassa asserts: 
I think it is a good strategy and very brave of this government if they meet the 
universal access and universal service goal to reach every qäbäle. Once they do that 
the market will probably be mature and hopefully some private company of 
Ethiopian origin will take over or alternatively they may partner with foreigners as 
long as they [foreigners] do not put the dollar in the bag and go. It is not deal if I 
give away a dollar every time I talk… The problem in this country is there is no 
individual or group that is capable of investing on this sector. In the absence of it, I 
have no problem if the state keeps it because they will have to liberalize it 
eventually anyway. Any government operator by its very nature is inefficient 
whether it is in Ethiopia, the United States or Canada (W. Kassa, personal 
communication, December 15, 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
Through an analysis of interviews and documents, this chapter aimed to mainly 
address the underlying reasons behind the differences in telecom liberalization policies 
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between the IMF and the Ethiopian state. It explored the debates surrounding 
deregulation discourses regarding the Ethiopian telecommunication sector, and 
investigated external pressures, motives and rationales—most notably led by the IMF—
that attempted to justify the need for liberalizing telecommunications operations in 
Ethiopia. Whereas domestic groups such as the private sector also share IMF’s call for 
liberalization, EPRDF remains adamant about keeping telecommunication operations in 
Ethiopia under state control for the foreseeable future.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
CHINESE MULTINATIONALS IN THE ETHIOPIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
SECTOR 
I’ll love you, dear, I'll love you 
        Till China and Africa meet 
And the river jumps over the mountain 
        And the salmon sing in the street. 
 
—W. H. Auden, As I Walked out One Evening 
 
 
The rise of neo-liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s after the crisis of Keynesian 
capitalism sealed the dismissal of all alternative forms of economic thinking (Chomsky, 
1999; Shefner & Fernández-Kelly, 2011). With the end of the Cold War and the demise 
of the former Soviet Union, it seemed the position of the United States as a global 
hegemon would prolong unchecked in the absence of any palpable economic and 
ideological contender (Hunt, 2007). The processes of globalization such as substantial 
increases in merchandise trade flows, foreign direct investment, and cross-border 
financial investments propelled neo-liberal practices to new heights (Duina, 2006). Soon 
after, neo-liberalism had strong advocates in continental Western Europe and Japan. 
Toward the end of the 20th century the U.S. has successfully dictated neo-liberal policies 
into most of the transitioning and developing economies. If there was any resistance to 
the neo-liberal global order, it was not a rejection of the notion in its entirety as such, but 
rather the pursuit to customize its tenets to local needs and national interests (Ferguson, 
2006; Soederberg, Menz, & Cerny, 2005; Solimano, 2012).  
Neo-liberalism was supposed to bring unprecedented American hegemony, 
provided that it was replicated in its original script. This means countries should 
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subscribe to the recommendations of deregulation of business, privatization of public 
activities and assets, elimination of or cutbacks in social welfare programs, and reduction 
of taxes on businesses and the investing class (Cypher, 1997). As for international trade, 
neo-liberalism calls for free movement of goods, services, capital, and money (but not 
people) across national boundaries (McDonough, Reich, and Kotz, 2010) 
The beginning of the 20th century delivered the rise of new economies that 
embraced market-led globalization. In fact, in 2003, the highly influential Goldman Sachs 
report, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050, emphatically predicted the BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), will economically overtake the traditional 
economic powerhouses or G7 countries (Wilson, Roopa, and Goldman, Sachs & Co., 
2003). The problem for the United States and its partners, however, was that these 
emerging economies didn’t simply clone the neo-liberal blueprint. They reprogrammed 
and mutated it to their developmental needs, essentially enabling them to actively 
participate in the global economic order while maintaining their independence from 
Washington (Overbeek and Apeldoorn, 2012). This newfound power and leverage is 
significantly challenging and changing dominant structures and hierarchies in 
international relations. By the end of 2007, for the first time in recorded history, the total 
deal size of emerging-into-developed economies was estimated to have exceeded that of 
developed-into-emerging economies (Gupta and Wang, 2009).  
More than 50% of the world’s GDP growth today is attributed to emerging 
markets (Becker, 2013). Remarkable as it may be, any significance of emerging 
economies cannot be meaningful without an analysis of the towering implosion of the 
Chinese economy in the past two decades. Such is the dominance of China’s presence 
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that its GDP is expected to become the world’s largest by around 2030 (“China to Be,” 
2010). In the past decade alone, China’s economy grew seven times as that of America. 
China is one of the few countries integrated into the global market economy that not only 
survived the international financial crisis but that also capitalized on it. It has been the 
fastest growing economy in the G20 for years now, and boasts ownership of the three 
largest banks globally in terms of market capitalization—an astonishing feat considering 
no Chinese bank was among the world’s largest a decade ago (Winters & Yusuf, 2007). 
China’s newfound creditor’s position is such that it has generated “a new potential for 
power in the form of influence in the international arena—a potential that is in fact 
greater than that of the Japanese state in the late 1980s” (Chin & Helleiner, 2008, p. 87). 
This increasing economic prowess of China in the past three decades has a 
demonstrated potential to challenge traditional practices in international power relations, 
diplomatic leverage and trade agreements. It remains unpredictable what China makes of 
this newfound economic might, however. China recognizes that the global economic 
system is increasingly becoming multipolar and decentralized, and thus it should 
transform to reflect the existing reality (Amin, 2006; Brzezinski, 2000). This would entail 
a more representative and participatory design and enforcement of international economic 
rules that would, among other things, reappraise future international roles of the United 
States, the U.S. dollar and international organizations like the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. Nevertheless, China has hardly 
made the case for the global economic order’s overhaul. This is not surprising given 
China has been a major beneficiary of economic globalization (Huan, Dang, & Wang, 
2011). As Fu Chengyu, CEO of Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation affirms, 
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“China’s goal is not to overturn the world order but instead to participate in this order and 
to reinforce it and even to profit from it” (Shirk, 2007, p. 34). 
This growing importance of China in the world has impacted every global 
economy directly and indirectly. Ethiopia is no exception. In fact, Ethiopia has repeatedly 
praised the Chinese approach to economic development as a welcome alternative to neo-
liberal capitalism. Consequently, Chinese multinational corporations, both private and 
state-owned, are capitalizing on the cordial state of Sino-Ethiopian relations, particularly 
in the telecommunications sector. In line with this increasingly significant development, 
this chapter aims to explore salient issues related to this research question: What are the 
premises on which Sino-Ethiopian partnerships in the Ethiopian telecommunications 
sector are laid? In order to address this question in a comprehensive manner, I will, 
firstly, discuss the circumstances of the growing presence of China in Africa and in 
Ethiopia. Then, I will explore why China succeed in wooing the Ethiopian government 
while others failed, and what issues are at stake in this partnership. Finally, I will analyze 
arguments for and against Chinese proliferation in the Ethiopian telecommunications 
sector. 
Tenets in Sino-African Partnerships 
“Where America brings drones, the Chinese build roads,” writes John Pilger 
(2013), a war correspondent, film-maker and author, in his The Guardian article, “More 
than Jihadism or Iran, China’s Role in Africa is Obama’s Obsession.” Whereas this quote 
doesn’t necessarily reflect the intricacies behind Chinese, American and African 
priorities in bilateral relations, it succinctly summarizes the growing influence of China 
in Africa at the expense of the United States and its allies, and, more importantly, why. 
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The relations between China and Africa date back to the 10th century B.C. 
through exploration and trade links (Strauss, 2009). Many sub-Saharan Africa countries 
had established economic relations since then. These links were undermined during the 
period of European imperialism in the African continent (Manji and Marks, 2007; Shinn 
& Eisenman, 2012).  The economic, political and social conditions of post-colonial 
Africa in the second half of the 20th century resuscitated Sino-African relations, 
nevertheless. The struggle for independence from Western colonialism, the challenges of 
nation building, and the lure of the economic and political left propelled many African 
countries to look for alternative partners in the East (Edoho, 2011; Rotberg, 2008). The 
Bandung Conference of 1955 attended by representatives of 29 Asian and African 
countries marked the first serious attempt to renew Afro-Asian relations in the areas of 
the role of the Third World in the Cold War, economic development, and decolonization. 
It set important benchmarks in shared concerns of participant nations like political self-
determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in 
internal affairs, and equality (Lee, 2010; Tan, 2008). The Bandung Conference, in which 
China played a prominent role, sought for collaboration among Third World countries 
and aimed to minimize economic reliance on the West, essentially foreshadowing today’s 
notion of South-South Cooperation.  
Varying range of loyalties by participant countries and accentuated Cold War 
polarities resulted in the waning of the “Bandung spirit” in the 1960’s and 1970’s. As a 
result, China’s engagement with Africa prioritized geopolitical interests over 
development initiatives (Alden, Large, & Oliveira, 2008). China maintained its shared 
solidarity with the Third World rhetoric of struggling against capitalism and economic 
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exploitation but didn’t have the resources to engage with the African continent through 
investment and trade. The “Great Leap Forward” economic program of Mao had 
disastrous economic consequences that led China to economic stagnation (Teiwes and 
Sun, 1999). Mao’s other radical left programs like the “Cultural Revolution” 
marginalized skilled and highly educated personnel from the economic system to the 
detriment of the industry sector (Luo, 1990). Subsequently, internal political and 
economic problems as well as ideological radicalism decapitated China’s leverage to 
compete with the United States and USSR in the scramble for international leverage.  
Sino-African relations remained static until the 1990s when Communism 
collapsed and China’s restructured state-led capitalist economy started vying for 
international markets. Beijing’s aggressive market-oriented economy identified the 
African continent as a prime target for development of trade, investment, new markets, 
energy and commodity resources (Ampiah & Naidu, 2008). By the turn of the 21st 
century Sino-African relations became institutionalized with the establishment of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). FOCAC serves as a platform to promote 
diplomatic, trade, security and investment relations between China and African countries 
(Taylor, 2010).  
After the first China-Africa Consultative Forum (CACF) in Beijing in 2000, 
China quickly moved to offer an attractive bundle of incentives in economic, political, 
and security fronts that significantly departed from traditional Western bilateral practices 
of tied aid, conditionalities and structural adjustments. These unique strategies include, 
among other things, targeted debt relief, cheap loans linked to infrastructure 
development, political “non-interference” in the internal policies of African countries, 
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promotion of South-South linkages, support for Africa in global forums such as the 
United Nations, WTO, IMF and World Bank, and the establishment of parallel funding 
agencies to institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (Brautigam, 2009; 
Eisenman, Heginbotham and Mitchell, 2007). The Beijing meeting was attended by over 
800 officials from China and 44 African countries and advocated for “an equitable and 
just new international political and economic order” (FOCAC, 2009). Today, China has 
invested close to $75 billion on the African continent and eclipsed the United States as 
Africa’s biggest trade partner in 2009 (Benjamin, 2013; Provost and Harris, 2013). In 
what is a symbolic gesture to the increasingly tightening tie between China and Africa, 
the former has fully funded and overseen the construction of the $200 million tower and 
conference center for the headquarters to the 53 member states of the African Union in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Ighobor, 2013). Even more telling is Angola’s surpassing of 
Saudi Arabia as China’s largest supplier of oil in 2006 (Zhu, 2008). The fact that China 
has eclipsed the World Bank to become Africa’s biggest creditor epitomizes the 
significance of Beijing to the African continent today (Swann & McQuillen, 2006). 
China’s near omnipresence in African economies is a subject of intense debate 
and scrutiny by concerned scholars, policy-makers and politicians around the world. An 
optimistic interpretation of Sino-African relations sees the partnership as one founded on 
mutual benefits and interests. In this sense, China is a development partner rather than an 
economic competitor with “a long-term strategic commitment to the continent, one that is 
driven by its own economic needs, a commitment to transmit its development experience 
to the continent and a desire to build effective cooperative partnerships across the 
developing world” (Alden, 2007, p. 5). This view is notably shared and articulated, 
! 257 
oftentimes in strong words, by African and Chinese politicians alike. African leaders 
contend Sino-African diplomacy and negotiation is carried out on a level-playing field. It 
is a key departure from how the West historically engaged with Africa through 
‘presumptuous’ economic and political interventions and tied aid. “Those who criticize 
China today are the same ones who used to impose their will on Africa…Those who 
believe so [that China is a threat] have no right to choose friends for Africa,” contends 
Joram Biswaro, Tanzania’s ambassador to Ethiopia (Essa, 2013). 
On the contrary, others are less enthusiastic about the Sino-African alliance and 
view it with varying doses of skepticism. They regard Beijing’s ubiquity in the African 
continent as motivated by the need to quench the former’s voracious appetite for energy 
and raw materials instigated by its economic upsurge. It frames China’s bilateral ties with 
individual African countries as an attempt to chain African resources to Chinese 
industries, particularly in the area of energy where traditional suppliers in the Middle East 
are becoming unreliable because of growing political instability in the region (Alden, 
2007; Ghazvinian, 2007; Rotberg, 2008). In essence, this analysis contends that China 
has little or no interest in catering to the development needs of Africa. Much like its 
Western counterparts, China’s interest is founded on short-term resource grab and 
exploitation motives. Most commentators in this group accuse China of dumping cheap 
goods in the African market to annihilate local manufacturing (Taylor, 2009). This camp 
interprets China’s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries as 
a deliberate tactic to disregard concerns in sustainable development, environment 
protection and human rights. They contend Beijing is systematically subordinating Africa 
to its pockets not only to satisfy its resource needs but also to advance its interests and 
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accentuate its soft power globally in issues it considers as critical to national security 
(Kurlantzick, 2007; Liang, 2012). They point out South Africa’s continued refusal to 
grant the Dalai Lama a visa and the majority of the continent’s reluctance to engage 
independently with Taiwan as consequences of the muzzling effect China’s soft power on 
African countries (Mishkin & Rice, 2013; Polgreen, 2011). In its extreme version, this 
view sees China as a neocolonial power with a long-term aim of annexing Africa through 
political and economic dependency. 
Regardless of the criticism, the view from Africa, particularly from politicians 
and policy makers, remains overwhelmingly positive towards emerging economies of the 
global South like China. As Manji and Marks (2007) highlight:  
[Africans] feel that traditional relations and partnerships with the West have not 
helped Africa overcome the structural obstacles to eradicating poverty and 
reversing its economic marginalisation. Rather than develop, Africa is 
haemorrhaging while the rest of the world accumulates wealth at its expense 
through the unbalanced exploitation of its natural resources and the enforcement 
of a distorted international economic system” (p. 17).  
 
In addition to the frustration compiled by the traditional broken development 
paradigm, there is also China’s extraordinary leap from poverty to a global economic 
powerhouse in a relatively short period of time, a symbolically significant pull factor for 
many African countries. For African politicians and policy makers “the knowledge that 
within a span of a few decades China had been able to scale the development heights 
without compromising sovereignty, party control or engaging in the elaborate formalities 
of Western-inspired ODA was a revelation” (Alden, 2007, p. 35)”. It is also important to 
emphasize the oft-overlooked aspect of China’s commitment to the notion of pan-
Africanism, both practically and through policy making. As China’s alternative model 
that blends balanced doses of idealism and pragmatism coincides with Africa’s continued 
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economic growth in the past decade, the current of the Beijing Consensus59 to displace 
traditional international development practices is momentous if not warranted. 
No Oil, No Problem: Making Sense of Ethio-Chinese Relations 
If the rhetoric of China’s interest in locking African resources through 
government-to-government bilateral relations is to be taken exclusive of other motives, 
Beijing excellent ties with Ethiopia shouldn’t make sense. Although Ethiopia and China 
had long established political exchanges, official diplomatic relations between the two 
countries didn’t begin until November 1971 during Emperor Haylä S!llasé’s visit of 
China. Ethio-Chinese relations remained cordial in diplomatic, political and economic 
fronts until the Derg, which aligned with the Soviet Union, thereby effectively becoming 
incompatible with the ideology of Maoist China. Chinese development assistance to 
Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s was therefore mostly limited to emergency relief (food 
aid) and manpower development (Adem, 2012). With the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the triumph of EPRDF over the Derg by the beginning of the 1990s, the conditions 
were ripe for Ethio-Chinese relations to resume (Sharamo & Mesfin, 2011). Although the 
TPLF, the veteran (and arguably the most important) organization within the EPRDF 
coalition has long adhered to Marxist principles and drafted its political program in the 
line of the Albanian Party of Labor, it had to quickly rebrand itself as free marketeer in 
response to changing dynamics in international relations and politics (Clapham, 1991; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 The “Beijing Consensus” was originally coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo to indicate the preeminence of a 
new Chinese inspired strategy in global economic development that contrasts with the so-called 
Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus proposes policy recommendations that espouse 
liberalization, privatization, and deregulation, principles that are closely associated with the neo-liberal 
ideology, free market capitalism or market fundamentalism. Instead of prescribing rigid recommendations 
for the problems of distant nations, the Beijing Consensus, Ramo argues, is inherently focused on 
innovation, while simultaneously emphasizing ideals such as equitable development and a “Peaceful Rise” 
(Ramo, 2004, p. 6). !
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Vestal, 1999). EPRDF remained largely sympathetic to Marxist economic principles, 
however, and eventually started openly criticizing Western neo-liberal practices. The 
unrelenting pressure from the West on the Ethiopian government to restructure the 
country’s economy along free market principles, coupled with EPRDF’s lingering 
Marxist ethos, paved the way for the search of alternative partners like Russia and China. 
Subsequently, between in the past two decades, high level visits were exchanged 
between Ethiopian leaders and their Chinese counterparts. The visits of Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin in 1996 and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in 2003 to Ethiopia and that of 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in 1995 and 2006 to China were very significant in this 
regard. EPRDF has reiterated the importance it attaches in strengthening its inter-party 
ties with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in order to “learn” state-running 
experiences and the practice of market-led socialism and agricultural development 
(Hackenesch, 2011). Events that followed the controversial 2005 national elections were 
important in EPRDF’s intensification of fortifying its relations with China. With a 
government crackdown of opposition groups, the latter boycotted the government, fled 
the country or were imprisoned. EPRDF’s methods brought severe criticism from 
traditional Western donors like the World Bank, which responded with measures like 
suspension or deferral of loans and aid. EPRDF saw this as a potential threat to its 
stability and henceforth started aggressively fortifying its ties with China and likeminded 
partners with the aim of curbing Western influence in the Ethiopian political sphere. 
EPRDF made its calculations right in that the government in China always refrained, 
unlike Western donors, from the issue of democratic reforms in Ethiopia. In short, 
EPRDF attaches massive significance to China’s “non-interference” policy in the internal 
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affairs of Ethiopia (Hackenesch, 2011). As such, EPRDF views the CCP as its natural 
international partner not only in terms of shared development models but also mutual 
interests in the role of the party in the state or party succession strategies. Here, it is also 
important to emphasize that EPRDF’s party-to-party relations with the CCP is demand-
driven, whereas political deliberations are usually pushed from the outside in the case of 
traditional Western donors. Economically, EPRDF sees an opportunity in minimizing the 
West’s clout in the development strategy of Ethiopia and working independently from 
donor preferences. Even though EPRDF officials occasionally suggest that China is not 
necessarily the ultimate model to follow, many observers say Ethiopia sees China as an 
economic model to emulate. The “authoritarian developmental state” model to which the 
CCP adheres and which EPRDF wants to adopt delivers economic development while 
maintaining political power, some commentators argue, albeit at the expense of 
participatory democracy, social justice and human rights (Lingle, 1996; Pei, 2006; Scott, 
1998).  
Given EPRDF’s apprehension of external interference on its national political 
behavior and economic program, Ethiopia’s flirtation with China is unsurprising. Chinese 
FDI increased from almost zero in 2004 to an annual figure of US$ 58.5 million in 2010 
(World Bank, 2012). An array of different agreements have been signed between 
Ethiopian and Chinese officials since 2006 including the establishment of Chinese 
language training center, the foundation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) for Chinese 
manufacturers, and accord of loans from the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of China to 
help housing projects in Ethiopia. Meanwhile, Beijing started following its newfound 
fandom in Ethiopia’s capital with great interest. This was particularly true concerning 
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Ethiopia’s bold support to Chinese positions in sensitive regional and international 
debates. For example, Ethiopia supported the adoption of the Anti-Secession Law by 
China’s National People’s Congress in 2006 in spite of the fact that Ethiopia is, 
ironically, the only country in the world that constitutionally grants the right of secession. 
In another instance, Ethiopia spoke out against the condemnation of China’s human 
rights record when it was a member of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in 
2007.  
For all the arguments that attempt to explain China’s resource-centered diplomacy 
with Africa, Beijing’s remarkable ties with Ethiopia defy logic. Ethiopia is not rich in 
resources that are critical to China’s insatiable industries. In a strictly economic sense, 
Ethiopia simply doesn’t have attractive incentives to lure China like Nigeria or Angola. 
So why does China continue to attach an enormous significance to its bilateral relations 
with Ethiopia?  
There are different explanations for this question. Firstly, Ethiopia’s excellent 
diplomatic stature within the African continent is valuable for China to foster the latter’s 
self-proclaimed “Africa’s development partner” position. The Ethiopian government, and 
particularly its late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, hardly shied away from defending 
China’s positive role in Africa. A staunch admirer of the Chinese state-led development 
model and ardent critic of neo-liberal capitalism, Zenawi lauded China’s efforts as a 
“godsend,” “generous” and “dependable” (Adem, 2011; “Looking East,” 2010). Beijing 
holds this decorated assessment of itself by the government in Addis Ababa with high 
regard. In Zenawi, China found a diplomatically astute and articulate partner who took it 
upon himself to don Beijing as Africa’s role model to get out of its poverty trap. Coupled 
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with Ethiopia’s history as a pioneer in black freedom and pan-Africanism movements, 
China understands that the leverage Addis enjoys within the African leadership is of 
paramount importance to its economic and diplomatic interests. China also recognizes 
Addis Ababa is the seat of the headquarters of the African Union, United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and many other regional and international 
organizations.  
In this sense, it is plausible to conclude that Ethiopia serves as the Chinese aisle to 
the rest of Africa in two ways. On one hand, Chinese investment in Ethiopia—a country 
lacking meaningful significance in terms of resources attractive for Beijing’s economic 
appetite—helps reinforce China’s self-proclaimed narrative that it is a trustworthy 
development partner with genuine commitment to poverty alleviation in the African 
continent. The Ethiopian scenario quells the argument that China is looting Africa 
through economic exploitation. On the other hand, it is common sense from China’s point 
of view to see Ethiopia as an investment and development workshop at which visiting 
African political elites can look and marvel. Every year, Addis Ababa hosts senior 
political figures, including presidents, prime ministers, ministers and delegates of almost 
all African countries for the African Union and other meetings, where the fast changing 
architecture and infrastructure development of the city in the areas of road construction, 
transportation and real estate development hardly go unnoticed. In this manner, Addis 
serves as a prototype of Chinese efficiency in infrastructure development, and assumes a 
real time see-it-for-yourself marketing and public relations hub for other African 
countries to follow. This is consistent with Deborah Brautigam’s (2009) argument that 
“the move by Chinese companies into production in Africa has the potential to catalyze a 
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flying geese model in leather. If this happens, it is likely to happen first in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia’s experience provides some early insights into what may follow across the 
Sahelian leather belt in Africa” (p. 213).    
Chinese Multinationals in the Ethiopian Telecommunications Sector 
If there is one sector that epitomizes EPRDF’s resolute stance on the significance 
it attaches to the notion of “state-led development,” it is telecommunications (Tsigie and 
Feyissa, 1999). The EPRDF controlled government views the telecommunications sector 
as a strategic asset for the economy and national security, which the state cannot afford to 
“let go” just yet.  
In spite of EPRDF’s vehement rejection of liberalization, the sector has remained 
pitifully incompetent in the past two decades. Such was the impotence of the then-ETC 
that, between 2004 and 2007, getting a SIM card required a customer to submit an 
application with a wait period of more than a year.  “At that time, a SIM card could fetch 
as much as $100 on the black market, not including call charges and 15% tax, and what’s 
more, you couldn’t necessarily buy one even if you did have the money” (The Chinese 
Telecommunications,” 2012).60   
What’s more, ETC’s cellular capacity at the time, a meager 700,000, was fiercely 
sought by global telecommunications equipment vendors including Nokia, Siemens, 
ZTE, Huawei, Ericsson and Alcatel-Lucent. This global interest was probably not 
necessarily because of the margin of profit involved per se, but rather because of what 
Ethiopia represents in terms of an untapped potential in the telecommunications market. 
Nonetheless, this competition did not always bring favorable outcomes to ETC’s 
expansion schemes. Before ETC floated its fourth tender calling for bids in mobile !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Comment by Zhang Jinyu, Chief inspector, ZTE Ethiopia Technology Center.  
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network infrastructure development in 2004, Ericsson was endowed with the task of 
building network capacity for 60,000 lines five years earlier in 1999. This was followed 
by a second tender in June 2003 that provided a capacity of 200,000 lines for $29 million. 
Nokia won the third tender that upgraded the network capacity by 300,000 lines in a deal 
that saw the Finnish communications and information technology multinational 
corporation get $47 million. This interchange of vendors caused incompatibility between 
the first two networks installed, thereby forcing ETC to use only 70% of the cumulative 
capacity of 260,000 lines (Girma, 2004).  
Despite being a pioneer in the African telecommunications landscape, it became 
obvious that ETC struggled to catch up with the dynamic changes and complexities in 
telecommunications technology and management, and was utterly inefficient in providing 
a reasonably sound service to its clients. With dissatisfied customers who would jump to 
a competitor and foreign investors ready to buy the sector at will if the market is 
liberalized, EPRDF understood it had to find a partner that would boost the country’s 
telecom service efficiency without compromising state ownership of the sector.  
When it became apparent to GoE officials that something needed to be done about the 
telecom sector, a drastic course of action in foundational telecom infrastructure 
investment was inevitable. As a result, in 2005 the government of Ethiopia (GoE) called 
for proposals for the construction of a backbone network in Global System for 
Mobile Communications (GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) and other 
technologies covering the entire country. The project, in which major global 
telecommunications equipment vendors including Ericsson, Nokia, Siemens, Alcatel-
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Lucent, Huawei, and ZTE took part and submitted bids, needed a budget between $1.8 
and 1.9 billion.  
Subsequently, GoE selected ZTE Corp. as a strategic partner for telecom 
infrastructure development in 2006, resulting in a framework agreement that would see 
the Chinese company aggressively upgrade the national telecom network. This historic 
agreement saw GoE ink a deal with the Chinese telecom giant to the tune of $1.5 billion, 
a credit as big as the total current worth of the Ethiopian telecom monopoly (Whelan, 
2010). The total cost of the project was, however, US$1.9 billion: $1.5 billion for 
equipment and $0.4 billion for engineering construction.  
Although three major Chinese telecommunications equipment producers and 
suppliers, ZTE, Huawei, and China Communications Services Corporation submitted 
expressions of interest, it was ZTE that was able to get the financial support from the 
Chinese Development Bank in order to win the bid. There were a couple of factors that 
tilted the balance in ZTE’s favor. Firstly, ZTE had a better knowledge of the Ethiopian 
telecom sector compared to its other competitors. Although its substantial breakthrough 
in the sector didn’t come until 2006, it started operating in Ethiopia in 1996 and officially 
opened its Ethiopian Office in 2000. ZTE, Ethio-Telecom, and the CBD have signed a 
long-term payment agreement which covers a period as long as 13 years, and is 
considered a mid to long-term loan, of which the first three years are interest-free. 
Vendor credit is provided by the export bank to the exporter (i.e., the supplier, in this case 
ZTE), and then the exporting and importing businesses (in this case Ethio-Telecom) 
signing a separate repayment contract. 
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In 2013, Ethio-Telecom signed a network expansion deal worth $1.6 billion with 
Huawei and ZTE with the two companies sharing 50 percent of the project each. For this 
latest project, Huawei and/or ZTE, pending further negotiations, are contracted to deliver 
fourth generation (4G) technology for the capital city of Addis Ababa that would allow 
customers to have browsing speeds of 100mb per second. The Chinese companies are 
also expected to expand the existing infrastructure of cellular networks and introduce 3G 
services in the 11 infrastructural zones set up by the Ethiopian state. The Ethiopian 
government sees the project as an implementation phase of the Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP) that will run out in 2015. The project aims to increase Ethio-
Telecom’s mobile subscription capacity from 23 million to 50 million.  
Salient Issues in the Proliferation of Chinese Multinationals into the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Sector: Assessing Advantages & Drawbacks 
Vendor Financing Schemes and Chinese Malleability 
Although the Ethiopian economy has registered some steady economic growth in 
the past decade, it has been hit by chronic foreign currency shortage that limited the 
country’s import capacity to a matter of few weeks.  Although an unstable foreign 
currency reserve has historically been Ethiopia’s underbelly, the past few years have 
especially been inopportune. In one instance, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), the 
state institution endowed with the authority of regulating financial sectors, notified 
importers that the state can no longer provide foreign currency. According to the IMF, 
gross official reserves in April 2012 decreased by almost $1.2 billion to 1.8 months of 
projected imports for 2012/13 (International Monetary Fund, 2012). NBE instituted a 
case-by-case application procedure where importers had to wait for months to get 
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rationed foreign currency. As a result, between 2008 and 2011, the country experienced 
unprecedented inflation rates. 
There are several reasons that cause the depletion of foreign currency in the 
Ethiopian financial sector. The huge imbalance between the country’s imports and 
exports contribute significantly to overseas hard currency flight. Although the annual 
income of exports has reached around $3 billion in 2012 (from about $1.8 billion in 
2007), Ethiopia’s imports remains four times higher than its exports with a trade deficit 
of around $6 billion.  
In the final analysis, so long as Ethiopia’s import-export balance remains in favor 
of the former, the country will remain prone to foreign currency deficit in the years to 
come (Figure 31). What this means is that the shortage of capital, in addition to the 
financial burden it imposes on the Ethiopian people in a form of inflation, will arrest the 
GoE from executing its ambitious infrastructure development schemes that are outlined 
in the Growth & Transformation Plan (GTP). In this sense, the GoE is at crossroads. If it 
opts to use all its capital resources to finance its massive infrastructure projects, it will 
come at the cost of macroeconomic stability that could, for example, escalate inflation to 
yet another unbearable height.  
Another course of action GoE could pursue is to finance these mega projects by 
garnering funds through the mobilization of local resources. The GoE has already taken 
this path in its construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Having 
understood that it could not secure external funds because of complex geopolitical and 
historical precedents, GoE decided to finance the massive $4.8 billion project by 
collecting funds from the local population through selling bonds, gifts and salary 
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deductibles. Although the majority of the Ethiopian populace responded positively to the 
construction of GERD and committed financial contributions to the cause, there was 
equally a sense of indignation by many who saw this as an additional burden on their 
households that had been hard-stricken by a severely inflated economy. This view is 
shared by the likes of the IMF and the World Bank, which warned that infrastructure 
spending financing was equivalent to 19 percent of Ethiopia’s GDP in the fiscal year 
2011/2012.  
Other sources of foreign currency for Ethiopia include foreign aid, which is 
estimated to have reached $4 billion, and foreign remittances, which reached $3 billion in 
the first nine months of 2011/2012 fiscal year. The problem with foreign aid, however, is 
that the receiving country is not usually in a position to spend the resources it gets in a 
way it sees fit, and even less so in infrastructure development. Ethiopia’s major bilateral 
and multilateral donors have particular areas of interest and priorities that they focus their 
investments. These priorities include health, education and poverty reduction. U.S. 
bilateral assistance to Ethiopia through USAID, for example, is focused on “reducing 
famine vulnerability, hunger, and poverty and emphasizes economic, governance, and 
social sector policy reforms” (U.S. Department of State, 2013). Similarly, U.K.’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) gives foreign assistance to GoE in 
order to “reduce child mortality, support the education system and protect people from 
hunger” (DFID Ethiopia, n.d.) This kind of assistance, overseen by the US Congress and 
the British Parliament respectively, cannot be redirected to other purposes including for 
infrastructure development.  
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This leaves Addis Ababa with the option of securing funds in a form of loans 
from international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund. Whereas this would be a viable alternative for many governments in the 
developing world, the window of opportunity for collaboration is limited for GoE. This is 
because of fundamental ideological differences in economic development paths as the 
EPRDF-led Ethiopian government continues to refuse liberalizing its banking and 
telecom sectors (among other sectors). Subsequently, the GoE can only secure loans from 
these institutions in select projects and programs in agriculture, transportation, education, 
basic services, energy, land management, natural disaster mitigation, et cetera, where 
standard lender procedures and conditionalities are met. 
When the FDRE government decided to radically upgrade telecommunications 
capacity in 2005, it simply didn’t have the money to finance the project. In addition to the 
different hindrances of securing foreign currency, Ethiopia’s GDP at the time, which 
totaled close to $15 billion—a relatively low income even by African standards—
couldn’t support this massive project. It is, therefore, in the context of EPRDF’s 
aggressive schemes in state-led infrastructure development and the GoE’s bottlenecked 
thirst of foreign currency that we find the most sense in Ethio-Chinese relations, 
particularly in the telecom sector. Debretsion Gebremichael, Minister of Communication 
and Information Technology and Deputy Prime Minister of Ethiopia explains why his 
government finds the Chinese partnership extremely valuable:  
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Figure 31: Major FDRE foreign currency inflow-outflow. Adapted from World Bank 
(2011, 2012, 2014c); Ministry of Finance (2010a, 2010b); African Development Bank 
(2013); International Monetary Fund (2012). 
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It has been some time now since we started using Chinese resources. The Chinese 
approach doesn’t compromise our sovereignty. It doesn’t interfere with our 
policy. It doesn’t deploy a prescription. It is purely business. The partnership we 
have with them is not only free from political conditionalities but also from 
business conditionalities. It is a very attractive deal that allows us to develop our 
capacity to implement our development policies (D. Gebremichael, personal 
communication, December 12, 2013).      
 
Whereas Chinese non-intervention policy in the internal matters of its partner 
states has been a key factor for Beijing’s success in Africa, this very trajectory is even 
more indispensable when dealing with EPRDF and its unbending development policies 
and political economy. China understands these dynamics thoroughly and responded to 
ETC’s vendor financing scheme with capital that GoE couldn’t simply have acquired 
from traditional creditors:    
It is important to remember that we got about $1.5 billion at once from these 
guys—just for telecom development. ETC did the discussions on the terms of the 
loan from our part; it didn’t even involve the central [Ethiopian] government. 
Nobody has given us this amount of money even at a national level. The 
maximum we can get from the likes of the World Bank is between $200-300 
million after arduous article-by-article negotiations (D. Gebremichael, personal 
communication, December 12, 2013). 
 
Many indicators suggest that the vendor-financing scheme involving Ethio-
Chinese collaboration in the Ethiopian telecom sector is a win-win scenario for the 
parties involved. For EPRDF, the Chinese alternative is some sort of emancipation from 
“Washington fatigue,” a sense of exasperation shared by many political leaders in the 
developing world borne out of conditions placed by the World Bank or the IMF on the 
usage or distribution of money lent. From the GoE’s perspective, Chinese vendor-
financing arrangements have therefore three major benefits: economic and development 
policy autonomy; low interest rates and generous grace period; and infrastructure 
development with warranted profit-making capabilities. 
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Chinese financial institutions play key roles in vendor-financed projects like this 
one. The China Export-Import Bank, established in 1994, has a mission of promoting 
Chinese exports and FDI in infrastructure development including roads, power plants, 
telecommunications, and so on (Wang, 2007). China Development Bank (CDB), also 
established in 1994, is another key player that offers loans to Chinese firms. CDB is 
particularly appealing to Chinese multinationals that operate on projects in the African 
continent since it has launched an exclusive China-Africa Development Fund to support 
Chinese FDI in Africa. ZTE’s four-year contract to build a backbone mobile phone 
network in Ethiopia in 2006 was possible only because CDB handed ETC a 13-year, 
US$1.5 billion loan to finance the project. SINOSURE (China Export and Credit 
Insurance Corporation) is yet another Chinese financial institution that has since 2001 
provided insurance against the risks involved in Chinese exports and foreign investment 
(Renard, 2011).  
Such vendor financing and cheap financing arrangements between these banks 
and the likes of Huawei and ZTE tips the balance in the favor of the Chinese when it 
comes to competing with telecom equipment providers globally: 
China Development Bank’s support for Huawei and other Chinese companies is 
the cornerstone of the country’s “going out” policy, meant to nurture companies 
in telecommunications, alternative energy and oil. The bank’s low-interest loans 
dwarf those offered by U.S. and European development agencies, helping 
Shenzhen-based Huawei and crosstown rival ZTE Corp. increase market share” 
(Bloomberg News, 2011). 
 
The benefits of vendor financing projects worldwide are therefore even more 
lucrative to China, particularly in the long run. By extending extremely attractive 
financing to Chinese multinationals operating globally from its immense capital, China 
makes it possible for its companies, particularly State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), to 
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increase their leverage in securing global contracts and building a global brand name in 
the process. Clients in developing countries like Ethiopia will in turn find such low-cost 
financing irresistible. This puts traditional Western powerhouses in the global telecom 
sector like GE, Siemens, Nokia, and Ericsson in a disadvantage when competing for 
telecom markets in developing countries. While the practice of vender financing is also 
common in many Western countries, the size of capital China extends to its SOEs in this 
regard is incomparable.61  
While the logic in vendor-financing schemes with countries like Ethiopia seems 
to be represent a fundamentally win-win situation for the parties, there are some concerns 
about the nature of the deals. Although Chinese development banks provide capital for a 
much-needed infrastructure investment in Ethiopia, the long-term effects of these lending 
practices in areas ranging from good governance to sustainability remain unclear. David 
Shinn, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington 
University’s Elliott School of International Affairs and Former Ambassador of the United 
States to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, warns that Ethiopia might find it difficult to repay 
these huge amounts of loans, especially considering its enormous trade deficit with 
China: 
What China is doing is offering the use of multi-billion dollar loans which in 
theory will have to be paid back. Their terms are quite attractive in terms of 
interest rate but the fact is they are loans and, theoretically, they [the Ethiopians] 
are supposed to pay them all back. The idea was that Ethiopia was to ship certain 
products to China to pay down its loans but Ethiopia’s trade with China is a one-
way proposition. It is China selling products to Ethiopia, not Ethiopia sending 
much to China. I just don’t see how they are going to pay down those loans by 
shipping sesame seed and goat and cattle skins to China. It takes a long time to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Huawei has a $30 billion credit line with China Development Bank, while ZTE has a $15 billion credit 
line. Such support for Chinese multi-nationals extends to every sector that Chinese firms compete in 
globally. !
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pay a multi-billion dollar loan that way (D. Shinn, personal communication, 
November 28, 2013). 
 
There are also concerns about quality. Like many different places in the world, it 
is fair to say that the image problem that is associated with Chinese products is widely 
ingrained into Ethiopian society. Other concerns include long-term operational costs and 
lack of genuine technology transfer to Ethiopian experts that could potentially create 
support and operational dependency on Chinese telecom manufacturers and service 
providers (Geda & G/Meskel, 2001). An informant who works for ZTE as a technical 
trainer to end-users explains that the quality of products and services involving Chinese 
multinationals like ZTE has more to do with the competency of buyers than with the 
companies themselves. According to the informant, the marketing and operational 
strategies of ZTE and other Chinese companies are usually formulated based on an 
analysis of the level of expertise and expectation of the client. The informant believes 
that Ethio-Telecom finds itself at a disadvantage in this regard in that it can potentially 
receive substandard services because of its lack of know-how in making the most out of 
the deal: 
Normally once a system gets operational, you have to wait and observe it live in 
order to make sure it is stable. If the system is stable, the work should be 
transferred to local technicians unless there is a maintenance agreement in the 
deal. In many different circumstances after finishing my training, I get frowned 
upon by my superiors when I make arrangements for local staff to take over. It 
looks as if they want to sustain some form of dependency. You can see this in 
Ethiopia, where, long after Ethio-Telecom approved ZTE’s completion of the 
project, it is still Chinese technicians that are running the network (M. Fanta, 
personal communication, December 10, 2013).  
 
It is also common practice, according to the informant, that ZTE brings fresh 
college graduates with no work experience. This not only includes engineers and 
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information technology professionals but accountants and other human resources that are 
easily available in the Ethiopian labor market:  
Local staff at Ethio-Telecom are hardly getting any benefit from this arrangement. 
Chinese junior expatriates get all the experience and financial reward, after which 
they will go and work in other projects with senior positions. In this aspect, I am 
of the opinion that ZTE has made a mockery of the country (M. Fanta, personal 
communication, December 10, 2013).  
 
Mereid Bekele, IP Next Generation Network (NGN) Project Consultant at Ethio-
Telecom, admits there might have been some setbacks in the transfer of know-how to 
local professionals, but not in the scale and for reasons stated above: 
There are two types of training components—offshore and onshore—offered by 
ZTE to Ethiopian personnel in all the nine sub-projects involving mobile, fixed 
line, billing, etc. In addition, a team from ETC was involved in every work from 
design to implementation. So, in principle, all the right conditions were set for 
knowledge transfer to take place…I suspect there might have been attitudinal and 
operational gaps when it comes to actually running the system. For example, most 
Ethio-Telecom personnel have good expertise on Nokia and Ericsson systems. 
When ZTE came, it introduced a different standard that required a new set of 
skills. In this regard, there may have been circumstances where some personnel 
believed studying Chinese products wouldn’t benefit their careers. Regardless, we 
remedied these issues. Currently, ETC personnel who participated in the trainings 
are actively involved in upgrading and updating the system without Chinese 
assistance. We may still need assistance in advanced operations but Ethiopians 
carry out basic operations (M. Bekele, personal communication, November 28, 
2013). 
 
Most of the interviewees, who participated in the now completed ZTE mega 
telecom infrastructure project, agree there is an inaccurate and unfounded stereotype 
associated with Chinese multinationals operating in Ethiopia. Woldeloul Kassa, Data and 
Network Design Consultant at Ethio-Telecom, has more than 30 years of experience 
working for some of the big names in the information communication technology 
industry in Silicon Valley including, Cisco Systems and Apple. Kassa admits that he had 
his doubts about the Chinese before he got the opportunity to work with them in the ZTE 
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project. He now describes the Chinese as “formidable practitioners” with proven global 
experience: 
[The Ethiopian project] was not a guinea pig. They [ZTE] didn’t begin to do it 
here. They have done it in France, Sweden, Russia, Iran, India and whatnot. Your 
satisfaction comes from the extent to which you met your objectives. The rest of it 
is your personal bias and prejudice (W. Kassa, personal communication, 
December 15, 2013). 
 
Kassa’s emphasis on the importance of competency rather than idiosyncrasy when 
it comes to Chinese telecom multinationals has a lot of merit when looking at ZTE’s and 
Huawei’s records internationally. ZTE, a publicly-listed global provider of 
telecommunications equipment and network solutions with products ranging from 
“wireless, access & bearer, VAS, terminals and professional services,” is the fifth largest 
smart phone vendor with a market share of 4.3% in 2012 at a yearly growth rate of 48.4% 
(Smith, 2013). After making an initial public offering (IPO) in 1997, ZTE exponentially 
expanded its overseas sales and services with clients that include major global brands like 
MTN and Glo in Africa; Etisalat in the Middle East; Vodafone, Telefónica, Telstra, and 
France Telecom in Europe; and Telus, AT&T, Cricket, T-Mobile, Sprint, Verizon and 
Virgin Mobile in North America. It now provides products and services to over 500 
operators in more than 140 countries. ZTE Corporation’s major subsidiaries include ZTE 
(Australia) Pty Ltd., ZTE Deutschland GmbH, ZTE USA Inc., ZTE (HK) Ltd and ZTE 
do Brasil Ltda (ZTE Corporation, 2012). By the end of 2009, ZTE was one of the top 
three global vendors of GSM telecom equipment with a market share of 20%. ZTE is is 
also a global leader in telecommunications innovation. For the second year running, it 
was ranked first in international patent applications by World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) in 2012, exceeding other global multinationals like Panasonic, 
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Ericsson, Nokia and Alcatel-Lucent by some distance. This trend makes ZTE “one of the 
leading patent holders among vendors in the telecommunications industry internationally, 
having filed applications for 48,000 patents globally, with more than 13,000 patents 
granted” (ZTE Corporation, 2013). ZTE’s nine-month net profit from January to 
September 2013 registered US$90.5 million, a 132% increase from the previous year 
(ZTE Corporation, 2013). 
Like ZTE Corp., Huawei Technologies is headquartered at Shenzhen, China, 
although its assets, global outreach and profit margins enormously exceed that of ZTE’s. 
Founded in 1987 and registered as an employee-owned company, Huawei provides 
comprehensive and multi-platform telecom products and services that are related to radio 
access, fixed access, core network, transport network, data communication, network 
energy, application and software, server, storage, cloud computing, management and 
tools and network security. In 2012, Huawei became the world’s largest 
telecommunications equipment maker overtaking Swedish telecommunications 
equipment giant Ericsson. In the same year Huawei reported a net profit of US$2.5 
billion, a 33% rise from 2011. Huawei’s products and services have been deployed in 
more than 140 countries and it currently serves 45 of the world’s 50 largest telecoms 
operators (The Economist, 2012). 
In this sense, the image problem and quality concerns associated with Chinese 
telecom companies operating in Ethiopia may as well be part of the colonial narrative of 
associating everything good with Western business practices and relegating alternative 
models to a sub-standard levels. The assumption that Chinese telecom multinationals are 
in Ethiopia simply because of the political clout that they enjoy within the ruling party, 
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and not because of their competence and smart business strategy, is therefore unfounded. 
In reflecting on the level of his office’s satisfaction on the work done by ZTE, Bekele, IP 
Next Generation Network (NGN) Project Consultant at Ethio-Telecom, explains: 
Our goal is not comparing ZTE with Western telecom companies. Our key 
question was: Are the specific targets and requirements we designed met? It is 
true that we occasionally encountered some problems. Sometimes there were 
features that were not supported by ZTE. Other times there were things that we 
saw needed upgrading or replacement. But at the end of the implementation, yes, 
we have got what we wanted to get from them and we were content (M. Bekele, 
personal communication, November 28, 2013). 
 
Another important theme that emerged repeatedly in the conversation I had with 
key figures in the Ethiopian telecommunication sector related to the experience of 
working with ZTE is the extent to which Ethiopia appreciates the willingness of the 
Chinese to work flexibly beyond contractual agreement stipulations. This factor, 
according to Kassa, has helped Ethio-Telecom get more than what it aspired to harvest 
from the project: 
It terms of deliverables, it met our objectives by in large. We regimented them in 
a way we wanted them to do it. That is what we are proud of. Although we had 
constraints of time, scope and budget that we probably stretched a lot, we not only 
met our objectives, but also exceeded them in some areas (W. Kassa, personal 
communication, December 15, 2013).  
 
Gebremichael further elucidates Kassa’s observations by indicating that the 
malleable manner in which the Chinese operated throughout the lifespan of the project 
and beyond not only delivered more than twice the intended objectives of the project, but 
it also brought a sense of mutual understanding that is hard to come by when dealing with 
“other” vendors: 
The completed project had a goal of creating capacity of 8.5 million cellular lines 
as stated in the contact. Without adding any money, we were able to raise this 
number to 22-23 million through internal negotiations only by making some 
design changes. In every sense we found this business deal to be remunerative. 
! 280 
We sought each other and we respected each other. We were not treated as equals 
in our business ventures with others (D. Gebremichael, personal communication, 
December 12, 2013). 
 
Chinese Multinationals and Surveillance 
Global information communication technology and telecommunication industry 
today is a multi-trillion dollar industry. Gartner, Inc., a leading information technology 
research and advisory company, estimates worldwide IT spending in 2013 to be US$3.6 
trillion, a two percent increase from the previous year (Gartner, 2012). The growing 
importance of telecommunications is not measured in terms of monetary value alone, 
however. Growing concerns in cyber security have made even the most free market-
oriented states exercise implicit and explicit control over telecommunications operations 
(Comor, 1994; Janczewski and Colarik, 2008; National Research Council, 2008; Traynor, 
McDaniel & La, 2008).  
Today, the outcome of this line of thinking is epitomized by the marriage of 
telecommunications and cyber surveillance. According to the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF), The United States government and its National Security Agency 
(NSA), with assistance from major telecommunications carriers including AT&T and 
Verizon, have been engaging in a massive illegal surveillance of domestic 
communications and communications records of millions of ordinary Americans since at 
least 2001. In addition, the NSA reportedly has direct access to data held by internet 
giants including Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, Facebook, YouTube, Skype and Apple 
(Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013). In 2011, The Guardian newspaper wrote an expose 
about “Tempora,” a clandestine security electronic surveillance program used by the 
British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) that infiltrates fiber-optic 
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cables to gain access to large amounts of internet users’ personal data (MacAskill et al., 
2013). In China, “the Great Firewall of China” allows access to foreign websites to be 
filtered. According to Reporters without Borders, in addition to the usual routing 
regulations that allow access to an IP address or a particular domain name to be blocked, 
the Great Firewall of China “makes large-scale use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) 
technology to block access based on keyword detection” (Reporters without Borders, 
n.d.).  
In this sense, the notion of techno-optimism, or the belief that technology can 
continually be improved and can improve the lives of people, especially in enhancing 
freedom of speech is unrealistic, if not ludicrous. McChesney (2013) warns us that 
contrary to our notion that internet access is a protected democratizing tool, in fact, it is 
turning out to be a modern way for corporate interests to control and exploit the public. 
According to Morozov (2013b), notions like “cyber-utopianism” and net neutrality are 
hardly making a case for true democratic societies; rather, create paranoia of what he 
calls the “net delusion.” He further elaborates: 
As the Internet takes on an even greater role in the politics of both authoritarian 
and democratic states, the pressure to forget the context and start with what the 
Internet allows will only grow. All by itself, however, the Internet provides 
nothing certain. In fact, as has become obvious in too many contexts, it empowers 
the strong and disempowers the weak. It is impossible to place the Internet at the 
heart of the enterprise of democracy promotion without risking the success of that 
very enterprise” (pp. xvi-xvii). 
 
The technological deterministic assumption that once information communication 
technologies penetrate into authoritarian regimes they can bring about democratic 
governance, to say the least, is futile. Instead of being intimidated by the technological 
possibilities of the digital aura, authoritarian regimes and their subsidiaries in 
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collaboration with corporations are embracing and appropriating ICTs and 
telecommunications to strengthen their positions through sophisticated policing of 
citizens to stifle dissent. As Kalathil and Boas (2003) correctly point out, “the 
authoritarian state is hardly obsolete in the era of the Internet” (p. 136). They further 
argue: 
In fact, the state plays a crucial role in charting the development of the Internet in 
authoritarian regimes and in conditioning the ways it is used by societal, 
economic, and political actors. Through proactive policies such as instituting e-
government and wiring key industries, authoritarian regimes can guide the 
development of the Internet so that it serves state-defined goals and priorities (p. 
136). 
 
The EPRDF-led Ethiopian government has been implicated in ICT-assisted 
surveillance that had the goal of crushing dissent and hunting down opposition groups 
and critical citizens. A report by OpenNet Initiative (2009) highlights how the 
telecommunications service provider in Ethiopia blocks independent media, blogs and 
human rights sites. In 2010 the now defunct Addis Neger Online reported Ethiopian 
Satellite Television (ESAT), a Washington D.C. based television station critical of the 
Ethiopian government, was successfully jammed and deterred from public viewership in 
Ethiopia by the Information Network Security Agency (INSA), GoE’s cyber and 
information infrastructure security unit (“China Involved In,” 2010). In the same year, the 
Ethiopian government admitted of procurement and testing of jamming equipment that 
targeted Voice of America’s (VOA) broadcasts in Amharic. In 2012, Rapid7, a global 
security solutions company with regional headquarters in Boston, London and Hong 
Kong reported that Ethiopia was among a group of 10 countries that possessed the 
commercial spyware toolkit FinFisher, a surveillance suite made and sold by a subsidiary 
of the UK based Gamma Group (“Analysis Of The,” 2012). In early 2012, Ethiopian 
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government persecutors presented intercepted e-mails and phone calls as evidences in the 
trials of Reeyot Alemu, Woubshet Taye and Elias Kifle.62 Later in 2012, Tor, a network 
of virtual tunnels that allows people and groups to improve their privacy and security on 
the Internet, reported that Ethio-Telecom has started testing or applying Deep Packet 
Inspection (DPI) of all Internet traffic passing through its facilities (“Ethiopia Introduces 
Deep,” 2012).  
The growing list of legal frameworks adopted by the Ethiopian government 
between 2009 and 2013 equip the government with an unprecedented power to monitor 
targets. The Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Law of 2009 gives the National Intelligence and 
Security Services (NISS) the authority to “intercept or conduct surveillance on the 
telephone, fax, radio, internet, electronic, postal, and similar communications of a person 
suspected of terrorism,” and to enter any premise to install and intercept communications 
after obtaining a court warrant (OpenNet Africa, n.d.). On one hand, there are fears that 
the Ethiopian government is undertaking massive surveillance infrastructure and program 
development through INSA. In November 2013, the Ethiopian parliament endorsed a 
new proclamation giving INSA the power to investigate suspected computers, networks, 
Internet radio, television and social media platforms like Facebook. The agency is vested 
with “the power to conduct an information or computer-based critical infrastructure 
security audit at any time, and provide, for those that meet the criteria, a security standard 
approval certificate or delegate other bodies to perform such functions” (Abiye, 2013a). 
In the same year, the Ethiopian government has announced the reestablishment of NISS 
into an autonomous federal government office with extended powers to “lead intelligence 
and security work both inside and outside Ethiopia, formulate national security and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 See Chapter V for details. 
! 284 
intelligence policies and establish and run intelligence and security training institutions” 
(“National Intelligence And,” n.d.). Although the Ethiopian government reiterated the 
purpose of these legal frameworks in providing a much needed upgrading in guaranteeing 
“national security,” critics fear these tools will be used against citizens and groups that 
are critical of the government.  
Some of these concerns, amidst the reported rise of surveillance sponsored by the 
Ethiopian government, are exacerbated by the growing presence of Chinese 
multinationals in the Ethiopian telecom sector. According to Freedom House (2013), the 
provision of equipment, software and training related to jamming, blocking and 
surveillance operations by the Chinese to the Ethiopian government in the past has casted 
a doubt on whether ZTE and Huawei are solely in Ethiopia for telecom infrastructure 
development:  
Given allegations that the Chinese authorities have provided the Ethiopian 
government with technology that can be used for political repression—such as 
surveillance cameras and satellite jamming equipment—in the past, the new 
contracts have led to increasing fears that the Chinese may also be assisting the 
authorities in developing more robust internet and mobile phone censorship and 
surveillance capacities (p. 7). 
 
The problem is compounded because both ZTE and Huawei have been linked 
with some security threats and surveillance patterns in different parts of the world. In 
October 2012, the Intelligence Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives strongly 
urged American firms including AT&T and Verizon Wireless to discontinue their 
business relationship with Huawei and ZTE because of espionage allegations that warned 
the two Chinese telecom giants are being used by Beijing for spying on U.S. 
communications and vital systems (Committee on Intelligence, 2012). In another 
instance, Michael Hayden, former head of the NSA, claimed that Huawei had “shared 
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with the Chinese state intimate and extensive knowledge of the foreign 
telecommunications systems it is involved with” (McGregor, 2013). In the same year, 
ZTE Corp. was criticized for selling to Iran a powerful surveillance system capable of 
monitoring landline, mobile and Internet communications as part of a US$130.6 million 
contract for networking equipment it provided to the state-owned Telecommunication 
Company of Iran (TCI) (“China’s ZTE To,” 2012). In Australia, Huawei was barred from 
participating in a US$38 billion tender made by NBN Co.—an Australian government-
owned corporation tasked to design, build and operate Australia’s National Broadband 
Network—after the Australian Security Intelligence Organization warned against security 
threats posed by the Shenzhen-based Chinese telecom giant (“Australia Blocks Huawei,” 
2012).  
With multiple legal frameworks endorsing mass surveillance, growing evidence 
of ICT-assisted government monitoring of dissidents and the proliferation of telecom 
equipment providers with a global track record of selling surveillance products and 
services, the concern over ZTE’s and Huawei’s role in the Ethiopian telecommunications 
sector is warranted. In doing so, however, there is a need to take extreme discretion not to 
attribute surveillance as a product or service inherently associated with certain entities. 
Like pizza, LeBron James or PlayStation, surveillance is a commodity that is traded in an 
intricate global economy of a supply-demand chain. Surveillance is a multi-billion dollar 
industry that has exponentially grown since 2001 to register a US$13.5 billion market 
share in 2012. In this sense, China, like everyone else, is participating in a global market 
with a heightened thirst for surveillance technology. In this regard, Huawei and ZTE are 
not necessarily pushing any particular agenda themselves. Rather, they amplify and 
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operationalize, just like any other multinational corporation in the sector, whatever 
interest the given client has. As unfortunate as it may be, the truth is if the Ethiopian 
government cannot buy surveillance from China, it will shop it from Gamma, Trovicor or 
Amesys. Therefore, if ZTE and Hauwei end up building surveillance infrastructure for 
the Ethiopian government, it is fundamentally because they are making profit out of the 
project, not because doing so is an exclusively Chinese attribute to do. Nokia/Siemens 
sold to the Iranian government surveillance technology that let them monitor calls and 
track activists (Dehghan, 2009). Cisco, Nortel, Blue Coat, and many other major 
telecommunications equipment providers have had a history of selling network 
technologies to repressive regimes (Deibert, 2013).  
On that account, so long as information communication technologies continue to 
shape the nature and purpose of interpersonal, group and international communication, 
the commodification of surveillance technologies will only balloon. Unfortunately for 
dissidents in authoritarian regimes like Ethiopia, information communication 
technologies are likely to be advanced tools for control rather than channels of free 
speech. It is also important, however, to remember that for a sparsely connected country 
like Ethiopia, framing the contributions of ZTE and Huawei only through the lens of 
surveillance disregards the various benefits ordinary Ethiopians are getting as a result of 
this telecom infrastructure development made possible by special vendor-financing 
arrangements. As Cobus Van Staden, South African journalist and academic, highlights, 
as important as it is to be unapologetic for repressive uses of ICTs, the mere presence of 
communication infrastructure can have a profound impact on ordinary Ethiopians: 
Even though the Ethiopian government is using Huawei equipment to oppress 
free speech, the fact that Huawei networks are bringing 4G and 3G networks to 
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Ethiopia, to normal Ethiopians, has a lot of positive impact on their lives as well. 
Even if they can’t use this equipment for political speech, they use it to improve 
their lives in lots of other kinds of ways…I tend to think that even if political 
speech is kind of controlled, other kind of speech is enabled (“Pros And Cons,” 
n.d.) 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the relationship between China and Ethiopia in the 
Ethiopian telecommunications sector. It particularly emphasized the pros and cons of this 
partnership. It examined the sustainability of the Chinese approach; implications to users 
in terms of access and quality of services made possible by Chinese telecom 
multinationals; and myths and realities in fears of state-sponsored surveillance enabled by 
Chinese assistance.  
The next chapter provides a summary of key findings and concludes the 
dissertation. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly 80 years after the publication of John Maynard Keynes’s (1936) The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, the global economy is still debating 
where—between the state and markets—the key lies in achieving economic development. 
In spite of the hegemony of neo-liberalism and the seeming infallibility of Hayekian 
market fundamentalism in the past three decades, the financial and economic crisis of 
2008 has brought the role of the state back to the discussion. In addition, the rise of the 
BRIC and particularly that of the explosion of the Chinese economy in the past decade 
has bred a growing sense of confidence and legitimacy to interventionist states, 
particularly in the developing world. 
Ethiopia is one such developing country that strongly adheres to the notion of 
state intervention as a guiding principle to economic development. There is hardly any 
other sector in the Ethiopian economy that draws debates and controversy, externally and 
internally, on the pros and cons of state intervention as telecommunications does. It is in 
light of the enormous significance of this debate and the absence of a comprehensive 
treatise of literature, policy, the whys and wherefores of stakeholders and empirical 
evidence that this dissertation research has undertaken the challenge of providing such 
analysis. 
A comprehensive and critical examination of key issues in the Ethiopian 
telecommunication sector calls for an analysis of a host of factors, actors and ideologies 
including the external versus the internal; the ruling versus the governed; state versus 
markets; developmental versus neopatrimonial; monopoly versus deregulation; and so 
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much more. In order to address the philosophical foundations of these ideas and their 
significance to this study, this study adapted a multidisciplinary and multi-method 
approach. As such, using a theoretical framework informed by political economy of 
communications, development studies and political science, this study has explored the 
foundations, rationales and implications of ideologies in the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector. The rationale behind this cross-pollination of theories and 
disciplines is not only to project the complexity of the challenge but also to provide a 
more complete analysis. This chapter discusses significant findings of the study and 
highlights areas for further investigation.   
Major Findings 
This research was guided by four research questions that called for a 
comprehensive analysis of salient issues in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector. 
These include analysis of: telecommunications history in Ethiopia; causes and 
consequences of discontent and surveillance in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector; 
discourses informing (de)regulation ideologies and policies in the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector; and the proliferation of Chinese multinationals in 
telecommunications operations in Ethiopia. The following summary of findings is 
organized in a manner that addresses each of the research questions guiding this research. 
Research Question 1: What is the institutional history of telecommunications in 
Ethiopia? 
The origin of telecommunications in Ethiopia dates back to the end of the 19th 
century, making Ethio-Telecom, Ethiopia’s sole provider of telecommunications services, 
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the oldest Public Telecommunications Operator (PTO) in Africa. The founding of Addis 
Ababa as the permanent capital of the then Ethiopian mobile court resulted in 
manifestations of urbanization including the development of the first telephone services 
in 1894. Cross-country installation of telephone and telegraph infrastructure was 
facilitated by the construction of the Ethio-Djibouti railway between 1897 and 1899. 
Although many members of the Ethiopian court and clergy were initially cynical about 
this “foreign” import, Emperor Menelik II played an instrumental role in the expansion of 
telephone and telegraph services in different parts of the country. 
The first ministerial level communications-related institution of Ethiopia, the 
Ministry of Posts, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT), was founded in 1911. Although 
Ethiopia had a head start in adapting telecommunications technology compared to other 
African countries, a host of different factors, including the deteriorating health condition 
of Menelik II and subsequent succession power struggles following his death, stagnated 
the sector’s development. The five-years-long fight between the Ethiopian resistance and 
Italian forces during Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia between 1936 and 1941 had had a 
particularly devastating effect as both groups targeted communication infrastructures to 
weaken the enemy’s coordination strategies. 
Between 1952 and 1992, the telecommunications sector in Ethiopia underwent 
through major infrastructure development projects and institutional reforms. Of particular 
importance in these transformations was the role of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association 
(IDA), both of which provided close to US$256 million in loans for six 
telecommunication infrastructure development and expansion projects.  
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The 1980s and 1990 saw the majority of telecommunication operators across the 
developed world embracing liberalization and privatization with the rise of neo-liberal 
policies in the United States and across Western Europe. The four-decade long 
relationship between the Ethiopian state and the World Bank in the Ethiopian 
telecommunication sector came to an end as a result of the former’s dissent to join the 
growing tide of liberalization in global telecommunications. As a result, the 1990s were 
marked by infrastructure development impasse due to lack of financial sources. However, 
this has changed in the past decade as the Ethiopian telecommunications sector is 
aggressively expanding as a result of vendor financed Chinese assistance.  
Research Question 2: To what extent does the Ethiopian public endorse/denounce 
state monopoly of the telecommunications sector, and why? 
Criticisms toward the poor services of Ethio-Telecom, the sole 
telecommunications services in Ethiopia, have been increasing in the past few years in 
magnitude and frequency. Ethiopian nationals who participated in the online survey that 
was designed to measure public perception of the state of telecommunications in Ethiopia 
expressed strong dissatisfaction on the services they get from Ethio-Telecom. This user 
discontent is consistent with dismissive public opinion on the services of Ethio-Telecom 
that is commonplace in social media platforms like Facebook, where members of groups 
like “ETC Sucks: Disconnecting Ethiopia from the Future!” post their disapproval of the 
service provider. According to opinion gathered through the survey, so poor is the public 
approval of Ethio-Telecom that it only managed rank 3rd when compared to other state-
owned enterprises with low public approval ratings. 
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Another important finding shows how telecommunications and Internet 
governance policies adopted by the FDRE government have conditioned the behavior of 
the de facto users of Ethio-Telecom. These legal frameworks including the Telecom 
Fraud Offense Proclamation, the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and the Ethiopian 
Information and Communication Technology Development Authority Establishment 
Proclamation stipulate clauses with significant restrictions on users’ online experience 
and vaguely worded language of what are considered as offenses.  Some of these clauses 
also empower the government to proactively interfere in and monitor users’ activities. 
Consistent with this observation, respondents to the survey have identified “government 
control and interference” and “violations to privacy” as the two most important 
challenges facing the Internet in Ethiopia today next to “lack of access.” A majority of 
the respondents identified the government as the most likely entity that monitors their 
online activity ahead of web page administrators, employers and Internet cafés. The 
majority of the respondents believe that posting material critical of the government 
involves risks in the following order: detention, arrest or criminal investigation; verbal 
abuse and intimidation; and loss of employment or demotion. Consequently, three-thirds 
of the respondents reported of exercising self-censorship from posting content because of 
risks involved while 45% reported to have used circumvention tools in order to access 
blocked content. 
The majority of respondents associate the poor performance of Ethio-Telecom 
and rampant surveillance activities with state monopoly of telecommunications policy of 
the Ethiopian government. This is supported by public opinion gathered by the survey. 
While only a tenth of the participants of this study’s survey support the monopolistic 
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control of the telecommunication sector, two-thirds of the respondents replied in favor of 
liberalization. Regarding state interference and monitoring of citizens, one in two 
respondents believe that state control of the telecommunications sector evokes 
surveillance of citizens by the government. 
Research Question 3: What are the underlying reasons behind the differences in 
telecom liberalization policies between the IMF and the Ethiopian state? 
Since the coming to power of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) at the beginning of the 1990s, telecommunications liberalization has been 
a cause of intense confrontations with the IMF. The IMF is of the opinion that state 
control of telecommunications promotes inefficiency and stalls the growth of other 
sectors. According to the IMF, the private sector is most affected by the state monopoly 
of telecommunications in Ethiopia as the lack of quality and the inefficiency of Ethio-
Telecom’s services cause failure to deliver basic financial transactions. State monopoly 
of the telecommunications sector is also affecting the supply of capital in local banks as 
government borrowing for investment on telecommunications infrastructure development 
dries up financing that the private sector could have used. For the IMF, the monopoly 
arrangement is also less appealing for foreign direct investment that brings knowhow and 
financing with it. 
In defending its monopolistic approach, EPRDF argues market forces work 
contrary to the government’s direction toward achieving universal access and universal 
service in telecommunications. Market forces, EPRDF contends, have “imperfections” 
that call for state intervention so that equitable distribution of resources can be realized. 
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Secondly, EPRDF officials have repeatedly characterized the telecommunications sector 
as a “cash cow” that generates huge amounts of revenue for the state, which, in turn, is 
used to finance the expansion of the sector and other infrastructure projects. Thirdly, 
EPRDF, while resolutely dismissing foreign proprietorship, believes the 
telecommunications sector in Ethiopia cannot be liberalized because of the absence of a 
potent local private sector that can invest on the industry.  
Research Question 4: What are the premises on which Sino-Ethiopian partnerships 
in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector are laid? 
The emergence of China as a global economic giant in the past two decades has 
had a tremendous impact on changing dominant patterns of international relations and 
development trajectories. This is particularly evident in the growing partnership of China 
and Africa where the former, among other things, brought alternatives to traditional 
Western bilateral practices of tied aid, conditionalities and structural adjustments. 
Policies like targeted debt relief, cheap loans linked to infrastructure development, 
political “non-interference” in the internal policies of African countries have made China 
popular within the circle of the African political elite. This approach was particularly 
attractive to EPRDF officials who deplored the West’s insistence on liberal democracy, 
human rights and free market economy.  
The proliferation of Chinese telecommunications multinationals ZTE Corporation 
and Huawei into the historically shielded Ethiopian telecommunication conforms to this 
development. EPRDF finds Chinese vendor-financing arrangements extremely attractive 
as they bring about economic and development policy autonomy; low interest rates and 
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generous grace period; and infrastructure development with warranted profit-making 
capabilities. However, critics warn that Chinese-Ethiopian trade relations reflect a one-
way traffic and that Ethiopia might find it difficult to repay these huge amounts of loans, 
especially considering its enormous trade deficit with China. Other critics single out 
concerns over substandard services from Chinese multinationals because of lack of 
know-how in making the most out of the deal from Ethiopia’s end. While some of these 
fears still persist, Ethio-Telecom consultants argue that Chinese telecommunication 
multinationals have a proven experience around the world in telecommunications 
infrastructure development, and that the problem of quality arises not from the 
inefficiency of the Chinese expertise but rather from lack of local know-how in 
maneuvering the installed infrastructure. 
China’s history of helping repressive regimes with censorship, blocking, 
jamming, content filtering and surveillance technologies has brought a significant amount 
of concern as well. Reports of Chinese empowered widespread surveillance undertaken 
by the Ethiopian government, particularly on dissidents, have made critics skeptical about 
the Chinese presence in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector. While this is a valid 
argument, what is missing is the fact that surveillance is a commodity made available by 
the global capitalist order. China, like everyone else, is participating in this global 
market. In fact, the commodification of surveillance has historically been promoted by 
popular Western brands like Cisco, Nortel and Blue Coat. In this sense, while fears of 
state-sponsored surveillance in Ethiopia made possible by Chinese technologies and 
know-how are, unfortunately, warranted to the detriment of political speech, other forms 
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of speech are made possible dues to Chinese-assisted telecommunication infrastructure 
development. 
Future Research Directions 
Although this study attempted to pursue a comprehensive analysis of salient 
issues in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector, it was naturally limited by its scope 
and foci. Some of the limitations of this study are related to methodological issues while 
others are linked with restraints in access, time and resources. This is further discussed in 
Chapter IV. However, the issues I explored and the research questions I attempted to 
address throughout this study have helped me identify a plethora of potential future lines 
of research on the Ethiopian telecommunication sector in particular and international 
communications systems in general.  
Some previous studies have been emphatic about the impact and spillover effects 
of telecommunications services and information communication technologies on 
economic development and poverty reduction (Claudio, 2005; Heeks, 2010; Kleine, 
2013, Robert and Ajay, 2008). Development communication scholars have particularly 
been interested in researching the role of communication in poverty reduction, social 
welfare and conflict resolution in developing countries (McPhail, 2009; Melkote and 
Steeves, 2001). The growing access to mobile communication in Ethiopia provides an 
important challenge in this regard. A scientific investigation into this growing accessory 
of everyday life embraced by people from all walks of life will add an important 
empirical perspective on the relationship (or not) between information communication 
technologies and development indicators like poverty reduction; increase in literacy; 
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gender equality and empowerment; improvement in child and maternal health; combating 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; and environmental sustainability.   
An interesting observation I made in the course of doing this research is the lack 
of literature on a comparative analysis of global telecommunications ownership models. 
Whereas states and markets are still the most important forces that dominate the 
discourse of telecommunication operations globally, research that is informed by a 
comprehensive comparison of alternative models is missing. 
Another important area to research is the political economy of global 
telecommunications. In spite of the fact that the global telecommunication bazaar is a 
trillion dollar business, which is more than any other media-related industry, it is 
surprising that a comprehensive literature in the area is lacking. From China Telecom, the 
world’s largest telecom operator that boasts over 700 million subscribers, to Mexico’s 
América Móvil and everyone in between and beyond, global telecommunications is a 
gigantic and intricate marketplace that calls for a scholastic inquiry of international 
magnitude. 
Concluding Remarks 
One of the remaining few countries to exercise state-monopoly of 
telecommunications, Ethiopia provides a rare insight into the promises and challenges of 
a counter-neo-liberal arrangement of infrastructure development and service delivery. In 
contemplating about this scenario and the course I have taken in assessing this situation, 
three things have stood out for me. 
i. It is an intriguing thought that a poor Third World country like Ethiopia stands 
up against the relentless profit-driven pressures of global capitalism. The 
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notions of universal service and universal access, as utopian and egalitarian 
they are, are important to uphold if the poor are to be served and if equitable 
development is to be realized. Although the Ethiopian case may be an 
anomaly, it informs us notions like sovereignty are not yet as blurred as global 
capitalism paints them to be. 
ii. EPRDF’s dogmatic creed of state monopoly of telecommunications in 
Ethiopia needs a serious rethinking. While the arguments for universal access 
and universal service are important to uphold, they can be achieved in a non-
monopolistic arrangement involving public-private partnerships.  
iii. The friction between forces of state monopoly and those of liberalization are 
increasingly getting insignificant to end-users. The external push for 
liberalization is not interested in serving the communication needs of end 
users in Ethiopia as much as it is interested in upholding the interest of 
transnational corporations and their profit-driven ethos. The Ethiopian state, 
on the other hand, seems to be less interested in providing quality service to 
its de facto users and more interested in using public infrastructure to exercise 
mass surveillance of citizens and exert control. If anything, in the battle for 
power between states and markets, end-users are the real losers, at least in 
Ethiopia.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
ACRONYMS 
 
AAU: Addis Ababa University  
ADF: African Development Fund 
AfDB: African Development Bank 
ANDM: Amhara National Democratic Movement  
AU: Africa Union 
BADEA: Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 
BTE: Board of Telecommunications of Ethiopia  
CACF: China-Africa Consultative Forum  
CDB: China Development Bank 
CDMA: Code Division Multiple Access 
CET: China Electric Power Equipment and Technology Co, Ltd 
CCP: Chinese Communist Party 
CPJ: Committee to Protect Journalists 
CSA Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia 
EDC: Export Development Canada 
EDU: Ethiopian Democratic Union  
DFID: Department for International Development 
ECCSA: Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce & Sectorial Associations 
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States 
EFF: Electronic Frontier Foundation  
! 300 
EICTDA: Ethiopian Information and Communication Technology Development 
Authority  
EPA: Ethiopian Privatization Agency 
EPDM: Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement 
EPLF: Eritrean People’s Liberation Front  
EPRDF: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front  
EPRP: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party  
ESAT: Ethiopian Satellite Television 
ETA: Ethiopian Telecommunications Authority; Ethiopian Telecommunications 
Agency 
ETC: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation 
EU: European Union 
EUS: Ethiopian University Service 
EXIM: Export-Import Bank 
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment 
FDRE: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
FOCAC: Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 
GCHQ: British Government Communications Headquarters  
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
GERD: Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
GoE: Government of Ethiopia 
GSM: Global System for Mobile Communications 
GTP: Growth and Transformation Plan 
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HDI: Human Development Index 
HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
HRW: Human Rights Watch 
IBTE: Imperial Board of Telecommunications of Ethiopia 
IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ICTs: Information Communication Technologies 
IDA: International Development Association 
IFIs: International Financial Institutions 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
ITU: International Telecommunications Union 
INSA: Information Network Security Agency 
LDCs: Least Developed Countries 
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals  
MEISON: All Ethiopian Socialist Movement  
MICT: Ministry of Information & Communication Technology  
MoFED: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of Ethiopia 
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement 
NBE:  National Bank of Ethiopia 
NISS: National Intelligence and Security Service 
NSA: National Security Agency 
OAU: Organization of African Unity 
ODA: Official Development Assistance 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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OLF: Oromo Liberation Front 
OPDO: Oromo People’s Democratic Organization  
PASDEP: Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
PDRE: People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
PMAC: Provisional Military Administrative Council 
PRSPs: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers  
PTT: (Ministry of) Posts, Telegraph and Telephone  
SAPs: Structural Adjustment Programs 
SDPRP: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program 
SDRs: Special Drawing Rights 
SEPDC: Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic Coalition  
SEPDF: Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic Front 
SINOSURE: China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation 
TPLF: Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front 
TGE: Transitional Government of Ethiopia  
UK: United Kingdom 
UNECA: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
US: United States 
USAID: United States Agency for International Development 
VOA: Voice of America 
VOIP: Voice Over Internet Protocol 
VSAT: Very Small Aperture Terminal  
WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization 
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WPE: Workers’ Party of Ethiopia  
WTO: World Trade Organization 
ZTE: Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment 
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APPENDIX B 
ONLINE SURVEY COSENT FORM (ENGLISH) 
 
Dear Research Participant: 
 
My name is Téwodros Workneh, and I am a doctoral student at the Department of 
Journalism & Communication, University of Oregon.  I would like to invite you to 
participate in my research study that explores public opinion about the ownership model 
of the Ethiopian telecommunication sector and its relationship with customer satisfaction, 
governance and democracy, development, surveillance and privacy issues.  You may 
participate if you are an Ethiopian national of 18-years-old and above getting landline, 
mobile or Internet services from Ethio-Telecom. 
The purpose of this study is to explore salient issues like ownership model, infrastructure 
development and privatization discourses in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector 
presently. If you choose to participate, you will be answering questions with themes of: 
the state of the Ethiopian telecom sector today; challenges and prospects of the state-
monopoly model of the sector; and the role of external stakeholders in the Ethiopian 
telecommunication sector. The survey will take about 15 minutes to complete.  
Participating in this study may not benefit you directly, but it will help us learn identify 
challenges in the delivery of services in the Ethiopian telecommunication sector. You 
may skip any question you don’t want to answer and you may end the interview at any 
time. There are no payments associated with participating in this study, and there is no 
cost to you to participate in this research study.  
Your questionnaire responses will be strictly confidential and data from this research will 
be reported in the dissertation aggregately and anonymously. You will not be asked of 
you name. If you would like a summary of my findings, you will be able to enter your 
email address at the end of the survey. 
Data will be collected through the survey software tool “Qualtrics” (www.qualtrics.com), 
a highly reliable and professional portal. Only the researcher will be able to access the 
database through a unique combination of username and password that is not shared with 
anyone else. Once the survey is closed, I will perform data analysis on the same software 
and download the results to my computer, which is placed in a locked office. There is no 
foreseeable danger associated with participating in this survey. You will not be asked to 
provide open ended and elaborate responses to issues of government policy in the 
Ethiopian telecommunications sector. For your own comfort, please make sure to close 
your browser after completing the survey. The risk associated with breach of 
confidentiality in this research is that of data security. The researcher cannot guarantee 
total data security in the unlikely event of data damage, interception, and/or corruption. In 
the unlikely scenario of breach of confidentiality, no harm is anticipated on you.  
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Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and there are no foreseeable risks 
associated with it. However, if you feel uncomfortable answering any questions, you can 
withdraw from the survey at any point. It is very important for me to learn your opinions. 
If you have any questions about this study, please contact me at tworkneh@uoregon.edu. 
My faculty advisor is Leslie Steeves, who may be reached at lsteeves@uoregon.edu. If 
you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact: 
Research Compliance Services, University of Oregon at (541) 346-2510 or 
ResearchCompliance@uoregon.edu. You may copy this consent form or print it for your 
records and future reference. 
 
Statement of Consent 
I have read the contents of this consent form and have been encouraged to participate in 
this survey.  I have received answers to my questions.  I give my consent to participate in 
this study.  I have received a copy of this form. 
 
          ___________________________                              ______________________ 
Digital Signature (first and last name initials)                                  Date 
 
 
By putting your initials and clicking “submit form” you are giving consent to participate 
in this survey. 
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APPENDIX C 
ONLINE SURVEY COSENT FORM (AMHARIC) 
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c/'Z#I!;$%)_!ù9a! /$!#b{''!!;$2Ü%!/N!cj6!;v3!cÇz|d!3!:!!#$%&D f% SHì% 
UGÉ8Z û(ü 8US†I #bpj~ lv3 ;`GVé `°|¢ 7V #W£Vj c"z¢-D 5DRZ/ÇNä 
VG#ÉÜ: V4 N1§ ;pÉ^H3I 7V #'`Å|' 3!:  
`|õ #bÅ;Å;! “Qualtrics” (www.qualtrics.com) ;'68 5•S c/'UUH ôAI!1 3! : 
`|õ-¶D  `GÇN #b8! #$%& 68OI dß uvD `|õ-¶D #Z] ®Vy 9Ü ;N/öz_ 9Ñ)% 
;V8A Éj VG;ÉÜ: `GVé l'G%ÇÇ ;©7 !™ì¶ NDqFN '´jî ;b´V ¨.≠ !/$ 68 
JNá<'1 VC6Ü: 5e4 `GV2 7V l`('A E1 'ZVÆ ël'j #bj NDN c^E #8N: `DS/I 
lWIXYZ ,[JK=LMD \1A E1 ;'ZZ\ /78! Øëu UdzTZ #bGV2 QAI $Zã ;e4 `GV2 7V 
cVí1N: 8'°UT $DÉã `GVéD mj'! ;b°1å;I qF #"| Cù UÅ¢ `(TZ-D `ÄEI-D 
cV1å: 
`GVéD lUG%Ç2- ;*I #W£Vj c"z¢-D #U/C6I cUz∞ c8-I: #$%&D f% f% SHì 
8US†I 8US†I #bpj~ lv3 dß #W£Vj c"z¢-D Z/C±: #W£Vj c"z¢- #bZ\! l[y 
c"z¢- E1 ;$2Ü uvD ;V8A Éj ;bG;2 ®Vj #$%& 68OI #Sj JNá<'1 !/$ VÇ`ój: 
#$%& 68OI #W£Vj c"z¢-D #$%&D f% f% SHì 8`7Q dß cD" qF VGÇUj: $%& 
;c$≤! cU{T Jb, ls^Ç% #$%& f% f% SHì l'7i  ;©7 #W£Vj c"z¢-D #Z\! ®Vj 
5DRG® V^|Ejç lc$≤! #W£Vj c{!DIN VÅ|≥j: le4 $%I E1 ëZZÄ #bj c^E ¨í1 
#`|õ $;É ~tV 3!: c$≤! AúN #v3 #`|õ $;ÉD ëZ|ES$ #UVj6x! 5D^ #¥V|/ $ÉI 
#`(ÅÜ 9Ñ)- ëZC$K VÜ Vv%j: NDN 5DâD V4 #blÅI;I cEób ;óN G6d ¨vDN 
#'lÅ' 5D^v3 SD c1/- 7V #bZ/lI8! NDN ~tI #8N: 
;"Eb!8U/)0/!Z4j!;e4!$%I!7V!Z8-I!'(Iî!KÜ!;KÜ!;pÉ^H3I!7V!#'`Å|'!3!:!;$%&!7V!
l`('A-!E1!;'ZZ\!NDN!#bZÅE-!3C1!#8N:!V9D!5Dï!8``8/!#UVpj~I!$Zã!{EGN-I!
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APPENDIX D 
ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH) 
 
 
1. Gender 
!Male          
!Female  
 
2. Age 
!18-24 years old 
!25-34 years old 
!35-44 years old 
!45-54 years old 
!55-64 years old 
!65-74 years old 
!75 years or older 
 
3. Place of residence 
!In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
!In one of the regional capitals, Ethiopia 
!A town in Ethiopia 
!Suburban Ethiopia 
!Rural Ethiopia 
!Outside of Ethiopia 
 
4. Monthly income 
!Less than 1000 ETB 
!1000-2000 ETB 
!2000-3000 ETB 
!3000-5000 ETB 
!5000-10000 ETB 
!More than 10,000 ETB 
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5. Education level 
!No schooling completed 
!Nursery school to 8th grade 
!Some high school, no diploma 
!High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent  
!Some college credit, no degree 
!Trade/technical/vocational training 
!Bachelor’s degree (BA, BSc, BEd) 
!Master’s degree (MA, MSc, MPhil) 
!Professional degree (MD, JD) 
!Doctorate degree (PhD) 
 
6. Employment status 
!Student 
!Employed 
!Self-employed 
!Out of work and looking for work 
!Out of work but not currently looking for work 
!Retired 
!Other 
 
7. Marital Status 
!Single 
!Married  
 
8. Do you use a mobile phone service? 
!Yes 
!No  
 
If your answer to question #8 is “yes,” please answer questions 8a-8e 
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8a. How many active mobile phones do you own? 
!None 
!One 
!Two 
!Three 
!More than three 
 
 
8b. Generally speaking, how important would you say the mobile phone is in your 
life? 
!Very important 
!Somewhat important 
!Not vey important 
!Not at all important 
 
8c. Approximately, how much of your monthly income do you spend on top-up cards 
for your mobile phone services? 
!Nothing 
!Less than 5% 
!Between 6%-10% 
!Between 11%-20% 
!Between 21%-40% 
!More than 40% 
 
8d. How would you describe the role of mobile phones in your professional life? 
!The nature of my work completely depends on my mobile phone 
!The nature of my work sometimes requires me using my mobile phone 
!The nature of my work doesn’t require me using my mobile phone 
 
8e. What kind of mobile phone do you own? 
!I have a basic mobile phone that has calling and texting capabilities 
!I have a mobile phone that has calling, texting and camera capabilities but has 
limited or no Internet functionalities 
!I have a smartphone that has calling, texting, camera and Internet functionalities 
that include the capability to download and use different applications. 
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9. Do you use the Internet? 
!Yes 
!No  
 
If your answer to question #9 is “yes,” please answer questions 9a-9e 
 
9a. Generally speaking, how important would you say the Internet is in your life? 
!Very important 
!Somewhat important 
!Not vey important 
!Not at all important 
 
9b. Approximately, how much of your monthly income do you spend on your Internet 
subscription? 
!Nothing 
!Less than 5% 
!Between 6%-10% 
!Between 11%-20% 
!Between 21%-40% 
!More than 40% 
 
Qc. How would you describe the role of Internet in your professional life? 
!The nature of my work completely depends on the Internet 
!The nature of my work sometimes requires me using the Internet 
!The nature of my work doesn’t require me using the Internet 
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9d. At which of the following places do you use the Internet regularly? Please check 
all that apply. 
 
 Always Most of 
the time 
Sometimes Occasionally Never 
Home ! ! ! ! ! 
Work ! ! ! ! ! 
On the go 
(mobile device) ! ! ! ! ! 
School ! ! ! ! ! 
Other location ! ! ! ! ! 
 
9e. On average how often do you use the Internet? 
!1  
!2  
!3  
!4  
!5 
!6  
!7 
 
9f. How comfortable are you using the Internet? 
!Very comfortable 
!Somewhat comfortable 
!Somewhat uncomfortable 
!Very uncomfortable 
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9g. How often, if at all, do you use social media (e.g. facebook, twitter, LinkedIn etc.)? 
!1  
!2  
!3  
!4  
!5 
!6  
!7 
 
9h. For what purposes do you use the Internet? 
  
 Always Usually About half the 
time 
Occasionally Never 
Work related ! ! ! ! ! 
Education ! ! ! ! ! 
Entertainment ! ! ! ! ! 
Information 
gathering 
! ! ! ! ! 
Social networking ! ! ! ! ! 
Activism ! ! ! ! ! 
Advertisement/Pro
motion 
! ! ! ! ! 
 
 
10. How satisfied are you with the service you get from Ethio-Telecom? 
!I am very satisfied 
!I am somehow satisfied 
!I am somehow not satisfied 
!I am not satisfied 
 
11. The following are some of the major state-owned organizations or institutions. How 
much are you satisfied with the service they provide? Please rank them from 1-4 (To 
rank them in order of your preference, click on the name of the 
organization/institution and drag it up or down). 
Ethio-Telecom 
Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation 
Water and Sewage Authority 
Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency 
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12. Which one of the following statements do you agree with? 
!The Internet solves more problems than it creates 
!The Internet creates more problems than it solves 
 
13. Which of the following Ethiopian development priorities (reflected in the Growth and 
Transformation Plan and Millennium Development Goals) do you believe the Internet 
has a role in achieving? 
 
 Definitely Probably Probably 
not 
Definitely 
not 
Not 
sure 
Economic growth and 
poverty reduction 
! ! ! ! ! 
Quality education and 
training 
! ! ! ! ! 
Infrastructure 
development 
! ! ! ! ! 
Gender equality ! ! ! ! ! 
Health and 
HIV/AIDS prevention 
! ! ! ! ! 
Environmental 
protection and 
sustainability 
! ! ! ! ! 
Good governance and 
corruption eradication 
! ! ! ! ! 
Protection of civil and 
human rights 
! ! ! ! ! 
Universal equity and 
social justice 
! ! ! ! ! 
Participatory 
democracy and civic 
engagement 
! ! ! ! ! 
 
14. What is the biggest concern facing the Internet today? 
!User privacy 
!Spam and other unwanted traffic 
!Copyright and intellectual property issues 
!Government control and interference 
!Lack of Internet access 
!Usability by multiple languages 
! 315 
!Nothing/none 
 
15. Do you know of a website that you cannot access from within Ethiopia? 
!Yes 
!No 
!I am not sure 
 
16. There should be no restriction on accessing lawful content/services via the Internet. 
!Agree 
!Agree somehow 
!Disagree  
 
17. Having a choice of telecom service providers is important. 
!Agree 
!Agree somehow 
!Disagree  
 
18. The ability to share and access information privately using the Internet is important to 
me. 
!Agree 
!Agree somehow 
!Disagree  
 
19. National filtering in my country is beneficial to society. 
!Agree 
!Agree somehow 
!Disagree  
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20. In your opinion, is national filtering for adults acceptable in the following categories? 
(Check all that apply) 
 
 Yes No Maybe 
Sexual content ! ! ! 
Religious content ! ! ! 
Political content ! ! ! 
Downloading of copyrighted media ! ! ! 
Social networking ! ! ! 
Dating sites ! ! ! 
Hacking content ! ! ! 
Circumvention/proxy/anonymity tools ! ! ! 
 
21. I believe people or organizations monitor the activities I perform over the Internet. 
!Agree 
!Agree somehow 
!Disagree  
 
22. How capable do you think each of the following people or organizations are of 
monitoring your online activities? 
 
 Definitely Probably Probably 
not 
Definitely not Not 
sure 
Government ! ! ! ! ! 
Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) 
! ! ! ! ! 
Websites visited or 
search engines 
! ! ! ! ! 
Family/spouse ! ! ! ! ! 
Employer/company ! ! ! ! ! 
Internet café ! ! ! ! ! 
Advertisers ! ! ! ! ! 
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23. What do you think are the risks of posting material critical of the government in 
Ethiopia? 
 
 Definitely Probably Probably 
not 
Definitely 
not 
Not 
sure 
Detention, arrest, or 
criminal investigation 
! ! ! !  
Monetary fine ! ! ! !  
Violence directed at 
self or family 
! ! ! !  
Public reporting of 
internet activity 
! ! ! !  
Loss of employment or 
demotion 
! ! ! !  
 
24. Have you ever exercised self-censorship in posting content because of the risks 
involved? 
!Yes 
!No 
!Not sure 
 
25. Do you or have you ever used circumvention tools in order to access blocked content?  
!Yes 
!No 
!Not sure 
 
26. How does it make you feel if you were to know the government monitors your online 
and phone activities? 
!I’d be happy 
!I don’t care 
! Worried 
 
 
27. Generally speaking, how much interest would you say you have in what’s going on in 
government and public affairs? 
!A great deal 
!A fair amount 
!No interest  
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28. People like me don’t have any say about what the government does. 
!Agree 
!Agree somehow 
!Disagree 
 
29. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right? 
!Just about always 
!Most of the time 
!Only some of the time 
!Almost never 
 
30. Which comes closer to your view regarding the telecom sector in Ethiopia? (Please 
check all that apply) 
!The state needs to continue its monopolistic control of the telecom sector. 
!The telecom sector should be liberalized. 
!The more the number of telecom service providers, the better the quality and the 
cheaper the price of services. 
!State control of the telecom sector is crucial for the development goals of the 
country. 
!The government needs to continue its ownership of the telecom sector in order to 
defend national security threats. 
!State control of the telecom sector brings about monitoring and surveillance of 
citizens by the government. 
 
31. Broadly speaking, how do you identify your position toward the economic and 
development policies of the Ethiopian governing body? 
!Supportive 
!Partially supportive 
!Critical 
!Independent 
!Unconcerned 
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Q32. Broadly speaking, how do you identify your position toward the political direction 
and behavior of the Ethiopian governing body? 
!Supportive 
!Partially supportive 
!Critical 
!Independent 
!Unconcerned 
 
 
The survey ends here. Again, thank you for your cooperation. If you would like to get the 
findings and the concluding remarks of the study, please write your email address below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
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APPENDIX E 
ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE (AMHARIC) 
 
1. !" 
! #$% 
! &' 
 
2. (%) 
! 18-24 
! 25-34 
! 35-44 
! 45-54 
! 55-64 
! 65-74 
! 75 #*+ ,-. /0* 
 
3. 123. 4" (123. 4" 56' 78$ .9/' :;<$ =>.10?' @AB *8$ 7$C 78$ D9/' :;< 
:%:' #E #*+ ,-. /0* .FGH I$JK@ /L' =@/M/'$ 4" I$J 123. 4" N#:O *P09)    
! 7Q: 7/D 
! %RSTU 1VWU 7S5U X$JE #*+ YTZ 
! D[E SEU \5U J&U \\]U ^_1`a bc;d #*+ efE 
! #0*" ghU 7ED +$iU KZ(jU @V+'a 7k0U Q0 #*+ Jlf lEY$ 
! ,0* ,mnVo' ,m5pP Aq 
 
4. #EYr sb 
! ,1000 lE /"P 
! /1000 Ij 2000 lE 1t,F 
! /2000 Ij 3000 lE 1t,F 
! /3000 Ij 5000 lE 1t,F 
! /5000 Ij 10000 lE 1t,F 
! ,10000 lE /0* 
 
5.  ='+[E' Jfu 
! 1J/v '+[E' 7Fm,"mFw+ 
! :+$mv ?;F$ xE^68  
! 86mv Jfu '+[E' y' slz68 {$ 70njVw+  
! 86mv Jfu '+[E' y' 7nj|}.68 
! =,;mv '+[E' m~+ slz68 (#*+ sl @/E){$ 70njVw+ 
! =Ä. #*+ Å?ÇtF :Fnj #:É m1E}.68  
! ,,;mv '+[E' m~+ =DP6E Q{3 +M| @Ñ (BA, BSc, BEd)  
! ,,;mv '+[E' m~+ =5:mE: Q{3 +M| @Ñ (MA, MSc, MPhil) 
! ,,;mv '+[E' m~+ =ÖÜáàjF Q{3 +M| @Ñ (JD, MD)  
! ,,;mv '+[E' m~+ =h?'R' Q{3 +M| @Ñ (PhD)  
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6. !"# $%& 
! '() 
! '*+) 
! !,- "# 
! "# ./0 
! "# !1234 1056 !78#9 :;< !123 
! =>'? 
! @/ 
 
7. !A<B $%& 
! C/DE$3 
! E19FG H2 
 
8. !'I*;JK 8-L CD-,M9 'NJO HP9? 
! CP H2 
! CQR1$3 
 
1STU 8 7-8P “CP H2” VWH XELP V8Y X8V 8Z T[9I STUP\ Q7-]^ 
 
8Y. 3I T_- CD-,M9 X!`= T[ !'I*;JK 8-L 787a\ C1P9? 
! CIb 
! $19  
! c89 
! Vc89 d/Q 
 
81. dNe//6 fD7,g9 !'I*;JK 8-L CD-,M9 dhQi9P 68S 3I T_- C8./0 H6? 
! d+3 C8./0 H6 
! d7Nj T8.-A- 
! TI T_- C8./0 CQR13 
! kGl C8./0 CQR13 
 
8m. 1'I*;JK 8-L CD-,M9 !OTi=9 iG:n LoT VNe// !iG DpP d,39 3I T_[I 
QWq-? 
! 3I3 LoT !1<23 
! V5% d&\ 
! V6 X8V 10% CrEp 
! V11 X8V 20% CrEp 
! V21 X8V 40% CrEp 
! V40% d/Q 
 
87. !'I*;JK 8-L CD-,M9 d8#P /Q 3I CQH9 Oq Qsi&-? 
! !8#t E_)Q d'I*;JK 8-L CD-,M9 /Q g[ dg[ !'7>uv H6 
! !8#t E_)Q CIFIb 05 !'I*;JK 8-L CD-,M9I Q.-A- 
! !8#t E_)Q !'I*;JK 8-L CD-,M9I CQ.-,3 
 
! 322 
8!. "#$%$& '()*+"& ,-*./0 123  4- 4- 56$& 57289& 6:;2? 
! <= >?@8A B*"2C 5DEF 'GHI B2J3KL- BM#N< 
! <= >?@8A B*"2C 5DEF 'GHI B2J3KL- BM#N<C OK8PI >-.&A QRS 
BT@G 
! <= >?@8A B*"2C 5DEF 'GHI B2J3KL- BM#N<C OK8PI >-.&A QRS 
BT@GC U-,FV& W6 ',B@XY 57289KL- B1)&C B,8"=Z[L- (applications) 
>\@?A B)*4 
 
9. 'U-,FV& 57289& ,)/( $[&? 
! 5[ $% 
! 56]MH4 
 
M<Z^ 9 B21[ “5[ $%” _`$ ab3[ _9c a1_ 9d Ze&- <Z^[L 6B2fg 
 
9c. ")TWW\ h7B8+& 'U-,FV& 57289& "i6N&[ \1< 4- Zj2 51kWl $\? 
! ";4 51kWl $\ 
! "B)m Z1k2n2 
! Z- Zj2 51kWl 56]M4  
! oFp 51kWl 56]M4  
 
9M. MU-,FV& 57289& '(ZNq& NFrs 3IZ _)TWW 'NF 7t[ "84& 4- Zje- 6`A2? 
! 4-4 3IZ 'Mu%4 
! _5% "vL 
! _6 a1_ 10% 5wbt 
! _11 a1_ 20% 5wbt 
! _21 a1_ 40% 5wbt 
! _40% "W6 
 
9x. 'U-,FV& 57289& "yP[ W6 4- z6$& (A 6DNv2? 
! 'yP{ bi=6 "U-,FV& 57289& W6 +e "+e ',B@X| $\  
! 'yP{ bi=6 5-}-? l~ 'U-,FV& 57289&- 6k2n2 
! 'yP{ bi=6 'U-,FV& 57289&- 56k284 
 
9B. "(_,e& v[L W6 U-,FV&- 4- Zj2 6)*>e?  
 
 H2l~ "5uÄÅ\ "_Ç2 5-}-? 
l~ 
kGÉ 
52)*44 
BÑ=Z Ö&  !  !  !  !  !  
&4jF& Ö&  !  !  !  !  !  
yP v !  !  !  !  !  
U-,FV& wÜ !  !  !  !  !  
B-7? W6 
(M4.á 
",-*./0 
123 N64 
"vuá&)  
!  !  !  !  !  
áW v !  !  !  !  !  
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9!."#$%& '() $% *+, -%(-.&) /0%123& 45,67&% 89-:;? 
! 1  
! 2  
! 3  
! 4  
! 5 
! 6  
! 7 
 
9<. "9=>>' /0%123& 49?-$ @+7&A% B%C& 85D6EF,? 
! -,GH IJ  
! K+. IJ  
! B$LM$ IJ  
! BN5OPQ  
 
9R. :S"<RTU VW* W< 5XY% (Z([@\ &U12\ ]%@^% _`1) "#$%& '() $% *+, -% 
(-.&) 89-:;? 
! 1 
! 2  
! 3  
! 4  
! 5  
! 6  
! 7 
 
9a. 0%123&% P$% b>: 89-E"F,? 
 
 Q,cd "4LMe' "fg, 4%h%W 
cd 
ijk 
4,9-$$ 
P(O lh8  !  !  !  !  !  
P&$+2& !  !  !  !  !  
PDm..& !  !  !  !  !  
D<n 
PDRLRL 
!  !  !  !  !  
:+"OU 
6%oIpY% 
PDq92 
!  !  !  !  !  
PP') 
B%=(?r 
!  !  !  !  !  
P:(F_s* !  !  !  !  !  
 
 
10. f0&t-uvw$ "V*5o& 45,67& $% *+, K(1e IA&? 
! "G$ K(1e IJ 
! "D9x K(1e IJ 
! B$LM$ K(1e 48KPQ$ 
! ijk K(1e 48KPQ$ 
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11. !"!#$% &'()*% +,-./ 012 #34% 5"678% 97:);% 2( 6<: =*#> ?@%? ABC@ 
=DE 9FG#F !1 9*! 4 1=,+HIFJ (5K=2 #!#: L'=,=, &M:N% 94OP Q1 RK 
9+,7F S1LT 0=Q1 012 0=U/ 6(VSKW) 
X%Y-Z[\2 
&X%Y]6 ^[C%_C `1: \,abc( 
Fde fSc 97:);% 
&X%Y]6 OgYe Z[hi( +,-% 
 
12. !"!#$% jL% kDf# ?7l/ 5&%>F 1*44$? 
! X(#,m% !"MUF &"MGDF /), 1:n:J 
! X(#,m% !"MGDF &"MUF /), 1:n:J 
 
13. &"!#$%( kL49Vf #VB1?% 6QIF( &LFGe &:4% 9Kop@/ 5X%Y]6 L4Sq% X(#,m% 
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APPENDIX F 
ONLINE SURVEY INVITATION MESSAGE  
 
Dear Prospective Research Participant, 
My name is Téwodros Workneh, and I am a doctoral student at the Department of 
Journalism & Communication, University of Oregon. I would like to indly invite you to 
participate in my research that explores public opinion about the ownership model of the 
Ethiopian telecommunication sector and its relationship with customer satisfaction, 
governance and democracy, development, surveillance and privacy issues. You may 
participate if you are an Ethiopian national of 18-years-old and above getting landline, 
mobile or Internet services from Ethio-Telecom. 
Since your answers are to remain anonymous, PLEASE DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME 
ON THIS SURVEY. 
Your input can help me identify challenges in the delivery of services in the Ethiopian 
telecommunication sector. I estimate that it will take you approximately 15 minutes to 
complete the survey. Please answer the questions to your comfort level. Simply click on 
the link below, or cut and paste the entire URL into your browser to access the survey: 
https://oregon.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_aiadzZGJsahL0Ox 
Before you start the survey, you will be prompted to read and sign a consent form. Only 
then can you proceed to fill the survey. 
 
I would appreciate your response by November 15, 2013. 
If you would like a summary of my findings, you will be able to enter your email address 
at the end of the survey. If you have any questions or if you experience technical 
difficulties accessing or submitting the survey please contact, please email me at 
tworkneh@uoregon.edu. 
 
Sincerely, 
Tewodros W. Workneh 
Doctoral Candidate, School of Journalism and Communication 
Allen 210, 1275 University of Oregon 
Eugene, OR 97403-1275 
Email: tworkneh@uoregon.edu 
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APPENDIX G 
INTERVIEW COSENT LETTER 
 
 
Dear (Name of Interviewee): 
 
My name is Téwodros Workneh, and I am a doctoral student at the Department of 
Journalism & Communication, University of Oregon. I would like to invite you to 
participate in my research study that explores public opinion about the ownership model 
of the Ethiopian telecommunication sector and its relationship with customer satisfaction, 
governance and democracy, development, surveillance and privacy issues.  You're 
eligible to participate in this study because of you represent an organization that directly 
or indirectly involves in policy making about the telecom sector in Ethiopia. 
The purpose of this study is to explore salient issues like ownership model, infrastructure 
development and privatization discourses in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector 
presently. 
If you choose to participate, you will be answering questions with themes of: the state of 
the Ethiopian telecom sector today; challenges and prospects of the state-monopoly 
model of the sector; and the role of external funders/investors in the Ethiopian 
telecommunication sector. The interview will be conducted through phone and will take 
about 30 minutes to complete.  
 "#$%&'&(#%&)*!&)!%+&,!,%-./!0#/!)1%!23)34&%!/1-!.&$3'%5/6!2-%!&%!7&55!+35(!-,!53#$) 
identify challenges in the delivery of services in the Ethiopian telecommunication sector. 81-!0#/!,9&(!#)/!:-3,%&1),!/1-!.1);%!7#)%!%1!#),73$!#).!/1-!0#/!3).!%+3!&)%3$<&37!#%!#)/!%&03= There are no payments associated with participating in this study. 
There is no cost to you to participate in this research study.  
 
This is completely voluntary and you may say no if you do not want this information 
used in the study.  If you agree and we start talking and you decide you no longer want to 
do this, we can stop at any time. If it is okay with you, I might want to use direct quotes 
from you. If you agree, you will be identified by name in the presentations and reports 
that are going to involve this study. If you do not, the information you provided will be 
reported and presented anonymously. If you choose to participate, I will also ask you 
permission to record our conversation so that I can report your responses as accurately as 
possible.  
 
There are no anticipated risks associated with this study. There are no direct benefits to 
you either.  If you agree to be recorded, the data you provided will be stored on my 
computer. The file will be password-protected, and will only be accessible me. Interview 
records will be destroyed once the dissertation is complete and approved, approximately 
12 months from the time of the interview. As in everything digital, the risk associated 
with breach of confidentiality in this research is that of data security. The researcher 
cannot guarantee total data security in the unlikely event of data damage, interception 
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and/or corruption or virus attack. In the unlikely scenario of breach of confidentiality, no 
harm is anticipated on you.  
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and there are no foreseeable risks 
associated with it. However, if you feel uncomfortable answering any questions, you can 
withdraw from the interview at any point. It is very important for me to learn your 
opinions. If you have any questions about this study, please contact me at 
tworkneh@uoregon.edu or through my phone 541.514.2231. If you have any questions 
about your rights as a research subject, you may contact: Research Compliance Services, 
University of Oregon at (541) 346-2510 or ResearchCompliance@uoregon.edu. A copy 
of this consent form will be sent to you through email or fax upon request. 
 
Statement of Consent: 
 
Do you give consent to talk with me?  Yes________ No_________ 
 
If “Yes”: 
 
Do you give consent to be identified by name? Yes________ No_________ 
 
Do you give consent for our conversation to be recorded? Yes________ No_________ 
 
The nature and purpose of this research have been sufficiently explained and I agree to 
participate in this study.  I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time without 
incurring any penalty. 
 
Signature: _____________________________________ Date: __________________ 
 
Name (print): ________________________________________________ 
 
 
If you choose to participate please send the signed informed consent to 
tworkneh@uoregon.edu or fax through +1(541) 346-0682 
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APPENDIX H 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Debretsion Gebremichael, Minister of Communication and Information Technology 
and Deputy Prime Minister of FDRE 
 
1. What is the rationale behind the Ethiopian government’s insistence on 
maintaining state monopoly of the telecommunications sector?  
2. In the past, state officials have repeatedly expressed the telecommunications 
sector won't be liberalized in the near future. What are the conditions that need to 
be realized in order for liberalization to be considered? 
3. What are the factors that are taken into consideration for awarding multi-billion 
dollar projects to Chinese multinational corporations to undertake Ethio-
Telecom’s infrastructure development program? What are the processes through 
which the government monitors and assesses the success of the projects? 
 
 
Jan Mikkelsen, IMF Resident Representative in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
 
1. How would you assess the relationship between IMF and the Ethiopian 
government in the past few years? 
2. What are the differences between IMF and the Ethiopian government regarding 
the economic and development policies and programs of EPRDF? 
3. How does the IMF assess the increasing presence of China in the Ethiopian 
economy, particularly the telecommunications sector?  
4. What is IMF’s position on the liberalization debate of the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector?  
 
David Shinn, former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and Adjunct Professor of 
International Affairs at The George Washington University's Elliott School of 
International Affairs 
 
1. What are the premises on which Chinese-Ethiopian relations are founded on? 
How sustainable is this relation? 
2. To what extent does the growing Ethio-Chinese relation affect Ethiopia’s 
international standing with the United States?  
3. Why does the Ethiopian government single out the Chinese government and 
Chinese multinationals to be more reliable partners in executing its economic and 
development goals? 
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Josefita Pardo de León, Legal Affairs Officer, Accessions Division, World Trade 
Organization (WTO) 
 
1. The Ethiopian government is optimistic about Ethiopia’s accession to the WTO 
while maintaining its grip on state owned enterprises like the telecom sector. This 
has been particularly the case after the WTO lowered the bar for the world's least 
developed countries to join the organization by agreeing new membership 
standards. Is this optimism shared by the WTO? What are some of the concerns 
reflected, if any, by member states or other stakeholders on Ethiopia’s (imminent) 
joining of WTO? 
2. Some question the decision of the Ethiopian government to join the WTO at this 
time. They argue the country is not yet fully competitive in the global market and 
that joining WTO will cause more setbacks than advantages. Are their fears 
legitimate? Why or why not? 
3. To what extent has the Ethiopian telecom sector been a center of discussion 
between the Ethiopian government and WTO in the former’s accession 
application process? 
4. To what extent is it in WTO’s interest that the Ethiopian government withdraws 
from public enterprises that are state monopolies, particularly the telecom sector? 
Why or why not? 
5. What are the concerns expressed by the Ethiopian government in not liberalizing 
the telecom sector? Does the WTO share these concerns? Why or why not? 
6. Is there a condition agreed by the Ethiopian government and the WTO in opening 
up the telecom sector in the future? If so, what are these conditions? 
7. In an ideal condition, how would the WTO like to see the Ethiopian telecom 
sector structured in terms of ownership, investment and competition? 
 
 
Mereid Bekele, IP Next Generation Network (NGN) Project Consultant at Ethio-
Telecom 
 
1. To what extent are you satisfied with the work undertaken by ZTE that aimed at 
expanding the Ethiopian telecommunications infrastructure? 
2. To what extent are you confident about the monitoring and assessment capacities 
of Ethio-Telecom regarding the work completed by ZTE? 
3. Ethio-Telecom is widely criticized for its poor quality services. In your view, 
what are some of the major problems that cause these problems? 
4. To what extent does the state-monopoly model of the Ethiopian 
telecommunication sector impact, positively or negatively, the service delivery 
capacity of Ethio-Telecom?  
 
Woldeloul Kassa, Data and Network Design Consultant at Ethio-Telecom 
 
1. To what extent are you satisfied with the work undertaken by ZTE that aimed at 
expanding the Ethiopian telecommunications infrastructure? 
! 334 
2. To what extent are you confident about the monitoring and assessment capacities 
of Ethio-Telecom regarding the work completed by ZTE? 
3. Ethio-Telecom is widely criticized for its poor quality services. In your view, 
what are some of the major problems that cause these problems? 
4. To what extent does the state-monopoly model of the Ethiopian 
telecommunication sector impact, positively or negatively, the service delivery 
capacity of Ethio-Telecom?  
 
Me’aza Fanta, Technical Trainer, ZTE 
 
1. Can you describe the peculiar features, if any, of Chinese multinationals in 
engaging with their Ethiopian clients? 
2. In your opinion, what are the benefits and costs of working with Chinese 
multinationals in the telecommunications sector? 
3. To what extent do you agree/disagree with the opinion that Chinese 
multinationals suffer a reputation problem in the Ethiopian market? 
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APPENDIX I 
WORLD BANK OPEN DATA ACCESS E-MAIL GUIDE 
 
Case Number AI1337 : Update on your Access to Information Request 
World Bank Access to Info wbaccess@worldbank.org 
 
Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 7:38 AM 
 
Reply-To: World Bank Access to Info wbaccess@worldbank.org 
 
To: tworkneh@uoregon.edu 
 
***Please don't remove the case number from the subject line when you respond***   
 
In response to your request under AI1337, the World Bank is pleased to inform you that 
the documents you are interested in are available in the World Bank's Documents and 
Reports database. You can either browse this database or search by using the Advanced 
Search which allows you to narrow your search based on specific criteria. If you browse 
this database by selecting country "Ethiopia", you will be able to access all documents 
including project reports, economic reports, departmental working papers etc. that 
concern Ethiopia. If you would like to see, for example, the latest Economic Reports on 
Ethiopia, you would select it from the country list (you can select more than one item 
from the drop down list by holding down the control key (CTRL) as you make your 
selections). Then select Economic Report as the document type. If you are only interested 
in reports for certain years, you can specify that in the date field. You may also enter 
information such as the author's name or select a topic in addition to the document type. 
You can choose to sort the search results list according to criteria such as date or report 
type. Once you have made your selections, click on the Search button to see the results. I 
have performed several quick searchers based on the information you provided in your 
request and included the links to the results below.  
Documents and Reports database 
http://go.worldbank.org/PIOY3DVLQ0   
 
Ethiopia Economic Reports 
http://go.worldbank.org/LH7BE1NYT0   
 
Ethiopia—Information and Communication Technology Assisted Development Project 
reports 
http://go.worldbank.org/V6S52Q2KE0   
 
Ethiopia and private sector development 
http://go.worldbank.org/73PW65O5L0   
 
You may also find the sources listed below useful for your research:   
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Ethiopia Country page—provides information on the country, Bank's projects and 
programs in Ethiopia 
http://go.worldbank.org/8LJTXYW420   
 
Topic Pages – provides information by topic 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/thematic.htm   
 
Projects Database – provides information on projects and analytical and advisory services 
provided by the Bank 
http://go.worldbank.org/KPMUDAVVT0   
 
Please note that use of the documents above is subject to “The World Bank Terms and 
Conditions”, which you can access at http://www.worldbank.org/terms, and by which you 
consent to be bound through your access and/or use of the documents.    
 
Thank you. 
  
Vlada Alekankina  
Archivist/Access to Information 
 
The World Bank 
www.worldbank.org/wbaccess 
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APPENDIX J 
TRANSLATED EXCERPTS USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Excerpt in original (Amharic) English translation Page 
number in 
dissertation 
!"-#$%#&' ()*)+,- *'. 
/0123 4-5 (67758 /9:+;< 
/0123 =>?@A (6BC(D8 
E<FF /@$G-< /9:+; 
/0<H5A+ I6AC 0123,J 
)KL%J M-= N5O (6)<)< 
9IP EQ>AC I6A< #,GRS= 
9ITM'U  
 
From its very beginning, 
neolibealism hardly delivered 
growth and development but 
rather exacerbated economic 
crisis, reinforced Africa’s 
economic dependency, and 
diminished Africa’s hopes of 
industrial development and 
structural transformation. 
 
232 
!"-#$%#&' /V%W XYZ[@A 
/\M]; 0123 /$^W@A )XG_J 
'<F '< E<`a@ $AbbI 
654)= 5M6WcI ):Ad-<' 
$AbbI 654)= /3TM- 
9I@$G'U !"-#$%#&' ):Ad 
Ye ,54)B- Sf: )<S5A< 
g` AC<hC 4ii )<S5A )4/D 
/)<S5A< QDj $KC@A $kS 
95(7+@A `Gl )>`Y /3I @-U 
Wk ):Ad $)XGm ,Nn7C 
/6,5oQ @-U  
 
Because it is inconcievable for 
neolibealism to correctly identify 
the fundamental source of the 
preeminence of rent seeking 
political economy, it is impossible 
for it to correcly propose a 
remedy. What neo-liberalism has 
proposed as a remedy is to shrink 
big government to small 
government and limiting the role  
of government to principally be 
that of a law-enforcing body. This 
proposition is fundamentally 
flawed and stalemated.  
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The democarcies that neo-
liberalism carved out in Africa 
respirate with foreign caretaker 
lungs. The parties receive their 
orders from foreign caretakers; if 
they refuse assistance will stop 
and they are doomed to wither. 
The countless NGOs in these 
countries multiply rent seeking 
nets and make the politics waltz 
with foreign tunes.    
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!"-#$%#&' ()*+,- ./0%1 
$)2345 (67 /89:; )<%= 
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)XHo Qp 5:EL_ 
 
While neo-liberalism makes 
African democracy 
quintessentially non-democratic 
and one without an opportunity to 
sustainable growth by subsuming 
it into an entire external caretaker 
arrangemet, developmental states 
create an infinite opportunity for 
opportunities of development and 
advanced democracy through 
internal development and 
transformation capacities. As a 
result, neo-liberalism, beyond 
merely declaring democracy can 
be created in poor countries, 
projects a catastrophic, deadlocked 
path of democratic system 
building that falls miserbly short 
even when compared to states that 
started as anti-democratic.  
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From the begining our party has 
relied on the support of the people 
and never on external assistance, 
thus following a fundamentally 
different direction from that of 
neo-liberalism. Today it is 
carrying out its developmental and 
democratic objectives successfuly. 
Even when its adherance to a 
different course resulted in cuts in 
assistance and loans or when it 
receives aid that is less than half 
what other African countries get 
individually on average, it is 
marching suceessfully determined 
with the course it paved. Inspite of 
the relentless campaign of radical 
neo-liberals from all directions, it 
[EPRDF] has prevailed resisting 
such offensive. 
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When a private investor engage in 
any kind of sector motive is get 
profit from every dollar it spends; 
249 
! 339 
!"#$% &'(!) *%+ ,-. -. 
/0+1 23. &04! 56 728) 
09:';1< "=/> 7*$5 
?5>%@A ,BC9A D)E 3F 
/?5>%@G !>"H1< &2( 
?C0;IJ "%KA 3L> M<# NOP 
QARS7TU ,A<<V /0";1. 
59W1 7!) QARS7TP XPY 
/?5>%@G 09:' Z<[\< 
/"#$% /"#$% ?2" ]Y ?^W 
_`# &'1> ?3\<PE ,B\aP 
D) ,^b ?5W1 &cdePfghV< 
?5>%@A ,B<%CA ijjY CY \k 
!NOP l] Z<[m$C &'*$5). 
ZnF *$o 23 /*$p ,q2 &%> 
r!s^t1 Z<[5^,A &'*$5)E 
B<%CA 3F< ?2" 3u &v?AwxDA 
BYF< y3z$Y ^b AY{ 
!'5|r8) A>>} /0+1. &04! 
56;1 228) p;1 ?5>%@G< 
Z&p9 /nF ,'5K) AY{ 
?5>%@G< ,?5~G ,+2 !"m$C 
312>E &%> r!s^t 3F<< Ä2" 
_7wPÅ ?31OPE 
 
and it should. In order to do this, 
the easy way is to provide a 
service that is surrounded by 
major cities and customers that 
have a relatively higher income. 
This arrangement cannot deliver a 
telecom service that plays a 
superior role in our development 
agenda by reaching out to all 
Ethiopians including those in 
small cities and rural areas. This is 
why telecommunincations services 
in many countries are kept under 
state control with the aim of 
achiving universal access, during 
which the private sector can be 
involved. The state can uphold this 
objective without being 
counterproductive to the principle 
of profitability by operating in big 
cities and providing services to 
customers with a higher income so 
as to use the profit it collects here 
in order to expand its services all 
over the country. Private investors 
cannot advance this cause 
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